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Abstract
The thesis examines how  the Russian arm y interpreted and  w hat lessons it learned from the 
w ars in Europe betw een 1859 and 1871 and the Am erican Civil War. This w as a tim e m arked 
by  rap id  change - political, social, economic and technological.
By raising the question of learning from foreign w ars the thesis attem pts to fill a gap in the 
h istoriography of the Russian army. The arm y was one of the pillars on w hich the Russian re­
gim e bu ilt its power, and it was crucial for the survival of the regime both  in dom estic and 
foreign affairs. The reactions and thinking of the m ilitary at a tim e of rap id  social, political, 
economic, and  technological change, therefore, tell a lot about the regim e's ability to adjust, 
develop, and  ultim ately survive.
Furtherm ore, the influence of foreign w ars on Russian strategic w ar p lanning is analysed 
w ith  the use of the first Russian w ar p lan  of 1873 and  the proceedings from the strategic con­
ference, chaired by A lexander II, in 1873. The influence of foreign w ars on the G eneral Staff 
officer education is also investigated.
The thesis is largely based on extensive research in Russian archives. Special attention is giv­
en to the m ilitary attaches and, thus, the thesis fills a gap in the historiography of the Russian 
army. It uncovers the developm ent of the m ilitary attache institution w ith  the use of new  ar­
chival m aterial. The Russian m ilitary attache reports from  the European G reat Pow ers 1859- 
71 and  the observer reports from the different w ar scenes are also examined. In addition, ex­
tensive use has been m ade of the m ilitary press and contem porary m ilitary literature w ith  re­
gard  to the wars.
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Introduction
Aim
W hen the historian John Keep described the in troduction of universal m ilitary service in  Rus­
sia, he w rote that "Sedan was alm ost a second Sevastopol for the Russian m ilitary establish­
m ent'.1 This was one of the starting points for this thesis. If a foreign war, the Franco-Prussian 
War to be specific, m ade such an im pression, how  were other foreign w ars in terpreted  and  
w hat other lessons were learned from them? The purpose here is to examine how  the Russian 
arm y interpreted the European w ars betw een 1859 and  1871; that is, the w ar of A ustria w ith  
France and Piedm ont 1859, the G erm an wars of unification (the Danish War 1864, the A ustro- 
P russian War 1866, and the Franco-Prussian W ar 1870-71), and the A m erican Civil War. The 
period is characterized by rap id  change: political, economic, and  technological. Therefore, it 
is an appropriate period for exam ining the attitude tow ards change. A num ber of technical 
innovations -  rifled w eapons, railways, the electric telegraph -  were introduced, and  they  af­
fected the w ay wars were fought and armies w ere trained. Large standing arm ies grew  sm all­
er as the use of reserves and the introduction of universal conscription spread  across Europe 
after the Prussian example. At the sam e time, nationalism  gained in strength as G erm any and  
Italy becam e unified nation states. The A ustrian  Em pire w as shaken to its foundations and, in 
1867, the A ustro-H ungarian dual-m onarchy w as created. In a m ere tw elve years, France had  
lost its position as the leading m ilitary pow er in  Europe to Prussia. H ow  d id  the arm y of the 
Russian Em pire perceive and interpret all of these changes?
1' Keep, John L. H. Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985): 376.
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The use of rifles, w hich m ade it possible to shoot w ith m ore speed and  accuracy than w ith  the 
old m uskets, raised questions about tactics and education of bo th  soldiers and  officers. The 
use of railways, w hich m ade speed a crucial factor in mobilization, led  to higher dem ands on 
advance w ar planning. The planning, in turn, required know ledge about the potential enem y; 
thus, the dem ands on m ilitary intelligence increased. The new  m ilitary technology, w hile im ­
portant, was only one aspect of change and  -  although expensive -  w as no t the m ost difficult 
issue. Technology, after all, could be bought from abroad or copied at hom e.2 The creation of a 
large reserve force that could be called u p  in the case of w ar required  educated soldiers and  
officers w ho could train  civilians in a relatively short period of time. Consequently, the ques­
tions of m ilitary education, organization, and advance w ar p lanning (involving strategy, 
transportation, and  supply) posed a greater challenge to the Russian army.
To w hat degree w as the arm y aware of and concerned w ith these questions? The Russian 
arm y m akes an interesting case to study since the conventional view  of arm ies in  general and, 
perhaps, the Russian in  particular is that the armies are bastions of conservatism , unw illing  to 
respond to any change. It should be underlined that the object of this s tudy  is, largely, a 
peacetim e army, and  it excludes the conquest of the Caucasus that ended  in 1864, and  the 
suppression of the Polish rebellion in 1863. Some m ay argue that the lessons d raw n  from  for­
eign w ars can never be as instructive as those learned from  one's ow n wars. N evertheless, 
one of the consequences of the wars of 1859-71, w ith  larger armies and  shorter m obilization 
times, w as that advanced w ar planning became increasingly im portant. It w as no  coincidence 
that General Staff officers studied m ilitary history in dep th  to seek ou t the tru ths of warfare. 
D uring this period, the study  of m ilitary history becam e an increasingly im portan t subject at 
w ar academies in Europe.3 The Russian m ilitary historian, N. P. Glinoetskii, w as acutely 
aw are of this and  w rote in the m ilitary journal Voennyi sbomik:
It is often said that war is the best school to gain military experience for the training of 
the army. This view -  entirely correct in the past when the wars were protracted and 
lasted for months, even years -  has completely lost its validity in our times, when put­
ting the army on a war footing and the very conduct of military operations happen very 
quickly, at a speed incomprehensible in the past. ...In our days, war is rather the exami­
nation or the tes t... the lessons of wars only become tangible for others, for those who 
do not take part in the war; that is, the lessons are gained through the study of great 
wars.4
2' Pintner, Walter. 'Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov', in Mak­
ers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by P. Paret. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986): 360.
3‘ Bucholz, Arden. Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning. (New York: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1991): 
55-56.
4‘ 'Inostrannoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (7,1871): 57-58.
8
The purpose of this study is straightforw ard: to examine w hat lessons the Russian arm y 
learned from  the w ars in Europe betw een 1859 and 1871 and  the A m erican Civil War. For this 
purpose, four different areas of the arm y have been chosen:
1. the m ilitary attaches and  observers, w ho were physically close to the w ar scenes and 
provided  first-hand inform ation to the War Ministry;
2. the m ilitary press an d  other m ilitary writings, to examine how  the foreign w ars were 
perceived by Russian m ilitary thinkers, and to w hat degree the lessons of the w ars 
were discussed in public;
3. the curriculum  of the Nicholas A cadem y of the General Staff, a vital institu tion in  ed­
ucating new  generations of staff officers;
4. the first Russian w ar p lan  of 1873, to trace the thoughts behind  it, and  to dem onstrate 
how  the p lan  was influenced by  foreign wars.
Each of these parts is central to any analysis that attem pts to understand  how  receptive the 
arm y w as to change. And, together, they provide a good picture of the level of aw areness of 
the changes w ith in  the army.
By paying special attention to the m ilitary attaches the thesis fills a gap in  the h istoriography 
of the Russian army.5 In scholarship, the Russian m ilitary attaches have stood in  the shadow  
of their European -  above all G erm an -  colleagues.6 This thesis takes a step to  rectify this sit­
uation, using new  archival m aterial to expose and exam ine the m ilitary attache institu tion  in 
Russia. Futherm ore, the thesis attem pts to answ er the question of w hat role the attaches and  
their reports played in  the early days of Russian w ar p lanning during  the period  of 1859-73.
One lesson of the Prussian victories in 1866 and 1870-71, w idely recognized by  historians, 
w as the introduction of universal conscription in Russia in  1874. This is valid  only u p  to a 
point. As will become evident from  this thesis, the need to m ake the standing arm y sm aller 
and  to create a large reserve force w as a lesson learned previously in  the C rim ean War. H ow ­
ever, universal conscription was not introduced in Russia until 1874 and then  the dom estic 
political debate, w hich eventually broke dow n all resistance, used  the Prussian exam ple as its 
key argum ent.
5- Fuller treats the period 1905-1914 in Fuller, William C. Jr. 'The Russian Empire', in Knowing One's Ene­
mies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars, edited by E. May. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1984): 98-126.
6‘ Craig, Gordon A. 'Military Diplomats in the Prussian and German Service: the Attaches, 1816-1914', 
Political Science Quarterly 64 (1,1949): 65-94; Lambsdorff, Gustav von. Die Militdrbevollmdchtigten Kaiser 
Wilhelms II. am Zarenhofe 1904-1914. (Berlin: Schliffen Verlag, 1937); Meisner, Hans Otto. Militdrattaches 
und Militdrbevollmdchtigte in Preuflen und im Deutschen Reich. (Berlin: Riitten und Loening, 1957); Vagts, 
Alfred. The Military Attache. (Princeton, N.J., 1967).
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The thesis m akes an attem pt to differentiate the view  of w hat the Russian arm y learned from  
foreign wars and  to dem onstrate that the m ilitary debate and the dom estic political debate 
were closely connected. The lessons from  foreign w ars no t only had  m ilitary im plications b u t 
p u t the entire m ilitary system  under pressure by calling its fundam ental values into question. 
The lessons were no t only observed and debated bu t directly influenced the education of the 
General Staff officers and the first Russian w ar p lan  of 1873.
By raising the question of learning from foreign w ars, the thesis attem pts to fill a gap in  the 
historiography of the Russian army. From this vantage point, it is possible to contribute to ou r 
know ledge of the intellectual climate and strategic thinking of the army, and  shed light on the 
question of the arm y's attitude tow ards change. The arm y w as one of the pillars on w hich the 
Russian regime bu ilt its power, and  it w as crucial for the survival of the regim e both  at hom e 
and  abroad. Therefore, the reactions and thinking of the arm y during  times of rap id  social, 
political, and economic change tell us a lot about the regim e's ability to adjust, develop, and  
ultim ately survive.
Sources
A diplom atic historian once noted that 'all sources are suspect', w hen he w anted  to illustrate 
the difficulties in  using both published and unpublished diplomatic m aterial.7 The published 
m aterial could be tendentious and  the archival m aterial incomplete. These problem s are 
know n to every historian, and this one is not an exception. Nevertheless, this s tudy  m akes ex­
tensive use of bo th  published sources and archival material, some of w hich has been used  for 
the first time. A few w ords need to be said about the prim ary  sources.
The m ain body of archival m aterial, used in this study, is found in the Russian State M ilitary 
H istory Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv, hereafter RGVIA) in 
M oscow and includes docum ents related to the developm ent of the m ilitary attache-institu- 
tion of the Russian arm y (which have no t been used previously to describe this develop­
m ent), the reports from the m ilitary attaches in  Berlin, Paris, Vienna, London and  Florence 
betw een 1859 and 1872, the records of the M ilitary Scientific Com m ittee 1863-76, and  the pro­
ceedings from the strategic conference in 1873 (which contain the first Russian w ar plan).8 
The m aterial regarding this conference is exam ined in C hapter 5 and, for the first time since 
the Soviet historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii used it in his book about the m ilitary reform s in 
1952, it is used here in its entirety.9
7‘ Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954): 
569.
8‘ See the Bibliography for a complete list of all the archival fondy (collections) used in this thesis.
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W orking in the M ilitary H istory Archive is a rew arding experience, p rov ided  one is equipped  
w ith  a great deal of persistence and  patience. M aterial regarding the m ilitary  attaches can be 
pieced together from a num ber of different fondy  (collections). Due to the reform s in  the 
1860s, old institutions were abolished and  new  created -  a developm ent th a t can be followed 
in the archive. This partially explains w hy seemingly related m aterial can be  found  in several 
different fondy. One practice -  as unfortunate as it is frustrating -  w as the hab it of rem oving 
m aterial from files, sometimes leaving a small note stating w hich docum ents have been taken 
out. Even m ore unfortunate for this study, however, was the m issing m aterial that 'o u g h t' to 
have been there. This is the case w ith  the reports relating to the Am erican C ivil War. Even 
though it is clear, as w e shall see in  C hapter 3, that there w ere at least tw o R ussian officers in 
America during  that war, RGVIA seem ed only to contain a four page copy of one report from  
1861. Consequently, I have relied prim arily  on published m aterial for the in terpretations of 
the Am erican Civil Wa whereas, in the case of the European wars, bo th  archival an d  p u b ­
lished sources have been used.
A few w ords need to be said about the m ost im portant collections of RGVIA used  in  this the­
sis. M aterial regarding the developm ent of the m ilitary attache as an  institu tion w as found  in 
fond 29 (Chancellery of the War M inistry), fond 38 (D epartm ent of the G eneral Staff), fond 
410 (M aterial about the H istory of the People of the USSR), fond 413 (M aterial Relating to  the 
Theory of M ilitary Science and M ilitary Economy), and  fond VUA (M ilitary Scientific Ar­
chive). The reports from the m ilitary attaches w ere concentrated in  the collections of the Mili­
tary Scientific Archive, not to be confused w ith the separate VUA-fond, and  the reports were 
d ivided according to country: 428 (Austria-Hungary), 453 (America), 431 (Great Britain), 432 
(Germany), 435 (Denmark), 437 (Italy), 440 (France) an d  488 (Foreign Wars). It should  be not­
ed  that the special fond of the M ilitary Scientific Archive, fond 846, only contained m ilitary 
attache reports from 1876 onw ards. The lists of the m ilitary attaches were located in  fond 38 
and 401 (Military Scientific Committee), and  the latter also contained the journals of the Mili­
tary Scientific Committee. Fond 401 w as also the source of the m aterial relating to the strate­
gic conference in 1873. In addition, fond 868 (Main Com m ittee on the O rganization and 
Education of Troops) proved to contain some useful reports from  England and  France, as well 
as the reports on tactics from  1873-75, w ritten  by  the observer to the Franco-Prussian war, L. 
L. Zeddeler. Fond 544 (the Nicholas Academ y of the G eneral Staff) contained m aterial regard­
ing sending General Staff officers abroad and  other docum ents about the life at the Academy. 
M issing, however, are copies of contem porary lectures held  at the A cadem y about the w ars in 
1859-71. This is not so serious for the European w ars since a lot of m aterial regarding these
9' Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Uni- 
versiteta, 1952): 280-304.
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wars was published. However, exactly what A. E Stankevich, Professor of Military History, 
said in his lectures about the American Civil War that began in 1867 remains a secret.
Neither the fondy of the Artillery Administration, 503 and 504, nor the fondy  of the Main En­
gineering Administration, 802 and 803, seemed to contain any reports from the military at­
taches or observers. However, fond 506 (The Technical Part of the Main Artillery 
Administration) held copies of Artillery Captain K. G. Doppelm aier's reports from the Fran­
co-Prussian War.
The m ilitary attache reports from Berlin, Paris, Vienna, London, and Florence between 1859 
and 1872 require some qualification as a historical source. First, how complete is the material? 
It seems that a surprisingly large lummmk of the reports has survived in the archives. Never­
theless, some material is conspicuously missing. One example is the reports from Count Va- 
silii Pavlovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, the military plenipotentiary in Berlin 1866-73. The 
actual material he sent can be found in RGVIA, fond 432, but this does not include his reports 
- or letters - to the Tsar. Only a handful of these letters are located in the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, hereafter GARF), fond 678 
(Alexander II). The material sent by his predecessor, Count N. V. Adlerberg, is also located in 
the RGVIA, fond 432, but there were no traces of Adlerberg's reports to Alexander II.
A nother example of missing material is the reports by L. L. Zeddeler from the theatre of war 
in 1870-71. According to Zeddeler himself, he wrote thirty-two extensive reports. A note in 
the archive of the Military Scientific Committee listed eleven different titles of Zeddeler's 
writings from the war.10 He published five of them in the military new spaper Russkii invalid, 
and two copies of the reports (about the Prussian military organization and tactical and stra­
tegic preparations including the military education of officers) can be found in Grand Duke 
Konstantin's fond in GARF. A note by the War Minister, D. A. Miliutin, gave Zeddeler per­
mission to take his reports out of the archive after the war, and it is doubtful that Zeddeler 
ever returned them.11 Twenty five years later, he wrote in his memoirs that he no longer had 
the strength to prepare the thirty-two reports for publication.
A nother observation about the attache reports is that they vary a great deal in quality. Some 
of them  are very good, full of details, and the author's own thoughts about developments; 
others consist of new spaper clippings and do not contain a single line of comment.13 In gen­
10’ Zeddeler, L.L. 'Dvadtsat' piat' let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii vestnik (4,1896): 115. 
RGVIA, 1871, F. 401, op. 2, d. 64, f. 13. 'About the Entry of Officers Into the Service Record, Officers Sent 
to the Theatre of War During the Franco-German War and Taking Part in Military Operations'. 1871.
11 RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1328, ff. 1-2. 'About Information From the Military Attaches During the Franco-
Prussian War'.
12- Zeddler, 'Dvadtsat' piat' let': 115.
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eral, the m aterial from the m ilitary attaches that has survived the archives reveals a great deal 
about w ha t kind of inform ation the War M inistry received from abroad, w hat the attaches 
tasks were, and  so on. However, w hen it comes to analyses of the different developm ents the 
m aterial varies a lot, depending sim ply on w hat has survived and  w ho w rote it.
Tracing the biographies of the individual attaches was not easy, and the archive proved  less 
helpful. The appropriate fond in RGVIA, fond 409, w hich holds m any service records, unfor­
tunately  d id  no t contain any for the attaches. Instead, a few w ere found in fond 1 (Chancel­
lery of the War M inistry), and  on occasion in other fondy. W ith the help of published m aterial, 
how ever, it w as possible to get an  alm ost complete picture.14
The Foreign Policy Archive (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskii Imperii, hereafter AVPRI) keeps 
the reports from  heads of missions. As an  exception, an occasional report from  a m ilitary ob­
server show ed up , as, for instance, the copy of the report by  Colonel Rom anov from  N orth  
Am erica in 1861. The Foreign M inistry functioned as the m ail distributor betw een the War 
M inistry and  the m ilitary attaches stationed abroad, bu t it does no t seem that the Foreign 
M inistry w as a regular reader of m ilitary reports.
A nother significant source for this study was the fond of D. A. M iliutin (fond 169) in  the M an­
uscrip t D epartm ent of the Russian State Library (Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Otdel 
rukopisi, hereafter RGB OR). M iliutin, War M inister betw een 1861 and  1881, w as blessed w ith 
a long life an d  good health  and he spent m uch of his retirem ent w riting his m em oirs and  or­
ganizing his archive. W hen he died in 1912, he left an  extremely rich source, containing no t 
only his m em oirs, diaries, and  letters, b u t also significant num bers of docum ents from  his 
w hole w orking life, m ost im portantly  m em oranda and notes related to different aspects of 
the m ilitary reforms. Furtherm ore, several docum ents from the strategic conference in  1873 
can be found here. Extensive use has been m ade of M iliutin 's m em oirs w ritten  betw een 1883 
and  1892. They are based on docum ents and often contain substantial quotes from  letters and 
reports. Each year contains a large section devoted to  the activities of the War M inistry, based  
on the yearly reports of the War M inistry to the Tsar. A complete set of these reports (vsepod- 
danneishii doklad) from 1862 until 1900 is also located in the fond. N o doubt, the holdings of
13- A personal conversation with the historian Oleg Airapetov at the Moscow State University, who has 
written a biography about N. N. Obruchev, revealed that some of the attach^ reports were presumably 
lost during the Civil War 1918-21. I have not been able to verify this or whether it applies to material 
from the 1860s, but it might explain some of the gaps in the material.
14‘ Some of the most helpful sources were Spisokgeneral'nogo shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografi- 
ia, 1875); Glinoetskii, N. P. Istoricheskii ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General’nogo shtaba. (St. Petersburg: 
Shtab voisk gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga, 1882); Ikonnikov, N. La Noblesse de Russie. 2nd 
ed. vols. A1-Z2 . (Paris, 1958-66); Miloradovich, G. A. Spisok lits Svity Ikh Velichestv s tsarstvovaniia Imper- 
atora Petra I-go po 1886 g. (Kiev: S.V. Kul'zhenko, 1886).
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the fond reflect the history as M iliutin saw it.15Still, the collections rem ain an  im portant 
source of inform ation.
A t least some of M iliutin 's accounts of events can be com pared w ith  the diaries of G rand 
D uke K onstantin Nikolaevich, held in  the collections of GARF. The diaries are located in  the 
personal fond of Konstantin Nikolaevich, the M arble Palace, fond 722. H e kep t diaries from  
the age of nine, 1836, until 1889, three years before he died. In addition, the personal fond of 
A lexander II, in GARF, harbours the diaries of A lexander II, b u t unfortunately  they w ere in­
accessible due to restoration work, w hen I was in Moscow.
A lthough relying heavily on archival sources, this thesis is not m arked by  a ju reur de Vinedit. 
In answ ering the question of the arm y's interpretation of the w ars of 1859-71, it w ould be in- 
sufficent to rely exclusively on the archives. The archival m aterial tells the tru th  b u t no t the 
w hole truth. Therefore, contem porary published material, nam ely the m ilitary  press and  the 
m ilitary literature from this period, has been examined. The m ilitary press -  the new spaper 
Russkii invalid, and the journals Voennyi sbomik, Artilleriiskii zhum al, Inzhenem yi zhum al, 
Oruzheinyi sbomik, andPedagogicheskii sbomik -  contain a som etimes lively debate about the 
changes in  warfare. The regular colum n in Voennyi sbomik, Foreign M ilitary Review, contains 
a w ealth  of inform ation useful for this study. In general, Russkii invalid and  Voennyi sbom ik  
played an  im portan t role in shaping and reflecting m ilitary attitudes of the Russian army. The 
m ilitary press proved to be a rich source, sometimes overlooked in the h istoriography of the 
Russian army. In addition, a num ber of p rin ted  m emoirs and diaries have been used.
Historiography
The Russian Im perial A rm y's defeats in  the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 and  the First World 
War low ered its status in the eyes of both former officers and  scholars. A  num ber of em igre 
officers h ad  m uch to criticize the arm y for w hen they sought an explanation to  the subse­
quent events of revolution and civil war.16 This negative im age of the Im perial A rm y w as 
echoed by  Soviet historiography, which w as interested in discrediting the Im perial regime 
and  depicting the revolution as inevitable according to M arxist laws of evolution.
For a long time, Western scholars -  w ith  a few notable exceptions17 -  w ere only m arginally 
interested in  the Russian army. However, over the years, particularly  in recent times, bo th  So­
v ie t/R ussian  and Western scholarship has produced a num ber of valuable studies, w ithout 
w hich this thesis w ould not have reached its current scope.
15‘ For instance, he destroyed the letters to his father.
16, Denikin, A. I. Staraia armiia. 2 vols. (Paris: Rodnik, 1929,1931); Kersnovskii, A.A. Istoriia russkoi armii.
4 vols. (Reprint ed. Moscow: Golos, 1992-94); Sukhomlinov, V. A. Vospominaniia. (Berlin, 1924).
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The m ilitary reforms under D. A. M iliutin have been thoroughly described by P. A. Zaionch- 
kovskii.18 L. G. Beskrovnyi, another Soviet specialist on the Russian army, com piled a lot of 
facts -  b u t n o t always in a consistent manner, w hich som etimes m ake the m aterial difficult to 
use.19 There is no  com plete biography on D. A. M iliutin, b u t his early career is covered by  
Brooks,20 and  Zaionchkovskii wrote a useful - although short - biographical essay as an  in tro­
duction  to M iliutin 's diaries 21M iller's book is m ore about the reform s than  M iliutin.22 Pre­
revolutionary  Russian m ilitary history is largely hagiographic, b u t w orks by  N. P. G linoet- 
skii23 and  M. Bogdanovich contain m any facts that m ake them  useful for references.24 A nd
17■ The most important are Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling. From Serf to Russian 
Soldier. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), both of whom write mainly from the perspec­
tive of the soldier. Beyrau in his valuable study investigates the army's position within the Russian aut- 
cracy. Beyrau, Dietrich. Militar und Gesellschaft im Vorrevolutionaren Russland. (Koln: Bohlau Verlag, 
1984).The Russian officer corps has been treated in several studies: Kenez, Peter. 'A Profile of the Prerev­
olutionary Officer Corps', California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-158; Bushnell, John. 'The Tsarist Officer 
Corps 1881-1914', American Historical Review 86 (3,1981): 753-80; Mayzel, Matitiahu. 'The Formation of 
the Russian General Staff 1880-1917, A Social Study', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique XVI (3-4,1975): 
297-321; Mayzel, Matitiahu. Generals and Revolutionaries: The Russian General Staff During the Revolution: 
A  Study in the Transformation of Military Elite. (Osnabriick: Biblio Verlag, 1979); Stein, Hans-Peter. 'Der 
Offizer der russischen Heeres im Zeitabschnitt zwischen Reform und Revolution', Forschungen zur os- 
teuropaischen Geschichte 13 (1967): 346-507; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe 
XIX-XX stoletii, 1881-1903. (Moscow: Mysl', 1973): 168-248. A recent study treats the higher military ed­
ucation in Russia, Mashkin, N. A. Vysshaia voennaia shkola Rossiiskoi imperii XlX-nachala X X  veka. (Mos­
cow: Akademiia, 1997).On officer education and the Russian army in Finland, see Luntinen, Pertti. The 
Imperial Russian Army and Navy in Finland 1808-1918, Studia Historica 56. (Helsinki: Societas Historica 
Finlandiae, 1997); Screen, J. E. O. 'The Entry of Finnish Officers into Russian Military Service'. Ph.D, 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, London, 1976; Screen, J. E. O. The 
Helsinki Yunker School 1846-1879: A Case Study of Officer Training in the Russian Army, Studia Historica 22. 
(Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1986). The role of the army in the turbulent years of revolution­
ary events has been treated in Bushnell, John. Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 
1905-06. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Wildman, Allan K. The End of the Russian Imperi­
al Army: the Old Army and the Soldier's Revolt (March-April 1917). (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1980). The army during the Crimean War and under the regin of Nicholas I was the topic of J. S. 
Curtiss. See his The Russian Army under Nicholas 1,1825-55. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965) 
and Russia's Crimean War. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979).
18- Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy. This book remains the standard work on the military reforms. In 
English, the military reforms are treated by Miller, Forrestt A. Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Rus­
sia. (Charlotte, North Carolina: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). The introduction of universal mili­
tary service has been examined by Baumann, Robert Fred. 'The Debates over Universal Military Service 
in Russia 1870-74'. Ph.D, Yale University, 1982. Civil-military relations in pre-revolutionary Russia has 
been the topic of Beyrau, Dietrich. Militar und Gesellschaft im Vorrevolutionaren Russland. Beitrage zur Ge­
schichte Osteuropas. Bd 15. (Koln: Bohlau Verlag, 1984) and Fuller, William. Civil-Military Conflict in Im­
perial Russia 1881-1914. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
19- Beskrovnyi, L. G. Russkaia armiia iflot v XIX veke.Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1973). His Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu voennoi istorii Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii 
nauk SSSR, 1957) is a good starting point for Russian military historical source material.
20, Brooks, Edwin Willis. 'D.A. Miliutin: Life and Activity to 1856'. Ph.D, Stanford University, 1970.
21‘ Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk', in Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 4 vols. (Mos­
cow: Gosudarstvennaia ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina. Otdel rukopisei., 1947-50), 
vol. 1: 5-72.
22- Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin.
23‘ Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk-, Glinoetskii, N. P. Istoriia russkogo general’nogo shtaba. 2 vols. (St. Pe­
tersburg: Shtab voisk gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga, Voennaia tipografiia, 1883,1894).
24- Bogdanovich, M. Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel’nosti voennogo upravleniia v Rossii v pervoe dvadtsati-piatiletie 
blagopoluchnogo tsarstvovaniia Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra Nikolaevicha (1855-1880 gg). 6 vols. (St. Pe­
tersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1879-1881). A classical pro-reform account of the reform era, including intro­
duction of universal conscription, was written by Dzhanshiev, G. Epokha velikikh reform. (St. Petersburg, 
1907).
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the official history  of the War M inistry Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902 contains some 
im portan t docum ents; m ost im portant is M iliutin 's first report to A lexander II, outlining the 
entire reform  program .25
Russian m ilitary theory has been a subject of several scholarly w orks, bo th  Soviet and  West­
ern.26 Com m on to these works - despite the differences in outlook - is that m ilitary theory  has 
been treated  in isolation, as largely an intellectual practice, w ith  little or no concern for strate­
gic factors. However, several recent studies have highlighted the im portance of strategy in 
Russian w ar planning.27 Inspired by  the relatively easy access to new ly opened archives, 
these scholars explore not only w hat the Russian General Staff thought, b u t also try  to explain 
w hy  it thought the w ay it did. However, they are largely silent on the issue of the in terpreta­
tions of foreign wars.
I have relied on the secondary literature only up  to a point. W hen it proved insufficient, I 
tu rned  to the original sources to dig out additional information. If others h ad  m ined the ar­
chives before m e on an issue related to the set of problem s exam ined here, I searched the doc­
um ents to see if som ething w as m issing in earlier interpretatations.
The G erm an historian, Leopold von Ranke, once rem arked that an  h istorian  has tw o choices: 
either to convey new  m aterial or to write about an  old problem  from  a new  angle.28This study  
set ou t to achieve the second alternative and, in the process new  m aterial is presented.
C hapter 1 is devoted to m ilitary developm ents during  the period 1859-1871. It briefly outlines 
the international context of the European wars and  describes som e of the pressing issues re­
garding changes in warfare that all European arm ies faced. C hapter 2 describes the state of
25• Skalon, D. A., ed. Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902.13 vols. (St. Petersburg: P.F. Panteleev, 
1902-1914): vol. 1. Appendix 11.
26‘ Beskrovnyi, L. G. Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973); Erickson, John. The Russian 
Imperial/Soviet General Staff. The College Station Papers. (College Station, TX: The Center for Strategic 
Technology, 1981); Meshcheriakov, G. P. Russkaia voennaia mysl' v XlX-om veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973); 
Steinberg, John W. 'The Education and Training of the Russian General Staff: A History of the Imperial 
Nicholas Military Academy 1832-1914'. Ph.D, Ohio State University, 1990; Wahlde, Peter von. 'Military 
Thought in Imperial Russia'. Ph.D, Indiana University, 1966. van Etyke, Carl. Russian Imperial Military 
Doctrine and Education 1832-1914. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); Zhilin, P. A. Russkaia voennaia 
mysl' konets XlX-nachalo X X  v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982).
27‘ Fuller, William C., Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free Press, 1992); Menning, 
Bruce W. Bayonets before Bullets. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Rich, David. 'Imperial­
ism, Reform and Strategy: Russian Military Statistics, 1840-1880', The Slavonic and East European Review 
74 (4,1996): 621-639; Rich, David. 'The Tsar's Colonels: Military Professionals and the Remaking of Rus­
sian Strategy, Foreign Policy, and Autocracy, 1840-1895', Manuscript, 1997, due to be published in 1998, 
based on his dissertation. See Rich, David A. 'The Professionalization of Russia's General Staff 1870- 
1895: Ideas, Strategy, and Foreign Policy'. Ph.D, Georgetown University, 1993. In exploring the career of 
N. N. Obruchev, O. R. Airapetov also touches on this question. Airapetov, Oleg Rudol'fovich. 'N. N. 
Obruchev. Zabytaia kar’era "russkogo Mol'tke"', Manuscript, 1996. While waiting for the manuscript to 
find a publisher with enough money, see the brief article O. R. Airapetov. 'Nikolai Nikolaevich 
Obruchev', Voprosy istorii (7,1996): 49-69.
28, Ranke, Leopold. Englische Geschichte vomehmlich im sechszehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert. 7 vols. 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1859-68): Vol. 1: xvi.
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the Russian arm y after the Crim ean War. The m ilitary reforms - including the changes in the 
m ilitary educational system, the rise of the General Staff, and  the introduction of universal 
m ilitary service - are outlined. Chapter 3 treats the developm ent of the m ilitary attaches in 
Russia. C hapter 4 analyses the interpretation of foreign w ars by  both the attaches, observers, 
and  other m ilitary thinkers, and examines how  foreign w ars affected the Nicholas Academ y 
of the General Staff. C hapter 5 examines the Russian w ar p lan  of 1873 - treated at a special 
conference under the chairm anship of A lexander II - and dem onstrates the influence of for­
eign w ars on Russian w ar planning.
Transliteration
Transliteration follows a m odified version of the system  of Library of Congress. In som e cas­
es, m ost notably surnam es of foreign origin, I have chosen their original form; for instance, 
W ittgenstein ra ther than Vitgenshtein. Archival references follow the Slavonic and East Europe­
an Review  style of using folio and verso instead of listy. Unless otherw ise indicated, dates are 
in the Julian calendar, used in the Russian Empire, w hich w as twelve days behind the Grego­
rian  calendar in  the nineteenth century.
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1 The Nation in Arms - Military
Development 1859-1871
1.1 From Peace to War in Europe
The Crim ean War of 1854-56 broke a forty year long period  of relative peace in  Europe. The 
w ar w as only the first in  a series of w ars that w ould  transform  no t only the m ap  of Europe 
b u t also the armies and, consequently, the societies that fought them .1 The traditional, stand­
ing professional arm y w as replaced by mass forces, citizen arm ies recruited by  conscription. 
A t the time of the Crim ean w ar none of the European pow ers, except Prussia, h ad  a recruiting 
system  based on universal conscription. After the Franco-Prussian w ar in 1870-71, conscrip­
tion w as the dom inating recruiting system  in Europe. This w as the period w hen  the m odem , 
industrialized nation states took shape, while nationalism  and  dem ands for liberalism  in  the 
political sphere both  grew. In science, positivism  w as the current trend. Charles D arw in p u b ­
lished The Origin o f Species (1859) and the first volum e of Das Kapital appeared  in  1867. In the 
arts, realism gained pow er over romanticism. In Russia, Dostoevsky w rote Crime and Punish­
m ent (1866) and Tolstoy com pleted War and Peace (1865-1869).
The most concise book on this topic is written by Howard, Michael. War in European History. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976). I found Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1550 to 2000. (London: Fontana Press, 1988), especially Chapter 4, use­
ful as a general introduction to the period. See also Pearton, Maurice. The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, 
War and Technology since 1830. (London: Burnett Books, 1982): Chapters 3 and 4. The diplomatic story is 
told by Taylor, A. J. P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1954), Chapters 5 through 10. See also Holsti, Kaveli J. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International 
Order 1648-1989. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Mosse, W. E. The European Powers and 
the German Question 1848-1871. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); and Mosse, W. E. Liber­
al Europe: The Age of Bourgeois Realism 1848-1875. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974).
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O n the European political scene, Russia turned to domestic political reform , in  the fam ous 
phrase of Foreign M inister A. M. Gorchakov: La Russie ne boude pas, mais se recueille. Plans to 
form  an  alliance w ith  France, the form er enemy, came to a halt w hen France sided  w ith  the 
Poles in the rebellion of 1863. M eanwhile, four w ars dram atically altered the E uropean bal­
ance of pow er that had  been established in 1815 in Vienna. The w ar of 1859 betw een Pied­
m ont - the K ingdom  of Sardinia w hich was supported  by  French troops - and  A ustria w as the 
first w ar that led to Italian unification. It resulted in the A ustrian loss of Lom bardy to P ied­
m ont. However, A ustria w as still in control of Venetia and the Q uadrilateral, the forts that 
protected A ustria on the Po and Mincio rivers. France w as indisputably  a t the height of its 
status as a great pow er w hen the w ar was over. W ithin eleven years, N apoleon III w ould  see 
his em pire crum ble and  find him self a prisoner of w ar of the Germans.
G erm an unification w as accomplished w ith the political skill of Bismarck and  the m ilitary 
pow er of the Prussian army.2 In 1859, "Germany' consisted of thirty-nine states loosely con­
nected in  the G erm an Bund  or Confederation. The G erm an federal diet w as situated  in  Frank­
fu rt and, although votes were w eighted in favour of A ustria and  Prussia, the Bund  w as 
dom inated  by Austria. This w as a construction conceived by  A ustria 's Foreign Minister, 
Prince Klemens M ettem ich, at the Congress of Vienna and  agreed on  by England, France, 
Russia, Austria, and Prussia. From 1848, m ounting tensions betw een A ustria an d  Prussia 
w ere evident, and in  1850 Prussia m ade a failed attem pt to threaten  A ustria w ith  the use of 
force in  an effort to establish a Germ an federation w ithout A ustria.3 In the 1860s, however, 
the tim e w as ripe for change. After far-reaching m ilitary reform s in  Prussia - as w e w ill see 
later - Bismarck saw  an opportunity  for a step tow ards unification in  the long-d isputed  ques­
tion of Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies belonged to Denm ark, b u t their legal ties to D enm ark 
were complex and  a m atter of dispute.4 After a formal d ispute over succession, A ustria and 
Prussia invaded  D enm ark in 1864 and D enm ark was forced to  give u p  the duchies to the joint 
rule by  A ustria and  Prussia. According to the agreem ent reached in Gastein in 1865 Prussia 
w as to ru le Schleswig and A ustria Holstein bu t this arrangem ent d id  no t last long. The w ar 
against A ustria in  1866 finally established Prussian suprem acy in  Germany. The o ld  Bund
2‘ For some useful surveys on German unification, see Craig, Gordon A. Germany: 1866-1945. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981): Chapters 1 and 2. Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany: 
The Period of Unification, 1815-1871. Vol. 1. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). The role of 
the army is dealt with by Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1964): Chapters 4 and 5; Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem 
des "Militarismus" in Deutschland. 4 vols. (Miinchen: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1959-1968): Vol. 1, Chapters
6- 8 .
3‘ Taylor, The Struggle: 40-42; Carr, William. The Origins of the Wars of German Unification. (London: Long­
man, 1991): 91-100.
4‘ Holstein, ethnically German, had been a member of the Holy Roman Empire and was represented at 
the German diet by a delegate appointed by the Danish king. Schleswig, where half the population was 
Danish, had never been a member of the Holy Roman Empire. Schleswig was considered of strategic 
importance to Denmark. Carr, Origins: 34-38; Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's War 
with Prussia and Italy in 1866. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996):40-41.
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ceased to exist; instead Prussia created the N orth  Germ an Federation. A South G erm an Con­
federation (consisting of Bavaria, W iirttemberg, Hessia-Darm stadt, an d  Baden) w as created 
an d  nom inally  protected by France b u t w as - in reality - bound  to  Prussia b y  m u tu a l defence 
treaties.5 In addition, Italy secured the annexation of Venetia as a result of the w ar in  1866, in  
spite of the m ilitary failure against the A ustrian army. The A ustrian em pire w as shaken and, 
in  1867, the A ustrian-H ungarian dual-m onarchy w as created.
In order finally to establish Germ an unification, Bismarck felt that a w ar against France w as 
necessary. France was provoked and declared w ar against Prussia over the succession d ispute 
on the Spanish throne. All of the G erm an forces were united  under Prussian com m and. W ith­
in a m onth  of fighting at the battle of Sedan 83 000 m en surrendered to Prussia an d  N apoleon 
III becam e a prisoner of w ar of the Prussian King. France, however, continued to  fight for an­
other five m onths under the leadership of the new ly declared Third Republic. As a resu lt of 
the G erm an victory, Alsace and Lorraine were occupied by  G erm an forces. O n  18 January 
1871at Versailles, King Wilhelm I of Prussia w as proclaimed Em peror of Germany. The Ital­
ians seized the opportunity  to occupy Rome. On 2 October 1870, the people of Rome voted 
for a un ion  w ith  Italy.
N either Britain nor Russia intervened during this process, m ainly because the th reat from  a 
un ited  G erm any w as not perceived as very great. The danger to peace and stability in Europe 
appeared  to  come from  France u nder N apoleon III.6 However, in  1870 Russia took  the chance 
to denounce the clauses of the Treaty of Paris, w hich prohibited Russia from  keeping w ar 
ships in  the Black Sea. A t that time it was largely a symbolic gesture an d  w hen  the Russo- 
Turkish War broke out in 1877 Russia had  not yet built up  a navy in the Black Sea.
5- Craig, Germany: 6-12; Wawro, Austro-Prussian War:277-78; Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck, Vol. 1: 369-71,406- 
411.
6' Russian foreign policy during the unification of Germany has been the subject of many studies. The 
diplomatic issue is treated by Narochnitskaia, L. I. Rossiia i voiny Prussii v 60-kh godakh X IX  v. za ob 'ed- 
inenie Germanii "sverkhu". (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960); 
Shneerson, L. M. Avstro-prusskaia voina 1866 g. i diplomatiia velikikh evropeiskikh derzhav. (Minsk: Minister- 
stvo vysshego, srednego spetsial'nogo i professional'nogo obrazovaniia SSSR, 1962); Shneerson, L.M. 
Franko-prusskaia voina i Rossiia. (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo BGU im. V.I. Lenina, 1976). The reactions of the Rus­
sian press is described Obolenskaia, S. V. Franko-prusskaia voina i obshchestvennoe mnenie Germanii i Rossii. 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1977) and Shneerson, L. M. Otkliki v Rossii na avstro-prusskuiu voinu 1866 g. Uchebnye 
zapiski Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (10,1950): 157-182. See also Beyrau, Dietrich. 'Der 
deutsche Komplex: Rufiland zur Zeit der Reichsgriindung', Historische Zeitschrift (6,1980): 63-107; 
Beyrau, Dietrich. 'Russische Interessenzonen und europaisches Gleichgewicht 1860-70', in Europa vor 
dem Krieg von 1870, edited by E. Kolb. (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1987): 65-76; Jelavich, Barbara. 
Sankt Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy 1814-1974. (Bloomington and London: Indi­
ana University Press, 1974): 147-157. Kiniapina, Nina. Vneshiaia politika Rossii vtoroi poloviny deviatnadtsa- 
togo veka. (Moscow, 1974): 41-50,83-118; Mosse, European Powers: 359-374. On the issue of Russian 
denouncement of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, see Narochnitskaia, L. I. Rossiia i otmena 
neitralizatsii Chernogo moria 1856-1871 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1989): esp. Chapter 6. and Mosse, W. E. The 
Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-71: The Story of a Peace Settlement. (London: Macmillan and Co, 
1963).
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1.2 Armies and Warfare in Transition
If events on the political scene were eventful, the m ilitary developm ent w as no  less signifi­
cant. The 1860s was the period w hen - according to m ost m ilitary historians - w arfare becam e 
"m odem '; that is, technological and industrial. Three factors are particularly  significant: (1) 
the appearance of conscript armies and  trained reserves, (2) the growing im portance of officer 
education and  the rise of general staffs, and (3) the technological developm ent, including the 
m ilitary application of the steam  railway, the electromagnetic telegraph, an d  the rifling of 
m uskets and  cannons. The em phasis on w hich of these factors is the m ost im portan t to deter­
m ine the 'm odern ity ' of warfare varies som ewhat.7 N evertheless, one feature that m ade this 
period  distinct from the Napoleonic era was the unprecedented peacetim e involvem ent of all
o
sectors of society in m ilitary efforts.
In the m id-nineteenth century, technological and scientific advances in conjunction w ith  po­
litical, economic, and  social change affected the arm ed forces. Industrialization and  techno­
logical developm ent led to specialization and division of labour.9 N ew  m achinery in the
7‘ The American Civil War has often been called the "first modem war'. Dupuy, Ernest R. & Dupuy, 
Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present. 4th ed. (London: BCA, 1993): 
898; Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modem Warfare. (Bloomington: Indi­
ana University Press, 1988): xi. Paddy Griffith disputed the notion that the Civil War was the 'first mod­
em  w ar' and placed it firmly in the Napoleonic era of warfare. Robert Epstein on the other hand argued 
that modem wars started with Napoleon. Epstein, Robert M. Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of 
Modern War. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994); Griffith, Paddy. Rally Once Again: Battle 
Tactics of the American Civil War. (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1987).
8‘ On the Pmssian wars see Craig, Gordon A. The Battle of Koniggrdtz. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. 
Lippincott Co, 1964); Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 1870- 
1871. Reprint of 1961 ed. (London: Routledge, 1991); Wawro, Austro-Pmssian War. The role of technolog­
ical changes in the German wars of unification is discussed in Showalter, Dennis. Railroads and Rifles: 
Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975) and Showalter, 
Dennis. 'Prussia, Technology and War: Artillery from 1815 to 1914', in Men, Machines and War, edited by 
R. Haycock and K. Neilson. (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1988): 115-151. For 
flaws in the Pmssian command and supply systems during the wars against Austria and France, see 
Creveld, Martin van. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1977): 75-108; Creveld, Martin van. Command in War. (Cambridge, Massachu­
setts: Harvard University Press, 1985): 132-147. The European (except for the Russian) reactions to the 
American Civil War is examined in Luvaas, Jay. The Military Legacy of the Civil War: the European Inherit­
ance. Reprint of 1959 ed. (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988). The literature on the 
American Civil War is immense. For useful surveys see for instance Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of 
War since the Eighteenth Century. 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): 68-94; Jones, 
Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987): 409-418; McElw- 
ee, William. The Art of War Waterloo to Mons. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974): 147-183; Ropp, 
Theodore. War in the Modem World. (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1959): 157-176.1 also found 
the single volume work Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A  Military History of 
the Civil War. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983) valuable as an introduction to this war. Useful 
general surveys on the development of warfare are McNeill, William H. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, 
Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); Gooch, John. Armies in Europe. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Howard, War, Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct 
of War. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983) and - in Swedish - Johansson, Alf W. Europas krig. Militart 
tdnkande, strategi och politikfr&n Napoleontiden till andra varldskrigets slut. (Stockholm: Tidens forlag, 1988).
9‘ For a good survey on this development, McNeill, The Pursuit: 206-261. Useful is also Kennedy, The
Rise and Fall: 183-193 and Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- 
Military Relations. Reprint of 1957 ed. (London: The Belknap Press of Cambridge University Press, 1995): 
32.
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factories, steam  engine trains, and new  production m ethods increasingly required specialists. 
The arm ies were no different, being as one historian pu t it 'n o t an independent section of the 
social system, bu t an aspect of it in its totality '.10 Larger than  ever and  w ith  a grow ing sophis­
tication in  weaponry, com m and, control and supply  systems, the armies of the m id-nine­
teenth  century became increasingly complex organizations in need of specially trained 
specialists. A growing arm am ents industry took shape, spurred  by the w ars and  scientific dis­
coveries such as the Bessemer steel-making process and m odem  m anufacturing processes in 
producing m etal cartridges. The days were over w hen the soldier w as responsible for m aking 
his paper cartridges. Arm ouries faced increasing difficulties in keeping up  w ith  the latest de­
velopm ents in rifle and cannon m odels and production m ethods.
The social and m ilitary implications were far-reaching. Soldiers as well as officers needed to 
be educated, and officers needed skills to educate civilians in  a com paratively short period of 
time. A t the sam e time, shorter mobilization times -  through the use of railw ays -  m ade de­
tailed, advance w ar planning m ore im portant.
Furtherm ore, the period saw several international agreem ents related to the conduct of war. 
They w ere designed to protect both soldiers and  civilians by  im posing lim itations on the use 
of m ilitary force. The Red Cross w as brought into existence by  the agreem ent signed by 26 na­
tions in Geneva in 1864. It was influenced by a Swiss observer w ho had  w itnessed the effect 
of the new  rifled cannon used by the French at Solferino in 1859 and  w rote a fam ous book Un 
Souvenir de Solferino. The Declaration of St. Petersburg in  1868 prohibited the use of explosive 
charges in  projectiles under fourteen ounces. The intent w as to prevent the developm ent of an 
explosive bullet following the cannon shell. A t the 1874 conference in  Brussels, following the 
P russian siege of Paris 1870/71, it was agreed to prohibit the bom bardm ent of cities.11
1.2.1 Civilians in Arms
The conscript arm y w as not a new  phenom enon in W estern warfare. The use of conscript sol­
diers had  been practised in large scale at the beginning of the century  w hen the arm ies of N a­
poleon fought on the battlefields of Europe. D uring the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, masses of people were p u t under arms, b u t this w as a tem porary  situation 
and  the practice w as largely abandoned after the Wars.12 The system  d id  no t becom e perm a­
nen t in  Europe, w ith the exception of Prussia. Conscription h ad  become associated w ith  revo­
lutionary politics, and, after 1815, the European states concentrated on restoring the old, pre­
10- Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 1.
n< See for instance Preston, R.A., S.F. Wise, and H.O Wemer. Men in Arms: A  History of Warfare and its In­
terrelationships with Western Society. (London: Atlantic Press, 1956): 207-15.
12‘ Rothenberg, Gunther. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Reprint ed. (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 
1997): 98-102,134-135.
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revolutionary order. Domestic concerns becam e dom inant and  the armies in  Europe w ere 
used  prim arily  for internal affairs. The prospect of arm ing and training large parts  of the pop­
u lation for m ilitary service w as not only expensive b u t could prove to be politically danger- 
13ous.
There w ere also a num ber of reasons for the m ilitary establishm ents to be sceptical tow ards 
conscript armies. The professional, long-service armies functioned well, and  allow ed for 
plen ty  of tim e to train  the troops and cultivate esprit de corps. There were doubts about the ef­
fectiveness of civilians in arm s.14 For instance, how  could civilians -  w ith  only a relatively 
short period of service -  be trusted  to stay in a battle and  fight? After all, desertion  w as a big 
enough problem  in  the long-service armies. D uring the Revolutionary w ars of the m id  1790s, 
the French arm y had  suffered yearly desertions of around eight per cent of the total strength. 
In the w ar of 1859, it has been estim ated that around 15,000 A ustrian troops deserted .15 In 
Russia, the rates of desertion were lower than  in other European armies, a lthough the official 
figures are no t very reliable.16
The Prussian victories against Austria in 1866 and  France in 1870-71 finally convinced the ru l­
ers of Europe of the benefits of conscripting all social groups into m ilitary service. Thus arose 
a system  w here civilians were trained in peacetime, only to be called up  in  the case of war. 
This w as a fundam ental change com pared to the 'nation  in arm s' of the N apoleonic era. In 
1813, a t the battle of Leipzig over 400,000 troops had  fought. In the m id-nineteenth  century, 
such num bers had  become the norm  on the battlefield. In 1870-71 G erm any p u t  alm ost 
1,200,000 m en in the field.17 W hat were the reasons behind this developm ent?
One of the underlying factors for the size of armies m ust be population  size.18 D uring  the first 
half of the nineteenth century, Europe had  experienced a period of relative prosperity. From 
1750 to 1800, Europe's population increased from 140 million to 187 million. In  the next fifty 
years, it rose to 266 m illion.19 Furtherm ore, industrial developm ent -  not least the m ass p ro­
duction process -  played a role in  facilitating the grow th of armies and  giving im petus to
13‘ Howard, War: 94-95; Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 15; McNeill, The Pursuit: 219-221.
14‘ Challener, Richard D. The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939. (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1955): 15.
15‘ Strachan, European Armies: 39. Rothenberg, Gunther. The Army of Francis Joseph. (West Lafayette, Ind.: 
Purdue University Press, 1976): 54-55.
16. Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling. From Serf to Russian Soldier. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1990): 110-115. See also Duffy, Christopher. Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Rus­
sian Military Power 1700-1800. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981): 46,133; Fuller, William C., Jr. 
Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free Press, 1992): 48-49,167-168; Keep, John L.H. Sol­
diers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985): 222-223.
17- Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 22-23.
18- Strachan, European Armies: 108-109.
19- Kennedy, The Rise and Fall: 187.
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large-scale arm s m anufacturing. Weapons production became an increasingly faster and 
cheaper process. For instance, w hen the Prussian arm y had  decided to rearm  its infantry w ith 
needle guns in the 1840s, it took twenty-six years to complete. Between 1841 and 1847, the 
production  capacity w as about 7,500 rifles a year com pared to the 300,000 needed  for the 
arm y and  its reserves in case of war. By 1851, the yearly production reached 22,000, a figure 
w hich constantly increased w ith  the availability of machines and  skilled workers.20 W hen, in 
the w ake of the Prussian victory at Koniggratz, France decided to rearm  its infantry w ith  the 
new  rifle, the chassepot, it m anaged to produce one million rifles in tim e for the outbreak of 
the w ar of 1870.21In Russia, the production of the new ly adopted rifled breech-loader, Berdan 
2, increased from  4,430 in 1872 to 123,718 three years later. 22
M oreover, the use of railways had  m ade it possible to rush  large num bers of troops to  the 
front. The first successful m ilitary use of railways was dem onstrated by France in  1859, w hen 
they m oved 250,000 m en by  rail to Piedm ont in the w ar against A ustria.23 It took eleven days 
- instead of two m onths of m arching - for 120,000 m en to reach the theatre of war.24 In 1866, 
Prussia w as faster to m obilize and concentrate its forces than w as the A ustrian  army.25 The 
m ilitary use of railways was further dem onstrated in  the Am erican Civil War, som ething that 
w as no t ignored, as w e shall see, by the Russian General Staff Academy.26
H ow ever im portant these factors m ay have been, they only provided  the potential for m ass 
armies. The political determ ination varied from country to country. Prussia w as the only 
country  to have kept universal conscription after 1815. It had  ben  introduced as a conse­
quence of the restrictions on the size of the Prussian peacetim e army, 42 000 m en, im posed by 
N apoleon at Tilsit.27 Every m ale Prussian at the age of tw enty w as required to serve five years 
in the standing army, three on active service, tw o in the reserve, and  fourteen years in  the 
Landwehr, the territorial militia. The whole m ilitary organization of Prussia h ad  undergone 
p rofound change as a consequence of the defeat at Jena 1806. The Prussian reform ers of the
20- Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 91; McNeill, The Pursuit: 235-236.
21 • Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 35.
22- Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo 
Universiteta, 1952): 178. See also Beskrovnyi, L. G. Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX  veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 
1973): 307-309.
231 Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 40; van Creveld, Martin. Technology and War from 2000 B.C. to the 
Present. (London: Brassey's, 1991): 158.
24- Howard, War: 97.
25• Wawro, Austro-Prussian War: 51-60.
26’ On other European reactions to the use of railways in the Civil War, see Luvaas, Military Legacy: 122; 
Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 48; McElwee, Art of War: 153. See also Jones, The Art of War: 409-413 and 
the early study on the military importance of railways Pratt, Edwin A. The Rise ofRail-Power in War and 
Conquest 1833-1914. (London: P.S. King & Son, 1915).
27■ McNeill, The Pursuit: 219. On the Prussian military reforms at this time see for instance Craig, The 
Politics: 38-75 and Delbriick, Hans. Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte. (Berlin: 
Georg Stilke, 1900-36).): Vol. 4: Chapter 4.
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early nineteenth  century firmly believed that it was significant to  involve all sectors of society 
in the defence of the nation. In the w ords of War M inister H erm an von Boyen (1771-1846):
The old school wishes to consider military questions without the participation of the 
public; the new school holds the defence of the state is impossible without the material 
and moral cooperation of the entire nation.28
The Landwehr-system  w as no t w ithout complications, and the events of 1848 and  1850 
show ed that Prussia w as in a precarious situation: its m ilitary pow er w as based on m obiliza­
tion  of the Landwehr forces w hich had  proved to be neither politically reliable, no r m ilitary ef­
ficient.29 The failed m obilization in  1859 in  support of A ustria again illustrated the poo r state 
of the Landwehr.30 The reforms of the 1860s were aim ed at addressing the problem s.31 It was 
decided to increase the size of the arm y by drafting a larger proportion of the population  
w ithou t exemptions. Conscripts served for three years in the standing arm y and four years in 
the reserves before passing on to the Landwehr. The decision to p u t the Landwehr un d er the su­
pervision  of the regular arm y was significant because, although m andatory  service in the 
Landwehr w as reduced to five years, it was tied more closely to the regular army.
In France, the principle of universal conscription existed on paper only. The arm y recruited 
by  voluntary  service p lus an  annual intake by  lot.32 The exem ption rules w ere generous, and  
there w as always the possibility of escaping service by finding a substitute or (from 1855) by 
paying directly to the state. The idea of universal conscription in  France w as very unpopu lar 
w ith  bo th  the m ilitary and populace in general. The m ilitary m aintained that it took a t least 
six years to train  a soldier and  generally thought that little good could be expected from  a 
short-term  conscript force. Those liable for conscription rejected any change in the recruiting 
system  because there w as alw ays a chance of escaping service by  draw ing a 'g ood ' num ber. 
This had  severe repercussions for the French arm y in that the num ber of trained reserves was 
no t sufficient. The reform efforts in  1868 proposed to increase the annual intake and - m ore 
im portantly  - to create a trained reserve force, garde mobile, of 500,000 men. However, the law 
was never im plem ented and France d id  no t introduce a conscription system, based on the 
principle of universal service, until 1872.33
28' Ropp, War in the Modem World: 153.
29' Craig, The Politics: 74-75,131; Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 12.
30- Wawro, Austro-Prussian War: 12.
31' On the Prussian army reform in the beginning of the 1860s, see Craig, The Politics: 138-179; Ritter, 
Staatskunst: Vol. 1:159-206; Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 18-29.
32‘ Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 13; Griffith, Paddy. Military thought in the French army, 1815-51. (Man­
chester: Manchester University Press, 1989): 7-11.
33‘ Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 29-35; Challener, Richard D. French Theory: 10-45. For a detailed study 
of the German influence on the French army, see Mitchell, Allan. Victors and Vanquished: the German Influ­
ence on Army and Church in France after 1870. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984): 
Chapters 1 through 5.
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A ustria h ad  a rather complex recruiting system, although the law  of 1852 aim ed at in troduc­
ing a coherent system  throughout the whole em pire.34 Following the defeat in  1866, A ustria 
in troduced legislation according to which all m ale subjects of the Em pire should serve twelve 
years; three in the army, seven years in the reserves, and  two in  the Landwehr. Exem ptions for 
clergy, theological students, and certain other social categories were allowed.
In  Russia, the recruiting system  w as based on selective conscription, affecting the poll-tax 
paying population. There were m any exemptions and, in  peacetim e during  the reign of N i­
cholas I, tw o to three soldiers per 100 liable for service w ere conscripted.35 Universal m ilitary 
conscription w as introduced in 1874, stipulating obligatory service for all m ales for fifteen 
years; six in the line, nine in the reserves. Britain d id  not introduce conscription b u t continued 
to rely on its volunteer service.36
The w ars of the 1860s dem onstrated that m obilization and  deploym ent of large arm ies had  
becom e m ore dependent on the systems that raised them . The ability of a country to  train, 
arm , and  deploy the large arm y involved larger sections of society than  ever before in  the his­
tory of w arfare. This is not to suggest an absolute link betw een economic pow er and  m ilitary 
power. A n economically poor country can choose to organize society in  such a w ay  as to  give 
it m ilitary power, and  an economically strong state can choose no t to create a strong m ilitary 
system. Nevertheless, it remains true that during  this period, bu t m ore particularly  in  the 
1880s an d  1890s, the link betw een economic and m ilitary pow er w as becom ing stronger.37
1.2.2 The Rise of General Staffs and Officer Education
As the arm ies increasingly consisted of am ateurs, the officer corps becam e more professional; 
that is, m ore specially trained.38 Larger armies and faster m obilization times increasingly re­
quired  educated  (rather than well connected) officers. A t the sam e time, the aristocratic per­
centage of the officer corps in  the European armies started  to decline. In 1865, alm ost half of 
the P russian officer corps w as noble; in the highest ranks of the arm y -  generals and  colonels 
-  over 80 per cent were noble. In 1913, 70 per cent of the officer corps w as m iddle class and 
the percentage of noble generals and colonels had  shrunk  to 52 per cent.39 In the A ustrian ar­
34' Rothenberg, The Army: 61-62,74-81.
35- On problems with the recruiting system during Nicholas I, see Wirtschafter: From Serf. 22-23; Keep: 
Soldiers: 325-330; Curtiss, John Shelton. The Russian Army under Nicholas 1,1825-55. (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1965): 234; Fuller, Strategy: 254-257.
36- Spiers, Edward. The Army and Society 1815-1914. (London: Longman, 1980): 35-52,168-169; Strachan, 
European Armies: 110.
37‘ For an illuminating discussion on this, see Kennedy, The Rise and Fall: Chapter 5.
38‘ Amateur here is not used in any negative sense, but as opposed to the professional long-service sol­
diers. For three views on the 'professionalization' of the officer corps during the second half of the nine­
teenth century, see Creveld, Technology and War: Chapter 10; Huntington, Soldier and the State: Chapter 2; 
and Finer, S. E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. (London: The Pall Mall Press, 
1962): 23-25.
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my, the non-nobles increased their percentage am ong the generals from  20 per cent in  1866 (in 
1848, it w as three per cent) to 58 per cent in 1878.40 The Russian arm y w as no  exception and 
from  the tim e after the Crim ean War to 1911 the nobility 's share of the officer corps shrank 
from  around  90 per cent to around 50 percent.41 This is not to suggest that aristocratic officers 
w ere no t educated - quite the contrary was often the case - b u t it is clear that old bonds, w here 
patronage and b irth  played an  im portant role, were slowly breaking up.
The rise of the general staff as the brain of the arm y and  a m ore specialist educated body  of 
officers w as a process underp inned  by several factors. The increasing pace of technological 
invention and  the increasing complexity of warfare played an  im portant ro le .^T he m ilitary 
use of trains m ade advance planning both necessary and feasible. Trains ran  on certain tracks, 
at certain times, w ith certain am ounts of m en and  supplies - all which could be p lanned  in  ad­
vance. The electric telegraph facilitated quick com m unications betw een headquarters 43 If 
m obilization and concentration44 of large armies and their supply  w ere to w ork  in  the case of 
war, the planning and  organization had  to take place before the outbreak of war. Moreover, 
all this greatly increased the dem and for more detailed intelligence about foreign armies. 
D uring the second half of the nineteenth century the use of m ilitary attaches becam e m ore 
w idespread. W hereas the m ajor European pow ers had  tw o to five m ilitary attaches in 1860, 
their num bers had  grow n to betw een fifteen and tw enty in 1913.45
Through the resounding victories over A ustria and France, Prussia had  dem onstrated  such 
superiority  that the Prussian m ilitary organization drew  the attention of all the m ajor armies
39- Craig, The Politics: 233-235; Demeter, Karl. Das deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Stoat 1650- 
1945. 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1965): 29-33.
40- Rothenberg, The Army: 62,81.
41 • For studies of the Russian officer corps, see Bushnell, John. The Tsarist Officer Corps 1881-1914', 
American Historical Review 86 (3,1981): 753-80; Kenez, Peter. 'A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer 
Corps', California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 121-158; Mayzel, Matitiahu. 'The Formation of the Russian Gen­
eral Staff 1880-1917, A Social Study', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique XVI (3-4,1975): 297-321; Mayzel, 
Matitiahu. Generals and Revolutionaries: The Russian General Staff During the Revolution: A  Study in the 
Transformation of Military Elite. (Osnabriick: Biblio Verlag, 1979); Stein, Hans-Peter. 'Der Offizer der rus- 
sischen Heeres im Zeitabschnitt zwischen Reform und Revolution', Forschungen zur osteuropdischen Ges­
chichte 13 (1967): 346-507; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 
1881-1903. (Moscow: Mysl’, 1973): 168-248. A brief study is written by Ray, Oliver Allen. 'The Imperial 
Russian Army Officer', Political Science Quarterly 76 (4,1961): 576-592. Details about the students and 
teachers at the higher military academies during the second half of the 19th century and beginning of 
20th are presented by Mashkin, N. A. Vysshaia voennaia shkola Rossiiskoi imperii XlX-nachala X X  veka. 
(Moscow: Akademiia, 1997): Chapters 2 and 3, Appendix 3-7.
42‘ Kennedy, Paul, ed. The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914. Paperback ed. (Boston: Allen & Un­
win, 1979): 1-3.
43‘ The electric telegraph was above all of strategic importance. It did not yet play any role on the battle­
field. On the weaknesses of the telegraph as a strategic weapon, see Creveld, Command: 107-109.
^  Mobilization refers to the process of calling up the different units, assembling them at certain points 
and gathering the necessary equipment. Concentration refers to the process of moving the troops to the 
main theatre of war.
45- These figures do not include naval attaches, which at least in 1913 were also stationed abroad. Beau­
vais, Armand. Attaches militaires, attaches navals et attaches de I'air. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1937): 30, 
44-48. For Russia, see below, Chapter 3.
27
in Europe. In particular, the Prussian General Staff system  received m uch recognition, bo th  
then  and  later.46 Therefore, it seems appropriate to outline w hat has been called the 'prim acy 
of Prussia '.47 More than one scholar has pointed to the fact that Prussia 's system  of choosing 
an d  prom oting officers ensured that the best and the brightest reached the top  48 The selec­
tion process w as based on m erit alone through examinations, and  of the 120 or so candidates 
to  the War Academ y in Berlin around forty gained entrance. After the three year course, these 
officers returned to regim ental duty, b u t after a year, twelve of the best w ere called up  to serve 
on the General Staff. If they d id  no t live up to expectations, they were im m ediately sent back 
to service w ith  the troops. The rotational troop du ty  contributed to the General Staff officers 
becom ing an integral part of the army.49
This w as very different to the French army. In 1818, M arshal G ouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-1830) 
h ad  established a corps d'etat-major w ith  specially trained officers from  w hich all staff officers 
w ere to be drawn. A special school, Ecole d'application d'etat-major, p rovided the training for 
these selected officers. From 1833 onw ards, a law  stipulated that graduates of the staff school 
w ere appointed  perm anently to staff service.50 This m eant that the only com petitive exam ina­
tion w as conducted upon entrance to the school and th a t the staff officers d id  no t have m uch 
contact w ith  and were often despised by colleagues serving in the field troops. The situation 
in  Russia w as m uch the same, bu t later we shall see that the W ar M inistry u n d er D. A. Miliu- 
tin tried  to bridge the gap betw een staff officers and the troops. The A ustrian  and  British ar­
m ies experienced the same problem .51
A nother im portant factor that distinguished the Prussian arm y from  its enem ies in 1866 and 
1870/71 was the attitude to m ilitary education and self-education am ong officers. P russian 
General G erhard Scham horst (1755-1831), a firm believer in the im portance an d  value of m il­
itary study, started several m ilitary journals, founded the Militdrische Gesellschaft (a society 
w here officers gathered and  discussed m ilitary science) in  1801-2 in Berlin, an d  helped  to cre­
ate the War Academ y in 1810. In the wake of the defeat at Jena, he reform ed the G eneral Staff. 
Together w ith  other arm y reform ers A ugust Gneisenau (1760-1831), and  H erm an von Boyen,
46- The French military attache in Berlin, for instance, in 1868 warned his superiors in Paris of the excel­
lence of the Prussian general staff. Stoffel, Eugene. Rapports militaires ecrits de Berlin 1866-70. (Paris: Gar- 
niers freres, 1871): 131.
47‘ Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. (Lon­
don: The Belknap Press of Cambridge University Press, 1957): 30.
48- Howard, Franco-Prussian War. 24-25; Huntington, Soldier and the State: 39-41,48; Kennedy: The Rise 
and Fall: 237.
49- Huntington, Soldier and the State: 53-54; Bucholz, Arden. Moltke, Schliejfen, and Prussian War Planning. 
(New York: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1991): 34-35
50- Irvine, Dallas D. 'The French and Prussian Staff Systems before 1870', The Journal of American Military 
History Foundation 2 (4,1938): 199-200. For more on the French military educational system, see Griffith, 
Military thought: Chapter 8.
5L Howard, War: 101.
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Scham horst played an im portant role in trying to create an  arm y that w ould  become the 
school of a the nation.52Ih e  Prussian General Staff had  its roots in  the old Q uarterm aster- 
G eneral's staff, an organization responsible for quartering the troops in the field. Staff w ork  in 
peacetim e consisted of intelligence gathering, m ap-m aking, m aking m obilization plans, and 
study  of m ilitary history.53 In 1864, a railway section was added the Great G eneral Staff.54 In 
spite of its nam e, this w as no t a large institution. In 1853, the General Staff in  Berlin had  a to­
tal of tw enty-one officers.55
The use of m ilitary history and w ar games in educating the General Staff officers played an 
im portan t role in encouraging a common w ay of thinking about tactical problem s.56This was 
im portan t in a time w hen the armies grew  larger and  m oved over considerable areas, w hich 
dim inished the possibility of direct control. Consequently, the role of the subordinate com­
m ander increased since he needed to m ake independent decisions in line w ith  the general in­
tentions of the commander. U nder M oltke's system  of m ission orders, a subordinate 
com m ander could change the instructions to reflect the intent of the com m ander. English ob­
servers particularly  noted the absence of slavish obedience to superiors that w as characteris­
tic of other armies.57 The personal role of H elm ut von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General 
Staff 1857-1888, should not be neglected and w as often m entioned by  his contem poraries as 
well as by  tw entieth-century scholars 58
Perhaps it w as the attitude tow ards intellectual m ilitary pursuits that m ade the Prussian 
arm y w illing to study and learn from the mistakes of previous cam paigns to a greater degree 
than  d id  other armies.59 Allegedly, w ar games were of no attraction to the A ustrian  arm y
57 Gat, Azar. The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989): 163. See also White, Charles Edward. The Enlightened Soldier: Schamhorst and the Militdrische 
Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805. (New York: Praeger, 1989); Homung, Klaus. Schamhorst: Soldat, Reformer, 
Staatsman. (Munich: Bechtle, 1997). For the reform of the General Staff in particular, see Ritter, Staat- 
skunst: Vol. 1: 211-221.
53‘ Bucholz, Moltke, Schliejfen: 12-16; Creveld, Command: 109-111; Gorlitz, Walter. Der deutsche Generalstab: 
Geschichte und Gestalt 1657-1945. (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1950): 9-29; Hittle, J. 
D. The Military Staff: Its History and Development. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Com­
pany, 1944):48f; Irvine, Dallas D. The Origin of Capital Staffs', The Journal of Modem History 10 (2,1938): 
161-179; Wilkinson, Spenser. The Brain of an Army: A  Popular Account of the German General Staff. 2nd ed. 
(London: Archibald Constable and Co, 1895): 175-187.
54- It has been suggested, without substantial evidence, that this was done as a result from lessons 
drawn from the American Civil War. Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power: 104; Luvaas, Military Legacy: 122; 
Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 48,232.
55‘ Creveld, Command:! 11. The Great General Staff referred to the general staff in Berlin to distinguish it 
from the General Staff at troop level, Truppengeneralstab. There were general staff officer at corps and di­
vision level of the army. Together they made up the General Staff of the Army.
56‘ Bucholz, Moltke, Schliejfen: 34-35.
57 Hamley, E.B. The Operations of War. 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1872): ix-x. See 
also Huntington, Soldier and the State: 51.
58‘ Stoffel, Rapports militaires: 39-40; Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 24-25; Bucholz, Moltke, Schliejfen: 39- 
43.
59' Kennedy, The Rise and Fall: 238; Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 23.
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since there w as no m oney to be m ade from  them .60 Even officers entering the G eneral Staff 
w ere no t convinced of the virtues of intellectual skills. This attitude w as reflected in  the 
w ords of the Chief of the General Staff Ludw ig Benedek (1804-1881), w hose d istrust of m ili­
tary  science w as well known: T h e  only talents required in a staff chief are a strong stom ach 
and  a good d igestion / 61 The French General Staff was perm eated by the sam e scorn for desk 
officers. U nder the old regime, the French staff system  had  been unrivalled  and , as early as 
1766 a General Staff had  been established.62 After 1815, however, this w as only a p roud  m em ­
ory. The French M arshal Patrice M acM ahon (1808-1893) allegedly threatened to elim inate any 
officer from  the prom otion list whose nam e he had  seen on the cover of a book.63
W hen discussing the Great General* Staff's rise to international acclaim it should  no t be for­
gotten that it w as a prolonged process. For m any years, the General Staff rem ained subordi­
nate to the War M inistry and its influence on the King was negligible. Its au thority  increased 
som ew hat in  1859 w hen M oltke was given the authority by War M inister von  Bonin to report 
directly to h im  rather than  through the Allgemeine Kriegsdepartement w ith in  the W ar Ministry. 
In 1862, it was possible to w rite a book about the Prussian arm y w ithou t m entioning the Gen­
eral Staff.64 The Danish w ar was the first w hich w on recognition for the P russian  General 
Staff - a t least w ithin the Prussian court and  the army. The General Staff's im pact on the bat­
tlefields of Schleswig and Denm ark w as initially insignificant. A t the final stages of the war, 
however, M oltke was called from Berlin, first to become Chief of Staff to W rangel and  later to 
Prince Frederick Charles. H e was largely responsible for the operation against Als, which 
b rought the w ar to an  end. The w ar strengthened M oltke's position and, in  the w ar against 
A ustria in 1866, the King entrusted the General Staff w ith issuing orders in  the field w ithout 
going th rough the War M inistry 65
As several historians have already noted, the Prussian victories in  1866 and  1870/71 w ere nei­
ther accidental nor inevitable.66 They highlighted the im portance of staff w ork.The hitherto  
accepted im age of the talented, natural genius w ho alone could com m and his arm y w as slow­
ly replaced by the planning staff officer.67
60- Creveld, Command:111.
61‘ Wawro, Austro-Prussian War: 25-26; See also Rothenberg, The Army: 10-11,41,60; Craig, Gordon A. 
'Command and Staff Problems in the Austrian Army 1740-1866', in The Theory and Practice of War, edited 
by M. Howard. (London: Cassel & Co, 1965): 43-67.
62‘ Irvine, 'The French and Prussian Staff Systems': 192-203. For a good study on French strategic plan­
ning see Cox, Gary P. The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. (Oxford: West- 
view Press, 1994).
63‘ Gat, Azar. The Development of Military Thought. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 119-120; Ropp, War 
in the Modem World: 129-130.
^  Creveld, Command: 112.
65- Craig, The Politics:193-95; McNeill, The Pursuit: 247-48.
66- Howard, War: 100-01; Showalter, Railroads and Rifles:223.
67' Creveld, Command: 115.
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1.2.3 Technology and Tactics
Larger armies needed new  tactics. A t the beginning of the nineteenth century, the old infantry 
linear tactics had  been replaced by  shock attack in columns. D uring the Revolutionary w ars, 
new  recruits had  been conscripted in large num bers and, w ithout m uch training, w ere 
th row n into battle.68 These troops could not be deployed in the traditional line to fire their 
m uskets b u t were deployed in colum ns that sprinted tow ards the enem y w ith  the bayonets 
dow n. Before the enem y had  time to reload the m uzzle-loading m uskets, the storm ing French 
units had  often broken through the lines.69 Thus, the colum n becam e the dom inant tactical 
form ation in European armies.
The introduction of the rifle as the m ain infantry w eapon w as a long process influenced by  a 
num ber of factors. The breech-loading rifle, used  m ostly for hunting, had  existed since the 
seventeenth century, bu t the m ilitary use of it d id  not spread until the 1860s. The flintlock 
m usket, adopted by armies in  the sixteenth century and  supplem ented w ith  a bayonet in the 
seventeenth century, was the standard  infantry w eapon used by all m ajor armies.
The m ilitary use of rifles had  been ham pered by many, above all technological problem s.70 
The m odem  production m ethods that brought dow n costs and the technical im provem ents of 
the breech-loading m echanism  paved the w ay for the rifle.71 In the beginning, the rifles were 
very expensive and the rifling m ade it difficult to get the ball dow n the barrel. However, the 
early nineteenth century discovery of fulm inate of m ercury (an explosive that detonated 
u pon  impact) paved the w ay for A lexander Forsyth, a sports-loving clergym an, to apply  the 
detonation principle to a rifle.72 In the 1820s, the percussion cap becam e available for m ilitary 
use. The elongated, cylindro-conoidal bullet nam ed after the French C aptain C laude-Etienne 
Minie, w as highly significant. The Minie bullet had  a hollow  base, an d  w hen the rifle w as 
fired, the force of the pow der gases expanded the hollow  portion  of the bullet causing it to 
take the rifling. This capability m ade the rifle a m uch m ore accurate w eapon than  the sm ooth­
bore m usket. The M inie rifle and bullet were used in the C rim ean War and  w ere developed 
together w ith im proved, m echanized, production m ethods. The percussion cap, the rifling, 
and  the Minie bullet had  greatly im proved the m usket, b u t it w as still loaded from  the m uz­
68‘ Jones, The Art of War: 322-325; Rothenberg, Gunther. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Reprint 
of 1978 ed. (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1997): 114-118,149-156.
69■ It required 42 moves to fire a musket. McNeill, The Pursuit: 126-133; Ropp, War in the Modem World: 
32-33.
70‘ For a broad and stimulating discussion on the relationship between technological development and 
war, see Creveld, Technology and War.
71 • Young, Peter. The Machinery of War. (New York: Crescent Books, 1973): 72-76; McElwee, The Art of 
War: 120-21; Ropp, War in the Modern World:14A-A5.
72' Bradley, Joseph. Guns for the Tsar: Technology Transfer and Small Arms Industry. (DeKalb, Illinois: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1990); 12-16; O'Connell, Robert L. O f Arms and Men: A  History of War, 
Weapons, and Aggression. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 191-192.
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zle. The needle gun, the first breech-loader to be used in a war, was developed by Johann 
Nikolaus Dreyse. The needle gun had a complicated construction. Gas leaked from the breech 
and since the needle went straight through the powder in the cartridge and exploded back ­
w ards', the needle was vulnerable to intensive use. In theory, it was possible to fire six rounds 
per m inute at a distance of up to 600 yards.73 Finally, the developm ent of the metallic car­
tridge helped in the subsequent development of breech-loading small arms. The metallic car­
tridge was easier to use than the paper cartridge, more reliable in all types of weather, more 
durable, and, once the manufacturing had improved, could be supplied in greater quanti­
ties.74
The closed infantry column seemed to have become obsolete in view of lager forces and vast­
ly im proved firepower. From the perspective of the battlefield, the Prussian captain Bo- 
guslawski summarized the latest tactical development in 1872:
All idea of attacking with large compact masses, or draw ing them up in line to fire 
upon one another, is finally exploded...The real secret of infantry fighting...now consists 
in so regulating and controlling the independent action of the individual soldier and of 
the leaders of a tactical unit as to facilitate...the direction of the fight, w ithout losing the 
advantages of that same self-reliance...75
In other words, the two or three lines deep, closed formation of the infantry battalion was su­
icidal against the new weapons with greater firepower and accuracy. A more flexible forma­
tion was required where every man used his initiative. Consequently, the technological 
developm ent did not diminish the role of the non-commissioned officer or the soldier on the 
battlefield; it increased it. The troops needed motivation to advance and endure on the battle­
field, in spite of the firestorms.
The im proved firepower seemed to have strengthened defensive over offensive action. In the
American Civil War, soldiers began to seek shelter in trenches or behind breastworks, making
- as one historian put it - 'use of spade and ax in conjunction w ith the rifle'.76 As we shall see,
the growing importance of entrenchments was a tactical lesson European armies digested
ly
slowly. Although much of the contemporary tactical debate was dom inated issues re­
lated to infantry, the changes affected other arms as well. Artillery tactics changed as smooth­
bores were replaced by breech-loading cannons. However, the technological developm ent of 
cannons was slower, and the rapid development of small arms in the mid-nineteenth century
73- McNeill, The Pursuit: 245; Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 82-84. See also Anon. 'Ob igol'chatykh 
ruzh 'iakh ', Artilleriiskii zhurnal (9,1866): 405-414.
74‘ The political danger of a widespread distribution of these weapons is also likely to have affected the 
military introduction of rifles. The Prussian army had introduced the rifle in the 1840s, but initially kept 
it in store to be distributed in an emergency. Showalter, Dennis. Railroads and Rifles: 81.
75■ Q uoted in Luvaas, Jay. 'European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914', in The Theory and Prac­
tice of War, edited by M. Howard: 83.
76- Luvaas, Military Legacy: 140.
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m ade som e th ink that artillery h ad  outlived its role. The advent of the breech-loading steel 
gu n  changed this and artillery becam e more significant as the size of the field guns grew.77
The role of the m ost traditional and  prestigious arm  of all, the cavalry, changed. In the A m er­
ican Civil War, the cavalry had  been used for raiding and  reconnaissance and  h ad  fought on 
foot as 'm ounted  infantry'. This w as fundam entally different from  the traditional cavalry 
shock, w hich h ad  become increasingly difficult to conduct.78
The strategy of breaking up  the closed infantry colum n and  letting each m an act m ore inde­
penden tly  w as controversial and  disputed, m ost likely because it led to a loss of control. The 
discussions about the rifle's im pact on infantry tactics in  Europe illustrate th a t it w as difficult 
to draw  the conclusions that seem so obvious in  hindsight. In 1859, the w ar against the French 
h ad  convinced the A ustrian arm y about the superiority of the bayonet attack.The A ustrian  in­
fantry w as badly  trained in the use of the new  rifles and  failed to realize that the bu llet m ade 
a curved pa th  through the air and  thus constantly shot over the storm ing French colum ns.79 
The French tactics of m assed bayonet attacks w ere judged  to be better and, in  1862, new  field 
regulations for A ustrian infantry were introduced according to  the French exam ple w ith  dis­
astrous effects only four years later.80
A nother illustration of the strength of firepower w as the battle at Lundby du rin g  the Danish 
War. The A ustrians and Prussians were allies in the w ar and, for the first time, the Prussian 
arm y used  their rifled breech-loader, the needle gun, in battle. A t Lundby on 3 July (N. S) the 
Prussians show ed the effectiveness of the needle gun 's firepower, w hen they repelled a D an­
ish attack by holding their fire until the attacking Danes w ere 250 paces aw ay an d  then firing 
three volleys. Of the 180 Danes w ho had  attacked, 22 m en died, 66 w ere w ounded , som e of 
the bodies had  been hit seven or eight times. Only three Prussians w ere w ounded .81
This, however, did not make the A ustrian arm y change its m ind about the advantage of the 
closed form ation.82 The A ustrian arm y's own experiences of the D anish w ar confirm ed their 
belief that the closed order form ation w ith  bayonet attack still had  a role to p lay  83Further­
77 - Strachan, European Armies: 117-119.
78■ For an introduction on the use of cavalry in the Civil War I found Griffith, Rally Once Again: esp. 
Chapter 8 and Jones, The Art of War: 409-418 helpful. Useful information can also be pieced together 
from Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. A  thorough investigation of the use of cavalry by the Un­
ion forces in the Civil War is Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War. 3 vols. (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1979-85).
79' Craig, The Battle: 9; Wawro, Austro-Prussian: 11-12.
80‘ Delbriick, Hans, continued by Emil Daniels. Geschichte der Kriegskunst: Vol. 5:229-30,425-28; Showal­
ter, Railroads and Rifles: 106-107; Strachan, European Armies: 115
81‘ Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 115-116; Wawro, Austro-Prussian War: 34-35.
82- After the defeat in 1866 Austria decided to rearm its infantry with rifles. See Wheatcroft, Andrew. 
'Technology and the Military Mind: Austria 1866-1914', in War, Economy and the Military Mind, edited by 
G. Best and A. Wheatcroft. (London: Croom Helm, 1976): 45-57.
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m ore, they were concerned about the Prussian tendency to disperse rather th an  keep the sol­
diers in tight control. The official A ustrian history of the Danish War m aintained that the 
P russian tactics 'could have been very dangerous against an  enem y w ho knew  how  to keep 
his forces concentrated'.84 It is w orth  noticing that this com m ent w as m ade in  1870, that is 
four years after Koniggratz (where the A ustrians had  been defeated by the very  sam e infantry 
tactics), w hich speaks volum es about the am biguity of the lessons of the w ar and  the difficul­
ties the armies faced. Even in  Prussia, the closed order w as considered superior in  the 1860s. 
The Prussian King continued to stress the value of closed form ations and  refused to change 
the infantry drill regulation.85 In 1870, the Germ an forces fought at Gravelotte in  closed for­
m ation w ith disastrous results. The Germ an losses during  the battle am ounted  to over 20,000, 
a quarter of the entire G uard Corps (8,000 officers and  men) died. The French losses were 
over 12,000.86
83‘ Rothenberg, The Army: 64-65; Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 114-116.
84' Cited in Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 115-116.
85' Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 216.
86‘ Howard, Franco-Prussian War:167-182.
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2 Reforming the Russian Army
M ost of the m ajor European armies w ere engaged in handling  rap id  changes of the 1860s and  
1870s. The Russian arm y h ad  been defeated in  the C rim ean War. Spurred b y  the defeat and  
the rap id  transform ation in  Europe, the Russian arm y faced tw o decades of transition an d  re­
form. The C rim ean War had  revealed weaknesses in  every aspect of the Russian m ilitary or­
ganization. This chapter aims to describe the lessons learned from  the C rim ean defeat and  to 
outline the m ajor m ilitary reform s u nder the War M inister Dm itrii Alekseevich M iliutin d u r­
ing the period  1862-1874. A t least some of the m ilitary reform s w ere a reaction to the Prussian  
victories on the battlefield and to the changes in  warfare outlined in  the previous chapter. 
W henever possible, such connections will be identified and, in some cases, expanded upon. 
But, it should  be m ade clear that the aim  here is not to investigate the influence of foreign 
w ars on each of the m ilitary reforms.
After the Crim ean War, a period dom inated by dom estic reform s existed in Russia. The re­
forms during  Alexander IPs reign are popularly  called the 'G reat Reforms'.1 Perhaps the m ost 
fundam ental reform took place in 1861 w ith the em ancipation of the serfs. O ther im portan t 
reform s -  apart from the m ilitary ones -  involved local governm ent, and the judicial system. 
H ow ever painful the defeat of the Russian arm y in the C rim ean War m ay have been, Sevas­
topol w as no  Jena that triggered im m ediate and radical reform s.2 It w as a hum iliating defeat, 
b u t no t fatal. Russia did no t have to su rrender to the com plete will of a foreign power. N ever­
theless, the arm y of Nicholas I, describe by  one historian as Targe in size and  form idable in 
appearance', had  been defeated.3 W hat lessons were learned from  this?
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2.1 Lessons from the Crimea
A  m em orandum  w ritten during the w ar by  D. A. M iliutin, w ho w as an  officer at the War M in­
is te r 's  disposition at the time the m em o was w ritten, listed several difficulties involved w ith  a 
decision to continue fighting.4 The arm y was running out of soldiers and officers to recruit. 
The supplies of w eapons were dim inishing quickly since it h ad  become increasingly difficult 
to  im port rifles from abroad. Food supplies were getting increasingly scarce as w ar zone sup­
plies w ere being depleted and the lines of communications w ere so deficient that bo th  the ac­
quisition of supplies and the transportation of troops were severely affected.
The short m em o eloquently sum m arized the problem s facing the Russian arm y at war. In the 
eyes of at least a few reform -m inded officers, the p roud  arm y of Nicholas I h ad  been thor­
oughly  discredited. One of these officers, General-Adjutant F. V. Rudiger, C om m ander of the 
G uard and  G renadier Corps, had  -  during the sum m er of 1855 -  d raw n the attention of the 
new  Tsar to the problem s in a num ber of reports.5 Rudiger criticized the excessive centraliza-
1- For some good, recent, general studies of the reform period see: Beyrau, Dietrich, Igor Cicurov, and 
Michael Stolleis, eds. Reformen im Ruflland des 19. und 20. Jahhunderts: Westliche Modelle und russische Er- 
fahrungen. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996); Lincoln, W. Bruce. The Great Reforms: Autoc­
racy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia. (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1990); Eklof, Ben, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds. Russia's Great Reforms, 
1855-1881. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). See also Lincoln, W. Bruce. In the Vanguard of 
Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861. Reprint of the 1982 ed. (De Kalb, 111.: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1986). A classical pro-reform description by a prerevolutionary historian was written 
by Dzhanshiev, G. Epokha velikikh reform. (St. Petersburg: B. M. Vol’f, 1907). See also Tatishchev, S. S. 7m- 
perator Alexander II, ego zhizn ' i ego tsarstvovanie. Reprint of 1911 ed. 2 vols. (Moscow: Charli, 1996) who 
devoted several chapters to the different reforms. On the abolishment of serfdom see Field, Daniel. The 
End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia 1855-1861. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1976) and Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Otmena krepostnogo prava v Rossii. 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gosudarst- 
vennoe uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1960). An interesting book on the judicial reform was 
written by Wortman, Richard S. The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976). The reform of the local government is described in Starr, S. Frederick. Decentraliza­
tion and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).
2' Field, The End of Serfdom: 54-55.
3- Fuller, William C., Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free Press, 1992): 241-42. For 
a few relevant studies on the Crimean war and the Russian army, see, for instance, Bestuzhev, I. V. Krym­
skaia voina 1853-56gg. (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1956); Curtiss, John Shelton. Russia's Crimean 
War. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979). Zaionchkovskii, A. M. Vostochnaia voina 1853-1856gg. 
v sviazi s sovremennoi ei politicheskoi obstonovki. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Ekspeditsiia zagotovleniia gos- 
udarstvennykh bumag, 1908-13) was initially planned in several more volumes. As it is, the account 
serves as a detailed introduction to the war.
4‘ Bestuzhev, I. V. Tz istorii krymskoi voiny 1853-1856 gg/, Istoricheskii arkhiv (1,1959): 204-208. Contains 
Miliutin's memorandum 'About the Dangers of Continuing Military Actions in 1856'. It was written at 
the end of 1855.
5‘ Skalon, D. A., ed. Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902 (hereafter Stoletie). 13 vols. (St. Petersburg, 
1902-1914): Vol. 1: Appendix 5-9. Rudiger's first report dated 22 March 1855 was not published. A copy 
of this report, which contain the initial proposal for creating a commission, can be found in the material 
relating to the secret conference held in 1873, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv 
(hereafter RGVIA), F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, ff. 117-126. See also Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 
godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952): 45-46; Brooks, Edwin Willis. 'Re­
form in the Russian Army 1856-61', Slavic Review 43 (1,1984): 63-82; Keep, John L.H. Soldiers of the Tsar: 
Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985): 353-356; Kersnovskii, A. A. Istoriia 
russkoi armii. Reprint of 1933-38 ed. 4 vols. (Moscow: Golos, 1992-94): Vol. 2:175-179.
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tion of the arm y w hich had  deprived com m anders of initiative. H e noted that, in  the arm y of 
N icholas I, any independent actions by officers w ere looked up o n  w ith  the deepest distrust. 
R udiger m aintained that the troops had  been trained for the parade ground only and  no t for 
the battlefield. The m ilitary education of officers needed im provem ent as d id  the entire p ro­
m otion process. He suggested that m erit and know ledge become the leading criterion for p ro­
m otion ra ther than seniority and  patronage.6 Furtherm ore, he proposed that division and 
corps com m anders be given increased responsibilities and pow ers, currently he ld  b y  the 
Com m ander-in-Chief and his staff. Specifically, R udiger advocated that bo th  the positions of 
Com m ander-in-Chief and his staff should be abolished in peacetime. He also recom m ended 
that officers w ho proved to be incom petent should be rem oved from  service.7
It is notew orthy that Rudiger also described the intellectual clim ate of the arm y as being in 
poor condition and needing im provem ent. He observed that it w as particularly  im portan t to 
encourage m ilitary w ritings on contem porary w ars and not stop o r inhibit such w riting  be­
cause the responsible com m anders were still alive. A  m ilitary journal could be created for this 
purpose. Moreover, the creation of regim ental libraries was vital for intellectual stim ulation 
as w as the organization of lectures and w ar games during the w in ter m onths.8
Rudiger w as not alone in expressing his criticism and  General-Adjutant V. A. G linka support­
ed  m any of R udiger's points.9 In July 1855, a special commission, the Com m ission for the Im ­
provem ent of the Military Sphere, was appointed to discuss all the aspects of reform . D. A. 
M iliutin, w ho was appointed a mem ber of the Commission, w rote a m em orandum  that ex­
pressed his thoughts on necessary reforms.10 He m ade a com parison of the m ilitary organiza­
tions of France, Austria and Prussia. H e praised the Prussian system  as being  superio r to all 
others in  term s of num bers and from an economic point of view. However, he  no ted  that the 
P russian Landwehr system  was likely to w ork only in states w here the level of education  was 
sufficiently high and w here the 'sp irit of the people ' and 'civil organization ' (grazhdanskoe us- 
troistvo) were hom ogeneous (edinoobrazno).n  M iliutin clearly though t that the differences be-
6‘ Stoletie: Vol. 1, Appendix 5:22. It is interesting to note that Rudiger advocated this principle not only 
for the army but for all other forms of state service as well.
7‘ Stoletie: Vol. 1, Appendix 6:33; Appendix 7:39-40.
8- Stoletie: Vol. 1, Appendix 8:43-47.
9‘ Glinka's report to Alexander II is published in Stoletie: Vol. 1: Appendix 10.
10- Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Otdel rukopisi, (hereafter RGB OR) F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr. 
29. 'Thoughts on the Existing Disadvantages in the Russian Military System and on the Measures for 
Their Elimination'. 29 March 1856. Zaionchkovskii made a brief summary of the memo in Zaionchko­
vskii, P. A., ed. 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk', in Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina. 4 vols. (Moscow: Gos­
udarstvennaia ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina. Otdel rukopisei., 1947-50): Vol. 1:17 
and in his Voennye reformy: 50 omitting any references to Miliutin's thoughts on Prussia. Miller relied on 
Zaionchkovskii's account, Miller, Forrestt A. Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia. (Charlotte, 
North Carolina: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968): 22. Brooks used the original but did not expand on 
its contents. Brooks, Edwin Willis. 'D.A. Miliutin: Life and Activity to 1856'. Ph.D., Stanford University, 
1970:163-164.
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tw een Prussia and Russia were too large for a Prussian system  to w ork in Russia. 
N evertheless, he advocated the introduction of a sm all standing arm y in peacetim e that could 
be expanded in wartim e. Service time should be reduced to create a reserve force that could 
be called u p  in wartim e. Secondly, he proposed to abolish the peacetim e organization of ar­
m ies and  corps and replace it w ith  m ilitary districts w here all the units for a fu ture w ar 
w ould  be set up  and the expanded w ith reserves in  w artim e.12H e w ould  later acknowledge 
that the idea of a m ilitary district system, as it w as outlined in the report w as largely a result 
of discussions w ith his famous uncle, C ount Pavel D m itrii Kiselev (1788-1872), then M inister 
of State Dom ains.13
In spite of these suggestions for reform, little happened  in the next few years. A lexander II ap ­
poin ted  N. O  Sukhozanet as new  War Minister, a m an of the old school, and  the reform  aspi­
rations came alm ost to a halt. The m ilitary colonies w ere abolished. The arm y w as reduced in 
size, due to the fact that no annual levies took place for three years, from 1.7 m illion m en in 
1856 to 850,000 m en in 1859.14 However, very little w as done in the sphere of m ilitary educa­
tion.15 The m easures taken under Sukhozanet w ere largely focused on adm inistrative m at­
ters. M iliutin reflected that the overriding concern of the highest m ilitary authorities seem ed 
to be to 'reduce, abolish, and d isband '.16 Nevertheless, perhaps one of the m ost significant 
m easures during  this period w as the creation of a new  m ilitary journal, Voennyi sbomik, in 
1858. The journal proved significant for the m ilitary debate. In the initial publications of the 
journal, tw o General Staff officers called for the introduction of a short-service system. One of 
the editors of Voennyi sbomik, N. N. Obruchev, soon one of M iliutin 's closest aides an d  later 
H ead of the General Staff, and N. P. Glinoetskii, a leading m ilitary historian, m ore or less ex­
plicitly expressed the desirability of such a system  in Russia.17 There were also articles that 
severely criticized the old army. M uch debate w as provoked by  N. N . O bruchev 's articles, 
w here he delivered a biting critique of the Russian arm y's supply  system  during  the Crim ean 
War.18 In fact, the articles criticized not only the supply  system , b u t also contained several
1L RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr. 29, ff. 4v-5.
12- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr. 29, ff. 8,10.
13‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 14. ed. khr. 1, f. 78v. 'Memoirs'. 1861. Kiselev had written to Miliutin outlining his 
thoughts on the subject. See RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr, 31. Kiselev, P. D. Thoughts on Staff and Or­
ganization of the Army. 1856.
14- Bogdanovich, M. Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel 'nosti voennogo upravleniia v Rossii v pervoe dvadtsati-piatiletie 
blagopoluchnogo tsarstvovaniia Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra Nikolaevicha (1855-1880 gg.). 6 vols. (St. Pe­
tersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1879-1881): Vol. 1: Appendix 5. See also Keep, Soldiers: 354; Kersnovskii, Istori- 
ia: Vol. 2:176-77.
15‘ Brooks, 'Reform': 70-72.
16- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 13, ed. khr. 3, f. 60. 'Memoirs'. 1858-60.
17’ Obruchev, N.N. 'O vooruzhennoi sile i eia ustroistve', Voennyi sbomik (1,1858): 52-53. Glinoetskii, N. 
P. 'Voennaia statistika i soldatskii byt", Voennyi sbomik (1,1858): 444-445. See also Keep, John L.H. Power 
and the People: Essays on Russian History. (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1995): 267-292 and Aira­
petov, O. R. 'N. N. Obruchev. Zabytaia kar'era "russkogo Mol'tke”', Manuscript, 1996: 34-37.
18‘ Obruchev, N.N. 'Iznanka Krymskoi voiny', Voennyi sbomik (1: 545-586; 2:429-476; 8:239-306,1858).
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jibes at other aspects of the army, including the maltreatment of soldiers, the lack of good 
m aps, and over-heavy equipm ent in view of the changes in tactics that required mobility.19
It is clear that several high-ranking officers learned lessons from the Crimean War, but they 
were few and unable to influence the military decisions in the period immediately following 
the war. Much has been m ade of the so-called revolutionary period within the army at the 
end of the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s -  especially by Soviet historians.20 Conven­
tional history has it that N. N. Obruchev took part in revolutionary activities and was a m em ­
ber of the radical group Zemlia i volia 21 Recently, serious doubts has been cast on w hether this
r\r\
actually was the case. Furthermore, the leading military thinker, M. I. Dragomirov, is said to 
have been a member of a circle of radical professors at the Nicholas Academy of the General 
Staff, which was linked to N. G. Chemyshevskii, but no substantial evidence is shown to sup­
port the claim 23A num ber of officer were, in fact, involved in revolutionary activity during 
these years, but to what extent and how high it had penetrated in the hierarchy is more uncer­
tain.24
2.2 Miliutin and the Military Reforms
Before examining the military reforms under D. A. Miliutin between 1862 and 1874, a few 
words of clarification seem apt. To describe the reforms and Miliutin, words such as 'liberal', 
'progressive', 'radical', and 'red ' can be found in abundance in the literature of Soviet and
19- Obruchev, 'Iznanka' (2,1858): 435-36,455,463-64,474.
20- D’iakov, V. A. 'Peterburgskie ofitserskie organizatsii kontsa 50-kh-nachala 60-kh g. XIX v. i ikh rol’ v 
istorii russko-pol’skikh revoliutsionnykh sviazei', in Iz istorii klassovoi bor'by i natsional'no-osvoboditel'no- 
go dvizheniia v slavianskikh stranakh, edited by I. A. Khrenov. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964): 268-359; D'iakov, V. 
A. Deiateli russkogo i pol'skogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v tsarskoi armii 1856-1865 godov. (Moscow: N au­
ka, 1967); D'iakov, V. A., and I. S. Miller. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii i vosstanie 1863. (Mos­
cow: Nauka, 1964); D’iakov, V. A. 'Soldatskoe dvizhenie v 1856-1865 gg.', in Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v 
Rossii 1859-1861, edited by M. V. Nechkina. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970): 71-89; Fedorov, A.V. Russkaia armiia 
v 50-70 godakh XIX veka. (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1959); 50-98; Taubin, P. A. 
'K voprosu o roli N. G. Chernysevskogo v sozdanii "Revoliutsionnoi Partii" v kontse 50-kh-nachale 60- 
kh godov XIX v.', Istoricheskie zapiski 39 (1952): 59-97.
21 • Barbasov, A. 'Russkii voennyi deiatel1 N.N. Obruchev', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 15 (8 August, 
1973): 100-105. D'iakov, 'Peterburgskie': passim; D'iakov, Deiateli russkogo: 125. D'iakov and Miller, Revo­
liutsionnoe dvizhenie: 120ff. Jakobs, Peter. Das Werden des franzdsisch-russischen Zweibundes 1890-1894, 
M arburger Abhandlungen zur Geschichte und Kultur Osteuropas. Bd 8. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassow- 
itz, 1968): 29-32; Kennan, George F. The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 
1875-1890. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979): 44-46; Ulam, Adam  B. In the Name of the 
People. (New York: Viking Press, 1977): 72-73, 84-87,99-101.
22- Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar'era': 41-43, 48-49; Airapetov, O. R. 'Nikolai Nikolaevich Obruchev', Voprosy 
istorii (7,1996): 49-69.
23‘ D'iakov, 'Peterburgskie': 286, 317,350. The General Staff officers and later revolutionary-emigre 
Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov claimed that Dragomirov was a supporter of Herzen at the end of the 
1850s. Veniukov, M. I. Iz vospominaniia. 3 vols. (Amsterdam, 1895): Vol. 1: 63.
24' In 1862,130 officers were convicted for illegal political activity. The docum ent in RGB OR lists all of 
them: F. 169, k. 40, ed. khr. 7. Heyden, F. L. 'Short Note on Persons w ithin the Military Department In­
volved in Political Crimes'. Neither Obruchev or Dragomirov found on this list.
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W estern historiography, stretching from  pre-revolutionary to contem porary accounts. H ere it 
is im portant to point out where M iliutin stood on a few significant issues.25 For instance, M il­
iu tin  played an instrum ental role in the m ilitary reforms, not the least due to the fact th a t du r­
ing his long tenure as War M inister he could see m any of the reform s im plem ented.
M iliutin was a firm  supporter of the autocracy and view ed the reforms as necessary to p re­
serve it. He disliked hereditary privileges and believed that m erit and  know ledge should  be 
the sole criteria for prom otion 26In the mid-60s, he sum m arized his view s in a rare profession 
defoi:
In our view, there are two fundamental, essential conditions [which are] the sine qua non 
without which every political theory in application to Russia ought to be considered 
worthless. The first is the unity and integrity of the state; the second is the equality of all 
its members. For the first condition, a strong central power and a decisive predomi­
nance of the Russian element (we are talking about the Empire...) are necessary. For the 
second condition, it is essential to cast away all outdated outlived privileges, to take 
leave, once and for all, of the rights of social group (kasta) over another. But a strong 
central power precludes neither personal freedom of the citizens nor does it preclude 
self-government; neither does the predominance of the Russian element mean the op­
pression and destruction of other nationalities. Rather, it means the elimination of an­
cient privileges...27
He was convinced that only by creating a nation of equal citizens w ould  the autocracy sur­
vive and he firmly supported  the em ancipation of the serfs. In this m em o of 1856, he explicit­
ly stated that serfdom  hindered the shortening of the time of service.28His m ain  argum ent 
was based on the firm conviction that only by creating equal citizens could the un ity  of the 
state be preserved 29 By educating soldiers and officers, the nation w ould  benefit in  tw o 
ways: the m en w ould  not only become better from a m ilitary poin t of view, they  w ould  also 
become better citizens.30
25- The best work on the development of Miliutin's ideas is Brooks, 'D. A. Miliutin'. Useful are also Za- 
ionchkovskii's biographical account, 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk', in Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina, 
Vol. 1: 5-72 and Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 'Vydaiushchiisia uchenyi i reformator russkoi armii', Voenno-is- 
toricheskii zhurnal (12,1965): 32-43. See also Miller, Forrestt A. 'Dmitrii Miliutin: Liberal or Conserva­
tive?', Jahrbiicher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas 13 (2,1965): 192-98; Lincoln, Bruce. 'D. A. Miliutin's Views on 
Russia and Reform', in Miliutin, D. A. Vospominaniia 1816-1843. (Moscow: Rossiiskii arkhiv, 1997): 479- 
485. Reprint of the 1979 ed. Miliutin as a military thinker has been treated by Osipova, M. 'Obzor voen- 
no-nauchnykh trudov D.A. Miliutina', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (9,1972): 102-107; Osipova, Margarita 
Nikolaevna. 'Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii v nauchnom nasledii D.A. Miliutina'. Avtoreferat dissertat- 
sii na stepeni kandidat istoricheskikh nauk, Institut voennoi istorii, Ministerstva oborony SSSR, Mos­
cow, 1977. Miliutin's influence on foreign policy is briefly sketched by Hammer, Michel. 'D.A. Miljutin 
et la Politique Exterieure de la Russie', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 23 (3-4,1982): 333-349.
26- In a letter from A. I. Bariatinskii to Alexander II in 1860, he characterized Miliutin as a person who 
discriminated in favour of officers with higher education at the expense of others. Bariatinskii also not­
ed Miliutin's dislike of aristocracy: 'He is hostile to everything aristocratic, especially to everything with 
titles, and for this reason I suggest that in time it would be useful to give him a title.' Miliutin received 
the title Count in 1878. At the publication of the biography on A. I. Bariatinskii in 1889, Miliutin blocked 
the publication of this letter. Zakharova, L. 'Dmitrii Alekseevich Miliutin, ego vremia i ego memuary', in 
Miliutin, D. A. Vospominaniia: 13-14.
27‘ Zaionchkovskii, 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk': 32. See also Lincoln, 'D. A. Miliutin's Views': 
482-83.
28‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr. 29, ff. 7, lOv.
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2.2.1 The Importance of Education
As w e have seen, it w as the C rim ean War that highlighted the need for educated  officers. The 
introduction of rifles w as changing the w ay battles were fought and  officers n eeded  a good 
m ilitary education. The fact that Miliutin, at the beginning of his tw enty-year term  as War 
M inister, concentrated on educational reforms, ra ther than pursu ing  the issue of a conscript 
army, w hich he recognized w ould  m eet stiff opposition, suggests that he w as w ell aw are of 
the requirem ents of m odem  warfare. M iliutin's reform s created a new  system  for m ilitary ed­
ucation, based prim arily on talent and  m erit rather than on b irth  and  patronage.
A ttracting officers becam e increasingly difficult as the aristocracy tu rned  aw ay from  the tra­
ditional service. It was no  longer as prestigious to serve as it h ad  been and  the b ad  financial 
situation after the Crim ean War d id  nothing to im prove the situation. M iliutin no ted  th a t m il­
itary service had  lost its attraction to young m en and  that they often view ed service w ith  con­
tem pt.31 The base for recruiting officers needed to be extended beyond the aristocracy which, 
in tu rn , required a reform  of the m ilitary educational system.
The Russian officer corps w as traditionally draw n from  tw o m ain groups: a round  a quarter of 
all officers came from the m ilitary educational institutions, that is, the Page Corps, the C adet 
Corps, and  special m ilitary schools for artillery and  engineering. The m ajority of the officer 
corps w as either form er soldiers or junkers w ho had  volunteered. The officer corps -  as w as 
the case everyw here in Europe at this time -  w as predom inantly  noble.32 The m ajority of of­
ficers, those w ho had  no t been educated at the m ilitary educational institutions, h ad  no  or 
very little formal, general education. In 1861, m ore than  54 per cent of all officers h ad  only 
been to elem entary school or had  received their education at home. In the infantry  alone, ap­
proxim ately 80 per cent of the officers had  no m ore than  elem entary education.33 This system  
had  tw o basic problems. First, it d id  no t produce enough officers. Second, the quality  of the
29' It has been suggested by Rieber that the military arguments were decisive for emanicaption. He ar­
gued that emancipation was necessary in order to create a large short-service army since serfs released 
from military service became free. However appealing such a theory may seem, it ignores the economic 
and other factors as impetus for reform. Furthermore, it would have been possible to create a fairly 
large, trained reserve even without emancipation by extending the obligation of service to groups that 
were exempt.The army conscripts did not solely consist of serfs, but also state and crown peasants, 
town labourers and other categories who paid the poll tax. Rieber, Alfred, ed. The Politics of Autocracy: 
Letters of Alexander II to Prince Bariatinskii 1857-64. (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1966): 25. Field provided an in­
teresting discussion on the reasons behind emancipation. Field, The End of Serfdom. See also Beyrau, Di­
etrich. 'Von der Niederlage zur Agrarreform', Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 23 (1975): 191-212.
30‘ See, for instance, RGB OR, F. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 4, ff. 147,161,162v. 'Memoirs'. 1863, and Miliutin, 
D.A. 'Vsepoddaneishii doklad po voennomu ministerstvu 15-go ianvaria 1862 goda' in Stoletie: Vol. 1: 
Appendix 11: 92.
3L RGB OR, F. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 4, f. 163.
32- See Chapter 1.
33‘ Lalaev, M. Istoricheskii ocherk voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii. (St. Petersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1880): Part 
2:189-190; Bobrovskii, P. O. 'Plan uchebnoi chasti v iunkerskikh shkolakh', Pedagogicheskii sbomik (14, 
1865): 1194; Screen, J. E. O. The Helsinki Yunker School 1846-1879: A  Case Study of Officer Training in the 
Russian Army. (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1986): 18.
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education was not high enough to meet the dem ands of rapid technological change and m od­
em  warfare.
In 1862 M iliutin drew up a programme that would transform the Russian m ilitary education­
alal system. He tried to abolish the Cadet Corps by transforming M into m ilitary gymnasia. 
M iliutin's main argument against the Cadet Corps was that % w m  inefficient and expensive. 
He had also noted how bad it was to give children -  a cadet usually entered service at the age 
of six or eight -  a military education before they were m ature enough.35 The creation of mili­
tary gymnasia was, in effect, an effort to de-militarize the early stages of officer education. 
The gymnasia followed the curriculum of the civilian Realschule w ith emphasis on m athem at­
ics and foreign languages. Civilian teachers were recruited and soon the military gymnasia 
had acquired a reputation as being the best secondary schools in Russia.36 The m ilitary au­
thorities em phasized the recruitment and training of the teachers and a special pedagogical 
journal, Pedagogicheskii sbomik, was founded in 1864.37 A graduate of the gym nasium  contin­
ued the studies to receive specialized military training at a so-called military school (voennoe 
uchilishche), where he studied special military subjects such as strategy, tactics, and fortifica­
tion. The engineering and artillery schools had a three-year programme, whereas the infantry 
and cavalry schools had a two-year training programme. Approximately 600 officers graduat­
ed from the military schools each year. Trying to separate general and military education was 
a big step forward towards the m odernization and professionalization of officer training. The 
effort to abolish the Cadet Corps was partly undone by Alexander III who abolished the gym­
nasia, reintroduced the Cadet Corps and fired the civilian teachers 38
For the majority, however, the military gymnasia were still out of reach. In order to be able to 
recruit more broadly the junker schools were reformed. These, according to M iliutin, had the 
largest potential for producing officers.39 The first junker schools had been established in the 
1820s at some corps or army headquarters in order to provide some education for non-com­
missioned officers seeking a commission.40 The quality of education varied am ong the
34- Miliutin, D. A. 'Mnenie o voenno-uchebnykh zavedeniiakh', in Stoletie: Vol. 10, Part 3:188-195. A 
copy of this report can be found in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 24. ed.khr. 3. For more on the reforms of the mili­
tary educational system, see Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 221-253; Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin: 88-141; 
Stein, Hans-Peter. 'Der Offizer der russischen Heeres im Zeitabschnitt zwischen Reform und  Revolu­
tion', Forschungen zur osteuropdischen Geschichte 13 (1967): 365-367,392-397. A factual account is provided 
by Lalaev, Istoricheskii ocherk, Part 2: Chapters 5-7.
35■ Miliutin, 'Mnenie': 188-192.
36, RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. lOlv. 'Memoirs'. 1870-71. See also Lalaev, Istoricheskii ocherk: Ap­
pendix II and III for a comparison of the curricula of the Cadet Corps and the military gymnasia.
37 A special two-year training course for teachers in the military gymnasia was created in 1865 at the 
Second Petersburg Military Gymnasium. Lalaev, Istoricheskii ocherk: Part 2:139-143,155-156; Polnoe so- 
branie zakonov (hereafter PSZ) II: XL, 41808 (13 Feb. 1865), XLIV, 46712 (1 Feb. 1869).
38’ Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 1881-1903. (Moscow:
Mysl', 1973): 299.
39- Miliutin, 'M nenie': 194. See also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 243.
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schools, and  -  m ore seriously -  since they were attached to headquarters, they w ere d isband­
ed  in  tim es of war.41 M iliutin tied the junker schools to the m ilitary district system  and  each 
district Chief-of-Staff was in charge of the school42 Since they w ere attached to  the staff, the 
school could continue to exist in  wartim e. Furtherm ore, the curriculum  w as unified and  su ­
pervised  by the Suprem e A dm inistration of the Institutions of M ilitary Instruction w ith in  the 
War Ministry. These junker schools were opened to non-nobles and entrance to the tw o-year 
program m e w as gained through examination. The social com position of the junkers changed 
considerably The percentage of nobles in the junker schools w as 86 per cent betw een 1868-72, 
54 per cent in  1894, and  37 per cent in 1905.43 The junker schools produced around 1,000 offic­
ers a year.
The em phasis of these reforms lay on education. Anyone w ho had  com pleted studies at a 
higher educational institution and  had  passed the exam ination in m ilitary studies at a m ili­
tary  school could get prom oted to officer after only a few m onths of service. Those w ith  sec­
ondary  education had  to take the test and  serve at least a year. In 1868, it w as decided no t to 
com m ission anyone to officer's status unless he had  passed the exam ination from  either a 
m ilitary or a junker school.44 This em phasis on officer education was an  exception in com par­
ison to other European armies. Stein rem arked that the Prussian arm y had  abolished the p riv ­
ilege of b irth  by 1808 and yet, at the beginning of the First World War, had  no t recognized the 
low er school certificate (Primareife) as a requirem ent for en try  into the officer corps.45
Efforts w ere also m ade to im prove education for non-com m issioned officers. The arm y suf­
fered a severe lack of trained NCOs. In 1867, special training units (uchebnye komandy) w ere 
established at the regim ental level w ith  the aim  to raise the level of education am ong NCOs.46 
In 1870, approxim ately 1,500 N C O 's attended the tw o-year course, w hich contained both  m il­
itary training and basic skills in reading and writing. In that sam e year, M ajor-General P. O.
40- Bobrovskii, P. O. 'Ob uchrezhdenii iunkerskikh uchilishch', Voennyi sbomik (11,1864): 92-144.
41 • Bobrovskii, 'Ob uchrezhdenii': 94-95; Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin: 103-104; Kenez, Peter. 'A Profile of the 
Prerevolutionary Officer Corps', California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 125-126.
42‘ The military districts were created in 1864-65. Initially there were ten districts that in 1871 had grown 
to fourteen. As they were created army and corps organization was abolished and the division became 
the largest unit within the district. This was controversial among some of the generals and, as we shall 
see, was used against Miliutin at the strategic conference in 1873. On the military district reform, see Za­
ionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 85-99; Miller, D. A. Miliutin: 40-50; Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk, Vol. 
4: 30-51. See also Miliutin's own account in [Miliutin, D. A.] 'Voennye reformy imperatora Aleksandra 
II', Vestnik Evropy (1,1882): 21-35.
43- Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 243; Kenez, 'Profile': 127.
Stein, 'Der Offizer': 396; Screen, Helsinki Yunker School: 25.
45- Stein, 'Der Offizer': 397.
46, 'Prikaz po voennomu vedomstvu No 262' published in Voennyi sbornik (11,1867): 143-157; Bo­
brovskii, P. O. 'Uchebnye komandy (polkovye shkoly)', Pedagogicheskii sbomik (8,1870): 807-829; Bo­
brovskii, P. O. 'Vzgliad na gramotnost’ i uchebnie komandy (ili polkovyie shkoly) v nashei armii', 
Voennyi sbomik (1870:12:279-310; 1871: 3:41-87; 4:283-297); Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk: Vol. 3:124; 
Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 215.
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Bobrovskii, H ead of the M ilitary Justice Academ y 1875 through 1897, inspected several train­
ing units and em phasized that contem porary w ars - especially the A ustro-Prussian War - h ad  
underlined  the need to im prove the level of education throughout the army. H e m ade no se­
cret of the frustration of the m ilitary authorities w ith the poor level of general education.47 
Likewise, Major-General M. N. Annenkov, one of the observers w ith the P russian arm y in 
1870-71, explicitly noted  that -  in  his view  -  it w as the educated Prussian N CO w ho h ad  m ost 
contributed to the success of the P russian arm y48
It w as clear to D. A. M iliutin that the arm y could not w ait for the M inistry of Education to in­
troduce a com prehensive elem entary educational system  49 The changing times m ade it m ore 
necessary than  ever to have educated soldiers and  officers. The literacy rate am ong the sol­
diers of Russian arm y was very low  com pared to other European armies. According to official 
sources, less than ten per cent of the new  recruits 1867-1869 were literate. In 1867, the literacy 
rate am ong the new  recruits was estim ated at 9.27 per cent. The rate rose slowly and, in  1873, 
it w as estim ated at 12.17 per cent am ong the new  recruits.50 In 1866, only 20 per cent of sol­
diers w ere thought to be literate.51 This figure compares well w ith  that of the A ustrian  army, 
w here the literacy rate am ong new  recruits was less than ten per cent in the mid-1860s, bu t is 
far less than  Prussia, w here the literacy rate am ong recruits w as 96 per cent, than England at 
77 p er cent, and  than France at 67 per cent.52 It should be noted that the figures varied greatly 
betw een the different branches of service. The soldiers in the G uards C orps had  a literacy rate 
estim ated at 60 per cent. Artillery and  engineering troops, unsurprisingly, also had  a consid­
erably higher degree of literacy than  the infantry.53
In 1867 m andatory  courses in literacy were introduced for all soldiers.54 By 1868, the War 
M inistry began to provide a small sum  of m oney for the necessary educational supplies.55
47‘ Bobrovskii, 'Uchebnye komandy': 808-809.
48- Annenkov, Michail Nikolaevich. Voina 1870 goda. Zametki i vpechatleniia russkogo ofitsera. (St. Peters­
burg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1871): 8
49- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, ed. khr. 2, f. 132v. 'Memoirs'. 1865.
50‘ Bobrovskii, 'Vzgliad na gramotnost’'(12,1870): 280; 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (4, 
1874): 154.See also 'Zametka ob uspekhakh gramotnykh nizhnykh chinov', Russkii invalid, 25 Jan. 1869, 
and Obruchev, N. N., ed. Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik. 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1867- 
71): Vol. 4, Part 2:35. Since the War Ministry only started collecting information about literacy among 
new recruits in 1867, these figures should be seen as approximations rather than the absolute rates cited 
in the official accounts.
51‘ Bobrovskii, P. O. 'Zatrudneniia v khode obucheniia gramotnosti v voiskakh', Pedagogicheskii sbomik 
(10,1870): 1047. The figure, 34 per cent literate soldiers, in the military statistical collection seems exag­
gerated. Obruchev, Voenno-statisticheskii: Vol. 4, Part 2:207.
52‘ Rothenberg, Gunther. The Army of Francis Joseph. (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 
1976): 61; Obruchev, Voenno-statisticheskii: Vol. 1:40,109; Bobrovskii, 'Zatrudneniia': 1047.
53- Bobrovskii, 'Vzgliad na gramotnost1' (12,1870): 282.
54‘ 'Prikaz po voennomu vedomstvu No 262', § 47. See also Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk, Vol. 3:123-
125; Keep, Soldiers: 370; Brooks, Jeffrey. When Russia Learned to Read. Literacy and Popular Literature 1861- 
1917. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1985): 18-22.
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Even the M ilitary Scientific Committee, which was responsible for all w ar planning, w as en­
gaged in  the efforts to increase literacy.56 It m ade inspections in  St. Petersburg M ilitary Dis­
trict, w here a special school for illiterate soldiers (created un d er the auspices of the influential 
pedagogue and teacher N. P. Stolpianskii) focused on teaching illiterate soldiers so th a t they, 
in  tu rn , could teach others.57
A n im portan t role in M iliutin 's efforts to raise the level of education am ong soldiers w as 
p layed  by  A. F. Pogosskii (1816-1874), the editor of the journals Soldatskaia beseda (1858-1863) 
an d  Dosug i delo (1867-1874). Both journals were aim ed at p roviding reading for soldiers, and 
Pogosskii wrote m any popular short-stories in the journals. Soldatskaia beseda gained im m edi­
ate popularity  and its circulation rose from 5,195 to 6,176 in I860.58 In 1866, Pogosskii w rote 
an article in  Voennyi sbomik, clearly w ith M iliutin's support,59 claiming that the shortened 
service time, the abolition of corporal punishm ent and  the need for intellectual developm ent 
h ad  already changed the life of the Russian soldier. C om paring literacy w ith  a pow erful 
w eapon to be used to im prove m orale and the intellectual climate am ong the troops, he 
wrote:
Literature is replacing the old disciplinary measures.... A correct cultivation of literacy 
does not fail to bear fruit, but helps develop the moral strength - and consequently the 
physical strength - of the troops, which at the same time is beneficial for the entire pop­
ulation.60
Some officers, for instance P. O. Bobrovskii felt that in  spite of these efforts, no t enough was 
being done, and he suggested several measures to im prove the quality of teaching literacy.61 
Still, literacy courses were introduced before universal conscription in  1874.62 D uring the next 
tw enty four years, the percentage of literate soldier in  the entire arm y had  m ore than  do u ­
bled, from  around 20 per cent in 1868 to 54 per cent in 1892.63 A t the sam e time, the literacy
55- In 1868, the War Ministry designated 50,000 roubles for this purpose. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye re­
formy: 212.
56‘ Svod Voennykh Postanovlenii 1869 (hereafter SVP): Part. 1, Voennye upravleniia, Book. 1, Voennoe minis­
terstvo, Art. 154.
57‘ Between January and May in 1870,30 soldiers of 47 soldiers had learned to teach other soldiers to 
read and write. Stolpianskii, N. 'Obuchenie nizhnykh chinov gramote', Russkii invalid, 7 June 1870.
58‘ Barenbaum, I. E. 'Narodnye zhumaly A. E Pogosskogo v gody revliutsionnoi situatsii', in Revoliut- 
sionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859-1861 gg., edited by M. V. Nechkina. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970): 213. For a 
contemporary appreciation of Pogosskii's work, see Bobrovskii, 'Vzgliadna gramotnost" (12,1870): 307.
59- Pogosskii was out of Russia between 1863 and 1867, officially for curing his health, but more likely 
because of his sympathies with Poland in 1863. In 1866, VUK expressed support for the publication of 
Pogosskii's short-stories. RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 342, f. 1. 'Journals VUK'. 1866. Barenbaum, 'Narodnye 
zhumaly': 199-200.
60- Pogosskii, A. F. 'O gramotnosti v voiskakh', Voennyi sbomik (6,1866): 264.
61 ■ See all the three articles Bobrovskii, 'Vzgliad na gramotnost".
62- Bushnell, John. 'Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society7, Journal of Social History 
13 (4,1980): 565-576; Bushnell, John. Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-06. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985): 5,261, and Eklof, Ben. Russian Peasant Schools. Official­
dom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy 1861-1914. (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1986): 124-125 wrongly stated 1874 or 1875 as the year of introducing obligatory literacy 
courses.
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rate am ong the new  recruits rose faster, from around nine per cent to 34 per cent. It m ay be an 
exaggeration to say that the arm y became the school of the nation, b u t the educational s tand­
ard w as still h igher am ong soldiers than w ithin the peasant population. It is clear that the ed­
ucational efforts played an im portant role in  strengthening the m orale of the troops. The 
young cavalry officer, V ladim ir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov, the fu ture W ar M inister (1909- 
1915), serving in W arsaw in 1870, w ould  later recall how  he taught soldiers to  w rite letters 
and  that they soon w ere able to do it by  them selves.64According to the British m ilitary attache 
and  observer of the Russo-Turkish w ar in 1877-78, the im provem ents for the soldier m ade by 
M iliutin greatly contributed to a successful outcom e of that war.65
U nder A lexander HI teaching soldiers literacy w as no longer obligatory, b u t nevertheless con­
tinued  throughout the 1880s. In the beginning of the 1890s, only one m ilitary district m ain­
tained literacy courses. It was in Kiev M ilitary District under the com m ander, M. I. 
Dragomirov, w hose ideas and im pressions from foreign wars will be analysed in  C hapter 4.
2.2.2 The Call for a Common Cause
As w e have seen, the experiences from the Crim ean War had  show n that the lack of a trained 
reserve force in times of w ar could have fatal consequences. Before the war, the standing 
arm y num bered 1,170,000 men. D uring the war, the arm y m ore than doubled in size. W hen 
the w ar was over, the num ber of m en had  reached 2,500,000.66 In spite of this enorm ous ef­
fort, Russia had  lost the war. The solution -  according to the War Minister, D. A. M iliutin -  
w as to create a sm all peacetime arm y w ith a large trained reserve force that could be called 
u p  in wartim e. In his report to A lexander I I 15 January 1862, he m ade a com parison betw een 
the reserve forces of other European armies:67
63‘ Bobrovskii, 'Vzgliad na gramotnost1' (12,1870): 282; Keep, Soldiers: 370; Zaionchkovskii, Samod- 
erzhavie: 275-277.
^  Sukhomlinov, V.A. Vospominaniia. (Berlin: Russkoe universal’noe izdatel’stvo, 1924): 9.
65. Wellesley, Frederick A. With the Russians in Peace and War. Recollections of a Military Attache. (London: 
Eveleigh Nash, 1905): 285. A less positive view was given by the Prussian ambassador to Russia 1876- 
1892, formerly military plenipotentiary at the Russian court 1865-1869, General von Schweinitz. In his 
view Miliutin treated the army not so much as an instrument for war as an 'institute for general educa­
tion'. Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Botschafters H.L. von Schweinitz. 2 vols. (Berlin: 
Verlag vom Reimar Hobbing, 1927): Vol. 2: 53.
^  RGVIA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 74v-75. 'Considerations on the Defence of Russia'. 19 Jan. 1873.
67' Miliutin, 'Vsepoddaneishii doklad': 75-86.
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TABLE 1 Reserve Forces in European Armies 1862
Peacetime Wartime Ratio
France 400,000 800,000 1:2
Austria 280,000 625,000 1:2.2
Prussia 200,000 695,000 1:3.4
Russia h ad  a peacetim e arm y of 765,532 m en and could -  officially -  expand to alm ost double 
that n um ber in times of war, b u t according to Miliutin, such an expansion w as illusory be­
cause it w as based on inaccurate data. In actual fact, M iliutin estim ated the reserves to be
242.000 m en. In order to create a substantial reserve force, he proposed an  annual intake of
100.000 m en serving eight years. In seven years, the reserves w ould  num ber 700,000 m en. 
This d id  no t quite succeed but, in 1869, the num ber of reserves rose to over 500,000 m en.68 
M eanw hile, the period  of service had  been reduced first in 1859 from  fifteen to tw elve years, 
and  then  in  1868 from  twelve to ten years.69
These reform s m ight have stopped here had  it not been for tw o significant events: the P rus­
sian success in the w ar against France and the timely intervention by  the ex-M inister of the 
Interior, M em ber of the State Council, P. A. Valuev. The introduction of universal m ilitary 
service in  Russia was a hard-w on battle w ith discussions and  debates stretching over three 
years before the law  finally came into effect.70In 1870, a Com mission w ith in  the War M inistry 
h ad  been  created to w ork on the issue of universal conscription and  it com pleted its d iscus­
sions in  the beginning of 1873. The proposals were then discussed in  the State Council, before 
they could become law  in 1874.71 There are already several studies that describe the in troduc­
tion of universal conscription in Russia. Here it is relevant to examine Valuev's influential 
m em orandum  to Alexander II more closely.
It is perhaps ironic that a civilian rather than a soldier played such a crucial role in  convincing 
A lexander II of the need for change in the army. Valuev h ad  been travelling in  Bavaria w hen
68‘ Obruchev, Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik: Vol. 4, Part 2: 76; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy. 79.
69- PSZII: XXXIX. 34882. (8 Sept. 1859); 45876 (20 May 1868).
70- PSZ II: XLIX. 52983 (1 Jan. 1874).
71 ■ The discussions of the Commission on universal military service are found in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 25, 
ed. khr. 2,8,10-16, 'Commission on Military Service', and ibid. k. 24, ed. khr. 42, 'On the Introduction of 
Universal Military Service'. The questions discussed and the members of the Commission are listed in 
RGB OR, F. 169, k. 24, ed. khr. 38, f.3. 'The Creation of the Commissions'. The discussions in the State 
Council are described in Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 304-334, Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 'Podgotovka 
voennoi reformy 1874', Istoricheskie zapiski (27,1948): 170-201; and Baumann, Robert Fred. 'The Debates 
over Universal Military Service in Russia 1870-74'. Ph.D, Yale University, 1982: esp. Chapters 4-7. Miller 
also treated the introduction of conscription, though without the benefit of archival sources. Miller, 
Dmitrii Miliutin: Chapter 6. See also Beyrau, Dietrich. Militdr und Gesellschaft im Vorrevolutiondren Russ- 
land, (Koln: Bohlau Verlag, 1984): 263-276; Dzhanshiev, Epokha velikikh reform: 509-530.
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German troops mobilized in the sum m er of 1870. His impressions had confirmed his belief in 
the need for a radical change of the Russian army and he expressed his thoughts in a memo­
randum  to Alexander II in the autum n 1870, 'A Non-Military M an's Thoughts on our Armed 
Forces'.72 In so doing, he lent his full support to D. A. Miliutin, who had prom pted him  to put 
his thoughts on paper for Alexander II.
P. A. Valuev and D. A. Miliutin m ade a curious pair. The latter was driven by the conviction 
that w ithout reforms the autocracy was threatened. Valuev, on the other hand, was a conserv­
ative and they disagreed on m ost political issues although M iliutin later described him  as 
'one of the most enlightened conservatives'.73 When it came to the army, Valuev supported 
the War Minister several times. In the wake of the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, Valuev not 
only helped Miliutin in the latter's pledges for a larger military budget, but also wrote a note 
to Miliutin arguing for the introduction of universal military service. It was inevitable, Valuev 
thought, in order to secure a larger reserve force and more officers.74
The m em orandum  of 1870 was well received by Alexander II, who wrote at the top of the first 
page 'Completely coincides with my own thoughts, that I hope will be carried out as far as 
possible'.75 Valuev -  who at the time had no official em ployment -  clearly had the Tsar's ear 
and there can be no doubt that Valuev's note played a vital role in convincing the Tsar of the 
inevitability of the reform. Furthermore, Valuev's thoughts reveal that he, like Miliutin, be­
lieved that the experience of universal military service w ould strengthen the possibility of a 
more united society.
'W hat is the reason for the remarkable success of Germany', Valuev asked. 'A nd if the reason 
can be found in the German military organization, can we adopt it - if not entirely so, at least 
partly'? Not surprisingly, Valuev found the reason for the German success in the military or­
ganization, in the speed and order with which the mobilization was carried out. He conclud­
ed that this scenario would not be possible in Russia, because the Russian territory was much 
larger and communications were insufficient. Furthermore, Russia did not have the popula­
tion density of Prussia which m ade the arm y's transition to a w ar footing easier for the Prus-
72- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. 20-29. Another copy of Valuev's m em orandum  is kept in RGB OR, F. 
169, k. 22, d. khr. 45. It was first analysed by Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy. 259-flftand in Zaionchko­
vskii, P. A. 'P. A. Valuev (Biograficheskii ocherk)', in Dnevnik P. A. Valueva. (Moscow: Izdaltel’stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961): 45-46. Baumann also used the m em orandum . Baumann, 'The Debates': 37- 
38. All these accounts contain certain - in my view - significant omissions.
73- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 50v. On their disagreements, see for instance RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, 
ed. khr. 3, ff. 134,136. 'Memoirs'. 1866. Miliutin was som ewhat reluctantly fascinated by Valuev and de­
voted several pages in his memoirs to describe Valuev's early career. RGB OR F. 169, k. 13. ed.khr. 4, ff. 
54v-55v. 'Memoirs'. 1860-61. Although they were about the same age and both came from Moscow, their 
views on most subjects were quite divergent.
74- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 1, f. 28. 'Memoirs'. 1867. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, ff. 50v-52.
75- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 20. The Tsar's note was w ritten  on 6 Oct. 1870.
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sians. H e drew the same conclusion as had the War Ministry; namely, that preparations for 
w ar should be made in peacetime. But even if they were done, it would by no means ensure 
Russian success. Valuev presumed that the War Ministry had done all in its pow er to make 
the necessary preparations. What was needed now was complete cooperation w ith the state's 
civilian institutions -  the recognition of a common cause:
On the whole, in our military State it seems that the Russian army and the Russian mil­
itary departm ents somehow are not ours, but outsiders. Not only do other depart­
ments, but also so called society, often treat it [the army] w ith remarkable indifference 
and even unsympathetically.76
According to Valuev, too many critics seemed more interested in finding and pointing out 
faults in the army than in making real improvements and achieving success. The armed forc­
es themselves bore some of the blame for this isolation, but this lack of unity in Russia w ould 
have fatal consequences for a Russian mobilization. So w hat could be done? He found the an­
swer in extending military service -  w ith certain restrictions -  to those parts of society that 
were exempt. With the impression of the German success on the battlefield still fresh, the time 
was right. Knowing how sensitive the issue of universal conscription was, Valuev crafted his 
arguments carefully by stating that universal military service w ould ensure (1) a sufficient 
num ber of officers both in peacetime and in wartime, and (2) one form of elementary educa­
tion.
Regarding the first point, Valuev had a case. The inability of the Russian military system to 
produce enough officers grew worse every year. In 1868, there was a lack of 1,400 officers in 
peacetime and 5,560 in wartime. By 1870, the figures had increased to 2,770 and 6,820, respec-
Valuev pointed out that universal m ilitary service in Prussia had not led to any internal dis­
turbances, but on the contrary:
...everywhere develops a feeling of solidarity w ith the general military affairs of the 
country .... It is said that the Prussian military system puts the army closer to the people.
Would it not be more correct to say that the system puts the whole country's population 
closer to the army?78
In supporting Miliutin in the dem and for universal m ilitary service, Valuev acted as he w ant­
ed other civilians to act. He threw himself behind the common cause of defending Russia. 
This echoes the Prussian reformer, Schamhorst, who aimed to raise and inspire the spirit of
79the army and to bring the army and the nation into a more intimate union.
76- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 24v.
71 ■ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, f. 78. 'Memoirs'. 1868-69. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii, (hereafter GARF), F. 677, op. 1, d. 345, f. 26. 'About the Basic Status of Individual Military Service'.
78‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 26v.
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The system  of 1874 w as no t universal in  the true sense of the word, b u t it a t least greatly ex­
p anded  the pool from w hich the arm y could draft people and  create a large reserve force. 
Those selected served for fifteen years, bu t the years in  the line before transfer to  the reserve 
varied depending on education. For those w ithout any education the service tim e w as set to 
six years in the line and  nine in the reserves. G raduates of a h igher educational institution 
were required to serve six m onths in the line and  fourteen and  a half years in  the  reserves. Re­
cruits w ith  elem entary education w ere required to serve four years in the line an d  eleven in 
the reserves. Exemptions were also m ade for 'fam ily reasons'; that is for sole breadw inners.80 
All in all approxim ately twenty-seven per cent of the m en eligible to serve w ere called up .81 
M ost significantly, the exemptions w ere no t based on people 's social origin, b u t on other fac­
tors such as educational qualifications. It was still a dram atic step aw ay from the old system  
and, w ith the law  of 1874 the Russian nobility lost its privileged position (w ith regard  to com­
pulsory  state service) that it had  retained since 1762. The trained reserve increased considera­
b ly  as a result of the reform. In 1873, there were 710,000 m en, in  1886 - despite the losses of the 
1877-78 w ar - there were 1,524,000 m en.82
2.2.3 The Rise of the General Staff
U nder M iliutin, several steps were taken to raise both the intellectual s tandard  of General 
Staff officers and the quality of staff work. The Russian term  general'nyi shtab d ated  back to at 
least 1763, b u t the definition of tasks remained unclear. According to  the official m ilitary code 
of 1859, the D epartm ent of the General Staff had  three functions: (1) it supported  the opera­
tional preparations of the army; (2) it perform ed the military-scientific w ork required  for the 
preparation  and conduct of war; (3) it supported  the adm inistrative tasks (otrasli deloproizvod- 
stva) that required either special preparation or a higher m ilitary education 83 As w e have 
seen, the im portance of staff w ork grew as the armies increased in num bers and  as railw ays 
enabled faster mobilization. U nder Nicholas I staff w ork  w as no t a h igh priority  in  an  arm y 
placing its em phasis on parade-ground training and obedience. The H ead of the W ar A cade­
my, I. O. Sukhozanet, echoing some of his European com rades-in-arm s, used  to claim: 'It is 
possible to w in w ithout science, b u t w ithout discipline -  never.'84
79 ■ Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964): 
41.
80- PSZ IT. XLIX. 52983 (1 Jan. 1874), VI § 45,53-56; Makhotin, Nikolai Antonovich. Spravochnaia knizhka 
dlia russkikh ofitserov. (St. Petersburg: Tip.Vtorogo otdeleniia sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliariia, 1875): 109- 
113.
81 • Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 308,333-34.
82‘ Zaionchkovskii, 'Podgotovka': 199.
83- SV P 1859, Pt. 1, Obrazovanie voennykh uchrezhdenii, Bk. 1, Obra£vanie voennogo ministerstva i osobykh us- 
taMtlenii, Arts. 52-56. See also Kavtaradze, A. 'Iz istorii russkogo general’nogo shtaba', Voenno-is- 
toricheskii zhurnal (12,1971): 76.
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Several factors played an im portant role in the efforts to create a professional General Staff. 
First, M iliutin created a unified m ilitary adm inistration and sim plified it th rough  a series of 
institutional measures. He b rought in several adm inistrations, previously out of the War M in­
ister's  control, u nder the authority  of the War Ministry. The War M inistry finally consisted of 
five m ajor units: Im perial H eadquarters, Military Council, H igh M ilitary Court, War M inistry 
Chancellery, and M ain Staff, as well as seven m ain sections (upravleniia): Intendance, Artillery, 
Engineer, Medical, M ilitary-Educational Institutions, Irregular Forces, and M ilitary Juridi- 
cial.85
The new  M ain Staff, created in  several adm inistrative steps, w as the cornerstone in Russia 's 
efforts to create a staff that could m eet the dem ands of m odernized warfare. In  1863, the D e­
partm ent of the General Staff w as transform ed into the M ain A dm inistration of the G eneral 
Staff (Glavnoe upravlenie generalnogo shtaba) w hich controlled bo th  the N icholas A cadem y of 
the General Staff and  the M ilitary-Topographical Depot. However, this w as only a tem porary  
construction and w hen the M ain A dm inistration was m erged w ith  the Inspectorate D epart­
m ent (Inspektorskii departament or Dezhurstvo)86 in  1865, the new  M ain Staff (G lavnyi shtab) fi­
nally emerged. All w ork in various sections of the M ain Staff w as directed by the 
Consultative Com mittee (Soveshchatel'nyi komitet), created in 1863 and  renam ed the M ilitary 
Scientific Com mittee (Voenno-uchenyi komitet) in 1867. It consisted of four sections: m ilitary 
statistical, m ilitary historical, tactical and topographical.87 The com m ittee w as set up  as 
'som ething completely new  in our General Staff', and it was noted that such com m ittees ex­
isted 'in  alm ost every major foreign arm y'.88
Beginning in 1867 un d er General N ikolai Obruchev, the M ilitary Scientific Com m ittee becam e 
solely responsible for central w ar planning in Russia and  stored all m ilitary intelligence. In 
1875, the M obilization Com mittee w as created to support the M ilitary Scientific Com mittee. 
In 1869, the M ain Staff consisted of seven branches: the General Staff, the M ilitary-Topo­
graphical Section, the Com mittee for the M ovem ent of Troops and  M ilitary Cargoes by  Rail­
w ay (created in 1868), the Com mittee for Preparing Data on the M obilization of Troops, the 
M ilitary Scientific Committee, and  Asiatic Section, and  the M ilitary Historical Com mission. 
From 1866 the H ead of the M ain Staff w as also Chief of the General Staff 89
84‘ Glinoetskii, N. P. Istoricheskii ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Shtab 
voisk gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga, 1882): 106. On Miliutin's negative characterization of 
I. O. Sukhozanet, see Miliutin, Vospominaniia: 151-152 and RGB OR, F. 169, k. 13, ed. khr. 4, ff. 7-7v.
85- SVP 1869, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Art. 4. See also Stoletie, Vol. 1:482-485.
86‘ The Inspectorate dealt with personnel, order-of-battle and deployment data.
87- 'Prikaz voennogo ministra No 349' published in Voennyi sbomik along with an outline of the reforms 
(12,1863): 141-153,515-522; SVP 1869, Pt. l,Bk. 1, Arts. 154-164. On the first meetings of the Consultative 
Committee, see Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar'era': 57-60.
88‘ Voennyi sbomik (12,1863): 517.
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The reform s of the Nicholas Academ y of the General Staff, the m ost im portan t source in  p ro­
v id ing  the arm y w ith  a body  of professional soldiers,90 also contributed to the rise of the Gen­
eral Staff. M iliutin 's aim  w as to m ake the A cadem y the school for the m ost intellectually able 
officers in  the arm y w here talent, no t birth, w ould decide prom otion. The changes in  the 
A cadem y's curriculum  will be examined m ore closely later.91 Suffice it to no te here that the 
entrance requirem ents were raised in  1862, substantial changes were m ade in  the curriculum , 
and  that the A cadem y increasingly came to provide the regim ents w ith  skilled com m anders. 
D uring M iliutin 's tim e as War M inister there was a considerable increase in the num ber of 
G eneral Staff officers appointed as regim ental com m anders. In  1844-53, nine officers from  the 
General Staff were appointed; in 1854-63, tw enty w ere appointed; in  1864-73, sixty-nine; and, 
in  1874-1882, ninety-nine were appointed.92
2.2.4 Miliutin and Prussia
A few w ords need to be said on w hether or no t the Prussian General Staff system  could have 
been introduced in Russia. After Prussia's success on the battlefields in  1866 an d  1870-71, this 
question was a m ajor source of conflict w ithin the higher echelons of the army. M iliutin 's crit­
ics w anted  a separate General Staff, responsible for all operational p lanning and  directly re­
sponsible to the Tsar. The War M inistry w ould be responsible for adm inistration. According 
to Sergei Witte, Finance M inister betw een 1892 and 1903 and  nephew  of R. A. Fadeev, Field 
M arshal A. I. Bariatinskii had  recom m ended D. A. M iliutin to the post of War M inister in 1860 
in anticipation of his ow n appointm ent as the Chief-of-Staff 93 This m ay very well have been 
so, b u t it should be rem em bered that, at that time, the Prussian Chief-of-Staff h ad  no t yet 
achieved its independent status vis-a-vis the War Ministry.94
89- Stoletie, Vol. 1:453-54; Kavtaradze, A. 'Iz istorii': 75-77; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 99-108; 
Jones, David R. 'Administrative system and policy-making process', in The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of 
Russia and the Soviet Union, edited by David R. Jones. 7, incomplete vols. (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic 
International Press, 1978-97): Vol.2:108-117.
90- Fuller, William. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1985): 32-33; Mashkin, N. A. Vysshaia voennaia shkola Rossiiskoi imperii XlX-nachala X X  veka. 
(Moscow: Akademiia, 1997): 27-42.
91- See Chapter 4.
92- Glinoetskii, N.P. Istoricheskii ocherk, 1882: 344; Mashkin, Vysshaia voennaia shkola: 105-108.
93‘ Witte, S. Iu. Vospominaniia. 3 vols. (Moscow: Izd. sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960): Vol. 1:
30-31.
94‘ That the deep conflict between Miliutin and Bariatinskii, which developed during the 1860s and cul­
minated at the strategic conference in 1873, should originate from this is possible, but it seems doubtful. 
Bariatinskii's biographer wrote that the reasons for the conflict remained unclear. Zisserman, A.L. 
Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii, 1815-1879. 3 vols. (Moscow: Universitetskaia 
tipografiia, 1890): Vol. 3: 208. This, on the other hand, might indicate that it was too sensitive a question 
to be discussed in public. Even so, this conflict most certainly had more to do with personal rivalry and 
different personalities than with anything else. The personal aspects are emphasized by Rieber in Rie- 
ber, Alfred, ed. The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince Bariatinskii 1857-64, (Paris: Mou- 
ton & Co, 1966): 68, whereas the ideological aspects are advocated by Zaionchkovskii. See 
Zaionchkovskii, 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk': 19 and Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-70 
godov v Rossii: 126-127. Beyrau mainly agreed with Zaionchkovskii. Beyrau, Militdr und Gesellschaft: 455.
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In any case, M iliutin w as accused by  his contem poraries and by  tw entieth  century historians 
for being essentially pro-French in his outlook on m ilitary affairs.95 The m ilitary historian, A. 
Svechin, even claim ed that M iliutin mechanically copied the French m ilitary system  to such 
an extent th a t it delayed the introduction of universal m ilitary service 96
It m ay  be that the organization of the W ar M inistry resembled the French. However, the claim  
that M iliutin w as essentially pro-French needs some qualification. In fact, he w as very know l- 
edgable about Prussian m ilitary affairs and on such subjects as m ilitary education and m ili­
tary  science he w as clearly inspired by Prussia. As early as 1840, on his first trip  abroad, he  
n o ted  in  his d iary  that the Prussian officer was well educated in com parison w ith  the Rus­
sian, an d  he deplored that so few Russian officers w ere interested in  m ilitary science.97 M iliu­
tin  saw  Prussian m ilitary potential and argued for the im portance of studying G erm an 
m ilitary pow er long before m ost people became aw are of the strength of the Prussian arm y 98 
Furtherm ore, as w e shall see later, m any aspects of the intellectual side of the Prussian m ili­
tary  system  becam e a source of inspiration for the Russian army. For instance, M iliutin m ade 
the following note after the Prussian victory in 1866:
A recent example shows us the great advantage that the Prussian army has over its ad­
versaries in having a considerable body of officers, well instructed in military affairs, 
and having a perfect General Staff organization of its army corps. ...Our army, so emi­
nent and smart in appearance with regard to soldiers, is poor when it comes to military 
science, compared to the French and the Prussian armies."
In 1872, the General Staff officer, F. A. Fel'dm an, who later succeeded O bruchev as head  of the 
M ilitary Scientific Committee, w rote a description of the Prussian G eneral Staff. H is report 
w as w ell received, not the least by  N. N. Obruchev w ho in a letter of recom m endation, possi­
bly to M iliutin, called him  a 'm ost deserving officer'.100 M iliutin scribbled dow n a few pages 
w ith  his reactions to Fel'dm an's report. A lthough the report has been rem oved from  the file,
95- GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 349, ff. 46v, 80v. 'Note by General Fadeev, R. Doubts about the Current Military 
Organization, 1871-72'; Witte, Vospomimniia, Vol. 1: 31-32. Chubinskii, M. 'Pamiati D. A. Miliutina', Vest- 
nik Evropy (9,1912): 328-331; van Dyke, Carl. Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education 1832-1914. 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990): 54. For Miliutin's response, see [Miliutin], 'Voennye reformy': 5- 
35.
96- Svechin, A. A. Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva. 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'st- 
vo otd. voennogo ministerstva, 1927-28), Vol. 1: 341. See also Osipova, Margarita Nikolaevna. 'Voprosy 
voennoi istorii': 3.
97‘ RGB OR, F 169. k. 1, ed. khr. 14, f. 46. 'Travel diary 1840 and 1841'. Book 1, Germany. See also Miliu­
tin, Vospominaniia: 329. Brooks, 'D.A. Miliutin': 87-88. Zaionchkovskii, 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii 
ocherk': 26.
98‘ Miliutin, D. A. Pervye opyty voennoi statistiki. 2 vols. (Moscow: Tip. Voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii, 
1847): Vol 1. 75-76.
"■ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr. 44, f. 10. 'Explanations to Count F. f. Berg's Memorandum to Alexander 
II about the Military and Political Situation of Russia'. 16 Aug. 1866.
100‘ RGVIA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 71. ff. 61-61 v. 'About the Mission of General Staff Colonel Fel'dman and FI. 
ad. Colonel Zeddeler Abroad'. 3 May-30 Nov. 1872. Fel'dman's pro-Prussian report is briefly mentioned 
by Veniukov, M. I. Istoricheskie ocherki Rossii so vremeni Krymskoi voiny do zakliucheniia Berlinskogo dogovora 
1855-1878. Vol 1. (Leipzig, 1878): 55.
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M iliutin's reactions have remained and it is w orth examining them in some detail.101 Miliutin 
adm itted that the report on the Prussian General Staff pointed out a num ber of deficiencies in 
the Russian equivalent, and that much could be learned from the Prussian example. Howev­
er, this did not necessarily m ean that Russia had to imitate the Prussian system:
Every state, and every army, have their own conditions, traditions and customs. W hat 
is good for one may be completely inappropriate for another. I am convinced that if we 
should try to rebuild our General Staff according to the Prussian example, w e w ould 
not so much create a new and better General Staff, as break up and destroy our current 
corps of General Staff officers.102
This corps was, according to Miliutin, the best educated that Russia had ever had. The link 
between the General Staff and the line (stroevaia sluzhba) had become stronger, and more regi­
mental and divisional commanders were recruited from the General Staff than ever before. 
The problem with the Russian General Staff corps, as Miliutin saw it, was that too few of the 
officers were involved in practical exercises which would prepare them for war. The newly 
introduced battlefield tours (polevaia poezdka) were undoubtedly a step in the right direction, 
but it was not enough. The officers often lacked real interest in what they were doing:
The majority of our capable and intelligent officers occupy themselves in other spheres 
of activity [than military studies]. This deficiency has nothing to do w ith the organiza­
tion of our General Staff and it cannot be overcome by legislative measures: everything 
depends on personality and personality alone. If everyone of our Chiefs-of-Staff w ould 
involve all his subordinates and instill in them a liking for work, it w ould have m any 
good effects also on today's General Staff organization.103
In other words, the practices that would secure a more professional General Staff lay beyond 
administrative or organizational means and had more to do with attitude and m ind set of the 
General Staff officer corps. Miliutin was not against copying from Prussia, bu t felt that the 
creation of an independent General Staff in Russia w ould create problems rather than solve 
them.
The strength of the Prussian General Staff organization, M iliutin found, d id  not lie in the or­
ganization but in the professional attitude of the officer corps. In Prussia, the General Staff or­
ganization was built on a cohesive, well-educated officer corps, conspicuously absent in 
Russia. It was this aspect of the Prussian army that Miliutin believed should be copied more 
than anything else:
I think, I am even convinced, that nothing in the current organization of the General 
Staff and the Main Staff prevents the development of specialized work (spetsial'naia 
rabota) to the same extent and of the same quality to that of the Great General S taff....
One essential characteristic of the Prussians is needed: that each officer should see it as 
his unquestionable and obvious duty to devote all his time, his efforts and ability to his
10L RGVIA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 71. ff. 65-68.
102- Ibid., f. 65
m  Ibid., f. 66
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work - including scientific studies - and that he should treat his work differently than a 
civilian haggling over the rate of the fee.104
The lack of professional attitude of the Russian officer corps greatly irritated  M iliutin. O n an­
other occasion the M ilitary Scientific Committee (VUK) h ad  suggested certain m easures to 
speed u p  the process of m ilitary statistical w ork in the m ilitary districts. A ccording to VUK, 
the slow progress w as due to lack of com petent officers and  to  the fact that officers w ho w ere 
engaged in statistical w ork frequently switched places. Therefore, the Com m ittee suggested 
that a few officers in each district should be assigned to finish the surveys an d  th a t they 
should  receive an extra rew ard ranging from  500 to 1,000 roubles w hen the surveys w ere 
com pleted.105 M iliutin responded:
... I have to say that it is the prime duty of General Staff officers to make military statis­
tical surveys; for a qualified performance of this duty, they receive rewards and high 
ranks (chiny). Therefore, there is hardly any justification to give them additional money 
for making military statistical descriptions. After that, it would be necessary to evaluate 
the size of the sum to be given for every completed work assignment.106
The reform  of the Russian General Staff - the creation of the M ain Staff and  the M ilitary Scien­
tific Com mittee - shows an awareness of the growing im portance of staff w ork. For the first 
time, the Russian arm y had  created an  organization that could serve as the /b ra in  of the ar­
m y ', w ith  professional staff officers. However, the M ain Staff w as an enorm ous organization 
w ith w ide ranging tasks. It controlled recruiting, m obilization, deploym ent, training, supply  
of troops, strategic and  economic aspects of force deploym ent, and  intelligence gathering. Be­
cause of its m any different kind of duties, it has been said that the M ain Staff tended  to be less 
effective.107 O verlapping tasks and departm ental infighting w ere perpetuated. Since it w as 
an integral part of the War Ministry, it could no t exert real influence on Russian w ar p lanning  
as could its Prussian counterpart.108 While there is m uch tru th  in this criticism, it is doubtfu l 
that an independent General Staff w ould  have been a better solution. Given the departm ental 
infighting and the political rivalries of the Russian autocracy, M iliutin m ay have been right in  
opposing such a staff. The experim ent w ith an  independent General Staff after the Russo-Jap­
anese War of 1904-05 seems, at least in  part, to have vindicated  M iliutin 's w orst fears. A fter a 
few years of pow er struggle and disunity, the General Staff w as brough t in u n d er the au thor­
ity of the War M inistry in 1909.109
104- Ibid., f. 68.
105- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 344, f. 80-83. 'VUK Journal No 11', 2 Nov. 1868.
106- Ibid., f. 79.19 Dec. 1868
107‘ Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 106.
108‘ See all three articles by Kavtaradze, 'Iz istorii russkogo general'nogo shtaba', Voenno-istoricheskii 
zhurnal (12,1971): 75-80. (7,1972): 87-92; (12,1974): 80-86; Menning, Bruce W. Bayonets before Bullets. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992)15-16, and Rich, David. 'The Tsar's Colonels: Military Pro­
fessionals and the Remaking of Russian Strategy, Foreign Policy, and Autocracy, 1840-1895', Manuscript, 
1997: Ch 3.
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2.2.5 Rifles and Guns
D uring the 1860s and  1870s, the Russian arm y was in a constant process of rearm am ent. The 
full story of this im portant developm ent has yet to be to ld , b u t it is significant to outline the 
m ain  events.110 The technological transform ation of the Russian arm y can, in  som e respects, 
be said to have been uncom plicated, since there w as no opposition or discussion about the 
need to acquire new  rifle weapons. That was plainly obvious. However, as w e shall see, the 
im plications of these new  w eapons on the battlefield w ere not alw ays obvious, and even if 
they were it was no t always clear how  to p u t the ideas in to  practice. The m ost pressing p rob ­
lem  regarding the new  rifle w eapons was how  to get as m any of them  as quickly as possible.
The m ilitary attaches played an im portant role by provid ing  inform ation about new  w eapons 
and  by acquiring and  sending examples of these w eapons to St. Petersburg. The rearm am ent 
of the Russian arm y w as a result of international cooperation and dom estic developm ent of 
the arm s industry. The Russian breech-loader, Berdan, w as developed b y  Russian A rtillery Of­
ficers, A. P. Gorlov and  K. I. Gunnius, in the factories of Colt Patent Firearms M anufacturing 
Com pany in the U nited States during the second half o f the 1860s.111 The first version availa­
ble in 1868, was called Berdan 1; the second version, available tw o years later, w as called Ber­
dan 2. By 1867, the Russian artillery officers believed the Gatling m achine gun  superior to  the 
French mitrailleuse, 112 w hich dem onstrates that the Russian arm y w as well aw are of the latest 
m ilitary technological changes.113 Initially, the Russian artillery w as dependen t on the steel 
guns from the K rupp factories in Essen. However, as one m ight expect, m oney w as a lim iting 
factor and it was neither financially possible nor politically desirable to rely com pletely on 
foreign production. M iliutin, who had w itnessed the vulnerability  of Russia in this respect,
109' Menning, Bayonets: 218; Fuller, Strategy and Power: 410-411; Kavtaradze, Tz istorii', (7,1972). For Mil­
iutin's reactions to the creation of an independent General Staff, see Miliutin, D. A. 'Starcheskie razmy- 
shleniia o sovremennom polozhenii voennogo dela v Rossii', Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Nikolaevskoi Voennoi 
Akademii (30,1912): 840.
110‘ Bradley, Joseph. Guns for the Tsar: Technology Transfer and Small Arms Industry. (DeKalb, Illinois: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1990) explored the cooperation between the United States and Russia 
in small arms technology. Soviet historians have tended to emphasize the Russian side of the develop­
ment. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia: 293-329; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 'Perevooruzhenie russkoi armii v 60- 
70kh gg. XIX veke', Istoricheskie zapiski 36 (1951): 64-100; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 136-180. The 
article by Sheparev, R. M. 'Perevooruzhenie russkoi armii v vtoroi polovine XIX veka', Moskovskii zhur- 
nal (6,1997): 50-56 is mostly useful for its drawings and pictures of the different rifles. A good introduc­
tion with regard to rifles is Mavrodin, V. V., and Val. V. Mavrodin. Iz istorii otechestvennogo oruzhiia. 
Russkaia vintovka. (Leningrad: Izd. Leningradskogo universiteta, 1981). A pre-revolutionary account de­
serves mentioning, Fedorov, V. G. Vooruzhenie russkoi armii v X IX  stoletii. (St. Petersburg: Tip. Khu- 
dozhestvennoi pechati, 1911).
in ‘ Bradley, Guns: 99-120.
112‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 1, f. 128; Bradley, Guns: 116.
113- The mitrailleuse was surrounded by so much secrecy within the French army that it was seldom used 
efficiently in the war against Germany since few officers knew how it worked. Howard, Michael. The 
Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 1870-1871. Reprint of 1961 ed. (London: Routledge, 
1991): 36.
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o ften  u n d e r lin e d  th e  im p o rtan ce  for R ussia  to  h a v e  a d o m estic  a rm s  in d u stry . In  h is  o w n  
w o rd s :
Russia is neither Egypt nor the Papal States and we have to restrict foreign w eapon pur­
chases for the army. We m ust build our ow n factories to produce our own w eapons in 
the future.114
T he R u ss ian  a rm s in d u s try  slow ly  b u ilt u p  a co n s id erab le  p ro d u c tio n  capacity . A s w e h av e  
d isc u sse d  p rev iously , the  p ro d u c tio n  of Berdan 2 in c reased  d ram a tic a lly  in  th e  1870s. T he p ro ­
d u c tio n  of m e ta l ca rtrid g es  rose from  five m illio n  in  1873 to  e ig h te e n  m illio n  in  1875, w h ich  - 
w h ile  sh o r t o f th e  p la n n e d  p ro d u c tio n  - w as, n ev e rth e le ss , a co n s id erab le  in c re ase .115
In  1866-67, th e  re a rm a m e n t of the  R u ssian  in fan try  w ith  m u z z le -lo a d e d  rifles w a s  co m p le ted . 
A t th e  sam e tim e, th e  A u stro -P ru ss ian  w a r  h ig h lig h te d  th e  n e e d  fo r a  b ree ch -lo ad e d  rifle .116 
T he firs t R u ssian  breech-loader, th e  so ca lled  Karle, w a s  in tro d u c e d  in  1866, fo llo w ed  b y  tw o
1 1 7d iffe ren t sy stem s, K m ka  (w ith  a m e ta l ca rtrid g e) a n d  Berdan (w ith  a  sm a lle r calibre). A fter 
a lm o s t tw e n ty  y ea rs  of rea rm am en t, th e  s itu a tio n  in  1877 can  b e  illu s tra te d  th ro u g h  th e  fol­
lo w in g  ta b le .118
TABLE 2 Russian Small Arms in 1877
Rifle For use I n * * *
Karle, infantry 150,868 51,096
Kmka, infantry 372,700 192,866
.60 calibre Kmka sys­
tem, dragoons
40,597 2,658
Berdan 1, infantry 17,810 10,104
Berdan 2, infantry 253,152 103,616
Carbines 12,102 6,388
Small-calibre rifles, 
dragoons
2,352 7,648
Small-calibre rifles, 
cossacks
60,000 10,000
Smith and Wesson 
revolvers
70,275 6,490
114' Q uoted in Fedorov, Voomzhenie: 237.
115- Zaionchkovskii, 'Perevooruzhenie': 98
116- M iliutin w ould later note that the Austro-Prussian War had dem onstrated to all European state the 
'urgent necessity' of introducing weapons loaded from the breech. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, ed. khr. 3, f. 
170. See also Anon. 'Ob igol'chatykh ruzh'iakh', Artilleriiskii zhurnal (9,1866): 405-414.
117, M avrodin and Mavrodin. Iz istorii otechestvennogo omzhiia: 54, 68, 76. See also the description in 
Greene, F. V. The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78. 2nd ed. (London: W.H. Allen and 
Co, 1880): 52-59.
118- Zaionchkovskii, 'Perevooruzhenie': 99; Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia: 309.
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Before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, sixteen of the forty-eight infantry divisions 
were equ ipped  w ith  Berdan rifles. N ot until 1884 was the entire Russian arm y - including the 
reserve - fully equipped w ith  Berdan rifles.119 Artillery also w ent through a transform ation 
from sm ooth-bores to rifled guns. The field artillery was rearm ed first w ith  a com bination of 
steel and  bronze cannons. There w as no doubt among Russian artillery officers about the su­
periority  of the steel cannon, bu t the production of large calibre steel guns w as insufficient. 
The w ar of 1866 had  m ade rearm am ent of the field artillery urgent and, in order to com plete 
the transform ation as quickly as possible, it w as decided to adop t a bronze gun, w hich the 
Russians could produce at hom e. In 1869, the field artillery w as fully equipped  w ith  rifled, 
breech-loaded guns.120
The rearm am ent of the fortress artillery w ent m ore slowly. In spite of foreign purchases from  
K rupp and  also, for instance, from Sweden, the Russian fortresses w ere still partly  equipped  
w ith  sm ooth-bores at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish w ar in  1877.121N evertheless, in  the 
mid-1870s, the Russian arm s industry  had  built u p  a capacity for m aking steel guns and d u r­
ing the period 1881-1894, produced 2,372 steel guns.122
A gainst this brief background of change and reform, w e can tu rn  to the m ore im m ediate 
question of observing foreign wars. Since no Russian w ar correspondents w ere sent from  the 
press, the m ilitary attaches and  the special observers sent out by the War M inistry w ere clos­
est to the w ar scenes. W ho w ere these people and, more specifically, w ho w ere the m ilitary at­
taches and  w hat were their tasks? W hat did  the War M inistry w an t to know? These questions 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
119- Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie: 156.
120‘ In 1867, Russia placed an order for 250 Krupp steel guns but since the Essen factory had its order 
books full, it would have taken too long to fulfil the order. Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk: Vol. 4: 246; 
Zaionchkovskii, 'Perevooruzhenie': 84-85. Miliutin described the adoption of bronze cannons a tempo­
rary and transitional measure. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, ed. khr. 3, f. 171 v.
121- Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk, Vol. 4:269-273; Vol. 6:209-223; Zaionchkovskii, 'Perevooruzhenie':
88-90.
122‘ Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie: 162.
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3 The Eyes of the Tsar: The 
Russian Military Attaches
Before discussing the m ilitary attaches, we m ust try to define the term. The w ord  used  by  the 
Russian War M inistry w ere voennyi agent or voennyi korrespondent, w hich referred to  tw o cate­
gories of officers stationed abroad: officers w ho h ad  the official status of a m ilitary attache 
and  those w ho had  not. The latter d id  not appear regularly on the lists of m ilitary attaches 
since they  received no pay -  or very little -  from the Ministry. Their role seems to have been 
that of a freelancing m ilitary attache, w ith tw o exceptions. First, Colonel N ikolai A leksan­
drovich Novitskii, the officer in London 1862-72, w ho d id  no t have the official title of m ilitary 
attache, b u t w ho received his pay from the M inistry and always appeared on the lists of at­
taches.1 Second, the assistant attache in Paris, w ho specialized in artillery reporting. Lieuten­
ant V ladim ir Iulievich Giuliani (1861-70) and Captain Dm itrii Nikolaevich Leont'ev (1870-72) 
w ere usually  listed as m ilitary attaches although they only received a very sm all salary in re­
lation to their rank.
The second group relevant to foreign military intelligence gathering are the m ilitary repre­
sentatives at the Prussian court. After the Napoleonic w ars, Russia and  Prussia in troduced a 
system  w here a high  ranking officer, usually a Guards officer and a personal adjutant of the 
sovereign, w as exchanged betw een the courts. Initially, this was an  expression of the friend­
ship betw een A lexander I and  Friedrich Wilhelm HI, which w as reinforced un d er Nicholas I 
w ho, in 1817, m arried  Friedrich W ilhelm Ill's daughter. The Prussian plenipotentiaries have 
earned some scholarly attention, w hereas little is know n about their Russian counterparts.
1- Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA), F. 38, op. 5, d. 1097. 
'About the Petition by Colonel Novitskii to Confer Him the Title of Military Agent and to Increase His 
Salary'. 1862. For a list of the military attaches and the other officers stationed abroad, see Appendix 1.
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These special envoys differed from ordinary m ilitary attaches no t only in their h igh  rank, b u t 
m ore significantly in that they were not subordinated to the H ead of the m ission. They report­
ed  directly -  b u t no t exclusively -  to the Tsar. The role of the m ilitary p lenipotentiary  w as that 
of the sovereign's Privatbotschafter -  a position betw een a m ilitary and  diplom atic post.3
The th ird  source for providing military intelligence is the observers sent to the various w ar 
fronts -  in  this case the European wars of 1859,1864,1866, and  1870-71, as w ell as to the 
A m erican Civil War of 1861-65. These observers were m ostly young General Staff officers or 
artillery specialists. Sending officers abroad to study different aspects of m ilitary  science w as 
no t a new  phenom enon in the Russian army, bu t after the C rim ean War it becam e m ore fre­
quent. For instance, the three military academies, the General Staff, A rtillery an d  Engineering 
began to  send to send professors abroad to study various aspects of m ilitary developm ent.4 
In addition , it w as fairly com m on for officers on vacation to visit different m ilitary  establish­
m ents in  Europe which, in  fact, upset both the m ilitary attache in Paris and the m ilitary p len ­
ipotentiary in Berlin. In 1862, Prince Petr L'vovich W ittgenstein com plained th a t officers on 
vacation and  even those on official trips tu rned  directly to the French authorities w ithou t no­
tifying h im  or the Embassy and  -  worse -  they were often ignorant about the subject th a t they  
came to study.5 Their behaviour com prom ised the reputation of Russian officers and  the Rus­
sian governm ent and even dam aged his own position in Paris. A few years later, C ount Vasilii 
Pavlovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov com plained that travelling officers stopping in  Berlin on 
their w ay  to or from  Paris often left before the necessary paperw ork  h ad  been processed. 
W hen he had  obtained the required authorization, it often happened  that the officers w ere 
gone and  perhaps later 'claim ed that the m ilitary attaches d id  no thing for them '.6
The custom  to place m ilitary attaches at foreign legations began after 1815, b u t d id  no t b e­
come w idespread in Europe until after 1848. The Russian arm y started  to place officers p e r­
m anently  abroad in  the 1830s.7 In this dissertation, the focus is on attaches perm anently  
stationed abroad and the special observers sent to the various w ar scenes. But, how  d id  the
2‘ See von Lambsdorff, Gustav. Die Militdrbevollmdchtigten Kaiser Wilhelms II. am Zarenhofe 1904-1914. 
(Berlin: Schliffen Verlag, 1937): 21-22; Vagts, Alfred. The Military Attache. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1967): 281-300; Craig, Gordon A. 'Military Diplomats in the Prussian and German Service: 
the Attaches, 1816-1914', Political Science Quarterly 64 (1,1949): 65-94; Meisner, Hans Otto. Militarattaches 
und Militdrbevollmachtigte in Preufien und im Deutschen Reich. (Berlin: Riitten und Loening, 1957): 67-70; 
Ritter, Gerhard. Die deutschen Militar-Attaches und das Auswartige Amt. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Univer- 
sitatsverlag, 1959): 5-11. See also the memoirs of the Prussian plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg 1865-69 
von Schweinitz, Hans Lothar. Denhviirdigkeiten des Botschafters H.L. von Schweinitz. 2 vols. (Berlin: Verlag 
vom Reimar Hobbing, 1927), Vol. 1:173-246
3‘ Meisner, Militarattaches und Militdrbevollmachtigte: 68.
4‘ 'Sines*', Zhumal Ministerstva Narodnogo Proisveshcheniia. (Aug. 1856): 43-45; Glinoetskii, N.P. Is­
toricheskii ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Shtab voisk gvardii i Peter- 
burgskogo voennogo okruga, 1882): 154,312. Starting in 1871, the Nicholas Academy of the General 
Staff began on a yearly basis to send the top student abroad for eight months.
5- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1103, ff. 6-7. 'Wittgenstein to the War Minister 4/16 Dec. 1862 Paris'.
6- RGVIA, F 432, op. 1. d. 193, f. 18. 'Kutuzov to the War Minister 27 Jan./8 Feb. 1868 Berlin'.
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institution of the m ilitary attache develop in Russia? H ow  im portant w as their role in  intelli­
gence gathering? This chapter examines these questions.
3.1 Gathering Intelligence through Attaches
The h isto ry  of the m ilitary attache in  Russia started, curiously enough, at the international 
congress in Troppau in 1820.8 There the decision was taken -  quite apart from  the internation­
al proceedings -  to establish a statistical section in the Russian Foreign Ministry.9 A djutant- 
G eneral A. S. M enshikov (1787-1869) took the opportunity  to highlight the arm y 's need  for 
m ilitary statistics about foreign armies. This kind of inform ation -  that is, num ber and  loca­
tion of the troops and  the navy, arm am ent, fortresses, m ilitary education, topographical infor­
m ation, and  so on -  had  previously been obtained during  cam paigns, particularly  the 
N apoleonic wars, and through officers travelling abroad. But as M enshikov po in ted  ou t in his 
m em orandum , the inform ation w as often incomplete and  varied greatly. 'It is only w ith  the 
cooperation of the M inistry of Foreign Affairs and the Com m ittee th a t is about to  be created 
that these gaps can be replenished', he noted.10 Instructions w ere sent to the Russian em bas­
sies an d  m issions abroad containing a short list of desiderata, and  it w as clearly stated  that in  
order to avoid the possibility of this new  task preventing the regular work, the am bassadors 
should assign the tasks to the m ost appropriate and capable attaches.11 Thus, the w ork  w as to 
be executed by the regular personnel at the embassy and  there w ere no explicit p lans to send 
m ilitary officers to perform  these functions.
Two years later, in  1822, the Quarterm aster-General Section (that is, the General Staff)12 had  
p roduced  m ore detailed instructions, specifying exactly w hat k ind of inform ation the arm y 
w anted from  the foreign m issions.13 The instructions, w ritten  by  Colonel Fedor Fedorovich
7- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 37. 'About the Collection of Statistical and Military Information from 
Foreign Countries'. 1850. See also Beauvais, Armand. Attaches Militaires, Attaches Navals et Attaches de 
I'air. (Paris: Les Presses Modemes, 1937): 7-17. Vagts, The Military Attache: 15-24. See also Pokhlebkin, V. 
V. 'Kto byl pervym v Evrope voennym attashe', Voprosy istorii (8,1996): 135-138.
8‘ Between October and December 1820, the Holy Alliance (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) met and even­
tually signed a Declaration of intention to take collective action against revolution.
9‘ RGVIA, F. 410, op. 1, d. 137. 'About the Creation of a Statistical Department at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Supply of Statistical Information to the Main Staff Regarding the Military Situation in 
Other Countries'. 1820.
10- RGVIA, F. 410, op, 1, d. 137, f. 20.
1L RGVIA, F. 410, op. 1, d. 137, f. 2v.
12- The Quartermaster-General Staff -  mainly responsible for quartering the troops in the field -  was the 
precursor of General Staffs in European armies. For Russia, see Kavtaradze, A. 'Iz istorii russkogo gen- 
eral'nogo shtaba', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (12,1971): 75-80. For general surveys see Hittle, J. D. The 
Military Staff: Its History and Development. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 
1944): 48-49; Irvine, Dallas D. 'The Origin of Capital Staffs', The Journal of Modern History 10 (2,1938): 
161-179; van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1985): 35-40,109.
13- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, ff. 6-31.
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Berg, later Field M arshal and  H ead of the Departm ent of the General Staff 1843-55,14 w ere de­
tailed  and  highly am bitious, and  m ake im pressive reading to this d ay  In his report on the de­
velopm ent of foreign m ilitary intelligence gathering in 1850, Colonel Dm itrii Alekseevich 
M iliutin  (the future War M inister) called them  a 'rem arkable w ork in its com pleteness and  
system atic logic'.15The fifty-four pages of instructions concern both  the arm y and  the navy, 
an d  cover every aspect of the arm ed forces including recruitm ent, education, budget, equ ip­
m ent, m orale, and  w ar preparations. They are divided into two m ain segm ents -  one for the 
army, the other for the navy -  and  each p art contains severed sections and  chapters. The A rm y 
segm ent consists of four sections that define the areas about which the foreign missions 
should  gather information: the War Ministry, military organization (including arm y and  
corps organization and  m ilitary institutions, the army (including the num ber and location of 
the troops and the spirit of the armies) and w ar preparations. The navy segm ent consists of 
five sections: the same as w ere no ted  for the arm y plus an additional section pertain ing to the 
construction of vessels. Clearly, it w ould  no t be easy for the traditional dip lom at to gather all 
of this inform ation -  in fact, it w as im possible since this w ork required m ilitary know ledge. 
Furtherm ore, there were no t enough personnel at the em bassy to carry out a task that m ost 
certainly w as judged by the diplom ats to be of secondary im portance. In 1822, Berg h in ted  at 
the problem  in a letter to M enshikov that accompanied the instructions:
It is not enough to specify the goal in sight. It is necessary to choose the means with
which the goal can be achieved.16
It is hard ly  surprising, therefore, that these instructions d id  not produce the desired result. In 
A ugust 1827, H ead of the General Staff, General Fedor Filippovich Dovre (1766-1828), w rote 
yet another m em orandum  to Foreign Minister, Karl Vasil'evich N esselrode,17 w here he ad ­
m itted  that the program m e w as far too extensive and complex to be hand led  by ordinary d ip ­
lom atic officials. Dovre proposed that General Staff officers be sent to the embassies to collect 
m ilitary statistical information. For naval m atters, naval officers w ould  be required. The sys­
tem atization of the m aterial should be handled  within the M ain Staff, w here Dovre suggested 
th a t a special committee should be created, consisting of one General Staff officer, one naval 
officer, and  additional officers specializing in adm inistrative and financial affairs. In addition, 
he proposed that the inform ation should be sent directly to the M ain Staff and  should  no t 
m ake the detour around the Foreign Ministry.18 These proposals w ould  have provided the 
Russian General Staff w ith both  m ilitary attaches and a strong centre for intelligence collec­
14‘ His service record is located in his personal fond in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
(hereafter GARF), F. 547, op. 1, d. 1.
15- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 33v.
16- RGVIA, F. 410, op. 1, d. 137, f. 27.
17~ Karl Vasil'evich Nesselrode (1780-1862) was Foreign Minister between 1816 and 1856.
18- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 34v-35v.
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tion and  analysis. But these were early days in the world of staff w ork  and  N esselrode's reac­
tion w as perfunctory. H e sent a letter to the embassies rem inding them  that Berg's 
instructions w ere still in  force. The inform ation should be sent to the Foreign M inistry and 
then  forw arded to the Main Staff. In the secret m em orandum  of 5 A ugust 1850, Colonel D. A. 
M iliutin, sum m arized the efforts of the General Staff to organize the collection of foreign mil­
itary  statistics in a systematic w ay betw een 1820 and  1832:
Unfortunately, one has to say that the correspondence, stretching over twelve years, re­
sulted in almost nothing, since the fragmentary information occasionally delivered by 
the embassies was far from sufficient to meet either the proposed intentions or the de­
mands of the State.19
As if this were no t enough, Berg's instructions were lost in the archives. W hen he needed  
them  in December 1843 to w rite a report about the necessity to update the secret archive of 
the D epartm ent of the General Staff w ith inform ation about foreign armies, he searched in 
vain. They were discovered only in  1850 w hen M iliutin wrote his m em orandum .20
The first m ilitary attaches from the War M inistry were sent abroad during  the second half of 
the 1830s.21 Officers were attached to the diplomatic missions in Paris, Berlin, C onstantinople 
and  Stockholm. This im proved the situation slightly, bu t apparently  no t very m uch. F. F. Berg 
com plained in 1843 that the inform ation from both the War M inistry 's correspondents and 
the diplom ats occurred 'very seldom  and [in] entirely insufficient [quantities] for the General 
Staff to fulfil its du ties '.22 In 1843, the m ost recent inform ation that the Russian G eneral Staff 
possessed about A ustrian forces w as tw o years old, and inform ation about Britain w as four 
years old.
After 1836 (when the Quarterm aster-General Section had  been abolished), the institu tion  re­
sponsible for collecting foreign m ilitary intelligence was the M ilitary Scientific Section (Voen- 
no-Uchenyi otdel) of the new ly created D epartm ent of the General Staff. The D epartm ent of the 
General Staff now  consisted of five sections: Section One was responsible for the m ovem ent 
and  quartering of troops; Section Two was the M ilitary Scientific Section; Section Three dealt 
w ith  accounting; Section Four, the chancellery, was responsible for the correspondence w ith  
the m ilitary attaches (among other things); and Section Five, w as an archive.
19- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 37v.
2a RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 45v.
21 • RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 37. See also Beauvais, Armand. Attaches Militaires, Attaches Navals et A t­
taches de Vair. (Paris: Les Presses Modemes, 1937): 16-17.
22- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 52.
23- Svod Voennykh Postanovlenii 1838 (hereafter SVP), Part 1, Obrazovanie voennykh uchrezhdenii, Book 1, 
Obrazvanie voennogo ministerstva i osobykh ustanvlenii, Arts. 45-50, and Art. 740. See also Curtiss, John 
Shelton. The Russian Army under Nicholas 1,1825-55. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965): 101- 
104.
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A part from  the problem s in  actually getting the information, there w ere serious flaws in  an­
other equally im portant aspect of intelligence w ork -  analysing and  evaluating the inform a­
tion. It happened  that the incom ing inform ation was sent directly from  the Foreign M inistry 
to the chancellery of the Quarterm aster-General Section or to the library of the G eneral Staff 
w here it w as sim ply filed away. 24As w e have seen, there h ad  been suggestions to create a 
special com m ittee responsible for the system atization and analysis of the m aterial, b u t no th ­
ing h ad  come of them. W ith the creation of the D epartm ent of the General Staff and  the intel­
ligence section (the M ilitary Scientific Section), the structure w as p u t into place, b u t the 
quality  of the staff w ork d id  not im prove accordingly. F. F. Berg later com plained th a t the re­
ports h ad  stopped reaching the D epartm ent of the General Staff and  that the G eneral Staff 
h ad  to piece together inform ation about foreign armies from  different periodicals and  jour­
nals. The inform ation in these journals clearly show ed that the data  received by  the General 
Staff from  the foreign legations was of poor quality: 'extrem ely fragmentary, contradictory, of­
ten  incorrect and  generally incom plete' w as how  Berg characterized it.25
In 1850, D. A. M iliutin had  pointed  out that the difficult p a rt of the task  had  already been ac­
com plished. The attaches w ere in  place, now  it only rem ained to 'reap  the fruits; th a t is, to 
create a centre, w here all the statistical inform ation from  abroad is collected for appropriate 
d istribution and com pilation'. He suggested the following m easures: (1) that a special statisti­
cal com m ittee should be created w ithin the War Ministry, as it w as in the Interior M inistry 
and  in the M inistry of State Properties;26 (2) that the w ork of the com mittee should be regulat­
ed  by  detailed and clear instructions; (3) that the com mittee compile a detailed program m e 
for the gathering of m ilitary statistical inform ation and  (4) that the com m ittee should im m e­
diately require the basic inform ation from  the m ilitary attaches and  then have it u p d a ted  con­
tinuously.27 However, it w as not until he became War M inister (eleven years later), that 
M iliutin w as able to realize his ideas fully.
Thirty years later, in 1852, F. F. Berg's instructions were still in  force b u t they had  no t p ro ­
duced the expected results. General A leksandr Ivanovich Chernyshev (1786-1857), w ho was 
the War M inister betw een 1832-52, w as acutely aw are of the problem . The Prussian General
24- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 36v.
^  RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 3v. It is interesting to note that Berg's critical tone in the internal papers 
of the General Staff differed drastically from his official voice. Officially, Berg declared that no changes 
were needed within the General Staff. Glinoetskii, N. P. Istoriia russkogo general'nogo shtaba. 2 vols. (St. 
Petersburg: Shtab voisk gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga, Voennaia tipografha, 1883,1894): 
Vol. 2: 59-65,140-144 and Glinoetskii's article, 'General'nyi shtab', in Leer, G.A., ed. Entsiklopediia voen­
nykh i morskikh nauk. 8 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1883-97): Vol. 2: 432.
26‘ It might seem strange that the War Ministry did not have this vital function of staff work. It should 
be remembered, however, that the importance of staff work is a product of the modernization of war­
fare. It was only when railways speeded up the communications, and larger armies could be mobilized 
faster, that advance war planning and, therefore, staff work became essential.
27 RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 39v.
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Staff seem ed to provide the solution. In a report from Berlin 12/24 M arch 1852,28 the m ilitary 
attache, M ajor-General C ount Konstantin Konstantinovich Benckendorff, described the or­
ganization of the Prussian General Staff. In response, Chernyshev encouraged an investiga­
tion on how  the Prussian system of collecting m ilitary inform ation could be in troduced in 
Russia.29 In his final report, F. F. Berg suggested that the Prussian system  of three desks w ith­
in the G eneral Staff should be copied.30 The first desk w ould consist of Sweden, Denm ark, the 
N etherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. The second desk w ould  
consist of Prussia, Austria, all of the Germ an states, the states in  the Italian peninsula, and 
Sw itzerland. The third desk w ould consist of Turkey, Persia, India, China, K okand, Bukhara 
and  Khiva. Berg also proposed that the existing m ilitary attaches should collect inform ation 
from  adjacent countries, and  that officers be sent on a regular basis to areas w here there were 
no m ilitary attaches, for example, Spain or Piedm ont.
All of these efforts came to nothing. Nicholas I w as not im pressed and  d id  no t th ink  it neces­
sary to introduce the Prussian system. In his view, the correspondents of the War M inistry 
should  continue to give as complete and  as timely m ilitary statistics as w as possible, and  the 
second section of the D epartm ent of the General Staff should collect the inform ation.31
The problem  w ith Russian intelligence gathering w as two-fold, bo th  consequences of a w eak 
centre. First, there was the problem  of ensuring direct access to the inform ation and  m aking 
sure it w as updated  continuously. Second, the intelligence that d id  reach the G eneral Staff 
was no t analysed in a systematic way. The inform ation flow through the Foreign M inistry 
w as a m ajor bottleneck. Thus, before the Crim ean War Russia had  insufficient and  partly  out­
dated  m ilitary statistical inform ation from countries like Britain, Turkey, Sweden, and  the 
states in the Italian peninsula. The inform ation about France and  Prussia w as slightly better, 
m ainly because the attaches in  those countries delivered m ore accurate and  detailed  m aterial 
than the attaches elsewhere 32 Consequently, there w as a large degree of arbitrariness in­
volved. The instructions existed, bu t there w ere no  real m eans or will to enforce them . In
28- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, ff. 57-58. 'Benckendorff to Chernyshev, Berlin 12/24 March 1852'. The re­
port - incidentally written in French - contained a description of the Prussian General Staff, and an ac­
count of the Generalstabsreisen, i. e. tours where General Staff officers performed duty and 
reconnaissance tours. This was eventually introduced in Russia in 1872.
29- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, ff. lv-2.
3a RGVIA, f. 29, op. 6, d. 178, ff. 59-63. 'About the General Staff Collection of Information on Foreign 
Military Forces'.
31- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 64. 'War Minister's Resolution, 19 April 1852'. The military correspond­
ents at the missions in Berlin, Stockholm, Paris and Constantinople were instructed to start compiling 
information on neighbouring forces. In addition, the missions in Stuttgart, Munich, Neaples, Rome, 
Dresden, Lisbon, and Teheran were reminded of their duty to collect military information. RGVIA, F. 29, 
op. 6, d. 178, ff. 64v-65, ff. 72-73. Chernyshev's letter of 8 May 1852 to the War Ministry is published in 
Primakov, E. M., ed. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. 3 vols., incomplete.Vol. 1. (Moscow: Mezh- 
dunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995): 149-150.
32- RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, f. 52v.
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1856, w hen  Colonel Baron Fedor Fedorovich Tom au was sent to Vienna, he show ed  the in ­
structions to a friend a t the Foreign M inistry w ho commented:
A highly honourable bureaucratic work, but my advice to you is: when you arrive in Vi­
enna, put your instructions under lock and key at the Embassy and do not look at them 
again, but act according to what the circumstances permit.33
A  certain degree of subjectivity w as perhaps inevitable in the process, b u t R ussian m ilitary in ­
telligence gathering in  the period before 1856 and im m ediately afterw ards suffered from  the 
lack of an  organized centre w here the inform ation could be collected and  -  even m ore im por­
tan t -  analysed. This deficiency continued to plague Russian m ilitary statistics in to  the 1860s. 
However, in the 1860s, m easures w ere taken to overcome the problems. The w ork  of the m ili­
tary  attaches was m ore regulated and  organized, and they were integrated in to  the staff proc­
ess of gathering an d  evaluating the information. The question of m ilitary statistical 
inform ation, bo th  about Russia and  her neighbours, was discussed in the C onsultative Com ­
m ittee in 1863. Descriptions such as "unsatisfactory', "incomplete", and "incorrect" w ere often 
used  to characterize the statistical projects before the Crim ean War.34
In  1865, the new  M ain Staff finally em erged. Responsible for foreign intelligence gathering 
w as the C onsultative Com mittee, created in 1863, renam ed the M ilitary Scientific C om m ittee 
in  1867.35 All of the m aterial w as collected in the Com m ittee's archive. N ew  instructions w ere 
issued, that, for instance, ensured a continuous updating  of foreign m ilitary statistics.36 W ith 
the reforms, War M inister D. A. M iliutin had  fulfilled all four of his suggestions from  1850. 
N evertheless, in spite of the efforts to strengthen the central organ of intelligence gathering, 
the War M inistry h ad  no effective w ay of enforcing the instructions. In this respect, the basic 
deficiency in  Russian intelligence gathering that was so obvious before the C rim ean War con­
tinued  to plague the Russian General Staff. H aving said this, it is im portant to stress that vital
33- Tomau, F. F. 'Vospominaniia Barona F. F. Tomau", Istoricheskii Vestnik (1:1897): 51-52. The friend was 
E. P. Kovalevskii, Head of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. F. F. Tomau (1810-1890) had 
received his education at the Tsarskoe Selo Lyceum, participated in the war against Turkey in 1828, and 
was then appointed to the topographical section of the general staff. He and D. A. Miliutin later met in 
the Caucasus after Tomau had been released from a two-year long imprisonment in Abkhazia. Miliutin, 
D. A. Vospominaniia 1816-1843. New edition. Originally published in Tomsk, 1919 and reprinted in New- 
tonville, 1979. (Moscow: Rossiiskii arkhiv, 1997): 274-275. On Tomau, see also Russkii biograficheskii slo- 
var', (hereafter RBS): Vol. 20A: 172-73; Ikonnikov, N. La Noblesse de Russie. 2nd ed. (Paris, 1958-66): Vol. 
Rl: 200.
34- Prince Golistyn's paper in RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 417, ff. 1-26, 'About Military-Statistical Works until 
the Present, Current Status and Means to Produce them in the Future", 19 Dec. 1863, and A. I. Mak- 
sheev's "Colonel Maksheev's Thoughts about the Military-Statistical Works of the General Staff", 25 Jan. 
1864. RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 417, ff. 73-84. See also Rich, David A. 'The Professionalization of Russia's 
General Staff 1870-1895: Ideas, Strategy, and Foreign Policy". Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1993:40-48, 
and his "Imperialism, Reform and Strategy: Russian Military Statistics, 1840-1880", The Slavonic and East 
European Review 74 (4,1996): 621-639.
35- SVP 1869, Pt. 1, Obrazovanie voennykh uchrezhdenii, Bk. 1, Obrazovanie voennogo ministerstva i osobykh 
ustanovlenii, Arts. 154-164.
36‘ RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1320, f. 1, f. 6. "About the Change of Instructions to Our Military Agents Abroad". 
1864.
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progress had  been m ade. The Military Scientific Com mittee had  been created as a centre for 
dealing w ith  foreign m ilitary intelligence, and the inform ation w as being u p d a ted  regularly. 
Furtherm ore, betw een 1867 and 1871, the H ead of the M ilitary Scientific Com m ittee, N. N. 
Obruchev, edited  and  published the first really substantial collection of m ilitary statistics to 
be published  in Russia, Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik. It consisted of four volum es containing 
the latest m ilitary inform ation as well as other statistical data on foreign countries as w ell as 
Russia.37
In  sum m ary, by  trying to im prove the collection and  analysis of foreign m ilitary intelligence, 
the Russian arm y d id  w hat other European armies were doing at the time.38 This w as no t so 
m uch the result of trying to com pensate for technological 'backw ardness', as it w as a re­
sponse to the grow ing im portance of staff w ork and of m aking w ar preparations in  peacetim e 
d u e  to the ever-shortening am ount of time it took to mobilize. This developm ent w as in  no 
w ay exceptional for Russia, b u t w as rather a trend am ong all European arm ies a t the time.39
3.2 Men in High Places
W ho, then, were the m ilitary attaches, and w here were they stationed? From 1856 Russia h ad  
perm anent attaches in Berlin, Vienna, London, Paris, and Constantinople.40 In 1862, w hen  
Russia recognized Italy, an  officer w as appointed to Turin 41 Ten years later there w ere also 
perm anen t m ilitary attaches in Rome, Washington, and the Hague. The War M inistry 's cost in 
salaries in had  risen from 23,895 roubles in 1862 to 48,590 roubles in 1872 42
In addition, there were the unofficial (freelance) officers w orking abroad w ithou t pay  from  
the War Ministry. In the beginning of the 1860s, there were only a few officers in  this category. 
Prince Em m anuil Nikolaevich Meshcherskii had  been in Brussels since at least 1859,43 C om et
37 Obruchev, N. N., ed. Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik. 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1867- 
71).
38- Beauvais, Armand. Attaches militaires, attaches navals et attaches de Vair. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 
1937): 22-30.
39• Fuller has argued that the Russian War Ministry started to place increasing emphasis on the collec­
tion of foreign military intelligence in 1880 as a mean to compensate for 'Russian technological back­
wardness'. Fuller, William C., Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free Press, 1992): 
341,344-45.
40‘ Primakov, Ocherki istorii: Vol. 1:151; RGVIA, F. 437, op. 1, d. 35, ff. 19-19v. 'About the Appointment of 
Colonel Hasford as Military Agent in Turin'. 1862. In 1866, Florence became the residence for the mili­
tary attach^ and after the unification of Italy, Rome. The post in London was initially held by Count N. 
P. Ignat'ev (1832-1908), later ambassador to Constantinople 1864-1874, but he left in 1858, and the posi­
tion was apparently vacant until Novitskii arrived in 1861. The attach^ sent to Paris in 1856, Adjutant- 
General P. P. Albedinskii (1826-1883), stayed for a two-year period and was then succeeded by P. A. 
Shuvalov. Albedinskii later became Commander of the troops in Riga and Vil'na Military Districts. In 
1881, he was appointed to the State Council.
4L RGVIA, F. 437, op. 1, d. 35, f. 2v.
42- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1097, ff.11-12; F. 440, op. 1, d. 190, f. 3v.
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Andrei Glebovich Nechaev was attached to the m ission in T urin ,44 and C aptain V. V. Mo- 
lostvov w as based in  F rankfu rt45 In 1869, Count M ikhail Petrovich Kleinmichel w as attached 
to the French em bassy at the suggestion of G rand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the E lder 46 That 
year a com prehensive list of these freelancers appeared in the M inistry 47 The list included  ten  
officers, one of w hom  w as N. A. Novitskii in London and  Colonel V. V. M olostvov w ho  had  
been transferred to Vienna to assist Baron F. F. Tomau. There w ere tw o officers w orking in 
Florence, one in Karlsruhe, and one in the Hague. The others w ere Prince E. N. M eshcherskii 
in  Brussels, C aptain Konstantin Gavrilovich Doppelm aier in Berlin, Captain V. I. G iuliani in 
Paris, and his successor, C aptain D. N. Leont'ev.
W ho was appointed to the position of m ilitary attache? The War M inistry under D. A. M iliu­
tin had  the explicit policy of appointing General Staff officers.48 If w e look at the officers w ith 
the official status of m ilitary attache w ho served betw een 1859 and  1872, including Novitskii 
in London b u t excluding the m ilitary representative in  Berlin, we have a total of eleven offic­
ers. Six of them  were either fligel' adjutants or adjutant-generals w hen appointed  or becam e 
so during  their years as attaches. Of the rem aining five, three w ere General Staff officers -  
Baron F. F. Tom au, Major-General Vsevolod Gustavovich H asford, Colonel A leksandr Semen­
ovich Zelenyi -  and the other two, Major-General A leksandr Pavlovich Gorlov and  Colonel 
Viktor A ntonovich Frankini, were graduates of the Artillery Academ y 49 In the group belong­
ing to the suite of the Tsar, Count Pavel Andreevich Shuvalov,50 Prince P. L. W ittgenstein and 
Major-General O tto Borisovich Richter came from the H orse G uards regim ent. N. A. N ovit­
skii w as a colonel w ho w as m arried to the daughter of G eneral V. F. Adlerberg, C om m ander 
of the Im perial H eadquarters.51 Captain Aleksandr A leksandrovich Daller w as an  artillery 
captain from the G uards and Count Pavel Ippolitovich Kutaisov h ad  served as a second lieu­
43‘ In 1866, he began to receive pay from the Ministry; 1,500 roubles, in recognition of his useful, but un­
paid, work for seven years. RGIVA, 1866, F. 401, op. 2, d. 69. f. 5. 'About the Designation of Salary to 
Lieutenant Prince Meshcherskii at our Mission in Brussels'. 1866. Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. Zl: 221 
contains some biographical information.
RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1081. About the Appointment of Lieutenant Nechaev, attached to our Embassy 
in Madrid to our Embassy in Turin 1862; F. 437, op. 1, d. 34. 'About the Appointment of Comet Nechaev 
to our Embassy in Turin without the Title of Military Agent'. 1860-61. There is a very brief reference to 
A. G. Nechaev in Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. K2:393.
45- RGVIA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 188. 'Information Provided by Captain Molostvov from our Mission in 
Frankfurt'. 1866. Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. J2:415.
46‘ RGIVA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 118, f. 1. 'About the Letter by the Commander of the Guards and Petersburg 
Military District Regarding the Appointment of Count Kleinmichel 2 to Paris or Brussels'. Kleinmichel 
was obviously very ill and died in 1872, aged twenty-four. Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. Gl: 144-45.
47- RGVIA, 1869, f. 401, op. 2, d. 118, f. 8. 'List of Officers Attached to our Foreign Embassies Indepen­
dently of the Military Agents'. 9 Dec. 1869.
48- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1183, f. 14. 'About General-Adjutant Barantsev's Petition for Appointing Colo­
nel De Shar'er Military Agent in Switzerland'. 1864.
49- Gorlov, an artillery specialist, played a vital role in developing the rifle Berdan No. 1, the first Russian 
breech-loading rifle. See Chapter 2.
50- His famous brother, Count Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, was Director of the Third Department. For bi­
ographical details about Pavel A., see Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. Cl: 280-281.
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tenant in the G uards Horse Pioneer Squadron before en tering  the General Staff Academy 
from  w hich he graduated  in I860.52
The G uards C orps was, no t surpisingly, a great source fo r providing officers for foreign as­
signments. Of the eleven officers, a t least nine came from  the G uards Corps an d  this figure 
m ight actually be higher since it has no t been possible to  track dow n the early service records 
for two of these men. If w e include the eleven officers w h o  w orked as freelancers, we find that 
from a total of tw enty-tw o m en at least nineteen came from  the G uards Corps. A lthough 
these figures m ight change slightly if w e could determ ine the education of the other three of­
ficers w e can clearly see the dom inance of the G uards Corps.
W ith regard to the branch of service, the artillery specialists and  graduates from  the General 
Staff A cadem y dom inated as the recruiting ground of th e  attaches. In the group of the eleven 
attaches, four came from either the G uards Horse Artilleiry or sim ply the G uards Artillery and  
three had  graduated  from the General Staff Academy. There seems to be only one officer, even 
if w e include all officers stationed abroad, w ho came from  the engineering troops, nam ely 
Count P. I. Kutaisov.
Favouritism  and  patronage clearly played an im portant role in  appointing the attaches. N o­
vitskii is one example, and  his protector, V. F. Adlerberg,, supported  h im  w hen he w anted to 
transfer from London to Paris.53 The M inister at the m ission in  Turin, C ount E rnst Gustavov- 
ich Stackelberg, actively supported  the appointm ent of C o m et A. G. Nechaev, even invoking 
the nam e of G rand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder.54 The latter w as also behind  the ap­
pointm ent of Kleinmichel to Paris 55 These are b u t a few (of the examples that dem onstrate the 
im portance of patronage. They are illustrative since it h a s  been possible to trace the patron­
age. However, the lack of w ritten  evidence in other cases is no  reason to believe that patron­
age d id  not exist in those cases as well.
It should be rem em bered that the num ber of people in tlhis exclusive club is very  sm all -  far 
too small to m ake it possible to draw  any statistically significant conclusions. N evertheless, it 
is notew orthy that a large proportion of these officers haid a specialist education. Even if pa­
tronage played an im portant role in appointing them , it w a s  seldom  the sole criterion. Knowl­
51' RGVIA, 1867, F. 401, op. 2, d. 50. See also Veniukov, M. I. Istomcheskie ocherki Rossii so vremeni Krymskoi 
winy do zakliucheniia Berlinskogo dogovora 1855-1878. 4 vols. (Leiipzig, Prague, 1878), Vol. 1: 54-55; Voen- 
naia entsiklopediia, Vol. 1:143-44.
52' Kutaisov succeeded Novitskii in London in 1872. RGVIA, F.. 440, op. 1, d. 190, f. 3v. See Ikonnikov, La 
Noblesse: Vol. HI: 249 for some biographical details.
53‘ RGVIA, 1867, F. 401, p. 2, d. 50. 'About Count Adlerberg I's Letter on Appointing Colonel Novitskii 
Military Agent in Paris'. 1867.
54 RGVIA, F. 437, op. 1, d. 34, f. 1.
55- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 2, d. 118, f. 1.
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edge and skill also characterized the majority of these officers.56 As we have seen, from 1859 
to 1872 approximately half of the military attaches (six of eleven) belonged to or were ap­
pointed to the suite of the Tsar, itself not a small body. In fact, Alexander II appointed 246 of­
ficers to the suite during his reign.57 In terms of specialization, Artillery and General Staff 
officers dominated. Personal wealth was almost a prerequisite, considering the low pay and 
the high costs involved. To be sent abroad as a military attache m ay have been an honourable 
assignment, certainly laborious, but definitely not a very profitable duty. The pay from the 
War M inistry was not enough to maintain an honourable position and to be able to partici­
pate in social events where it was possible to gain access to information. M oney problems 
were a constant complaint in the letters of Baron Tomau in Vienna, exacerbated by the fact 
that the Ministry occasionally was slow in paying his salary 58
What, then, did these officers do once they were stationed abroad? Judging from the instruc­
tions, the workload of the attaches was heavy. They reported to the Military Scientific Com­
mittee w ithin the Main Staff and directly to the War Minister. In addition, they were expected 
to report on changes and improvements in artillery and engineering directly to the Artillery 
and Engineering Administrations. In addition to writing reports, they sent weapons so that 
new models could be tested.59
The instructions used after the Crimean War were essentially based on those of Berg written
i  ,n
in 18#2. Only minor adaptations had been made in the intervening years. The m ilitary at­
tache was supposed to report on:
1. numbers, organization and the location of both arm y and fleet;
2. personnel reinforcement capacity and supply mechanisms;
3. troop movements and, if possible, the reasons for such movements;
4. fortresses and fortifications;
5. experiments and tests of new weapons and other items that have an im pact on mili­
tary science;
56' Veniukov was not correct w hen he stated that the position of the m ilitary attache w as transform ed 
into a sinecure for inferior officers, appointed exclusively through connections.Veniukov, Istoricheskie 
ocherki: 54.
57'• Miloradovich, G. A. Spisok lits Svity Ikh Velichestv s tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Petra I-go po 1886 g. (Kiev: 
S.V. Kul'zhenko, 1886): 200-201.
58 Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Otdel rukopisi, (hereafter RGB OR), F. 169, k. 76, ed. khr. 
35, ff. 1-2. T. F. Tomau to D. A. Miliutin 6/18 M ayl86T; Ibid., ed. khr. 36, ff. 1-2. 'F. F. Tom au to D. A. 
Miliutin 14/26 Jan. 1867', and Ibid., f. 15. 'F. F. Tomau to D. A. 13/25 Jan. 1868'. And yet, Tornau w as by 
no means a poor man. He had an estate in Russia, 460 hectares. Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. Rl: 200. See 
also his letters to Miliutin, w ritten at the estate during the 1840s and early 1850s. RGB OR, f. 169, k. 76, 
ed. khr. 29 and 30.
59 Lukin, P. 'Kollektsiia ruchnogo ognestrel'nogo oruzhiia inostrannykh obraztsov, prinadlezhashchaia 
Oruzheinoi komissii', Ornzheinyi sbomik (2,1861): 1-15.
6a In 1852, an abridged version was produced. RGVIA, F. 29, op. 6, d. 178, ff. 70-71.
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6. cam ps and  m anoeuvers;
7. the spirit of the troops and the Officer Corps;
8. the state of the artillery, engineering, commissariat, provisions, and m edical adm inis­
trations;
9. changes in regulations, arm am ent, and uniforms;
10. new  w orks in the field of m ilitary science, m aps, etc.;
11. the m ilitary educational establishm ent and teaching m ethods;
12. the organization of the General Staff;
13. detailed inform ation about troop m ovem ents by  railways, num bers and  m obilization 
time;
14. im provem ents in m ilitary adm inistration.61
In addition, it w as em phasized that they were subordinated to the H ead of the m ission and, if 
they reported  on technical issues, they should avoid reporting facts that 'norm ally  filled for­
eign journals' and  instead concentrate on 'even the m ost trivial details'. The attaches were 
also instructed to gather the m aterial w ith caution and to be careful no t to arouse the suspi­
cion of the local authorities. In order to stay abreast of m ilitary know ledge a t hom e, the at­
taches received the Artilleriiskii zhum al and the Inzhenem yi zhum al from  St. Petersburg. From 
1862 onw ard they also received the Voennyi sbomik.62
In 1864, the Consultative Committee revised the instructions and issued new  ones.63 Perhaps 
the m ost interesting change w as the point about m ilitary education. The War M inistry w as 
explicitly interested in  the reforms in other countries concerning the training of the troops 
and  the m easures for support and dissem ination of education in the arm y -  for officers as 
w ell as for soldiers.64 This is revealing for several reasons. The technical changes (the rifle and 
the rifled gun, for instance) had  implications for tactics and education, and  the Russian arm y 
clearly was aw are of and interested in these m atters. Moreover, to instruct the attaches to re­
port on how  other armies supported  education shows an understanding  of the necessity to 
create an educated arm y of literate soldiers and knowledgeable officers.
61‘ See, for instance, RGVIA, F. 437, op. 1, d. 34, ff. 4-6; F. 437, op. 1, d. 35, ff. 21-23. A copy of Hasford's 
instructions from 1862 can be found in Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskii Imperii (hereafter AVPRI), F. 
133, op. 469, d. 57, ff. 84-87. The instructions to the military attaches in 1856 were published in Primakov, 
Ocherki istorii: Vol. 1:152-153.
62- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1104. 'About Sending the Journal Voennyi sbomik to the Military Agents'; 
RGVIA, f. 437, op. 1, d. 34, f. 6.
63- RGVLA, F. VUA, d. 1320. van Dyke briefly summarized the 1864 instructions, van Dyke, Carl. Russian 
Imperial Military Doctrine and Education 1832-1914. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990): 78.
641 RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1320, f. 5v.
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O ther no tew orthy changes in the instructions were, first, the attaches w ere to update  the mil­
itary  statistical notebooks for respective countries three times a year: 1 January, 1 May, and  1 
September. This w ould  ensure that the m ilitary statistical inform ation w as up  to date. Second, 
they w ere to w rite in Russian and  translate parts of im portant foreign books or booklets into 
Russian. In previous instructions, this was only a recom m endation and  the reports w ere 
som etim es w ritten  in French. Even after the new  instructions had  been issued this practice 
continued.
Reports that described the political situation were to be sent directly to the War M inister after 
being show n to the H ead of the mission. It is interesting to note that the Russian m ilitary at­
tache w as if no t encouraged then at least, perm itted to w rite about political issues. This is 
very  different from the Prussian instructions of 1816, w here the attaches w ere told explicitly 
to  stay out of politics. The Prussian instructions explicitly stated that the m ilitary attaches 
w ere to get 'an  accurate know ledge of states from the purely  m ilitary po int of v iew ' and  
should  'avoid  m eddling in politics'.65
A lthough nothing w as said in the instructions on the use of agents it was allow ed in practice. 
For instance, F. F. Tom au in Vienna hired an  inform ant in 1870. This agent, however, proved 
to be useless and  he w as fired after only one m onth.66
The instructions were subsequently sent out to the attaches67 and  if they d id  no t send timely, 
u p d ated  inform ation on the size of the army, the m ilitary budget etc. they received a letter 
from  the War Ministry.68 W ittgenstein responded that, prior to this he had  been unable to u p ­
date the inform ation three times a year because it w as im possible to find the necessary docu­
m ents w ith  the exact data. He m aintained that it w as possible to compile such inform ation 
only once a year, that is, w hen the budget w as discussed and w hen the Finance M inister p re­
sented a com prehensive report w ith the exact num bers and  m oney allocated to the different 
units.69
65’ Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964): 
258. Vagts, The Military Attache: 15-16. It was only in the 1880s that the Prussian army and other armies 
began to engage the military attaches in political reporting to an unprecedented degree. See Craig, The 
Politics: 266-268.
66‘ Tomau felt that he needed extra help in the summer of 1870 when the Franco-Prussian War was be­
ginning. Having discovered that the man ( called 'U' by Tomau) provided false information, he got rid 
of him. Subsequently, Tomau was sceptical of the value of trying to find another agent. RGVIA. F. VUA, 
d. 1328, ff. 296-97. 'Tomau to Miliutin 17/19 July 1870 Vienna'; ff. 113-14. 'Tomau to Miliutin 23 Aug./4 
Sept. 1870 Vienna'.
67' See for instance RGVIA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 181, ff. 76-77. 'Miliutin to Adlerberg 5 June 1864'; F. 440, op. 1,
d. 176, ff. 29-30. 'Miliutin to Wittgenstein 25 June 1864'.
68- RGVIA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 181, f. 107. 'Verigin to Adlerberg, November 1864'.
69- RGVIA, F. 440, op. 1, d. 181, ff. 14-15. 'Wittgenstein to Miliutin. Paris 28 March/9 April 1865'.
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The Tsar read a substantial part of the reports from Berlin, Paris, and  Vienna. His brief, bu t 
frequent, com m ents w ritten  on the reports are an indicator that the Russian reports were not 
treated  as lightly as the reports by the famous French m ilitary attache in  Berlin, Baron Stof- 
fel.70 Stoffel's published reports clearly m ade an im pression on Russian officers.71 In relation 
to  this, it is interesting to note a conversation betw een the Russian observer to the Franco- 
P russian  War, Baron L. L. Zeddeler, and  C ount Golenishchev-Kutuzov, w ho m et each other at 
the end  of the Franco-Prussian War.72 Kutuzov looked depressed and  explained that he had  
been  reading the recently published reports from Baron Stoffel. In the light of these reports, 
h is ow n seem ed insignificant. Z eddeler tried to com fort h im  by pointing out that Stoffel's re­
po rts  w ere no t even read and consequently had  no t been of any use to the French army. 'M ay­
be the sam e thing happened  to the C ount's reports', Zeddeler rem arked. However, m ost of 
K utuzov 's reports that are kept in GARF and RGVIA show  clear signs of having been read by 
the Tsar and  the other addressees.
As far as can be judged, the content of the attache reports varies -  depending  on the person 
reporting. While several attaches w rote (at least for this study) m any relevant reports others 
proved  less useful. For instance, Novitskii in London seems only to have sent new spaper clip­
pings, books and official reports on various topics.73 C ontem porary recognition of the m ili­
tary  attaches is scarce, b u t even Veniukov,74 w ho d id  not have a h igh regard for the officers 
appoin ted  m ilitary attaches, acknow ledged that Gorlov in  the U nited States, D oppelm aier in 
Prussia, and  Fel'dm an in  A ustria provided useful inform ation.75In spite of all instructions, it 
seems clear that the attaches had  a large degree of personal freedom  to shape their work.
H ow  im portant w ere m ilitary attaches in a larger perspective? One w ay of trying to answ er 
this question is to look at their careers. First, we can note that several of the attaches during  
the period 1859-72 served for a long time. Tomau stayed in Vienna from 1856 to 1873, Franki-
70' After the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, Baron Stoffel was accused of not having reported 
about the superiority of the Prussian army. He then published several of his reports and, in so doing, 
found them unopened in the War Ministry. Stoffel, Eugene. Rapports militaires ecrits de Berlin 1866-70. 
(Paris: Gamiers freres, 1871).
71 • The reports were almost immediately translated into Russian and published in Voennyi sbomik (3, 
1871): 127-164. Leont'ev wrote that the reports could be useful for the Russian army. RGVIA, F. 440, op. 
1, d. 188, ff. 22-23. 'Leont'ev to the War Minister 25 Jan./6 Feb. 1871'. Miliutin agreed and at once recom­
mended their publication in Voennyi sbomik. RGVIA, F. 440, op. 1, d. 188, f. 24. 'Note by Miliutin 5 Feb. 
1871'.
72- Zeddeler, L.L. 'Dvadtsat1 piat let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii vestnik (4,1896): 118-119.
73- One can only regret that Shuvalov stayed such a brief period in Paris. His reports make excellent 
reading and show both political and military insight. It is hardly surprising that he was a highly respect­
ed diplomat during his tenure as ambassador in Berlin 1885-94. See Lieven, Dominic. Russia's Rulers un­
der the Old Regime. (London: Yale University Press, 1989): 198-98,353.
74- Veniukov, Mikhail Ivanovich (1832-1901), General Staff officer and geographer. Sympathizing with 
revolutionary ideas, he emigrated from Russia in 1877.
75 ■ Veniukov, M.I. Istoricheskie ocherki Rossii so vremeni Krymskoi voiny do zakliucheniia Berlinskogo dogovora 
1855-1878.4 vols. (Leipzig, Prag, 1878), Vol. 1:54-55. Fel'dman worked as military attache in Vienna be­
tween 1876 and 1881.
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n i served in  Constantinople 1856-71, Novitskii in London 1861-72 and  then in Rome from  
1872, and  W ittgenstein in Paris 1861-75. All four advanced to the rank of lieutenant-general, 
w hich is the th ird  highest rank  after general and field m arshal. Of the eleven officers w ho 
served as m ilitary attaches during  1859-72, at least six becam e lieutenant-generals, four be­
came generals (Shuvalov, Kutaisov, Richter and Zelenyi) and  three (Shuvalov, Richter, and  
Kutaisov) were appointed to  the State Council. If w e ad d  the m ilitary representatives at the 
P russian  court, w ho already were h igh ranking officers, C ount Nikolai V ladim irovich Adler- 
berg also finished as a general in the State Council and C ount V. P. K utuzov w as a lieutenant- 
general w hen  he died in 1873. The four generals w ho w ere appoin ted  to the State Council had  
all entered service in the Guards, A dlerberg had  served as governor-general, and  Kutaisov 
served as governor. Richter held  the position of C om m ander of the Im perial H eadquarters 
w hen he w as appointed. Of the m ilitary officers in the State Council, they clearly belonged to 
w hat has been described as the social elite m ade up  of G uards officers ra ther than  the intellec­
tual elite w ith officers of the artillery, engineering, and  sappers.76
The relationship betw een the officers and the diplom atic corps at the legations w as n o t free of 
tensions.77 W hen the Russian m ilitary attache, Baron Fedor Fedorovich Tom au, arrived in  Vi­
enna im m ediately after the Crim ean War, he w as greeted by the acting H ead of the m ission, 
Viktor Petrovich Balabin (1811-1864), w ith the words: 'W rite as little as you can, if you start to 
w rite it w ill not do you any good '.78 Baron Tomau, however, d id  no t take heed  and w rote ex­
tensively about A ustrian m ilitary and  political life throughout his years as m ilitary attache. 
The tensions betw een the professional diplom ats and  the m ilitary had  probably no t been 
eased by  the fact that two officers w ho served as m ilitary attaches before the C rim ean War 
(Count K. K. Benckendorff, m ilitary attache in Berlin 1847-56, and  M ajor-General C ount E. G. 
Stackelberg, m ilitary attache in Vienna 1852-56) had  been prom oted to m inisters at diplom atic 
m issions after the Crim ean War.79
The friction betw een diplom ats and  officers w as a reality and  on one occasion an  am bassador 
intervened. In 1862, Colonel Novitskii in London com plained to M iliutin that the War M inis­
try 's  lack of recognition of his position as m ilitary attache constrained his w ork.80 H e com­
76‘ Lieven, Russia's Rulers: 64-65.
T7' For the tensions between the diplomats and the military attaches in the Prussian army, see Craig, 
'Military Diplomats'.
78- RGB-OR, F. 169, k. 76, ed.khr. 34, f. 23. 'F. F. Tomau to D.A. Miliutin 14 Sept. 1857'. See also excerpts 
from Tomau's memoirs, Tomau, F. F. 'Vospominaniia Barona F. F. Tomau', Istoricheskii Vestnik (1,1897):
50-82.
79■ Konstantin Konstantinovich Benckendorf, Count, (1817-1858) was appointed Minister to the court of 
Wiirttemberg 1856-58: RBS, Vol. 2:698. Ernst Gustavovich Stackelberg, Count (1813-1870) was appoint­
ed Head of the Russian mission of the Kingdom of Sardinia inl856. In 1864 -68, he served in Vienna.His 
last position was as ambassador in Paris. RBS, Vol. 23:396-397. His obituary is in Russkii invalid, 7 May,
1870.
80- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1097, ff. 5-7. 'Novitskii to Miliutin 8/20 Oct. 1862'.
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p ared  him self w ith his French colleague w ho could w ork  openly. The am bassador, C ount 
Filip Ivanovich Brunnov (1797-1875), argued forcibly against giving Novitskii the form al title 
an d  eventually succeeded.81 Briinnov's m ain argum ent w as that there was no difference in 
the w orking conditions betw een Novitskii and the French m ilitary attache. Both w ere subor­
dinate to the H ead of the m ission and  were free to do all of the necessary work. W hy w as it so 
im portan t to Brunnov that Novitskii not be given the official status? H is behaviour illustrates 
the tension betw een the diplom atic and m ilitary attaches and  indicates that the am bassador 
felt that he w ould  lose some of his control over Novitskii if he becam e a 'fu ll b low n ' m ilitary 
attache -  in spite of the formal regulation.
Furtherm ore, it is clear that, in m ost cases, the Russian m ilitary attaches were able m en, obvi­
ously aw are of their roles as officers w ithout a uniform  -  soldiers in civilian surroundings. F. 
F. Tom au thought him self superior to his diplomatic colleagues. For instance, he no ted  that 
any m an of some talent could p u t together a diplomatic report filled w ith  gossip an d  extracts 
from  a new spaper, whereas a m ilitary report required hard  facts and  exact num bers.82
3.3 At the Prussian Court
The m ilitary plenipotentiary in Berlin had  -  as already noted -  a special position th a t de­
serves some attention. The m ost im portant difference betw een the attaches and  m ilitary rep­
resentatives w as that the latter w ere directly subordinate to the Tsar only. This difference 
could cause complications. C ount N. V. Adlerberg (1819-1892) w as sent initially as m ilitary at­
tache to Berlin {voennyi agent sostoiashchii pri missii v  Berline) im m ediately after the Crim ean 
War. In  1861, the Tsar elevated him  to the position of m ilitary representative at the Prussian 
court (voennyi agent sostoiashchii pri Ego Velichestve Korole Prusskom). He felt obliged to poin t 
out to the Im perial H eadquarters that it be m ade perfectly clear that he w as now  com pletely 
independent of both the m ission and the Foreign Ministry. H e w rote that 'failure to un d er­
stand this will give rise to inconveniences and unfriendly conflicts, harm ful to  the service'.83
In addition  to the m ilitary representative there was also a Russian m ilitary attache in Prussia. 
In compliance w ith the m ilitary convention betw een Russia and  Prussia, signed in  1863, the 
General Staff officer Colonel Fedor Petrovich W eymam  w as sent to Prussia for three years.84
81- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1097, ff. 24-28. 'Briinnov to Gorchakov, London, 13/25 Nov. 1862'.
8Z RGB OR, F. 169, k. 76, ed. 36, ff. 14v-15. 'F. F. Tornau to D. A. Miliutin,19 June/1 Julyl867'.
83‘ RGVIA, F. 970, op. 1, d. 750, f. lv. 'About the Appointment of General-Adjutant Count Adlerberg 3, 
attached to His Majesty the King of Prussia'. October 1861.
84‘ RGVIA, F. 1, op. 1, d. 58131, f. 33. 'Lieutenant-General Weymam's Service Record 1891': ff. 31-40. In
connection with the Polish uprising, Russia and Prussia concluded an agreement providing for the co­
operation of the military authorities in the frontier districts against the rebels. See Taylor, A. J. P. The 
Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954): 133-136.
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H e w as succeeded by the Artillery Officer Captain K. G. D oppelm aier who, in  turn , w as suc­
ceeded in 1872 by Artillery C aptain A. A. Daller.
It is no tew orthy that A dlerberg 's successor, C ount V. P. G olenishchev-Kutuzov (1803-1873),85 
received the norm al instructions sent to all m ilitary attaches from the War M inistry -  includ­
ing the paragraph  that he w as subordinate to the H ead of the mission. This, however, should 
n o t be taken too literally. K utuzov clearly w rote reports directly to the Tsar.86 The exchange of 
m ilitary plenipotentiary and attache in Berlin occurred at a bad  time. A dlerberg left in early 
1866 to take up  his post as governor-general in Finland before K utuzov arrived. K utuzov had  
only been in Berlin less than a m onth  before he found him self in the field attached to  the 
H eadquarters of the Prussian army.87 The m ilitary attache, W eymam, w ho alone h ad  been re­
sponsible for the reporting during  the build-up to the Austro-Prussian War, left in early June 
for F inland and a position at the m ilitary district staff 88 Interestingly enough, W eym am  
thought that A ustria w ould w in  the war. In his view, the Prussian Landw ehr-system  w as use­
ful only in the case of a defensive w ar w here one could appeal to patriotic feelings. In  an  of­
fensive war, w here large losses could be expected, such troops w ere no t likely to be 
successful. Even though he acknowledged that the Prussian infantry was better arm ed, he 
thought that the A ustrian soldiers had  a superior morale, were m ore energetic, and w ere un i­
fied in their actions.89
The Russian m ilitary representatives were integrated w ith  the ordinary attaches in term s of 
reporting. The Prussian representative, General von Schweinitz, claim ed that he reported  to 
no  one b u t the King.90 Both A dlerberg and Golenishchev-Kutuzov w rote regularly  to  the War 
M inister and to the M ain Staff. They appeared regularly in  the M inistry 's lists of m ilitary at­
taches. Even though they provided both the War M inister and  the M ain Staff w ith  inform a­
tion, it was not the m ilitary representative's m ain task to report on  every detail of the army. 
Their tasks were more extensive than  those of the ordinary m ilitary attaches. The Prussian 
Militdrbevollmdchtigter General von Schweinitz explained that it w as essential to gain the con­
fidence of the Tsar; otherwise the position was untenable. They often accom panied the sover­
eign on hunts and m anoeuvres, and reported all the m inutiae of m ilitary life including the
85- Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. XI: 166-167.
86- GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 502. 'Reports by Count Kutuzov to Alexander II from Berlin with Enclosed In­
formation about the Prussian Army 1867-72'. All in all, there are 22 letters. For Kutuzov's biographical 
details, see Miloradovich, Spisok: 45,72,144, and Ikonnikov, La Noblesse: Vol. XI: 166-67.
87 RGVIA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 187, ff. 88,95-96,102. He wrote his first report from Berlin on 31 M ay/12 June 
1866. His first report from the Prussian army HQ was written on 19 June/1 July 1866.
88- RGVIA, F. 1, op. 1, d. 58131, f. 33v.
89- See his reports, RGVIA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 187, ff. 74-76, 'Report to the War Minister 7/19 May 1866', 
and f. 79-80, 'Weymam to Miliutin, Berlin, 12/24 May 1866'.
90- Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Botschafters H.L. von Schweinitz. 2 vols. (Berlin: 
Verlag vom Reimar Hobbing, 1927): Vol. 1:181-82.
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bestow al of orders and changes in uniform s to the extent that the Prussian envoy used  the 
w ord  'Hosenspione' to describe their duties 91The reports from K utuzov that have been p re­
served show  that there is some tru th  in this, b u t at the sam e time it is a simplification. K utu­
zov som etim es acted as a messenger, conveying diplom atic m essages betw een the tw o 
sovereigns. It w as K utuzov's idea to have D ragom irov's book on the A ustro-Prussian War 
translated  into German.92 Moreover, he w as behind the suggestion to send the artillery officer 
K. G. D oppelm aier as an observer to the Prussian arm y in 1866.93
The m ilitary representative at the Prussian court earned considerably m ore than  the norm al 
attaches -  usually  twice as much. In 1862, N. V. A dlerberg earned 10,000 roubles, w hereas the 
m ilitary attaches in Vienna, Turin, London, and  Paris earned betw een 5,000 an d  5,700 roubles. 
The attache in Constantinople earned a total of 2,500 roubles. This sum  included 1,200 roubles 
for neglasnye expenses; that is, for agents, telegrams, postage, and  the acquisition of new  
w eapons.94 These figures approxim ately equalled the pay  of the councillor (sovetnik) at the 
em bassy w ho usually earned betw een 4,000 and 6,000 roubles. The pay  w as approxim ately 
the sam e ten years later. 95A major-general serving at a staff in St. Petersburg w ould  earn  ap­
proxim ately 3,400 roubles 96
The m ilitary representative signified the friendly personal ties betw een Russia and  Prussia, 
and  held  a position stationed betw een a m ilitary and a diplom atic post. The extent to w hich 
he w ould  be successful depended on personal contacts in the higher spheres of the m ilitary 
and  the political arena. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that they do no t seem to  have w ritten 
any deeper analysis about the changes in warfare during  the 1860s. In general, the reports of 
the ordinary military attaches contain more analysis of this kind, although n o t very m any of 
the direct reports to the Tsar seem  to have survived.
3.4 The Observers
If the m ilitary attache and the officer at the Prussian court w ere the m ain  source of foreign 
m ilitary intelligence in peacetime, then the observers w ere an  equally im portan t source in  
w artim e since this was the traditional w ay of studying the special features of w ar in prac-
91, Schweinitz. Denkwurdigkeiten: Vol. 1:175-76,181-81.
92‘ GARF, F. 678, op. 1, d. 502, f. 2, 'Kutuzov to Alexander II, Berlin, 18/30 Nov. 1867'.
93- RGIVA, F. 432, op. 1, d. 187, ff. 98-f. 98v. 'Kutuzov to Miliutin 4/11 June 1866'.
94‘ RGVIA, 1867, F. 401, op. 2, sv. 423, d. 22b. The sum for expenses remained the same over the years. In 
1912, it was still 1,200 roubles. See Fuller, William C. Jr. 'The Russian Empire.', in Knowing One’s Enemies: 
Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars, edited by E. May. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1984): 106.
95- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 1097, ff. 11-12,15-16; F. 440, op. 1, d. 190, f. 3v.
96- Obruchev, Voenno-statisticheskii: Vol. 4, Pt. 2:155.
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Q7tice. To a certain degree -  as w as the case w ith  the attaches -  it w as also a diplom atic posi­
tion. Thus, w hen discussing w ho to send to the Prussian army, C ount E. G. Stackelberg, H ead 
of the m ission in  Vienna, felt obliged to poin t out that it w as necessary to send  an observer to 
the A ustrian arm y to ensure that the situation w ould no t be m isinterpreted at the A ustrian  
court.98 The A ustrian army, however, declared that the Kaiser d id  no t w an t any foreign ob­
servers at all this time.99 A part from  the m ilitary representative, V. P. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, 
and  the attache artillery officer K. G. Doppelmaier, the Russian General Staff sent Colonel M. 
I. Dragomirov, later Head of the General Staff Academ y and  one of the m ost influential m ili­
tary  thinkers in  the Russian army, to the Prussian army.100 In the w ar of 1859, w hen the ordi­
nary  m ilitary attaches in France and Austria w ent to the respective armies, D ragom irov had  
served as an observer. Shuvalov travelled w ith  the French headquarters and  Tom au w ith  the 
Austrian. Dragom irov was sent to the Piedm ontese army.
In 1870, the French arm y did not allow any foreign observers b u t the Prussian arm y w as open 
and  the interest from the Russian side was enormous. The Russian arm y sent eleven officers 
to cover all conceivable aspects of the campaign, and this figure does no t include the eight 
m edical doctors that were sent from the M ilitary M edical A dm inistration. K utuzov travelled 
w ith  the Prussian headquarters, Baron L. L. Zeddeler w as first w ith the X C orps and  then  VI 
Corps, w itnessing the sieges of M etz and Paris.101 K. G. D oppelm aier travelled w ith the P rus­
sian Guard, E. N. M eshcherskii travelled w ith the V Corps un d er General von Kirchbach. The 
nephew  of Field M arshal F. F. Berg, C om et Georg Gustavovich Berg,102 accom panied the First 
Prussian Corps under General von Manteuffel. Major-General M ikhail N ikolaevich A nnenk­
97' Sending observers to other armies had its roots in the antiquity. Beauvais, Attaches Militaires: 3-9; 
Vagts, The Military Attache: 3-8.
98‘ RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 103, ff. 30-31. 'Information from the Military Attach^ in Vienna, Tomau, 
About the Austrian Army's War Preparations'.
"■ RGVIA, 1866, F. 401, op. 2, d. 57, f. 4. 'About the Appointment of General Staff Colonel Dragomirov 
to the Prussian Army During the Military Operations'.
1 0 0 . D r a g o m i r o v  graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1856 as the first in his class and was 
awarded the gold medal, a rare distinction. He soon gained a reputation as one of the most perceptive 
military thinkers and was appointed Commandant of the General Staff Academy between 1878 and 
1889. For an introduction to Dragomirov's tactical and educational thoughts see, for instance, Bonch- 
Bruevich, M. D. 'Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov. (Ocherk)', Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Nikolaevskoi Voennoi 
Akademii (25,1912): 80-101; Beskrovnyi, L. G. 'M. I. Dragomirov', in M. I. Dragomirov. Izbrannye trudy. Vo- 
prosy vospitaniia i obucheniia voisk, edited by L. G. Beskrovnyi. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956): 3-39; Komissa­
rov, A. M. 'M. I. Dragomirov o voinskoi distsipline', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (6,1989): 89-92; Zaitsev, 
L. A. 'Voenno-pedagogicheskie vzgliady M. I. Dragomirova', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (9,1983): 72-76; 
Fuller, Strategy and Power: 303-305; Menning, Bayonets: 38-42; Pintner, Walter. 'Russian Military Thought: 
The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov', in Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nu­
clear Age, edited by P. Paret. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986): 354-375; Wahlde, Peter von. 'Military 
Thought in Imperial Russia'. Ph.D., Indiana University, 1966:120-124; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye re- 
formy 1860-70 godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952):185-186.
101' Metz fell on 29 October after a more than two months long siege. Paris capitulated on 28 January 
1871 after a siege that started on 19 September 1870. The bombardment of Paris had begun on 5 January
1871. All the dates here are given in the new style.
102. According to Miliutin, he was sent because of the persistent pleading on his behalf by Field Marshal 
Berg. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 33. 'Memoirs'. 1870-71. For G. G. Berg's service record, see 
GARF, F. 547, op. 1, d. 806.
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ov w as sent to study the use of railways. The M ain Engineering A dm inistration sent three of­
ficers: M ajor-General O ttom ar Borisovich Gem, Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Val'berg,103 and  
Staff-Captain M el'nitskii. The Intendance A dm inistration sent Colonels Tsurm ilen an d  Bark- 
m an  to study the organization of the rear.104In Paris, the m ilitary attache, P. L. W ittgenstein, 
an d  his assistant, D. N. Leont'ev, still m anaged to w rite their im pressions.105
The Am erican Civil War d id  no t attract the same attention, and  a perm anent m ilitary attache 
w as no t placed in W ashington until 1868. Colonel D. I. Rom anov w as w ith  the U nion arm y at 
the outbreak of the w ar and, in 1864, Colonel de Struve from the Engineering C orps d id  some 
reporting from  the Confederate arm y and the Arm y of the Potom ac.106
The circumstances of travelling during times of w ar w ere often chaotic, and  the observers -  
being guests in  the foreign armies -  often had  to adjust their reports out of consideration to 
their hosts.107 In both of the w ars to w hich he was sent, M. I. D ragom irov failed to reach the 
battlefield in time to be an eyewitness to the m ain battles of those w ars; namely, M agenta (4 
June) and  Solferino (24 June) in 1859 and Koniggratz (3 July) in  1866.108 Furtherm ore, w hen  
M. I. Dragom irov was sent to  the Piedm ontese arm y in 1859, he w as assigned such a sm all 
am ount of m oney that he could not afford a horse -  an  absolute necessity. The H ead  of the 
mission, C ount E. G. Stackelberg, volunteered to lend h im  the money.109 D uring  the bu ild-up  
to the w ar in 1870, Count Golenishchev-Kutuzov was taking a cure in  Karlsbad. D oppelm aier
103‘ He published two technical reports on French fortresses during the war. See Val'berg, I. 'Ocherk 
voennykh deistvii pod frantsuzskimi krepostiami v 1870-71 g /, Inzhenernyi zhurnal (5:556-596; 6: 644- 
690,1873).
104- RGVIA, 1870, F. 401, op. 2, d. 90. 'About the Missions of Russian Officers to the Prussian and French 
Armies During the Military Operations'. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 32-33. 'Memoirs'. 1870-71. 
See also Zeddeler, L: L. 'Dvadtsat' piat’ let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii vestnik (4,1896): 114- 
129 and (5,1896): 480-508. Barkman was a graduate of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff. He 
died in 1871. Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 129.
105‘ Leont'ev published a brief account about the defence of Paris in Voennyi sbornik (6-9,1871). A sepa­
rate volume was also published. Leont'ev, D. Oborona Parizha. Zapiski ochevidtsa. (St. Petersburg: Depar- 
tament udelov, 1871).
106- See E. Everts' article 'Voennye deistviia pod Charl'stonom s 1861 po 1865 g.', Voennyi sbornik (8, 
1867): 180. One of Romanov's reports is in RGVIA, F. 453, op. 1, d. 342. A copy of this is kept in AVPRI, 
Kollektsiia mikrofil'mov, No 13, op. 66. De Struve published one specialized article De Struve, G. E. 'Ob 
oborone morskikh prokhodov i gavanei v Anglii i v Soedinennykh shtatakh Sevemoi Ameriki', Inzhen­
ernyi zhurnal (1,1866): 52-78. His presence in the US was briefly mentioned by the Russian Minister in 
Washington, E. de Stockl. See Woldman, Albert A. Lincoln and the Russians. (Cleveland and New York: 
The World Publishing Company, 1952): 231. A number of de Stockl's dispatches from the US during the 
Civil War are quoted in this book and in Sideman, Belle B., and Lillian Friedman, eds. Europe Looks at the 
Civil War. (New York, N. Y.: Collier Books, 1960). See also Malkin, M. 'K istorii russko-amerikanskikh ot- 
nosheniiakh vo vremia grazhdanskoi voiny v SShA', Krasnyi arkhiv (3,1939): 97-153, and Golder, Frank 
A. 'The American Civil War Through the Eyes of a Russian Diplomat', American Historical Review 26 (3, 
1921): 454-463.
107• RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 86, f. 11. 'Tornau to the War Minister. 11/23 July 1859, Vienna'. See also 
RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 872, ff. lv-2, 'About the Mission of General Staff Staff-Captain Dragomirov to Ita­
ly and His Presence at the HQ of the Sardinian Army'. 1859, where Dragomirov was instructed to be 
careful when writing as not to offend the dignity (dostoinstvo) of the Piedmontese army, and RGVIA F. 
401, op. 2, d. 57, ff. 57-58,1866.
108. ah dates here are given in new style.
109- RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 872, ff. 7-8. 'Stackelberg to Sukhozanet, 28 June 1859'.
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w rote, w ith  visible irritation that he w ould  start to report since K utuzov w as away. H e also 
em phasized the im portance of m aking necessary preparations well in  time to 'avo id  w hat 
happened  to Colonel Dragom irov in the last w a r '.110
Travelling w ith foreign armies w as no sinecure, not even for these experienced officers. Zed- 
deler later rem em bered m any hardships and left the w ar scene for tw o weeks after falling ill 
in  France.111 M eshcherskii returned  briefly to Brussels w hen he suffered from  dysentery.112
The Russian General Staff clearly relied on the observers' ability to study  the latest m ilitary 
developm ent. The War Minister, Miliutin, often m ade references to useful inform ation that he 
had  received from the observers, particularly from the Franco-Prussian War.113 It is also re­
vealing to look at the instructions given to the observers. In D ragom irov's instructions of 
1859, there were three key items to w hich attention should be paid: the progress of the war, 
the condition of the fighting armies, and  the use of the m ore sophisticated w eapons.114 Eleven 
years later, the instructions had  grow n considerably and  contained all the curren t questions 
that w ere troubling the m inds of m ilitary thinkers in Europe. The Russian officers shou ld  es­
pecially observe:
• the use of railways for transporting masses of soldiers and  the influence of railw ays 
on the progress of the war;
• the significance of the different kinds of m ilitary transport;
• the significance of the bayonet attack, considering the contem porary infantry arm a­
m ent;
• how  the cavalry acts in battle against infantry;
• in  general, the adm inistration of troops in war, and  the organization of lines of com ­
m unications, hospitals, and the transport system .115
In summary, during the period 1859-71, the Russian arm y had  built up  a system  of system atic 
intelligence gathering from foreign armies, both in peacetim e and  w artim e. The im portance
110, RGVIA, F. 506, op. 1, d. 534, ff. 5-6. 'Doppelmaier to Fersman, 2/14 July 1870, Berlin'. Lieutenant 
General Aleksandr Fedorovich Fersman (1813-1880) was member of the Artillery Committee of the 
Main Artillery Administration.
114 RGVIA, 1870, F. 401, op. 2, d. 90, f. 201. 'Zeddeler to the War Minister 22 Dec. 1870'; Zeddeler, 
'Dvadtsat' piat’ let nazad', (4,1896): 121-122, and (5,1896): 501.
112- RGVIA, 1870, F. 401, op. 1, d. 90, f. 181. 'Meshcherskii to Miliutin. 26 Nov/8 Dec. 1870'; RGIVA, F. 
VUA, d. 1328, ff. 263-64, 'Meshcherskii to Miliutin. 3/15 Oct. 1870' and Ibid., f. 288, 'Meshcherskii to 
Heiden, 16/28 Dec. 1870'. Count Fedor Logginovich Heiden (1821-1900) was Head of the Main Staff 
1866-1881.
113‘ For references to military attaches and observers, see, for instance, RGB OR, F. 169, k. 14. ed. khr. 4, f. 
52v; Ibid., k. 15, ed. khr. 3, ff. 35, 70; Ibid., k. 16, ed. khr. 3, ff. 32v-33v. 'Memoirs'. 1863,1866,1870-71.
114 RGVIA, F. 38, op. 5, d. 872, ff. 1-lv.
115- RGVIA, 1870, F. 401, op. 2, d. 90, ff. 11-11 v. 'Heyden to Wittgenstein. July'. 1870.
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of foreign intelligence w as increasingly recognized, although there w as never any discussion 
of abolishing the institution of m ilitary attaches, no t even during  the years w hen  there were 
serious problems. Just how  m uch confidence the War M inister placed #n  foreign intelligence 
gathering becomes evident in a letter from D. A. M iliutin to V. P. G olenishchev-K utuzov at the 
outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War. M iliutin w anted to send officers from  all branches of the 
service so that the Russian arm y could receive:
the most accurate information possible about the practical use of all the improvements 
and innovations that have been introduced in armies lately and that will be tried out for 
the first time in this war.116
Furtherm ore, in the sum m er of 1870, Russia kept a sharp eye on A ustria since it feared a rap id  
A ustrian mobilization. Consequently, F. F. Tomau, the attache in Vienna, w as p u t u n d er great 
pressure to report as soon as he saw  anything that suggested A ustrian m obilization. M iliutin, 
however, w arned him  to be careful and to discrim inate betw een ordinary peacetim e prepara­
tions, and  those clearly linked to war.117
The content of this m aterial w ill be dealt w ith in due course, b u t already one can note that 
am ong the observers, L. L. Z eddeler's  reporting w as particularly influential. N ot only d id  it 
arouse lively debate, bu t his reports w ere read by several m em bers of the Im perial family.118 
It should  also be noted that it is not necessarily the actual reports from  the theatre of w ar that 
are the m ost revealing about the Russian arm y's im pression from the war, b u t ra ther the m ili­
tary debate and the M ain Staff's evaluation and interpretation of these reports. Next, w e shall 
see w hat issues were discussed in  the m ilitary debate and  how  the General Staff A cadem y re­
acted to the changes in warfare.
116‘ RGVIA, 1866, F. 401, op. 2, d. 57, f. 7. 'Miliutin to Kutuzov, 9 June 1866'. See also RGB OR, F. 169, k. 
15, ed. khr. 3, f. 169v, where Miliutin gave credit to the military attaches for providing useful informa­
tion.
117‘ RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1328, ff. 124v-125. 'Miliutin to Tomau, 19 July 1870'. This document was briefly 
consulted by Shneerson, L.M. Franko-prusskaia voina i Rossiia. (Minsk: Izdatel’stvo BGU im.V. I. Lenina, 
1976): 111. Note that the name of the attach^ in Vienna is F. F. Tomau, not Tarkov, as Shneerson stated.
118- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, ff. 33-33v; RGVIA, F. 1, op. 1, d. 58133. 'Zeddeler's Service Record'.
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4 Lessons From Foreign Wars - the
Military Debate and the General 
Staff Academy
4.1 Military Reporting
R ussian m ilitary reporting during  these w ars relied to a large degree on inform ation obtained 
by people on the spot, either by  the regular m ilitary attaches or specially sent observers. The 
Russian press, however, d id  no t send its own correspondents to the foreign w ar scenes.1 D ur­
ing 1859-71, the press had  to rely on the foreign correspondents' reports th rough  new s agen­
cies. This caused some irritation, especially w ith regard to  the A m erican Civil War, an d  there 
were com plaints bo th  in  the m ilitary and the regular press about the lack of reliable inform a­
tion from  this war. 2 The situation was exacerbated, no doubt, because the W ar M inistry  d id  
no t have a m ilitary attache in  the U nited States at that time. A t least tw o officers, as w e have 
seen, travelled in the U nited States during  the w ar but, since only a fragm ent of their reports 
seems to  have survived in  the archives and they published only sparingly, it is difficult to  as­
sess to  w hat extent they observed the war.
It seems clear that the Russian War M inistry d id  no t attach the sam e h igh  priority  to the Civil 
War as it d id  to the European wars.3 Russia sent observers to all of the w ars except for the 
Danish W ar in 1864 and, in  addition, had  perm anent m ilitary attaches in  all of the m ajor cities 
of Europe, as w e saw  in C hapter 3.
1- The first Russian war correspondent was N. V. Berg in the Crimean War. In the Russo-Turkish War 
1877-78 and the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05, there were several Russian reporters. See the entry 'Voen- 
nye korrespondenty' in Voennaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 13:198-202 and McReynolds, Louise. The News Under 
Russia's Old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1991): 87-92.
2‘ Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbornik, (5,1861): 278; Ibid., (6,1862): 507; McReynolds,
The News: 48.
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Voennyi sbornik and Russkii invalid carried regular new s articles about the developm ent on the 
different theatres of all of the wars. M ost of the articles (in both  publications!) w ere w ritten  by 
N. P. Glinoetskii and  were based on telegram s and  reports in  foreign new spapers.4 In add i­
tion, M. I. D ragom irov wrote three articles in Russkii invalid in  18665 and  L. L. Z eddeler con­
tribu ted  w ith at least four in  1870.6
As w e have seen, during  the short period betw een 1859 and  1871, a num ber of questions con­
cerning m ilitary developm ent were raised w hich w ere of m ajor concern for all E uropean ar­
mies. Subjects for debate were, for instance, the dem onstrated  im portance of the P russian 
General Staff, the grow ing strength of nationalism  in Europe, the grow ing use of reserves, 
and  the im pact of technology on warfare (that is, the developm ent of railw ays, the introduc­
tion of rifles and  rifled guns, and  the electric telegraph). This, in  turn , raised questions about 
the education and m orale of the army. A t the level of infantry tactics the closed colum n used 
for attack was called into question and the days of the cavalry attack w ith  cold steel seem ed 
to be num bered.
H ow  d id  the Russian arm y view these changes and  in terpret foreign wars? To w h a t degree 
were the results of the European wars ascribed to cultural and  national factors? Was the m ili­
tary less inclined to learn lessons because foreign experience was seen as unsuitable for the 
Russian army? Did the Russian military w riters rom anticize their ow n forces? The issue of 
national factors in the m ilitary reporting is relevant since it casts light on how  the grow ing 
strength of nationalism  in European politics was reflected in  Russian m ilitary thought. M ore­
over, rom anticizing one's ow n forces could lead to an  unw illingness to  adap t to changing cir­
cumstances.
This chapter aims to examine w hat inform ation the m ilitary attaches sent to the M ain Staff 
and to  illustrate the m ilitary debate in the wake of the wars. The chapter aims to  dem onstrate 
the burn ing  issues in Russian m ilitary thought during  this period and  to cast som e light on
3- Not just the lack of material in the archives seems to indicate this. D. A. Miliutin in his memoirs listed 
all of the observers and military attaches sent to the war scenes in Europe but, in his writings about the 
American Civil War, there are no references to any attache or observer. Miliutin wrote about the Civil 
War in his memoirs each year for as long as it lasted, displaying his pro-Union sentiments, which were 
well in line with the official Russian policy towards the warring parties. Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia 
Biblioteka, Otdel rukopisi, (hereafter RGB OR) F. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 1, ff. 54-58. (1861); Ibid., k. 14, ed. 
khr. 2, ff. 117v-119v. (1862); Ibid., k. 14, ed. khr. 4, ff. 6-7v. (1863); Ibid., k. 15, ed. khr. 1, ff. 154-154v. 
(1864); Ibid., k. 15, ed. khr. 2, ff. 116-f. 119v. (1865).
4‘ Nikolai Pavlovich Glinoetskii, (1830-1892). Military historian and prolific writer. 1872 member of the 
Military Scientific Committee, General-Lieutenant. Russkii biograficheskii slovar' (hereafter RBS): Vol. 15: 
315-16.
5‘ Russkii invalid, 22 July 1866,3 Aug. 1866,9 Aug. 1866. The articles were later published in Dragomirov, 
M. I. Sbornik original'nykh i perevodnykh statei. (St. Petersburg: V.S. Balashev, 1881): 248-269.
6- Russkii invalid, 17 Sep. 1870,1 Oct. 1870,4 Oct 1870,8 Nov 1870 and possibly 20 Sep 1870.
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the level of aw areness am ong the leading m ilitary thinkers in the Russian arm y about the les­
sons to be learned from  foreign wars.
The chapter will also show how  the w ars affected the curriculum  and the teachings at the N i­
cholas Academ y of the General Staff. In relation to this, the process of w ar planning, w hich 
began in Russia during  this period, will be touched upon. It will m ake clear th a t the A cadem y 
learned several lessons, m ainly from Prussia, and am ong other things in troduced Generalstab- 
sreisen and  w ar games. Furtherm ore, officer clubs w ere introduced an d  public lectures about 
m ilitary subjects w ere initiated by the Academy. The study  of m ilitary history  w as em pha­
sized in  the curriculum . This dem onstrates no t only that the future General Staff officers de­
voted time to studying foreign wars, b u t that some of the lessons w ere actually incorporated 
into the higher education of the Russian army.
4.2 Observing Foreign Wars
4.2.1 The Military System and Nationalism
The connection betw een the political system  and  the m ilitary organization w as one of the 
m ain them es in the Russian military literature on the European w ars betw een 1859 and  1871. 
It w as a subject raised m any times to explain A ustria 's tw o defeats in  1859 and  1866, no t least 
by  F. F. Tomau, the m ilitary attache in Vienna and observer in the A ustrian arm y in 1859. In 
Tom au's view, it was the A ustrian political system  that w as responsible for the A ustrian de­
feat in  1859 -  no t m ainly rifles or tactics.7 He noted that should  there be another w ar against a 
European m ilitary power, A ustria w ould  lose again if no thing was done about the m ilitary 
system  and 'the inner workings of the governm ent' (vnutrennee grazhdanskoe upravlenie).8 Af­
ter the A ustrian defeat in 1866, he concluded that in order to enhance the fighting strength  of 
the Em pire's m ilitary forces, morale needed to be boosted, w hich could no t be achieved w ith ­
out a 'radical reform  of the political organization of the Em pire'.9
Tom au's criticism of the A ustrian arm y reflects m uch of w hat was said about the Russian 
arm y of Nicholas I after the Crim ean defeat, and Tom au w as not alone in  his critical approach 
to the A ustrian empire. In Voennyi sbornik L ieutenant-General M. I. Ivanin, a G eneral Staff of­
ficer,10 frankly stated that the Prussian needle gun  had  little to do w ith  the A ustrian  defeat in
7‘ As we have seen in Chapter 1, as a consequence of defeat, Austria changed its tactical doctrine toward 
even greater emphasis on the closed order bayonet attack.
8‘ Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA) F. 428, op. 1, d. 85, f.l62v. 
'Tomau to the War Minister. 16/28 Sept. 1859'; RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 86, f. 42v. 'Tomau to the War Min­
ister 11/23 July 1859'.
9- RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 103, ff. 91v-92. 'Tomau to the War Minister, November 1866'.
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1866. The real reason for the A ustrian debacle w as the inability of the political system  to cre­
ate an  effective fighting force. A ustria was "a paralyzed political, financial system 7.11 Further­
more, according to Ivanin, the reason behind A ustria's 'half-century stagnation ' w as th a t the 
governm ent had  suppressed all other nationalities of the Em pire and  forced them  to  be sub­
ordinate to the Germ an race. The Prussians, on the other hand , had  understood  how  to culti­
vate and  strengthen the national consciousness of the people. M ore im portantly, the Prussian 
governm ent had  m ade sure that this education had  reached all the estates of society so that 
the arm y was seen by everyone as the 'bulw ark of the pow er of the state '.12
It is scarcely surprising that the Russians looked a t the P russian m ilitary organization w ith  
adm iration. Particularly noteworthy, however, are the w ritings of G enrikh A ntonovich Leer 
(1829-1904), Professor of Strategy at the General Staff Academy.13 H e w as one of the m ost sig­
nificant Russian m ilitary theorists and  later becam e C om m andant of the G eneral Staff A cade­
m y betw een 1889 and 1898. The m ost im portant lesson of the Franco-Prussian war, d raw n  by 
Leer im m ediately at the end of that war, was that it had  dem onstrated  the im portance of hav­
ing a properly arranged m ilitary organization in order to achieve the m axim um  fighting 
strength of the army.14 The Great Com mander, the genius (like N apoleon I) w as also im por­
tant b u t rare, and  Prussia had  -  through its m ilitary organization -  m anaged to insure itself 
from  having to rely on a single genius. It was the m ilitary organization that h ad  enabled Prus­
sia to mobilize such a large fighting force so quickly. In addition, he concluded that the w ar 
had  dem onstrated (1) the necessity of strict calculation (razschet) and the rem oval of im provi­
sation in w ar planning, and (2) the necessity of know ing the enem y's m ilitary organization. 
Regarding the last point, he stressed the im portance of m ilitary statistics and  -  not least -  the 
role of the m ilitary attaches, w hom  he saw as advance posts, the eyes and  ears of the army.15 
Detailed and exact knowledge of the enem y was a prerequisite for a rational war plan an d  the 
Prussian example had  show n the im portance of preparing  such plans regarding potential en­
emies.
Furtherm ore, Leer developed his thinking about the connection betw een the political system  
of a state and the organization of its arm ed forces. H e noted  that the m ilitary system  w as 'on-
10‘ Ivanin, Mikhail Ignat'evich (1801-1874). In 1866, he became chairman of a commission dealing with 
transportation of troops by rail. In 1871, he was appointed member of the Military Scientific Committee.
11 ■ Ivanin, M. 'Avstro-Prusskaia voina 1866 g.', Voennyi sbornik (12,1866): 235-236.
1Z Ibid., 237.
13‘ Leer was appointed to the Chair of Strategy 1865. For introductions on Leer's thoughts, see Be­
skrovnyi, L. G. Ocherki voennoi istoriografii Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1962): 203- 
208; Meshcheriakov, G.P. Russkaia voennaia mysl' v XlX-om veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973): 176-180,206- 
297; Zhilin, P.A., ed. Russkaia voennaia mysl' konets XlX-nachalo X X  v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982): 81-83; 
Wahlde, Peter von. 'Military Thought in Imperial Russia'. Ph.D., Indiana University, 1966:133-142.
14‘ Leer, G. A. Publichnye lektsii o voine 1870 mezhdu Frantsiei i Germaniei do Sedana vkliuchitel'no. (St. Pe­
tersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1871): 7.
15- Ibid., 10,25.
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ly a reflection of the political system '.16 In the case of Prussia, he traced the reasons for the 
success of its arm y to the general political developm ent of Prussia. It was P russia 's strength 
that in  times of need it w as able to achieve radical political and  m ilitary reform. C om paring 
Prussia after the defeat of Jena and Prussia at the end  of the 1850s, he pointed ou t that, in the 
political sphere, yesterday 's Stein w as today 's Bismarck.17 In the adm inistrative sphere, par­
allels could be d raw n betw een Scham horst and Roon, and  in strategic th inking betw een 
G neisenau and  Moltke. H e recognized that Prussia had  achieved its political goal b y  using 
force. Echoing Clausewitz, Leer was convinced that w ar w as the continuation of politics by  
other means:
...war, in certain respects, is the political bayonet, whereas all the other means, such as sci­
ence....are only preparations. War, however, finally determines the most important political 
issues.18 (All the italics in the original.)
H e pointed  out that the political issue of the unification of G erm any w as now  solved, bu t the 
m ilitary strength rem ained. He asked: 'W ho can guarantee that som eone is no t tem pted  to 
abuse it? '19
C ontrary to m ost other m ilitary writers at the time, Leer tried  to  penetrate the connection be­
tw een the m ilitary and  political organization of a state and  to link the political system  of a 
state to the kind of w ars it was likely to conduct. The m ilitary organization of a state w as in­
fluenced both by foreign policy and domestic political conditions. Consequently, despotic re­
gimes, characterized by centralization of pow er in the hands of one ru ler and  the absence of 
civic rights, were m ost likely to conduct offensive wars. One example w as Turkey in  the 
eighteenth century.20 Democratic republics (that is, the ancient Greek republics) w ere the very 
opposite of despotic regim es and  em bodied equality for all in  political and civic affairs. This 
system  w as generally unable to conduct offensive w ars w hile it w as unusually  strong in the 
defence. M onarchies -  com bining centralization w ith  a certain am ount of freedom  an d  rights 
-  were, accordingly, good for both  offensive and  defensive warfare.21
16- Ibid., 13.
17' Ibid., 19-20. Thus, Leer argued that Bismarck and Roon had not created anything new, but were 
building on the foundation laid down by the reformers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Karl 
Stein (1757-1831) became First Minister in Prussia in 1807. He undertook far-reaching changes towards 
reform, such as abolishing hereditary serfdom and introducing local government in cities. Later, he en­
tered Russian service and influenced the creation of the European coalition against Napoleon. Craig, 
Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964): 38-42.
18- Ibid., 22.
19- Ibid., 9.
20- Leer, G. A. Opyt kritiko-istoricheskogo issledovaniia zakonov iskusstva vedeniia voiny (polozhitel'naia strate- 
giia). (St. Petersburg: V. Golovin, 1869): 469. Parts of this book were published in Voennyi sbornik in 1867, 
No 1-5,9-10.
21- Leer, Opyt: 470.
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Leer saw  the introduction of universal m ilitary service as a direct consequence of the tenden­
cy tow ards a public life (obshchestvennoe ustroistvo) based on equal rights before the law. This 
h ad  led to larger arm ies on the battlefield and to an  increase in the quality of the troops since 
the 'best elements of the society7 had  started to enter m ilitary service. The tactical form ation 
of the armies had  also changed as a consequence of the introduction of conscription. Tactics 
began to  be based on trust, w hich led to m ore flexibility w herein the initiative of the ind iv idu­
al officers played a greater role and the terrain w as used to a large degree. All this stood in 
sharp  contrast to the old linear tactics w here the entire arm y w as used  as a m achine un d er 
one com m ander on a flat battlefield.22
Foreign policy also affected the m ilitary organization of the state. In Leer's opinion, foreign 
policy and m ilitary force com plem ented each other. It w as the task of foreign policy to enter 
into coalitions or to rem ain neutral, thus influencing the question of securing the flanks and 
the rear; that is, the operational lines. H e stressed that it w as both  easier and  m ore convenient 
to secure the operational lines th rough foreign policy than  to rely on m ilitary force alone.23
Finally, he form ulated a m ilitary policy for Russia. Since it w as Russia 's political m ission to 
bring Western European civilization -  adopted and rew orked by  Russia -  to the Asiatic peo­
ple, the m ilitary policy of Russia should continue to be the traditional policy of Peter I, nam e­
ly, defence in the West and  offensive in the East. In so far as the Russian arm y h ad  conducted 
offensive cam paigns in the West, these had  been offensive only from a m ilitary po in t of view 
b u t had  rem ained defensive w ith  regard to foreign policy, according to Leer.24 H e obviously 
defined an offensive w ar as one w ith civilizing missions, and  he d id  no t count Peter I's chal- 
lange to Sweden's ho ld  on the Baltic, for instance, as one of these.
Leer has been accused of relating contem porary warfare to the experience of the N apoleonic 
Wars and of failing, therefore, to appreciate the changes in warfare. It is true that Leer related 
and com pared the latest events on the battlefield w ith the experience from the Napoleonic 
w ars, bu t this d id  no t necessarily m ean that he did not see and value the new  dim ensions in 
warfare. Flis preoccupation w ith  theory, according to one historian, led h im  to concentrate on 
the w rong trees w hile the entire forest around him  w as changing.25 By connecting political 
and m ilitary reform in  an  effort to achieve a strong army, he w as hard ly  focusing on the 
w rong trees, bu t gave form idable support to the War M inister w ho w as in the m idst of p lan­
ning the introduction of universal m ilitary service.
22’ Leer, Opyt: 470; Leer, Publichnye...do Sedana: 27.
23- Leer, Opyt: 471. He illustrated this by the example of Napoleon I, who in 1805 had secured Prussia's 
neutrality during the campaign in Moravia.
24 Ibid., 472.
25‘ Menning, Bruce W. Bayonets before Bullets. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992): 36.
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Several Russian officers explained the causes for the victories and  defeats on the battlefields 
of Europe in  1859-71 in national and cultural term s -  at least up  to a point. This is reflected in 
attache reports as w ell as in published m aterial in the w ake of the wars. Before the outbreak 
of the w ar in  1859, Tom au in Vienna wrote an evaluation of the different peoples of the A us­
trian  em pire from a m ilitary perspective.26
According to Tomau, the H ungarians were the best soldiers of the A ustrian arm y -  brave, re­
ceptive, and  more suited for attack than for defence. They w ere physically strong and  had  a 
h igh m orale. The Italians were characterized as receptive bu t equally liable to forget w hat 
they h ad  learned -  brave b u t no t as physically strong as the H ungarians. Therefore, the Ital­
ians w ere particularly useful as chasseurs and as light cavalrym en rather than  as infantry­
m en. In  w riting  about the East and West Slavs, Tom au used  the geographical area ra ther than 
the nationality  as the denominator. The Galicians (that is, the Ruthenians) w ere difficult to 
train, b u t m ore than  any other nationality they could endure physical labour and deprivation. 
They w ere loyal to their com m anders. M any A ustrian officers ranked the Galicians h igher 
than the H ungarians. The Bohemians (that is, the Czechs) w ere educated, industrious, and  
bright b u t at the sam e time stubborn, cunning, and  ungrateful.27 The Czech chasseurs w ere 
fam ous for their accurate shooting and the infantry regim ents for their fortitude. H eavy cav­
alry consisted of m en recruited from Bohemia -  bo th  Czechs and Germans. The Slovenes - 
Tom au called them  the Styrians and the C arinthians - w ere loyal and  w ell-behaved b u t phys­
ically weak. The Slovenian infantry was famous for its discipline. The southern  Slavs (Tor- 
nau 's  w ords), on the contrary, were good soldiers b u t lacked the necessary discipline to m ake 
them  excellent. In the artillery, there were m any good Serbocroats (sic!), b u t in  general the 
Slavs w ere better for service in  the infantry.
Finally, Tom au's description of the Germans revealed an  underly ing antipathy and  suspicion 
tow ards the ruling nationality, characteristic of the Russian sentim ents tow ards A ustria after 
the Crim ean War. Tom au rem arked that the Germ ans w ere less suited for m ilitary service 
than any of the other nationalities of the A ustrian army.28 They w ere m ore educated than  the 
other nationalities, b u t this only m ade them  m ore intelligent, no t necessarily m ore know ­
ledgeable about m ilitary affairs. They were useless in the face of danger, bu t good for service 
in the engineering troops, the technically advanced artillery, and  the m edical units. It is w orth  
noticing that Tomau d id  not m ention the Poles in his description, bu t talked m erely of the 
Galicians.
26- RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 85, ff. 52-54. 'Tomau to the War Minister, 3/15 April 1859'.
27- Ibid., f. 53.
28- Ibid., f. 53v.
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O ne of the Russian m ilitary w riters who was m ost outspoken in his view that the outcom e of 
the w ars in  1859 and 1866 could be ascribed to national factors w as the young G eneral Staff 
officer, M ikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov. His thoughts on the influence on national factors on 
w arfare deserve attention, since m ost of the scholarship on D ragom irov has concentrated on 
his tactical thinking.
In h is articles of the w ar in  1859, Dragomirov interpreted the w ar as a struggle betw een the 
Latin an d  G erm an races.29 He view ed the Italian efforts to obtain independence as a natu ra l 
consequence of the fact that the A ustrian empire was inherently flawed:
Austria, put together from different parts which do not have anything organic in com­
mon, at an early stage engendered mistrust among the people, forcing together those 
who do not have any common interests.30
H e m ocked the A ustrian governm ent's investm ents in  roads and  railways as if the A ustrians 
h ad  though t that roads w ould  bring together the different people 'no t noticing that no  rail­
w ay can provide a relationship am ong those w ho cannot stand  each other'. H e w as full of ad­
m iration  for the Italians w ho fought bravely in spite of m eagre m ilitary m eans and w ho  h ad  a 
clear goal set for themselves: Italian unification and independence.31 D ragom irov stressed 
that the m aterial side of w arfare w as useful only if the m orale w as sound. It is w orth  noticing 
that D ragom irov had  already form ulated one of the basic principles in his m ilitary thinking, a 
principle he w ould  no t shrink from regardless of the technical developm ents th roughout the 
century.
In taking the Italian side, Dragom irov adhered to the strong anti-A ustrian sentim ents in  Rus­
sia after the C rim ean War. However, neither he nor Tom au ever drew  any parallel betw een 
Russia and  A ustria, w hich m ay seem  remarkable today particularly  considering the m ulti-na­
tional similarities.The m ost obvious explanation for this is that they d id  no t draw  a parallel 
because they d id  not see one. Together w ith Belorussians and Ukrainians, w ho w ere no t seen 
as very  different, the Russians constituted the vast majority w ith in  the army. C learly this 
w as no t the sam e thing as the distinct groups of the A ustrian  army: H ungarians, Germ ans, 
Czechs, etc. M oreover, A ustria was seen as an em pire falling apart and  a parallel to Russia 
contained devastating implications.
29' Dragomirov, M. I. 'Obzor Ital’ianskoi kampanii 1859', Inzhenemyi zhurnal (6,1861): 503.
3a Ibid., 505.
31- Ibid., 504,506.
32‘ Although reliable figures do not exist, the share of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians in the levy 
of 1870 were estimated at 90 per cent, in absolute figures 83,931 out of 93,437. These figures do not in­
clude Poland, which was treated separately. Obruchev, N. N., ed. Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik. 4 vols. (St. 
Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1867-71): Vol. 4, Part 2:227.
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The P russian  success in  1866 w as also ascribed to national factors. It is interesting to  note that 
in 1866 Dragom irov clearly had  read Tom au's 1859 reports. In D ragom irov's analysis of the 
A ustrian defeat in 1866 against Prussia, there are several paragraphs that can be found  verba­
tim  in  T om au's report of 1859.33 According to Dragomirov, it w as both  the political system  
and  the characteristics of the Prussian race (prusskaia rasa) that constituted the recipe for P rus­
sian victory.34 Moreover, he rem arked that respect for the law  w as w idespread, recognized by 
every Prussian regardless of class. As a consequence of this 'law fulness' (zakonnost'), every­
one in  Pm ssia accepted their m ilitary duty.
In sum m ary, the Russian officers saw the national un ity  of Pm ssia and  the in ternal un ity  of 
the society (where all sectors w ere gathered behind the army) as tw o of the m ost im portan t 
explanations for the Prussian victories. Dragom irov w as far from  alone in stressing this.35 In 
analysing Pm ssia, Leer m ade a distinction betw een the m ilitary spirit of an  arm y an d  the na­
tional spirit (narodnyi dukh). The latter stem m ed from the historical developm ent of the na­
tion. It w as necessary for a successful arm y to have both  36
4.2.2 Men Against Fire
If there w as un ity  in the view of the Prussian m ilitary organization, the issue of the conse­
quences of increased firepower caused some debate. Breech-loading rifled guns an d  rifles had  
led to m ore accurate fire, increased fire-range and increased ra te of fire, since they w ere easier 
to reload than  the old muskets. For instance, the Prussian needle gun used  in  1866 and  1870 
had  a fire-rate of six rounds a m inute and a range of around 600 paces. The French chassepot, 
an im proved rifle, had  a fire-rate of nine rounds a m inute and  a range of 1,500 to 2,000 paces.
The issue of firepower caused a debate that touched on m any im portan t topics. The develop­
m ent raised m any questions: about possible changes in the tactical form ations an d  entrench­
33‘ Dragomirov, M. I. Ocherki Avstro-Prusskoi voiny v 1866 godu. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamen- 
ta Udelov, 1867): 70; and RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, d. 86, f. 51. 'Tomau to the War Minister. August 1859'. The 
paragraphs relate a passage which made clear that the reasons for the Austrian defeat could be found in 
the political system of the Austrian empire. It was a system based on mistrust towards its peopl and the 
soldiers brought up in such a system were deprived of the personal energy essential for a good soldier. 
Dragomirov's articles were also published in Voennyi sbornik (3-6,1867).
34‘ Dragomirov, Ocherki: 1. As exclusively Pmssian traits, distinct from German, he noted 'the youthful 
confidence in their own strength and superiority, also in relations to foreign elements'.
35• For a few other eloquent examples of the same thinking, see: Zinov'ev, M. A. 'Zametki o germanskoi 
armii', Voennyi sbornik (5,1873): 4-5; and Ibid., (6,1873): 267; Baikov, L. 'Frantsuzskaia i germanskaia 
armii pered voinoiu 1870 g.', Voennyi sbornik (5,1876): 43. See also Zeddeler's report from the Prussian 
army. 'Vzgliad na prusskuiu voennuiu organizatsiiu' published in Russkii invalid, 4 Oct. 1870. A copy of 
the original report is kept in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) F. 677, op. 
1, d. 343. 'Memorandum by Lieutenant Zeddeler'. 8 Sept. 1870.
36‘ One of Leer's pupils at the General Staff Academy, N. V. Shenshin, would later follow in his profes­
sor's footsteps by stressing the national unity of the Pmssian forces and emphasizing that Prussia had 
inspired other European states to introduce national armies. Shenshin, N. 'Strategicheskii obzor voen- 
nykh deistvii 1870 g. do Sedanskoi kapituliatsii vkliuchitel’no', Voennyi sbornik (7:5-44; 8:223-264,1876).
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m ent tactics, about ways to boost morale and  to prepare the troops for the storm  of bullets 
and shells on the battlefield of the future.
In the C rim ean War, French and English troops had  used  rifles against the Russian m uskets. 
The Russian arm y had  already experienced the devastating effects of rifles, b u t it w as no t un ­
til the w ar of 1859 that bo th  sides were arm ed w ith  rifles. The im portance of fire on the battle­
field d id  no t escape any of the influential Russian m ilitary thinkers. However, opinions 
differed som ew hat w ith regard to the consequences for tactical principles. As w e shall see, 
some stressed the im portance of strengthening the m orale of the troops to be able to m eet the 
firestorms, w hereas others advocated the need to m eet fire w ith  fire.
The results of the w ar in 1870-71 had  further highlighted the im portance of firepower. From 
the battlefield, the Russian War M inistry received alarm ing reports from  the artillery officer, 
K. G. Doppelm aier, w ho d id  no t mince his words:
Infantry must above all attack in open order, and the distance between the first and sec­
ond line must be increased. ...Attack under individual fire must be made running.
...Such battles require independence of the individual soldier and the officers and make 
it imperative that commands be fulfilled unconditionally and immediately. ...Only a 
fully disciplined infantry, with decisive officers, can be successful in attacks today in 
view of the defensive power of fire.37
In 1870-71, the Germ ans had  even m oved aw ay from  the tactical regulations, w hich stipulat­
ed attack in  closed columns, in favour of attacking in dispersed order during  the latter p a rt of 
the war.38
How  w as this received in  St. Petersburg? A particularly interesting exam ple of the debate in 
Voennyi sbornik on the consequences of increased firepower on the battlefield broke ou t after 
the war. One of the m ain participants in the debate w as M. I. Dragomirov. H e w as reluctant to 
elevate fire to the leading tactical principle. Instead, he em phasized the m orale of the troops 
and the im portance of training and education.
It is necessary to pause briefly to  examine his opinions, since his insistence on the m oral ele­
m ent in w arfare (which led h im  to talk more about the traditional bayonet attack than  fire­
power) has given him  a bad  reputation in view of the Russian defeats in  1904-05 and  in the 
First World War.39 As a consequence, his ideas and the rationale for his conclusions have been 
som ew hat obscured. W hat d id  he  say that m ade such an im pression on contem poraries? His 
basic ideas can be sum m arized in  three principles:40
37- RGVIA, F. 506, op. 1, d. 534, ff. 80v-81. Doppelmaier died shortly after the end of the war in a riding 
accident in Berlin in 1871. Zeddeler, L.L. 'Dvadtsat' piat' let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii 
vestnik (4,1896): 117.
38‘ RGVIA, F. 506, op. 1, d. 534, f. 80v. 'Doppelmaier to A. F. Fersman, Gonesse, 20 Oct. 1870'. See also 
Zeddeler, L. L. 'Pekhota, artilleriia i kavaleriia v boiu i vne boia, v Germano-Frantsuzskoi voine 1870- 
1871 godov', Voennyi sbornik (7,1872): 49-50.
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• to teach the soldier only w hat was necessary in  war;
• to treat the soldier w ith respect;
• to em phasize the bayonet attack in training, no t because firing was n o t im portan t b u t 
because the bayonet attack required m ore psychological strength, w hich w as m ore 
difficult to train and  took longer time to acquire.
These thoughts stood in sharp contrast to the traditional view on how  to create an  effective 
army. The first point was one of Suvorov's principles, bu t after the Crim ean War, it also en­
com passed an indirect criticism of the arm y of N icholas I, w here the em phasis on train ing lay 
on the parade-ground. The second point related to the efforts to create a m ore hum ane envi­
ronm ent for the soldier, w hich was linked to a m ore restrictive use of corporal punishm ent.41 
The th ird  point essentially subscribed to the Napoleonic principle that w ar w as largely a m or­
al exercise. Dragom irov's ideas were not entirely uncontroversial42
It w as L. M. Baikov, a young General Staff graduate, w ho started the debate by  claim ing that 
the lessons of the battle of Koniggratz had  not been properly appreciated 43 H e acknowl­
edged -  in accordance w ith  Leer and Dragom irov and  others -  that Koniggratz had  show n 
the need to create a national (narodnaia) arm y and had  dem onstrated the need for national ed­
ucation and universal m ilitary service. However, he challenged Dragom irov in  the tactical 
field by  claiming that the traditional infantry attack in closed-order colum n had  becom e al­
m ost impossible. H e questioned the validity of D ragom irov's oft-repeated Suvorov-dictum  
'The bullet is a fool, bu t the bayonet is a fine fellow'. Koniggratz had  led to a new  age in tac­
tics -  the 'tactics of fire' as opposed to the 'tactics of the bayonet'. This m eant that m any sm all 
units should be the formation for attack, not the closed-order m ass column. Baikov claim ed
39‘ Kersnovskii, A.A. Istoriia russkoi armii. 4 vols. (Reprint of 1933-38 ed. Moscow: Golos, 1992-94): Vol. 3: 
24; Menning, Bayonets: 3,38-43; Snyder, Jack. 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 
1914 and 1984', in Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, edited by S. E. Miller, S. M. 
Lynn-Jones and S. Van Evera. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991): 49.
40‘ Dragomirov most important publications are collected in three works: Dragomirov, M. I. Sbornik orig- 
inal'nykh; Chetymadtsat' let. 1881-1894. Sbornik original'nykh i perevodnykh statei. (St. Petersburg: V. Bere- 
zovskii, 1895); Odinnadtsat' let. 1895-1905 gg. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Russkaia skoropechatnia, 1909). See 
also his course books: Lektsii taktiki, chitannye v uchebnom pekhotnom batalione. Kurs 1863-64. (St. Peters­
burg: A.P. Chemviakov, 1864); Kurs prinoravlennyikprogramma voennykh uchilishch. 2nd ed. (St. Peters­
burg: Pechatnia V.I. Golovina, 1872).
41 • Bogdanovich, M. Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti voennogo upravleniia v Rossii v pervoe dvadtsati-piatiletie 
blagopoluchnogo tsarstvovaniia Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra Nikolaevicha (1855-1880 gg.). 6 vols. (St. Pe­
tersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1879-1881); Vol. 4:454,456-458; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 
godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952): 109.
42- An illustrative example is, for instance, Major-General K. I. Gershel'man's article in Voennyi sbornik 
where he attacked Dragomirov for underestimating the virtue of repetition and habit in peacetime 
training. Pedantry was necessary since it secured order in a real battle-situation. Gershel’man, K. I. 
'Neskol’ko slov o sovremennom napravlenii nekotorykh nashikh pisatelei po taktike', Voennyi sbornik (1, 
1868): 3-22. Gershel'man was an officer of the General Staff and a member of the Committee of the Or­
ganization and Education of Troops.
43‘ Baikov, L. 'Vliianie srazheniia pod Keniggretsom na taktiku', Voennyi sbornik (6,1872): 303-352; Baik­
ov, L. 'Po povodu stat’i M. Dragomirova pomeshchennoi v 12 No "Voennogo sbomika" za 1872 g.', Voen­
nyi sbornik (4,1873): 303-334. See also Baumann, Robert F. 'Technology versus the Moral Element: 
Emerging Views in the Russian Officer Corps, 1870-1904', in New Perspectives in Modern Russian History, 
edited by R. B. McKean. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992): 43-64.
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th a t the infantry w as by far the m ost im portant un it on the field, w hereas artillery and  cavalry 
h ad  been assigned to support infantry. Fire w as now  the dom inant factor on the battlefield.
The observer w ith  the Prussian arm y in 1870-71, L. L. Zeddeler, expressed sim ilar views in an  
article w here he sum m arized his impressions from  the war.44 More cautiously than Baikov, he 
no ted  the grow ing im portance of fire on the battlefield and w ondered w hether Suvorov, had 
he been  alive, w ould  have trained his troops to attack in closed formation. H e poin ted  out 
that the w ar h ad  show n that the frontal attack had  become very difficult to conduct and  led to 
enorm ous losses. H e argued that firearms had  gained strength on the battlefield to the degree 
that 'a t least in  this war, they have replaced the bayonet a tta c k '45
Dragom irov replied to both articles 46 He accused Baikov of being incapable of an objective 
analysis an d  of being a 'knight of the bullet'. D ragom irov d id  no t see anything that changed 
the established tru th  that fire prepared the w ay for the bayonet attack. H e stressed that the 
bullet and  the bayonet d id  no t exclude each other, b u t com plem ented each other; consequent­
ly, the d ispersed order w as a com plem ent to the closed order.47 The purpose in w ar w as not 
to kill and  h u rt as m any as possible, b u t 'to  force the enem y to surrender to us '. The m orale of 
the troops (that is, the bayonet attack) is the determ ining factor on the battlefield, and it m ade 
little sense to talk about 'tactics of fire' and 'tactics of the bayonet', since the only tactics w orth  
the nam e w as 'sound  tactics'.
In response to Z eddeler's doubts about Suvorov's training m ethods had  he been alive, Drag­
om irov coldly replied that this issue was irrelevant:
A change of weapons might lead to a change in training methods in how to handle this 
weapon, but it hardly has anything to do with the moral strength of people.48
A few year later, Zeddeler openly stated that the Franco-Prussian w ar had  so clearly dem on­
strated  the im portance of firepower that the line of infantry (strelkovaia tsep') could no  longer 
be considered to act as a com plem ent to the closed colum n b u t had  acquired an independent 
role on the battlefield.49This article is a publication of two m em oranda w ritten  by Zeddeler in 
1872-74 and  w as originally sent to the C om m ander of the G uards and  St. Petersburg M ilitary 
District, G rand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder. The m em oranda w ere then considered 
by  a com m ission w ithin the M ain Committee on the O rganization and  Education of Troops
44 Zeddeler, 'Pekhota, artilleriia i kavaleriia': 33-114.
45- Ibid., 55.
46- Dragomirov, M. I. 'Po povodu nekotorykh statei vyzvannykh poslednimi dvumia kampaniiami', 
Voennyi sbornik (12,1872): 253-274; (1,1873: 89-106).
47 Dragomirov, 'Po povodu', (12,1872): 261,269. This was one of Dragomirov's favourite maxims.
48‘ Dragomirov, 'Po povodu', (1,1873): 97.
49• Zeddeler, L.L. 'Vliianie oruzhiia, zariazhaiushchegosia s kazny na ogon’, boi i boevuiu podgotovku 
pekhoty', Voennyi sbornik (1,1876): 68.
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under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General G. I. Chertkov. The commission recognized 
the importance of firepower, but did not make any recommendations about changes in the 
tactical regulations. The commission's protocols were also read by the M ilitary Scientific 
Committee and by Alexander II.50 Others w ho argued in the press for a change in the tactical 
regulations were General-Adjutant Todleben, the war hero of Sevastopol, and the General 
Staff officer, A. P. Skugarevskii.51
Dragomirov did not change his emphasis despite the increase in firepower. He recognized 
that increased firepower imposed new requirements on the troops. Greater flexibility and the 
developm ent of courage and resourcefulness were needed in every m an in the arm  -  officer 
as well as soldier.52 Consequently, he was not against a gradual revision of the existing tacti­
cal regulations, but he did not advocate a complete overturn.53
In fact, the 1866 regulations governing infantry assault tactics took the increased importance 
of firepower into account and prescribed a combination of open- and closed-order for the at­
tack, leaving some freedom to commanders to adapt to the situation. Still, the em phasis lay 
on the bayonet attack. In 1881 - after the Russo-Turkish War - the new tactical regulations ex­
plicitly recommended that infantry deploy for the attack in skirmish formation.54 Further­
more, between 1881 and 1904, the tactical doctrine was changed three times. The Russian 
army seems to have m ade more - not tat* - changes to its regulations than other European ar­
mies in trying to keep up with the rapid changes in organization and technology.55 The prob­
lem was that although the regulations stipulated certain things, they were not necessarily pu t 
into practice. Dragomirov, who was acutely aware of this problem, m ade it clear in his argu­
ment with Baikov in 1872: To observe the regulations is one thing; to apply them  [to reality] 
quite another.'56
50- Zeddeler's m emoranda are located in RGVIA, F. 868, op. 1, d. 277, ff. 2-59, and the protocols in Ibid. 
ff. 77-88,111-147. Comments by the Tsar and the Military Scientific Committee are in Ibid. ff. 102-109. 
The deliberations of the Military Scientific Committee are also located in RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 350, ff. 
27v-29v. 'Journals of the Military Scientific Committee, No. 1. 25 Jan. 1875'. Excerpts of the com mittee 
protocols were published in Voennyi sbornik, 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie' (6,1879): 119-126. The com­
mission is briefly mentioned in Beskrovnyi, L. G. Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX  veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 
1973): 149-150; Menning, Bayonets: 44; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 189-90.
51 • Todleben, E. I. 'O znachenii ognia v boiu', Voennyi sbornik (8,1876): 294-306; Skugarevskii, A. 'Novye 
trebovaniia taktiki v vidu ozhidaemykh izmenenii v pekhotnom ustave', Voennyi sbornik (4: 304-332; 11:
64-100,1876).
52- Dragomirov, Ocherki: 221.
53‘ Dragomirov, M. I. 'O  veroiatnykh perem enakh v taktike', Voennyi sbornik (11: 3-26; 12:167-211,1867).
54‘ Dobrovol'skii, D. Tssledovanie ob ustave nashei pekhoty', Voennyi sbornik (1,1867): 301-340; M en­
ning, Bayonets: 41-42,136-138; Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia: 150-151; Beskrovnyi, L. G. Ocherki po istoch- 
nikovedeniiu voennoi istorii Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957): 355-56.
55- Menning, Bayonets: 136. See also Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct o f War. (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1983): 114-117.
56- Dragomirov, 'Po povodu', (12,1872): 257.
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In relation to this debate, a few w ords need to be said about the allegedly fundam ental con­
flict in Russian m ilitary thought during  the second half of the nineteenth century. Conven­
tional history has it that the Russian m ilitary thinkers were split into tw o distinct groups: one 
em phasizing the need to adop t m odem  technology, the other em phasizing the extraordinary 
qualities of the Russian soldier. In his study of Russian m ilitary thinking, von W ahlde m ade a 
distinction betw een nationalists and  academics, that is, he applied the Slavophile /W estem iz- 
er controversy to m ilitary thinking.57 Finding this distinction inadequate, Fuller d iv ided  the 
two groups into magicians and technicians, arguing that his division allows a broader inter­
pretation, where a technician at the same time can be a Slavophile.58 Soviet scholars have 
d raw n the line betw een academics and representatives of the national Russian school.59
In m y view, this conflict has been largely exaggerated and has created an  artificial contradic­
tion between, for instance, D. A. M iliutin and M. I. Dragom irov or D ragom irov and  Leer. In 
fact, m ore united Dragom irov and  Leer than divided them .60 As far as M iliutin is concerned, 
he said m uch of w hat Dragom irov said - tw enty years earlier in an  article hailing Suvorov.61 
This article, however, was perhaps not so m uch a glorification of Suvorov as a cleverly con­
cealed criticism of the arm y of Nicholas I. M iliutin w as already form ulating the principles 
that could be discussed in public only tw enty years later. By referring to Suvorov, he stressed 
the im portance of the independent initiative of the individual com m ander and  of the soldier 
as the determ ining factor in  warfare. H e argued that officers should treat the soldiers in  a h u ­
m ane manner.62 This w as the very opposite of the prevailing view  that leadership em anated 
from Im perial inspiration and  that harsh  discipline was vital for m ilitary success.63
In m uch the same way, D ragom irov constantly referred to Suvorov w hen arguing his case.64 
Some of these ideas were controversial or -  worse -  perceived as radical, and  it m ight be ar­
gued that Dragom irov tried to legitimize these ideas am ong the m ore traditional parts of the 
Russian officer corps by using the authority  of Suvorov.
57' Wahlde, 'Military Thought': 95-116.
58- Fuller, William C., Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free Press, 1992): 303-305, 
514.
59‘ Beskrovnyi, Ocherki voennoi: 203-270; Zhilin, Russkaia voennaia mysl': 106ff.
60‘ Both, for instance, agree that the morale of the troops was the determining factor in war and that fire 
complemented the bayonet attack. Yet, Dragomirov as been described as advocating 'military nihilism' 
while Leer 'the most significant military-scientific figure in the Russian Army'. Kersnovskii, Istoriia: Vol. 
3: 23-24. See also Sukhomlinov, V. A. Vospominaniia. (Berlin: Russkoe universal'noe izdatel'stvo, 1924): 
11,16-17,55-56.
61 ■ Miliutin, D.A. 'Suvorov kak polkovodets', Otechestvennye zapiski (3,1839): 1-32,71-94.
62- In spite of the vast improvements of military technology at the turn of the century, Miliutin still em­
phasized the overall importance of the morale of the troops as the determining factor in warfare. See his 
article written in 1909, but published posthumously in 1912. Miliutin, D. A. 'Starcheskie razmyshleniia o 
sovremennom polozhenii voennogo dela v Rossii', Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Nikolaevskoi Voennoi Akademii 
(30,1912): 833-858.
63- See also Brooks, Edwin Willis. 'D.A. Miliutin: Life and Activity to 1856'. Ph.D., Stanford University,
1970: 67-68.
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It is notew orthy that neither Dragom irov nor Leer rom anticized the Russian soldier. Leer, as 
w e shall see later, firmly believed that the laws of w ar w ere eternal, unaffected by  time and  
borders.65 D ragom irov's ideas were based on a hum ane concern for the m ilitary m an in the 
w id est sense and he w as clearly perceived by  contem poraries as saying things of a m ore gen­
era l applicability. For instance, the Prussian officer A. Drygalski, praised the advanced Rus­
sian  m ilitary debate and  thought highly of bo th  Dragom irov and Leer.66A nother indication of 
contem porary appreciation w as that both Dragom irov and  Leer w ere appoin ted  honorary 
m em bers of the Swedish Royal Military Academ y in Stockholm.67
There is a fundam ental difference, therefore, betw een D ragom irov's thinking and  that of the 
Pan-Slavist General R. A. Fadeev. The latter argued that the Russian soldier w as no t suited for 
independen t actions since he lacked personal initiative. The Russian soldier could only fight 
in  closed columns, d istrusted  his commander, and hated  firing.68
A nother illustrative example of the debate on the im pact of firepow er broke o u t regarding 
field fortifications. The example of M etz was the d isputed  issue. M etz w as a tow n and  a for­
tress w hich the Germ an forces besieged betw een 19 A ugust and 29 October 1871 w hen the 
French commander, General Bazaine, finally capitulated w ithout having tried  to  break out. 
Z eddeler was convinced that the Germ an field fortifications around the fortress, in com bina­
tion w ith  the firepower of rifled artillery, were so strong that a breakout had  been  condem ned 
to failure.69 The G erm an forces had  the fortress under full control. Z eddeler concluded that in
It is interesting to note that Dragomirov did not only re-edit Suvorov's Nauka pobezhdat' but was also 
the first to translate a part of Clausewitz' On War into Russian in 1888. Dragomirov, M. I. Uchenie o 
voine Klauzevitsa - osnovnye polozheniia. Voennyi sbornik (10: 245-271; 11:5-22,1888). This is a transla­
tion from a French edition, corrected towards the original by M. A. Gazenkampf, Professor of Military 
Administration at the General Staff Academy. The first more substantial translation of On War in Rus­
sian appeared in 1902, translated by K. Voide: Klauzevitz. Voina (Teoriia strategii). 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: 
Tip. Glavnogo Upraleniia Udelov, 1902).
65- See, for instance, Leer, Publichnye...do Sedana: 237,256-258.
66- Drygalski, Albert von. Die neu-russische Taktik in ihrer gegenwdrtigen Entwicklung mit besonderen 
Berucksichtigung der herrschenden Ausbildung. (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1880): iii-viii, 9-10. See also 
Spaleny, Norbert. Ruckblicke aufdie russische Taktik der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. (Graz: Albert Lent- 
ner, 1878): 94-98,174. Spaleny, anAustrian officer, not using any Russian sources in the original language, 
gave the Russian army credit for having moved towards dispersed order. However, quoting Fadeev, he 
claimed that the Russians had understood only the form - not the spirit - of the new infantry tactic.
67‘ Glete, Jan. Krigsvetenskapsakademien, forsvaret och den industriella samhallsomvandlingen 1870- 
1920. In Faderneslandets forsvar. Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademien 1796-1996, edited by E. Norberg. (Stock­
holm: Atlantis, 1996): 210-213; Kjellander, Rune. Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien. Biografisk matrikel med 
portrattgalleri 1795-1995. (Stockholm: Akad., 1996): 77, 91.
68‘ GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 335, ff. 2, 7-9. 'Memorandum by Major-General Fadeev on the Importance of 
Armour For All the Branches of Service'. June 1869. This is an article originally intended for publication 
in Voennyi sbornik. The journal had refused to publish it with the motivation that armour on infantry 
was hardly an appropriate response to the introduction of rifles, since it would seriously hamper the 
speed of an attack. See also Fadeev, R. Vooruzhennye sily Rossii. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia 
(Katkov i Ko), 1868): 282.
69- Zeddeler, L. L. 'K voprosu: mogli-li frantsuzy probit'sia iz Metsa i Parizha?', Russkii invalid, 14 March 
1871 and Zeddeler, L. L. 'Zametka na stat'iu g. G. Leera', Russkii invalid, 30 March 1871.
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today 's warfare, field fortifications played such an im portant role that breakouts of the sort 
that could have been attem pted from  M etz and Paris become alm ost im possible.
This em phasis on m aterial conditions was rejected by Leer. He argued that a breakout at­
tem pt could very well have succeeded had  it no t been for the dem oralized French army. It 
was the lack of m orale that had  determ ined the outcome of M etz.70 Above all, the poor m o­
rale am ong the generals of the French arm y w as a consequence of an  inadequate m ilitary or-
71garuzation.
The im portance of the spade and field fortifications was noted prim arily  in connection w ith  
the European wars. The engineering officer, E. Everts (a veteran of Sevastopol) w rote on  w hat 
the Am erican Civil War had  to teach about defending fortresses from  attack from  bo th  land  
and sea. He found the evidence inconclusive and could not determ ine any rules that could 
guide a future siege.72 On the basis of his experience in Prussia in 1866, D ragom irov argued 
that artillery and infantry fire had  highlighted the im portance of field fortifications. H e rec­
om m ended that the infantry be trained in using spades.73 In the sam e vein, Leer called for the 
introduction of field fortifications in  infantry training.74 Zeddeler observed that although the 
French entrenchm ents had  not stopped the Prussian infantry there w as no d o ub t about the 
great im portance of entrenchm ents for defensive action 75 The lessons of the Civil War took a 
b it longer to sink in. D uring the Russo-Turkish War, the engineering officer I. G ausm an, p u b ­
lished a book on the use of field fortifications during  the Civil War 76 G ausm an drew  the read­
e r 's  attention to the fact that 'som etim es the Americans used the spade and the axe in  battle 
m ore than the bayonet and firearms'. 77 It is largely a descriptive and technical w ork, b u t it 
clearly shows an aw areness of the im portance of the spade on the battlefield.
Quite possibly, the im portance of entrenchm ents was not learned in  earnest un til the three 
battles of Plevna (8 July, 18 July, and 11 September 1877) during  the Russo-Turkish War. The
70‘ Leer, G. A. 'Zametka na stat'iu: K voprosu: mogli-li frantsuzy probit'sia iz Metsa i Parizha?', Russkii 
invalid, 21 March 1871 and Leer, G. A. 'Zametka na zametku Barona Zeddelera', Russkii invalid, 12 April 
1871. Leer would later receive support for his views, albeit from a slightly more technical point of view, 
by the engineering officer, A. Nikulishchev. See his article 'Blokada i kapituliatsiia Metsa', Inzhenernyi 
zhurnal (1872,6:497-548; 9: 739-780; 1873,5: 481-555; 6:597-643), especially 6,1873.
71‘ See also Leer, G.A. 'Prigovor nad Bazenom', Voennyi sbornik (1,1874):87-92. Incidentally, a twentieth 
century historian reached the same conclusion. Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: the German 
Invasion of France, 1870-1871. University Paperbacks ed. (London: Routledge, 1961): 257.
72‘ Everts, E. 'Voennye deistviia pod Charl’stonom s 1861 po 1865 g.', Voennyi sbornik (10,1867): 213.
73- Dragomirov, 'O veroiatnykh peremenakh', (12,1867): 201-203.
74- Leer, G. A. Publichnye lektsii o voine 1870-71 godov mezhdu Frantsiei i Germaniei ot Sedana do kontsa voiny. 
(St. Petersburg: Tipografiia departamenta udelov, 1873): 12-13.
75‘ Zeddeler, 'Pekhota, artilleriia i kavaleriia': 47, and Zeddeler, L. L. 'Znachenie polevykh ukreplenii pri 
sovremennom obraze deistviia pekhoty', Russkii invalid, 217,1 Oct. 1870.
76- Gausman, Iosif. Voina v Soedinennykh Shtatakh Ameriki 1861-65 gg. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Departamenta Udelov, 1877-78).
77■ Ibid., Vol. 1: 7,16.
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Russian arm y succeeded in taking Plevna only after suffering m assive losses in the three at­
tacks. Zeddeler w ould  later rem ark bitterly  that the efforts of the Russian arm y to take Plevna 
clearly show ed that nothing had  been learned from  M etz and  Paris.78 The experiences of this 
w ar clearly dem onstrated the im portance of entrenchm ents, and an entrenching tool subse­
quently becam e standard  equipm ent for the Russian soldier. If the Russians w ere slow  to 
learn this lesson, they were not alone. Foreign observers during  the Russo-Turkish War 1877- 
78, in spite of the evidence of Plevna, w ere reluctant to  conclude that attacks against en­
trenched positions had  become almost impossible.79 If anything, this reluctance dem onstrates 
that it is one thing to  observe a lesson and  learn it in  theory -  quite another to p u t theory  into 
practice. Only after the practical experience was the arm y able to take certain m easures to im ­
plem ent the lessons th roughout the entire organization. Perhaps this is particularly true  for 
large organizations, such as armies, b u t it w as nothing exceptional for the Russian army.
Why w ere Dragom irov and others so reluctant to dim inish the em phasis on the bayonet in fa­
vour of fire? It was not, as sometimes believed, that the Russian tactical thinkers w ere un a­
ware or underestim ated the increased im portance of fire on  the battlefield.80 One of the 
reasons w as the conviction that dim inishing the em phasis on the bayonet w ould  negatively 
affect the soldier's w ill to fight. It could potentially lead the soldier to be m ore concerned for 
his own safety than to concentrate on the task, which w as to  m ove forw ard in  spite of the rain 
of bullets. In other words, firepower w as seen as som ething that potentially could paralyze 
the troops.
A tactical commission (in w hich Dragom irov was an  influential m em ber) -  created in  the 
wake of the Austro-Prussian War to consider the effects of firepower on tactics -  declared that 
it w ould be 'very  harm ful' if the opinion spread am ong the troops that the significance of the 
bayonet had  dim inished:
The bullet and the bayonet do not exclude each other but complement each other: the 
first paves the way for the other and to overlook one or the other would be equally 
harmful.81
There was also the fear that the soldiers w ould  use all of the am m unition at an  early stage and  
then w ould  have to fight w ithout any bullets.This w as im portant since there w ere several 
kinds of rifles in the Russian arm y and the m ajority of them  were effective only a t close
78‘ Zeddeler, L. L. 'Dvadtsat1 piat’ let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii vestnik (5,1896): 490.
79' O’Connor, Maureen P. 'The Vision of Soldiers: Britain, France, Germany and the United States Ob­
serve the Russo-Turkish War', War in History (3,1997): 271-72,277, 283-84.
80‘ A typical complaint among Soviet scholars was that Dragomirov did not appreciate the material fac­
tor in warfare. Beskrovnyi, L. G. 'M. I. Dragomirov', in M. I. Dragomirov. Izbrannye trudy, edited by L. G. 
Beskrovnyi. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956): 6-7.
81- RGVIA, F. 868, op. 1, d. 217, ff. 12-13. 'Report by the Tactical Commission on Changes in Tactical 
Training in Connection with the Improvement of Rifles and Artillery Weapons'. 26 May 1867.
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range.82 Likewise, the increase in firepower above all strengthened the defender w ho could 
hide and  shoot from a long distance w ith great precision 83 But too m uch em phasis on dig­
ging entrenchm ents and learning to seek shelter in  the terrain w as no t seen as a productive 
training. Offensive action w as viewed as an im portant w ay to boost the m orale of the 
troops.84
A nother reason for concern w as that dispersed order m eant less control of the troops. The 
closed colum n sym bolized order. As armies had  grow n larger, so had  the battlefield and  
choosing dispersed order the m ain form ation could lead to com plete chaos. The role of the 
non-com m issioned officer had  increased and he needed  to be able to m ake independen t deci­
sions. This w as w idely recognized85 b u t it w as not enough com pletely to overhaul the pre­
vailing belief in Russia and elsewhere that the closed order w as still the only w ay forward. 
Significant here was the fact that the arm y suffered a severe lack of trained NCOs, an issue 
that become even m ore serious when, in 1874, the tim e of service becam e shorter.86 Finally, 
the w ar 1870-71 could be seen as an eloquent confirm ation of the opinion that technology 
alone is no t sufficient to w in  wars. In this war, the Prussian needle gun  w as technically inferi­
or to the French chassepot -  and  yet, Prussia had  won.
4.2.3 The Cavalry Reconsidered
Cavalry w as the m ost traditional arm  of the army. It played a key p art in the ethos of the no­
bility, w ith  p roud  traditions of heroic exploits on the battlefield.87 A rm ed w ith  sabres and  
lances, it w as the cavalry that could determ ine a battle through resolute shock-actions and  
quick pu rsu it of the enemy. It was also an  expensive p art of the army. A t a time w hen devel­
opm ent pointed tow ard sm all standing armies and  large reserves, it w as no t possible to keep 
large, perm anent cavalry units in the same w ay as before. Moreover, the im proved firepower 
of artillery and  infantry weapons did no t bode w ell for the fu ture of cavalry. All of these fac­
tors - social, economic, and  m ilitary - m ake it particularly  interesting to see how  the changes 
were interpreted w ith  regard to cavalry.
87 During the Russo-Turkish War, there was no shortage of ammunition, largely because the troops had 
been taught to save ammunition. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 343-344.
83- Kalinskii, Fedor. 'Vzgliad na upotrebleniie v boiu polevoi i gomoi artillerii osobenno v bol'shikh 
massakh', Artilleriiskii zhurnal (7,1872): 792.
841 Leer, Publichnye... do Sedana: 5-6.
85' See, for instance, Dragomirov, 'O veroiatnykh peremenakh', (12,1867): 204-205; Leer, G.A. 'Vliianie 
nareznogo oruzhiia na sovremennoe sostoianie taktiki', Voennyi sbomik (4,1861): 298, (5,1861): 34-37.
86- Rediger, A. Unter-ofitserskii vopros v glavnykh evropeiskikh armiiakh. (St. Petersburg: Trenke i Fiusno, 
1880): 1,145.
87 Of all the branches, the cavalry, not surprisingly, had the highest proportion of noble officers. Zaion­
chkovskii, P. A. Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 1881-1903. (Moscow: Mysl', 
1973): 203-205.
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The fu ture role of the cavalry was an issue m uch debated in the m ilitary press. It does not 
seem  to have been a major concern of the observers and the m ilitary attaches. N evertheless, 
these w ere w orrying times for the cavalry. In the European w ars of 1859-71, the cavalry had  
n o t played a distinguished role. In the w ars of 1866 and 1870-71, the cavalry w as hardly used  
a t all on the battlefield and every time it w as used the losses w ere terrible. The battlefield w as 
dom inated  by artillery and infantry.88 D uring the Franco-Prussian War, there w as only one 
successful cavalry attack, on 16 A ugust (N.S.) 1870 by G erm an forces at Mars-la-Tours, de­
scribed by  one historian as probably 'the last successful cavalry charge in W estern European 
w arfare '.89
Looking at European wars during  the 1860s, however, d id  no t provide any solutions for Rus­
sian m ilitary writers. They were all in agreem ent that the w ars had , above all, dem onstrated 
the need to train  cavalry units even more diligently than  before. The m om ent of attack, the 
tim ing, w as even m ore crucial than ever.90 The argum ent w as that cavalry charges against in­
fantry  w ith  rifles, even smooth-bores, had  never been successful. A t one point, the General 
Staff A cadem y graduate, M. A. Terent'ev, had  to argue that it was, in  fact, possible to train 
cavalrym en.91
The 1870s saw an intensified debate about the future role of cavalry. The professor of the Gen­
eral Staff Academy, A. I. Vitmer, even proposed to the M ilitary Scientific Com m ittee that a 
special journal for cavalrym en be started. The Com m ittee voiced support in principle for the 
proposal, b u t noted that there were no funds for such a journal and added  that articles on 
cavalry could always be published in Voennyi sbom ik 92
The outcom e of the w ar in 1870-71 m ay have prom pted  the debate, b u t at the sam e time the 
lessons of the Am erican Civil War were slowly beginning to sink in. A m ong the Russian offic­
ers there w as clearly awareness of the Civil War and  its lessons. The fact that the m ilitary at­
tache in Paris, P. L. W ittgenstein, in the m idst of the Franco-Prussian war, noted that the Civil 
War had  show n that the defender had  an advantage over the attacker in a siege is bu t one ex­
am ple to illustrate this.93
88- Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 115-118; Jones, Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1987): 401; Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War. Austria's War with 
Prussia and Italy in 1866. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 290-291.
89, Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 156-157.
90‘ Dragomirov, 'O veroiatnykh peremenakh', (12,1867): 193-94; Dragomirov, Ocherki: 222-223; Leer, 
Publichnye...do Sedana: 261; Terent'ev, M. 'Ostalas' li konnitsa tern, chembyla?', Voennyi sbomik (2,1865): 
294-297.
91‘ Terent'ev, M. A. 'Kavaleriiskie voprosy', Voennyi sbomik (10,1865): 289.
92- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 346, ff. 6-6v. 'Journals of the Military Scientific Committee'. No 1.10 Jan. 
1870.
93‘ RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1328, f. 19v. 'Wittgenstein to the War Minister. 5/15 Sept. 1870. Defence Resources 
of Paris'.
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A lthough Leer had  observed that cavalry had  been used m ostly for reconnaissance in  1870- 
71, and  even hinted at the necessity of transform ing the entire cavalry into dragoons94 (that is, 
light infantry arm ed w ith  rifles acting as m ounted infantry), it w as the A m erican Civil War 
that provided more substantial evidence of the changing role of cavalry. The young General 
Staff officer, N. N. Sukhotin, later m em ber of the State Council, looked at A m erica for solu­
tions. His dissertation a t the General Staff A cadem y is a thorough investigation of the use of 
cavalry raids and reconnaissance during the Civil War.95 Sukhotin found that it w as too early 
to w rite off the cavalry and that the Civil War had  show n that the cavalry could be very  use­
ful if it was used in the right way. It was, above all, the raids conducted by light cavalry of the 
Confederate Arm y that im pressed him. He argued that these raids had  played an instrum en­
tal role in keeping the South in  the w ar for so long, despite the num eral superiority  of the U n­
ion Army.96 The raids served several purposes; above all, to destroy railw ay lines and  
supplies, factories, etc. In  some cases, the raids had  a political motive; for instance, the Con­
federate cavalry leader Brigadier General John H. M organ's raids into enem y territory  had  
served the purpose of trying to persuade the inhabitants to change sides. The strategic signif­
icance of the raids w as equally great. They h ad  shaken the m orale of the enem y forces, d ivert­
ed  forces and attention from  im portant points, and broken supply  and com m unication 
routes 97
Sukhotin was convinced that the Am erican use of cavalry could be applied in  Europe. H e 
even argued that the Franco-Prussian War m ight have ended m ore rapidly if the Germ ans 
had  used  cavalry raids against Paris w hen one French arm y w as in M etz and  the o ther on  the 
w ay to Sedan. Furtherm ore, Sukhotin argued that the differences betw een the light cavalry 
units (that is, dragoons, uhlans and hussars) should be abolished and  that only one form  of 
light cavalry should exist.98
Sukhotin was rather alone am ong European m ilitary writers in placing such confidence in 
cavalry raids. N either the famous Justus Scheibert in  Prussia, w ho had  been an  observer in 
the Civil War, nor Vigo Roussillon in France thought highly of the A m erican use of cavalry. 
N either d id  the English observers.99
94‘ Leer, Publichnye...do kontsa voiny: 16-17.
95■ Sukhotin, N. Reidy i poiski kavalerii vo vremia amerikanskoi voiny 1861-65. (Moscow: Tipografiia shtaba 
Moskovskogo voennogo okruga, 1875).
96- Ibid., 221-222.
97‘ Ibid.,226-227.
98- N.S. 'Zametka o kavalerii', Voennyi sbomik (8,1874): 295-299.
"• Luvaas, Jay. The Military Legacy of the Civil War: the European Inheritance. Reprint of 1959 ed. (Law­
rence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988): 66; 104,131,147-148.
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One m ilitary w riter w ho played a part in aw akening the Russian interest in the use of cavalry 
in the Civil War - and  one that Sukhotin had  read - w as the British cavalry officer, L ieutenant 
Colonel George T. Denison. Denison, serving in Canada, had  w ritten  a book in  1868 on caval­
ry, draw ing  heavily on the lessons from the Civil War. Significantly, although he  argued  for 
the im portance of light cavalry, he still believed in the old-style cavalry trained for the trad i­
tional charge of cold steel.100 This w ent dow n very well in Russia and the book w as translat­
ed  from  a Germ an edition and published in 1872.101 The com bination of finding a new  role 
for the cavalry together w ith a m oderate respect for the traditional one secured D enison's 
success. In 1877, his history of cavalry w on the first prize in a com petition set u p  by G rand 
Duke Nikolai N ikolaevich the Elder.102
The idea of changing the focus on the use of cavalry to tasks of reconnaissance and  ra ids -  
which m ust have seem ed a lot less glorious that the cold-steel charge -  was, in  fact, ra ther ac­
cepted am ong cavalry officers.103 The lessons of the Civil War were also incorporated in Rus­
sian cavalry planning. In 1874, V. A. Sukhomlinov, w ho at that time w as a s tuden t at the 
General Staff Academy, w as assigned to m ake a study  of how  a cavalry breakthrough into the 
Germ an lines could be accomplished. The time for G erm an m obilization w as assum ed to  be 
six days.104 Furtherm ore, in 1874 the M ilitary Scientific Com mittee discussed the usefulness 
of using cavalry raids to destroy railways. It instructed the M ain A dm inistration for Engi­
neering to ask the m ilitary attache in Vienna to provide 50 p u d  (819 kg) of dynam ite and  the 
attache in London to send 50 p u d  of nitroglycerin so that tests could be conducted to deter­
m ine w hich substance w as the m ost useful. General Todleben had  already spoken ou t in  fa­
vour of dynam ite.105 In the au tum n of 1876, a large practice ra id  w as conducted in Poland 
that Sukhotin described as the 'first try  in Europe to apply the A m erican cavalry raid  on the 
railways across the Vistula.'106 Further evidence can be found in  the Russo-Turkish War in the
10°- Luvaas, Military Legacy: 111-113.
101 • Denison, George. 'Organizatsiia, vooruzheniia i upotreblenie kavalerii na voine soglasno sovremen- 
nomu sposobu vedeniia voiny', Voennaia biblioteka, Vol. 8. (St. Petersburg: Tip. V. S. Balasheva, 1872).
102- Denison, George. Istoriia konnitsy. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. A. Benke, 1897): Vol. 1: i-v. The impor­
tance of this victory should not be exaggerated. Denison's entry was one of only two and the only one of 
any quality. Nikolai Nikolaevich was said to have been disappointed with the outcome and the book 
was not translated into Russian until twenty years later. This translation also contains a separate vol­
ume with comments from the German edition of Denison's book. The opinions of the reviewing com­
mittee on Denison's work are in Appendix 4, Vol. 1: xxviii-xxx.
103- See, for instance, Major General P. Skobel'tsyn's articles where he stressed the importance of cavalry 
raids. Skobel'tsyn, P. E. 'Sovremennaia osnovaniia organizatsii i taktiki kavalerii', Voennyi sbomik (9, 
1876): 89-128; (4,1877): 273-296. Skobel'tsyn was a Guards cavalry officer and a graduate of the General 
Staff Academy. See also the article by the cavalry commander, Novitskii, N. D. 'Zametki o boevoi 
naznachenii i obuchenii kavalerii', Voennyi sbornik (3,1876): 61-68.
104- Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia: 13-14.
105- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 350, ff. l-2v. 'Journals of the Military Scientific Committee'. No 1.26 Jan. 
1874'.
106‘ Sukhotin, N. 'Nabeg letuchogo otriada za Vislu. Epizod iz kavaleriiskikh manevrov', Voennyi sbomik 
(11:125-153; 12: 365-398,1876).
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advance of M ajor General I. V. Gurko in Bulgaria in 1877.107 D uring this war, the Am erican 
observer, L ieutenant Francis V. Greene, w as frequently asked by Russian officers about the 
raids during  the Civil War.108
It w as only later, in connection w ith the reform of 1882, th a t protests against this em phasis on 
cavalry ra ids w ere voiced. This reform  transform ed all hussar and uh lan  regim ents - except 
the Guards - into dragoons. It also stipulated that all the Russian cavalry should  be arm ed 
w ith  rifles and  bayonets instead of lances in order to increase the firepow er of the cavalry.109 
The reform  w as prepared during the 1870s, w hen the cavalry regulations were also am ended, 
providing for d ism ounted training for first dragoons and, later, hussars and uhlans.110As w e 
shall see, this line of thinking had  strong support in  the w ar planning section of the Russian 
War Ministry. The reform  did  m uch to im prove the fighting strength of the cavalry as an  inde­
pendent branch of the army, although it was not fully p u t into practice. It clearly show s an  ef­
fort to react to the changes, an effort that caused some attention and  regard am ong m ilitary 
writers in  Europe.111 This developm ent continued into the 1890s w hen a reaction set in  and  
the focus shifted from  dism ounted action back to the traditional cavalry charge of cold- 
steel.112
It is clear that the Russian military w riters debated alm ost all of the issues raised by the w ars 
in 1859-71. However, there were a few notew orthy exceptions. One issue alm ost com pletely 
absent in the Russian military w riting was the im portance of industrial pow er in w ar -  ind i­
cated by  the Am erican Civil War -  or that wars could be protracted. In 1862, G linoetskii noted  
that the N orth  had  to -  and was also willing to -  spend enorm ous resources on its army.113 
Towards the end, w hen it was clear that the w ar w as draw ing to a close, he concluded that the 
Confederacy had  run  out of resources and could no t be expected to ho ld  ou t against the 
N orth.114 Likewise, E. I. Everts, noted that the U nion arm y h ad  a great advantage over the 
Confederacy in  that the industry  in the N orth had  m ostly been involved in fulfilling the
107' McElwee, William. The Art of War Waterloo to Mons. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974): 334; 
Menning, Bayonets: 57-58.
108- Greene, F. V. The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78. 2nd ed. (London: W.H. Allen 
and Co, 1880): 453; O'Connor, 'The Vision of Soldiers': 278.
109' Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie: 136; Kersnovskii, Istoriia: Vol. 3:18-21; Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia: 
29,52-53; Menning, Bayonets: 145-46. Kersnovskii called the reform a 'knockout blow for the Russian 
cavalry.'
110- Menning, Bayonets: 45-46; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 207.
11L Anon. Was haben wir von der russische Kavallerie zu erwarten? (Hannover: Helwing’sche Verlagsbuch- 
handlung, 1884).
112- Menning, Bayonets: 146. Nevertheless, the American officer who observed the manoeuvres at Kras- 
noe Selo in 1897 praised the flexible performance of the cavalry and noted that the Russians seemed to 
have understood the true r61e of cavalry better than either the Germans, the French, or the English. 
Miles, Nelson A. Report of Major-General Nelson A. Miles of his Tour of Observation in Europe. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1899): 50.
113‘ Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (2,1862): 544
114‘ Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Inostrannoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik, (10,1864): 194.
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needs of bo th  arm y and  fleet.115 But now here is there any indication of a deeper understand ­
ing of this phenom enon. This lesson w as largely overlooked by  other European arm ies as 
well. In Prussia, the m ilitary writer, Justus Scheibert, was one of the few to in terpret the Civil 
War as a product of the industrial age, b u t it was no t generally recognized until the end  of the 
century.116 In fact, the Prussian victories suggested that wars could be short, and  that a large, 
w ell-trained arm y could w in w ars very rapidly.
A nother issue that d id  not draw  m uch attention in  the m ilitary press w as the organization of 
the rear. Arm ies and theatres of w ar had  grow n in size, and railw ays had  speeded up  the m o­
bilization and  concentration of the troops. All this indicated that the planning of transport 
and supply  h ad  to be carried ou t in peacetim e in m uch greater detail than  before. It w as an 
area of m ilitary planning that, so it seem ed to the Russian m ilitary w riters, had  becom e m ore 
difficult that before, in spite of the railways.117 The m ilitary use of railw ays lay, above all, in 
their strategic im portance.118 N ot even the Prussians perform ed very well in supplying their 
troops, and this w as the only area w here they d id  no t receive their usual praise.119 The ob­
server, Cavalry Captain Prince E. N. M eshcherskii, w as highly critical of the Prussians on the 
grounds that requisitions underm ined  the discipline of the troops.120
The lack of public debate about the im portance of the Intendance does no t m ean that the Rus­
sian arm y w as unaw are of it. Two officers w ere sent to the P russian arm y w ith  the specific 
task of studying the organization of the rear in  the Prussian army.121 In spite of this, M. Ga- 
zenkam pf later com plained that inform ation about food supplies in the 1870-71 w ar w as very 
fragmentary.122 In 1872, the War M inistry appointed  a commission, headed  by  A djutant-G en­
eral A. A. Nepokoichitskii, in order to w ork out new  regulations for the organization of the 
rear.123 War M inister D. A. M iliutin w ould  later claim that it w as the Franco-Prussian w ar that
115- Everts, E. 'Voennye deistviia pod Charl'stonom s 1861 po 1865 g/, Voennyi sbomik (8:1867): 185.
116‘ Luvaas, Military Legacy. 74,137. It was I. S. Bliokh, at the turn of the century, who first made a thor­
ough study of the economic implications of war, although he thought that all production would come to 
a halt during a future war since all the productive forces would be out fighting. Bliokh, I.S. Budushchaia 
voina v tekhnicheskom, ekonomicheskom i politicheskom otnosheniiakh. 6 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia I. A. 
Efrona, 1898): Vol. 6:162-192, esp. 175. See also Howard, Michael. 'Men Against Fire: Expectations of 
War in 1914', in Military Strategy, edited by S. E. Miller, et al.: 3-7; Zhilin, Russkaia voennaia mysV: 99-106.
117- Gazenkampf, M. 'Prodovol’stvie voisk v mimoe i voennoe voennoe vremia v russkoi i inostrannykh 
armiiakh', Voennyi sbomik (10,1875): 282.
118- For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Chapter 5. The military writers were unanimous in their 
opinions on railways. See, for instance, Annenkov, Michail Nikolaevich. 'O primenenii zheleznykh dor- 
og k voennomu delu', Voennyi sbomik (12,1866): 329-352; Annenkov, M. N. Voina 1870 goda. Zametki i 
vpechatleniia russkogo ofitsera. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1871). Dragomirov, Ocherki: 229- 
231; Leer, Publichnye...do Sedana: 258-59; Leer, Publichnye...do kontsa voiny: 360-363; Mau, N. 'Vliianie 
zheleznykh dorog na uspekh voiskkovykh peredvizhenii', Voennyi sbomik (8,1872): 293-318.
119- 'Polevaia intendantskaia chast' v prusskoi armii (S teatra voiny)', Russkii invalid, 8 Nov. 1870.
120‘ RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 1328, ff. 238v-239. 'Meshcherskii to the War Minister. Orbais, 29 Aug/10 Sept. 
1870'.
121- Colonel Barkman and Colonel Tsurmilen.
122‘ Gazenkampf, 'Prodovol'stvie voisk', Voennyi sbomik (11,1875): 197.
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h a d  prom pted  the appoin tm ent of the commission since the w ar "provided us w ith  valuable 
inform ation ' in this area. The com m ission d id  no t finish its w ork  until 1876. M iliutin blam ed 
the com m ission for w orking so slowly th a t no provisions for a better organization of the rear 
services had  been p u t in  place in  time for the Russo-Turkish War.124
In some cases, pu rpo rted  lessons were no t so m uch lessons learned from  the w ars, as argu­
m ents used in  the current dom estic political debate. A  particularly illustrative exam ple w as 
w hen  N. P Glinoetskii portrayed  the Am erican m ilitary organization in a positive light. The 
general attitude in European armies tow ards the Am erican m ilitary organization w as one of 
contem pt. Colonel Rom anov observed that the U nited States had  spent very little m oney on 
its arm ed forces. N ow  the economy had  to change and supply  large sum s of m oney for the 
war. H e asked: "Is it possible to m ake w ar only w ith money, w ithou t properly  trained troops 
an d  know ledge of m ilitary science?'125 A t the bottom  of this lay a European scepticism  to­
w ards m ilitia forces and  a strong belief in  a standing army. All the m ore surprising, therefore, 
w hen  Glinoetskii in 1862 looked to the U nited States as an exam ple to follow. H e noted  that 
'the  new  fashion to fight w ars requires large arm ies', bu t since this w as expensive it w as nec­
essary to find a w ay to increase standing armies w ithout spending m ore money:
[Today] it would be easy to train a citizen to become a soldier in the permanent army, 
especially if he has had some experience of serving in the militia, the volunteer forces, 
or the national guards, and provided he is trained by good and experienced command­
ers. The best example of this is America w here... in spite of the most unfavourable con­
ditions, quite good armies have been created.126
H e suggested that it m ight be possible to reduce the standing arm y in peacetim e in favour of 
increasing the reserve forces. W hen the w ar w as over, Glinoetskii w rote respectfully about the 
pow er and  experience of the Union army, and  predicted that it w ould  come to play  an  im por­
tan t role in  international affairs in the years to come.127 Glinoetskii's support for an  increased 
reserve force was no t a lesson learned from the Civil War, b u t it illustrates w ell how  the issue 
of increasing the reserve w as used as a lesson in  order to give it extra w eight in the political 
debate. Rather, this w as a lesson of the Crim ean defeat and, as w e have seen, M iliutin h ad  al­
ready sketched out these p lans in 1856 w hen he served as a m em ber of the 1855 com m ission 
chaired by General F. V. Rudiger.128
123‘ Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk: Vol. 6:163-164.
124 RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 151. 'Memoirs'. 1870-71.
125‘ Glinoetskii, N. R 'Voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (9,1861): 244-45; RGVIA, F. 453, op. 1, d. 342,
f. 4v. 'Extract from the letter by Lieutenant-Colonel Romanov, New York 5 Oct. 1861, Observations of the 
Military Operations on the Potomac'.
126- Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (1,1862): 267
127‘ Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Inostrannoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (5,1865): 116-117.
128‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 22, ed. khr, 29, ff. 7-7v. 'Thoughts on the Existing Disadvantages in the Russian 
Military System and on the Measures for Their Elimination'. 29 March 1856.
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4.3 Studying Foreign Wars at the General Staff Academy
4.3.1 The Theory and Practice of Educating General Staff Officers
The General Staff A cadem y w as founded in 1832 w ith  the participation of General A ntoine 
Henri Jomini, w ho had  left N apoleon and transferred his services to the Tsar.129 He envi­
sioned a m ilitary academ y w ith em phasis on theoretical subjects like tactics, strategy, m ilitary 
statistics, an d  m ilitary history. However, practical exercises in the form of parade  ground drill 
prevailed and  came to dom inate the first decades of the Academy. W hen the young N. N. 
Obruchev m et Jomini in  Paris in 1864, he was m et w ith the question: 'Your Academy, is it re­
ally an  academ y or sim ply a school?'130 The report does no t reveal w hat O bruchev answ ered, 
bu t in the mid-60s the Academ y em barked on a balancing act betw een m ore practical know l­
edge, represented by 'staff rides' and w ar games, and  m ore theoretical know ledge, principal­
ly represented by  m ilitary history and strategy. War games were played on m aps using small 
m etal pieces to represent the troops. Two adversary units played against each other un d er the 
supervision of an  um pire, whose role was vital to the gam e and w hose instructions could not 
be contradicted.131 The 'staff ride ' was a w ar game conducted on the ground and  w as 'the u l­
timate w ar gam e test'.132 It differed from a field exercise in  that it involved only a ra ther small 
group of G eneral Staff officers, some line officers, and no  troops. The purpose w as to prepare 
officers for w ar time duties and acquaint them  w ith the actual terrain of either an  historic bat­
tle or of a possible future theatre of war. In Russia, the staff rides took place in  the border are-
129- His son, Aleksandr Genrikovich (1814-1888), was a senior official of the Russian Foreign Office 
through the 1870s and 1880s. On the development of the Academy, see Glinoetskii, N.R Istoricheskii 
ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Shtab voisk gvardii i Peterburg- 
skogovoennogo okruga, 1882) which is official in its tone but, nonetheless, contains a wealth of facts. 
More recent studies are: Steinberg, John W. 'The Education and Training of the Russian General Staff: A 
History of the Imperial Nicholas Military Academy 1832-1914'. PhD, Ohio State University, 1990. van 
Dyke, Carl. Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education 1832-1914. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1990). On Jomini see for instance Shy, John. 'Jomini', in Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear Age, edited by P. Paret. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986): 143-185; Strachan, European Armies: 60- 
75.
130- RGVIA, F. 544, op. 1, d. 615, ff. 16v-17. 'Obruchev to Leont'ev. 6 Oct. 1864'. There is no study devot­
ed to Jomini's influence in Russia, but it is usually perceived - probably rightly so - to have been great. 
But in the 1860s, Jomini's position as a leading military thinker was in decline both in Russia and else­
where. Miliutin remarked in his memoirs that when Jomini died in 1869, at the age 90, his intellectual 
ability had weakened and, with a stain of bitterness, he noted that Jomini had advised the Tsar about 
how damaging it would be for Russia to build strategic railways. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, f. 94v. 
'Memoirs'. 1868-69.
131- 'Voennaia igra', Leer, G.A., ed. Entsiklopediia voennykh i morskikh nauk. 8 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1883- 
97): Vol. 2:199-200; Skugarevskii, A. 'Prakticheskiia zaniatiia po taktike', Voennyi sbomik (2,1873): 259- 
290; Skugarevskii, A. 'Voennaia igra, ee literatura i znachenie', Voennyi sbomik (1,1874): 59-70; Sku­
garevskii, A. Voennaia igra. Sbomik zadach. (St. Petersburg, 1874): 1-4.
132- Bucholz, Arden. Moltke, Schlieffen, and Pmssian War Planning. (New York: Berg Publishers, Inc.,
1991): 34. See also Irvine, Dallas D. 'The French and Prussian Staff Systems before 1870', The Journal of 
American Military History Foundation 2 (4,1938): 195.
133‘ Otchet o polevoi poezdke partii ofitserov komendirovannykh ot glavnogo shtaba v 1871. (St. Petersburg: 
Voennaia tipografiia, 1871): 3-4.
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Officers w ith  four years of service, at least tw o of which had  been in line duty, could apply  to 
the Academy. Each had  to sit tw o competitive examinations; the first in the m ilitary district in 
w hich  he served and, if successful, the second in  the Academ y in St. Petersburg. One could 
then  en ter the Academ y for tw o years of general courses. The advancem ent from  one year to 
the next w as based on m erit only; that is, exam  results. A fter graduation, it w as the rank  w ith­
in  the class that determ ined w hether or not the officer w ould  be allow ed to join the General 
Staff or not. In practice, the graduates were so few and  the requirem ent of data  gathering and 
plann ing  so great that a majority w ent to the General Staff. According to Beskrovnyi, w hose 
figures cover the period 1852-1882, 903 of 1,329 graduates continued to the G eneral Staff.134 
In  the 1890s, it w as decided that half of the graduates should be adm itted  to the General Staff.
In  1869, a th ird  year (actually, six m onths) w as added  to the General Staff education w ith  the 
in ten tion  that the officers should apply their know ledge to specific m ilitary problem s.135 Each 
officer should  prepare two oral presentations - one related to  m ilitary history, the o ther to 
m ilitary  art/science - and one w ritten paper on a subject involving strategy, m ilitary statistics, 
and  m ilitary administration. From 1871 onw ard, the third-year General Staff studen ts also 
took p art in  the w ar games and  staff rides that were introduced that year, an d  to  w hich w e 
w ill re tu rn  in this chapter. Thus, the th ird  year incorporated a deepening of bo th  the 
theoretical and practical work.
In theory, the Russian General Staff Academ y adhered to the sam e principles as the Prussian 
Kriegsakademie -  it was open and  based on m erit -  and  graduates could be sent back to serve 
in  the line rather than autom atically entering the General Staff. In France, the G eneral Staff 
system  w as closed; that is, graduates of the staff school w ere appointed perm anently  to staff 
service and  prom otions were alm ost exclusively based on seniority.136 The sim ilarities be­
tw een the Russian and  Prussian General Staff education were, however, largely theoretical. In 
practice, there w as a fundam ental difference. L ieutenant-General A leksandr Karlovich Baum- 
garten  (1815-1883), C om m andant of the General Staff Academ y 1858-1862, po in ted  o u t that 
the line service requirem ent w as not always fulfilled in  Russia, w hereas in Prussia, it was fol­
low ed rigorously.137 He attributed this to the lack of a sense of du ty  am ong R ussian officers 
which, in  turn, originated from the lack of m echanisms to enforce the regulations, b u t added  
w ith  a sigh of resignation:
134’ Beskrovnyi, L.G. Russkaia armiia iflot v XIX veke. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973): 189.
135’ Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 237-242. Miliutin mentioned this in his memoirs. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 
16, ed. khr. 2, f. 165.
1 3 6 . Mitchell, Allan. Victors and Vanquished: the German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984): 82-92; Irvine, 'The French and Prussian': 200- 
201.
137' RGVIA, F. 544, op. 1, d. 566, f. 4. 'Lieutenant-General Baumgarten to the Staff of the Military Educa­
tional Institutions'. 13 Aug. 1862.
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No matter how much we demanded that the commanders write certificates for the of­
ficers wanting to enter the Academy, they would always look at it as a mere formali­
ty.138
H e also no ted  that the Russian General Staff Academ y had  the explicit goal of educating offic­
ers to  serve in  the General Staff and, therefore, found the Prussian concept of a 'm ilitary  un i­
versity ' too broad for its purposes. U nder the influence of G. A. Leer, that w as to change 
tow ards the end  of the century.139
The founding  father of the P russian War Academy, G erhard von Scham horst, had  p ioneered 
m ilitary  education in Prussia in the w ake of the Prussian defeat against N apoleon at Jena. 
Scham horst taugh t at the A cadem y and introduced not only staff rides and  w ar gam es bu t 
the stu d y  of m ilitary art through the examples provided by  m ilitary history. A m ong the stu ­
dents w ere Clausewitz, w ho later no ted  that Scham horst had  taugh t 'w ar as it really w as' 
(den eigentlichen Krieg). This so called applicatory m ethod essentially m eant learn by  doing, 
bu t it is im portan t to stress that is w as as m uch a m ental exercise as it w as an  exercise in  prac­
tical operations.140 After years in decline, the ideas of Scham horst w ere revitalized in  Prussia 
by G eneral Verdy d u  Vemois, to w hom  w e will return.141 This had  little in  com m on w ith  the 
French applicatory m ethod (used a t the Ecole d'application d'etat major in  Paris) that the aca­
dem ic com m ittee of the Russian General Staff A cadem y dism issed in 1864 based on 
O bruchev 's report. The academic com m ittee noted that the scientific considerations in  the 
French applicatory school were highly 'superficial and fragm entary ' and, therefore, of little
138- RGVIA, F. 544, op. 1, d. 566, f. 4v.
139‘ RGVIA, F. 544, op. 1, d. 566, ff. 15v-16; F. 401, op. 5, d. 345, f. 135. 'Journals of the Military Scientific 
Committee'. No 13,31 Oct. 1869. See also 'Academies, Military', in Jones, David R., ed. The Military-Na­
val Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union. (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press,1978-): 
Vol. 1:126-127
140, Clausewitz quoted in Homung, Klaus. Schamhorst: Soldat, Reformer, Staatsman. (Munich: Bechtle, 
1997): 91. Other useful sources on Prussian military education and the role of Schamhorst are, for in­
stance, Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen: 29; Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff. Translated by 
Brian Battershaw. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985): 19-20; Hahlweg, Wemer. 'Das Clasewitzbild einst 
und jetzt', in Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege. (Bonn: Diimmler, 1991): 28-29; Huntington, Samuel P. The 
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. (London: The Belknap Press of 
Cambridge University Press, 1957): 39-46. Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and. the State. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976): 65-74; Paret, Peter. 'Clausewitz', in Makers of Modem Strategy, edited by P. Paret: 186-213; 
Paret, Peter: 'The Genesis of On War', in Carl von Clausewitz: On War, edited by P. Paret and M. 
Howard. (London: Everyman's Library, 1993: 9-10; Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. 4 
vols.(Miinchen: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1959-1968): Vol. 1: Chapters 3-4. White, Charles Edward. The En­
lightened Soldier: Schamhorst and the Militdrische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805. (New York: Praeger, 
1989): 87-113. For French military education, see, for example Griffith, Paddy. Military thought in the 
French army, 1815-51. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989): Chapter 8; and, briefly, in Cox, 
Gary P. The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. (Oxford: Westview Press, 
1994): 45-51. See also Airapetov, O. R. 'N. N. Obruchev. Zabytaia kar'era "russkogo Mol'tke"', Manu­
script, 1996: 50-51, and van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine: 59-60.
1 4 1 . Wilkinson, Spenser. The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff. 2nd ed. (Lon­
don: Archibald Constable and Co, 1895): 187.
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use to Russian General Staff education.142 Instead, the source for m ilitary intellectual inspira­
tion w as found in Prussia.
The first tw o years at the Russian General Staff Academ y entailed both  general and  m ilitary 
subjects. The category of m ain subjects included: tactics, strategy, m ilitary history, m ilitary 
adm inistration, and geodesy w ith cartography. Subsidiary subjects included Russian and  for­
eign languages, engineering and artillery studies, and political history, w ith som e reference to 
in ternational law.143
4.3.2 The Curriculum
The im pact of the w ars (that is, the Franco-Austrian in 1859, the Am erican Civil War, and  the 
Wars of G erm an unification 1864,1866, and 1870-71) on the General Staff A cadem y's curricu­
lum  w as im m ediate. The im pact can also be seen in  the library and  in  the discussions w ith in  
the academ ic committee w hose yearly accounts began to be published in  1863.144 How, then, 
w ere the w ars reflected in the courses and the library?
All of the w ars, except for the Danish War in 1864, entered the curriculum  in  one w ay or an ­
other. The Austro-French War of 1859 was incorporated in  the curriculum  to study, above all, 
the significance of railways as lines of communications and  the significance of the electric tel­
egraph. The battles of Solferino and Magenta were particularly  studied in the tactics course as 
exam ples of unplanned battles (sluchainye srazheniia).145 The A m erican Civil War appeared in 
the strategy course of 1865 illustrating 'the influence of technology on coastal attacks and  de­
fence'.146
From 1867, A. EStankevich, Professor of M ilitary History, lectured about the Am erican Civil 
War, giving particular attention to the organization of the U nion army, the use of railw ays 
and the telegraph.147 In fact, extra time was added  to the m ilitary history course in  1867 ex­
plicitly in  order to provide time for the study of the Civil War.148 This p u t the Russian arm y
142- Otchet o zantiatiiakh konferentsii Nikoaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba v techenii uchebnogo 1863-64
g. (St. Petersburg: V. Spridonov, 1864): 17,35.
143‘ Svod voennykh postanovlenii 1869, (hereafter: SVP) Pt. 4, Voennye zavedeniia, Bk. 15, Zavedeniia voenno- 
uchebnye, art. 50.
144‘ A summary of the accounts were regularly published at the beginning of each year in Voennyi 
sbornik’s Russian military section, which pertained to Russian military developments.
145 . Pfogrammy kursa Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Eduard Veimar, 1865): 10.
146- Ibid., 17.
147- Afanasii Evlampievich Stankevich (1834-1881) was appointed professor of military history at the 
Nicholas Academy of the General Staff in 1862. See RBS: Vol. 19: 319-20.
148. p r0g ram m y  kursa Nikolaevskoi Akademii General’nogo Shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Eduard Veimar, 1865): 17; 
Otchet o zanaiatiiakh konferentsii Nikoaevskoi Akademii General’nogo Shtaba v techenii uchebnogo 1865-66 g. 
(St. Petersburg: Eduard Veimar, 1867): 10; Otchet o zamiatiiakh... 1866-67g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 
1867): 15; Otchet o zankiatiiakh... 1867-68 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1869): 13.
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well in line w ith  the French and British Academies w here lectures on the A m erican Civil War 
started  at around the same time, whereas it never appeared on the curriculum  of the P russian 
War Academ y.149 Initially, Stankevich devoted his lectures to G rant's cam paigns of 1862, il­
lustrating  the 'features of the organization of the American army, the im portance of railw ays 
and  telegraphs and, finally, river and sea communications'. Later, he added  Sherm an's cam ­
paign  of 1864 to his lectures.150 In 1870, the m ilitary history course of the second year com ­
prised  eight lectures on the American Civil War and twelve on the A ustro-Prussian.151 In 
1871, ten  lectures were devoted to the Civil War and there w as a rem arkable increase in  lec­
tures devoted  to the campaign in Bohemia in 1866, now  tw enty-eight lectures.152 This can be 
com pared to the Polish campaign of 1830-31, which had  forty-nine lectures increased to fifty- 
tw o.153 This w as to change again and, in 1873, there were twenty-six lectures about Poland 
1830-31, tw enty-four lectures on the 1866 campaign, and sixteen lectures on the Franco-Prus­
sian War.154The American Civil War had disappeared from the m ilitary h istory  course.
No other war, however, m ade a stronger im pact on the curriculum  than  the Franco-Prussian. 
According to the yearly accounts from the Academy and the course program m e from  1878, 
this w ar dom inated the entire curriculum .155There was still some room  for the A m erican Civ­
il War, however. It was studied during the 1870s in relation to bo th  strategy and  engineering 
tactics, above all, in illustrating hasty fortifications and entrenchm ents.156 The w ar of 1859 
seems to  have disappeared from the curriculum.
Furtherm ore, the new  wars clearly m ade an im pact on the students a t the Academy. Of the 
them es chosen by the third-year students for the presentation in m ilitary h istory  in  1870-71, 
seven them es w ere dedicated to the m ost recent wars, that is, from 1859 onw ards. Twelve 
them es concerned the Napoleonic Wars and six dealt w ith the period 1828-55.157 These fig­
ures rem ained m ore or less constant throughout the first half of the 1870s. Even m ore com pel­
ling is the choice of them e for the military science presentation. In 1871-72, these 
presentations dealt w ith issues of quick-firing artillery, the m ilitary telegraph, the im portance
149- Luvaas, Military Legacy: 101,144,137. One(most likely apocryphal) story has it that Moltke said 
about the Civil War that this war was only a matter of 'two armed mobs chasing each other around the 
country'. No one - it seems - has ever documented Moltke's alleged statement. Even if Moltke was not 
particularly impressed with what he saw, it does not mean - as Luvaas has shown - that the war was ig­
nored in Europe.
150, Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...1869-70 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1871): 22.
151‘ A lecture lasted 1.5 hours.
152- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh..,1871-72 g. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Morskogo ministerstva, 1873): 5.
153, Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...1870-71 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1872): 4-5
154- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...l872-73 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1873): 5-6.
155, Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...l871-72 g.: 6.
156 . p r0g ramrny  kursa Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia 
pol’za, 1878): 21,58-60.
157‘ Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...1870-71 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1872): 25.
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of fortresses, cavalry, field fortifications, and field defences -  all in the light of the experiences 
of the Prussian victories in 1866 and 1870-71.158
This dom inance of contem porary wars dem onstrates a w illingness to learn from  foreign 
wars. A lthough it could be argued that the students chose the latest cam paigns because there 
w as less m aterial -  and consequently -  less reading to do, there w as also a risk involved. The 
lessons of these wars were far from clear and some of them  controversial, as we have seen. So 
for a young, rising, officer it could have seemed safer no t to risk his career by  reaching the 
"wrong7 conclusions. In addition, these were, after all, foreign w ars and  norm ally one w ould  
assum e th a t the Russian campaigns w ould be the first choice for students.
It w as n o t only w ithin the walls of the Academy that the w ars of 1866 and  1870-71 resounded. 
In 1866, public lectures were introduced, starting w ith M. I. D ragom irov's lectures on the les­
sons of the Austro-Prussian War.159 The lectures were considered so successful that it becam e 
a regular event in the life of the Academy.160 In 1870-71, G. A. Leer held  public lectures about 
the ongoing w ar and, later, one of the observers during the war, L. L. Zeddeler, gave m uch 
publicized lectures at the Academy.161 In due course, the other Academ ies (the Artillery 
Academ y and the Engineering Academy) followed suit. The lectures w ere held  in  the evening 
during  the winter. They were not m andatory for the Academ y students. N ot all of them  w ere 
public an d  the War Minister, D. A. Miliutin, urged the Academ y to organize m ore public lec­
tures.162
N ot all of the lectures were as popular as Dragom irov's in 1866, which allegedly attracted 300 
to 500 listeners, or Leer's and Zeddeler's, whose lectures w ere attended  by A lexander II, b u t 
these lectures represented something distinctly new  in Russian m ilitary life. After L eer's lec­
tures, the academic committee noted that they had  a trem endous im pact on Russian 'm ilitary 
society' (voennoe obshchestvo) and 'should undoubtedly m ake the audience understand  ... the 
im portan t value and practical use of the study of m ilitary h istory '.163 But the benefit for the 
m ilitary w as only one side of the coin. By m aking m any of the lectures public, certain sectors 
of society w ere invited to get a glimpse of military affairs, and  -  surely this w as the in tent -  a 
greater understanding  of the army.
158- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...l871-72 g.: 28.
159- Dragomirov, Ocherki.
160- Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 309f.
161‘ Abridged versions of Leer's lectures were published in the military newspaper Russkii invalid dur­
ing the winter of 1870-71 and then published in two separate volumes. For Zeddeler's lectures, see Zed­
deler, 'Pekhota, artilleriia i kavaleriia'.
162- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...1870-71 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1872): 45.
163- Ibid., 44-45.
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A com parison of the entrance tests from 1865 and 1876 reveals that the m ost striking differ­
ence (apart from the fact that in 1876 there is a recom m ended reading list, w hereas in 1865 the 
applicants sim ply referred to notes from the military schools) w as that bo th  French an d  Ger­
m an  w ere m andatory  tests. 164There was also an increasing pressure to know  English. In  1866, 
the academ ic committee, m uch concerned w ith the poor know ledge of languages in general, 
set u p  a voluntary  course in English in extra-curricular tim e.165
4.3.3 The Library
It should  be noted  that several im provem ents were m ade to the library du ring  the 1860s. A 
reading room  w as created and, betw een 1866 and 1873,3000 new  volum es w ere acquired. 
O ld books w ere given to public libraries and library catalogues began to be published .166
A brief look at the contents of the Academy library can explain w hy G erm an h ad  become ab­
solutely crucial for the future General Staff officers. The library 's collection of books regard­
ing m ilitary  history and, above all, m ilitary science in  G erm an increased m ore than  the 
holdings in  Russian, French, or any other language betw een 1866 and  1887. M ilitary science 
included books on strategy, tactics and  regulations. The num ber of titles in G erm an on  this 
subject increased by  505 titles betw een 1866 and 1887. The num ber of French titles increased 
by 260, and  Russian titles increased by 161.167
TABLE 3 Holdings of the General Staff Academy Library by Language 1866-1887
Military history Military science
1866 1873 1887 1866 1873 1887
Russian 133 195 378 107 173 268
French 379 518 238 316 393 576
German 279 443 314 380 558 885
Other 37 75 99 104 109 109
164 . P rogram m a dlia ispytaniia ofitserov postupaiushchikh v Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (St. Pe­
tersburg: Eduard Veimar, 1865); Programma dlia ispytaniia ofitserov postupaiushchikh v Nikolaevskoi 
Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1876): 71.
165 . The conference of the Academy noted that knowledge of English would be useful for every General 
Staff officer, especially the geodesist, because of the wealth of books in English relating to physics and 
mathematics.
166. Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 298; Kvitnitskii, Katalog biblioteki Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo 
Shtaba. 1 ed. (St. Petersburg: Eduard Veimar, 1866); Vil'k, Katalog biblioteki Nikolaevskoi Akademii Gener- 
al'nogo Shtaba (1866-1873). (St. Petersburg: Tip. Morskogo ministerstva, 1873); Shevelev, A. Sistemat- 
icheskii katalog biblioteki Nikolaevskoi Akademii General’nogo Shtaba (1873-87). (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Trenke i Fiusno, 1887).
167- Kvitnitskii, Katalog biblioteki: 3-83; Vil'k, Katalog biblioteki: 3-54; Shevelev, Sistematicheskii katalog: 19- 
40. See also Rich, David A. The Professionalization of Russia's General Staff 1870-1895: Ideas, Strategy, 
and Foreign Policy'. Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1993: 55.
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If w e b reak  dow n the military history figures and look at books related to  the w ars that con­
cern  us, w e find - hardly  surprisingly - that the Franco-Prussian War attracted the  greatest in­
terest.
Even m ore interesting is the fact that no t only d id  the A cadem y acquire a large num ber of 
French and  G erm an books about the war, bu t the Russian officers produced  several original 
studies on the subject. Table 4 illustrates the num ber of titles in the library in R ussian in con-
TABLE 4 Library Holdings in Military History. Books in Russian/Total Holdings by Wars.
1859 1861-65 1864 1866 1870-71
1866 2/12 1/4 -/3 - -
1873 2/18 5/30 1/8 2/61 3/98
1887 2/18 6/40 1/9 3/71 8/196
trast to those in any other language; that is, Germ an, French, and  English. The figures m ay 
n o t look very im pressive from a Russian point of view, b u t it should be rem em bered that less 
than  a quarter of the total library holdings were in Russian initially.168 Two years after the 
Franco-Prussian War had  ended, three studies by  Russian officers had  been published. This 
could be com pared w ith the five titles on the Am erican Civil War, where only one w as a Rus­
sian study,169 the rest being translations. It is also interesting to note that none of the English 
titles in  1866 related to the American Civil War, whereas seven years later there w ere sixteen 
English titles about the war.
It needs to be stressed that the library catalogues cannot reveal w hat the G eneral Staff officers 
actually read, bu t at least they give a good indication of w here the A cadem y's interests lay.
4.3.4 The Role of Military History and the General Staff
We have seen that m ilitary developm ent of the 1860s po inted  tow ards the need  to  m ake p rep ­
arations for w ar in peacetime. War planning is a process w hich involves m any aspects. In 
short, the m axim  of Vegetius 'if you w ant peace, prepare for w a r ' covers m uch m ore than  
sim ply acquiring weapons. According to the historian A rden Bucholz, the Prussian w ar p lan ­
n ing process consisted of four segments: organizational, representational, educational, and 
analytical.170 Bucholz's structure contains im portant features that can be used  as tools, al­
though it tends to neglect the role of individuals. In Russia, the will of the Tsar w as still para­
m ount, as w e shall see. The use of m ilitary attaches to gain inform ation about foreign armies,
168. -pke Academy library contained a total of approximately 40,000 volumes. Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii 
ocherk: 298.
169■ A separate volume of E. Everts' articles first published in Voennyi sbomik, 1867. 'Voennye deistviia 
pod Charl'stonom s 1861 po 1865 g.' (8:179-222; 9: 3-24; 10:191-218,1867).
170- Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen: 12-17.
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in  Bucholz's term inology the 'representational' aspect, w as briefly dealt w ith  in  the previous 
chapter. The overall role of m ilitary statistics in Russian w ar p lanning has been exam ined in 
detail b y  D avid Rich.171 The other aspects of w ar planning, the 'educational' aspect (m ilitary 
h istory) and  the 'analytical (w ar games) are, however, tw o distinct features th a t also shaped 
early  Russian w ar planning process and they will be considered here. This w as a develop­
m en t clearly influenced by the events in  Europe. The General Staff officer, A. P. Skugarevskii, 
recognized the increased im portance of studying m ilitary history and  sum m ed u p  p art of the 
p rob lem  of preparing an arm y for w ar w hen he wrote:
Military history gives a true picture of the actual battle. It provides material and sup­
ports theoretical conclusions; it is the source and verification of all practical exercises. ...
The theoretical discussions and the practical exercises should together help in the inde­
pendent search for actual facts.172
Bucholz noted  that m ilitary history becam e m ore and m ore im portant in Prussia, and  this 
w as true also in Russia.173 It is no  exaggeration to say that the im portance of m ilitary history 
grew  during  the 1860s to such an extent that by  the 1870s it w as the cornerstone in Russian 
m ilitary  science.174 Two institutions were instrum ental in  this developm ent: the General Staff 
A cadem y and the Consultative Com mittee -  later renam ed the M ilitary Scientific Com m ittee 
-  w ith in  the M ain Staff. We will begin w ith  the former. M ilitary history w as im portan t for tw o 
reasons. O n the one hand, it served as a tool for com paring the current developm ents w ith  
the past. O n the other hand, it w as in tended to encourage a coherent thinking on strategical 
an d  tactical issues. It is this reasoning that lay behind the substantial changes in  the m ilitary 
h istory  course and the strategy course offered at the General Staff A cadem y in  1865. These 
courses h ad  no t changed in any significant w ay since the establishm ent of the A cadem y in 
1832.175 The prelim inary w ork (before the decision w as taken to change the m ilitary history  
course) had  been conducted by a commission com prising four General Staff officers un d er 
the chairm anship of Major-General Petr Kononovich M en'kov, w ho also w as ed itor of the 
m ilitary journal Voennyi sb om ik}76
171- Rich, 'The Professionalization'.
172‘ Skugarevskii, A. Srazhenie pri Nakhode 27-go iunia 1866 g. (St. Petersburg: Tip. V. Demakova, 1875): ii.
173- Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen: 56,77.
174‘ Rich, 'The Professionalization': 55. See also Avdeev, V. A. 'Voenno-istoricheskie issledovaniia v 
russkoi armii', Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal (3,1986): 81-84. Avdeev, V. A. 'Voenno-istoricheskie issledova­
niia v Akademii General’nogo shtaba russkoi armii', Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal (12,1987): 77-80. Leoni­
dov, L. 'Iz istorii russkoi voenno-istoricheskoi mysli 60-kh godov XIX veka', Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal 
(10,1973): 95-100. Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar’era': 66-67.
175- Soobrazheniia po peresmotru kursov i uchenykh. zaniatii v Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (St. 
Petersburg: V. Spirodonov, 1865). The results of this were also published in Voennyi sbomik, 'Russkoe ov- 
ennoe obozrenie', (4,1865): 138-154. The new curriculum is described in Voennyi sbomik (1,1866): 32-54, 
and (2,1866): 161-192.
176‘ A printed version of the commissions deliberations are kept in RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 18068, ff. 449-479.
'Material Regarding the Review of the Courses at the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff'. 1865. In
1869, P. K. Men'kov (1814-1875) also became the editor of Russkii invalid when the editorship of the 
newspaper and the journal merged.
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The new  m ilitary h istory  course w as divided into tw o parts: (1) the art of w arfare (voennoe 
iskusstvo), and  (2) the study  of cam paigns (izuchenie kampanii). The first part w as to aim  at 
show ing the influence of contem porary conditions on the art of warfare, and  the second part 
w as to contain a critical exam ination of tw o or three cam paigns instead of the previous ac­
counts of one w ar after another. The strategy course w as to consist of tw o parts  also: (1) a his­
torical survey of the influence of different factors on warfare, and  (2) a synthesis of the 
different factors, w ith  particular attention to the executive and mechanical side of m ilitary op­
erations. It w as em phasized that the course should have a practical direction w ithou t dogm a­
tism  and  abstract theories. The tw o courses were interrelated and  w ere to be developed  in 
close cooperation w ith  each other. The academic com mittee of the A cadem y later stated  that 
the changes w ere a direct response to the new  dem ands on the General Staff.177 Furtherm ore, 
it w as stressed that m ilitary historical w orks had  to be provided w ith  bibliographical notes - a 
sm all b u t vital indication that the attitude tow ards m ilitary history w as changing tow ards a 
m ore scientific approach.
G. A. Leer w as responsible for these changes. In 1867, he m ade a study  trip  to  the War A cade­
m y in  Berlin, and  there can be no  doubt that he w as inspired by  Prussia.178 Leer hailed the 
w ay the Prussians valued  and  taugh t m ilitary history.179 As the founder of the "critical-histor­
ical' school in  Russian m ilitary thought, Leer has been accused of being too preoccupied w ith  
abstract theories. The essence of his critical-historical m ethod w as to search for the eternal 
laws of w arfare by choosing the appropriate examples in m ilitary history. It w as im portan t to 
choose facts closest in tim e to the period studied.180 The view  that m ilitary science could be 
studied  through the p rism  of m ilitary history was essentially the same approach advocated 
by  Scham horst half a century earlier in  Berlin.
However, Leer criticized the War Academ y in  Berlin for no t having a course in  strategy al­
though  "a theory of strategy is entirely possible'.181 In his search for this theory, he differed 
from  Prussian thinkers, no t least Clausewitz himself. Nevertheless, C lausew itz had  som e in­
fluence on Leer, which can be seen in Leer's em phasis on the psychological aspects of w arfare 
and  in  his efforts to explain the relationship betw een strategy and politics.182
177' Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...l871-72 g.: 2.
178. this trip, he also met General Moltke in Berlin. 'Genrikh Antonovich Leer', Russkaia starina
(3,1894): 238.
179' Leer, G. 'General’nyi shtab i ego komplektovanie v Prussii i vo Frantsii', Voennyi sbomik (11,1868): 
49-74; (12,1868): 343-372.
180- Leer, G.A. 'Znachenie kriticheskoi voennoi istorii', Voennyi sbomik (5,1863): 82.; Leer, Opyt: vi.
18L Leer, 'General'nyi shtab', (11,1868): 72-73.
182- See, for example, Leer, Opyt: 1-3,18-25. See also van Dyke's discussion, where he makes an effort to 
show a direct link between Leer's Opyt and Clausewitz's On War: Russian Imperial Military Doctrine: 68-
73. A recent study examines the influence of Clausewitz in Russia. Rose, Olaf. Carl von Clausewitz: 
Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Ruflland und der Sowjetunion 1836-1991. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Ver- 
lag, 1995): esp. 11-84.
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The academ ic committee noted that Leer's observations on m ilitary history in  Berlin were 
particu larly  useful for Russia, especially the study  of cam paigns in greater detail, on a day- 
by- day  basis. It w as General Verdy du  Vemois in Berlin w ho had  revitalized this m ethod in 
the stu d y  of m ilitary history.183 He w as well know n in the Russian m ilitary establishm ent and 
h ad  spen t tw o year w ith the Russian army in Poland in  1863-65.184 His w ritings and  lectures 
later had  an  im m ediate influence on the young Staff-Captain Skugarevskii, w ho  h ad  been 
sent abroad by the Academ y in 1871 to the m ilitary academ ies in  Berlin and  Vienna.185 Sku­
garevskii, as w e shall see, played an im portant role in introducing w ar gam es in  Russia. A t 
the sam e time, Leer pointed out that this m ethod of teaching m ilitary history required  better 
organized archives than Russia had  and pu t large dem ands on the teacher.186
The other institution w here m ilitary history developed w as the C onsultative Com m ittee 
w ith in  the M ain Staff. With regard to historical writings, one of the m ain concerns of the 
C om m ittee w as the fact that other European armies took responsibility for the w riting  of m il­
itary  history whereas in Russia, a few individuals had  produced  w orks of 'only  rarely serious 
quality '.187 The Committee drew  up  a list of preferential subjects, including the Russo-Turk- 
ish W ar 1828-29, single battles from  the Crim ean War, the fighting against Sham il etc. Further­
m ore, to stim ulate m ilitary historical writing, the Com m ittee decided to rew ard m onographs 
on certain w ars and m ilitary adm inistration, and  to publish the best articles in  Voennyi 
sbomik. The Com mittee also decided to support General Staff officers w ho w anted  to w rite or 
translate m ilitary historical works or tactical w orks w ith  an  allowance ranging from  1,000 to 
2,500 silver ro u b les .188
This w as a m ajor step forward, particularly in view  of the fact that there w as no  official Rus­
sian account of the Crimean War, bu t Russian translations of the Prussian official history  of 
the War of 1859, the A ustrian and Prussian official accounts of the w ar of 1866, and  the Prus­
sian official history of the Franco-Prussian War. In Russia a special com m ission w as created in  
1879 to w rite the official history of the Russo-Turkish War.189 This w as the first w ar for w hich 
the Russians w rote an official history.
1 8 3 . juijus Verdy du Vemois (1832-1910), Prussian General and teacher at the Kriegsakademie. During the 
Franco-Prussian War, he was responsible for intelligence at the Prussian General Staff under Moltke. He 
was War Minister for a brief period in 1889-1890.
184. Verdy du Vemois, Julius. 1m Hauptquartier der russischen Armee in Polen 1863-65. (Berlin: Ernst Sieg­
fried Mittler und Sohn, 1905). L. L. Zeddeler met him during the 1870-71 war and had been greeted by 
him in Russian. Zeddeler, 'Dvadtsat' piat' let nazad', (4,1896): 125.
185‘ He had been sent abroad specifically to learn German. When in Berlin, he attended Verdy d« Ver- 
nois' lectures almost exclusively. His report from the six months trip between August 1871 and February 
1872 is in RGVIA, F. 413, op. 1, d. 44.
186‘ Otchet 0  zanaiatiiakh... 1867-68 g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1869): 13-14.
187' N. O. 'Obzor deiatel'nosti soveshchatel'nogo komiteta general'nogo shtaba za 1864 i 1865 gg.', Voen­
nyi sbomik (7,1866): 50. See also Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar’era': 59.
1 8 8 . o  'Obzor deiatel'nosti': 51.
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We no ted  earlier that the Danish War of 1864 never appeared in the curriculum  at the General 
Staff Academy. However, tw o years after that w ar a study  appeared  in  p rin t w ritten  b y  Gen­
eral Staff officer, C aptain Vladimir Nikitich Chudovskii. The book deserves m entioning no t 
so m uch  for its original ideas,190 b u t because it was the first study  about a recent w ar to be 
aw arded  prize m oney (350 roubles) by the Consultative Com m ittee,191 w hich is an indication 
th a t the com m ittee w as no t solely interested in Russian w ars or w ars in traditional areas such 
as the Caucasus. 192Furtherm ore, the Committee stressed the need to encourage w ritings not 
only about Russian w ars bu t also about operations from the m ost recent w ars 'in  order to ex­
p lain  the contem porary art of w arfare'.193 One of the legacies of the w ork  of the C om m ittee - 
certainly appreciated by  this historian - was the determ ination w ith  w hich it decided to bring  
order to  the m ilitary historical archive.194
After the P russian trium ph in 1866, the Academ y explicitly noted  that the tasks of G eneral 
Staffs in  all European armies had  become m ore and m ore varied.195 The academ ic com m ittee 
stressed that, therefore, it w as vital to concentrate on a careful selection of officers for the Gen­
eral Staff. These officers should be provided w ith  a m ore practical education. It w as also im ­
po rtan t to develop a closer relationship betw een the troops and  the General Staff. The 
com m ittee w orried about the fact that the Russian General Staff corps d id  no t yet fully appre­
ciate all of its responsibilities. In order to understand  the grow ing im portance of staff w ork, 
special attention should be given to the General Staffs of foreign arm ies.196 The com m ittee 
d id  no t specify w hich 'foreign arm ies' it had  in  m ind, b u t it is n o t too w ild a guess to assum e 
that the P russian arm y w as setting the example. For instance, it w as surely no  coincidence 
that G. A. Leer w as sent to the Kriegsakademie in  Berlin in 1867.
Furtherm ore, a num ber of articles in Voennyi sbomik com pared the Russian G eneral Staff sys­
tem  w ith  foreign system s and called for reforms of the Russian system. These articles, w ritten  
by  graduates of the Academy, em phasized the need to im prove the education a t the G eneral 
Staff Academy, to study  recent campaigns, and  to bring the General Staff officers closer to the
189‘ A task it took over 20 years to complete, but finally resulted in the nine volume account Voenno-is- 
toricheskaia kommissia glavnogo shtaba. Opisanie russko-turetskoi voiny 1877-78 gg. na Balkanskom poluos- 
trove. 9 vols. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1901-13) and a special attachment, Osoboe pribavlenie k 
opisaniiu russko-turetskoi voiny 1877-78 gg. na Balkanskom poluostrove (1909-11).
190- it was, above all, based on the book by the Prussian military historian, Wilhelm Riistow, and the 
book by Count Waldersee, then artillery officer, later Chief of the Prussian General Staff (1888-91).
191, Chudovskii, V. Voina za Shlesvig-Golstein 1864 goda. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1866). 
It was one of three works rewarded by the Consultative Committee in 1865. See the Committee's journal 
in RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 342, f. 76, and N. O. 'Obzor deiatel'nosti': 64.
192‘ Airapetov hastily drew such a conclusion based the list of prioritized themes from the first meeting 
of the Committee. Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar’era': 59-60.
193- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 342, f. 55v. 'Journals of the Consultative Committee'. No 7,1866.
194- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 342, f. 57v.
195- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh...1866-67g. (St. Petersburg: A. Iakobson, 1867): 18-19
196, Ibid., 19; Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 270-71.
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troops.197 This preoccupation w ith the education of General Staff officers and  the creation of 
an  intellectual centre w ithin the War M inistry indicate that the Russian m ilitary h ad  realized 
the grow ing im portance of staff work.
4.3.5 Staff Rides and War Games
The staff ride w as the practical side of w ar gaming. War gam es played an im portan t role in 
the w ar p lanning process for several reasons. First, the gam es entailed a practical aspect, 
w hich added  a practical elem ent to the theoretical education. Second, and  perhaps m ore im ­
portantly, they encouraged a uniform  thinking about tactical problem s, w hich w as significant 
considering the increased im portance of independent officers on the battlefield. In this re­
spect, they served the sam e purpose as m ilitary history. W ith larger armies spread  over larger 
areas, the possibility of direct central control had  dim inished and  the role of the subordinate 
com m ander increased, since he needed  to be able to m ake independent decisions in accord­
ance w ith  the general intentions of the commander. In Prussia, the General Staff un d er Gener­
al M oltke practised a system  of m ission orders w here a subordinate com m ander could 
change the instructions so that they w ould reflect the in tent of the com m ander. English ob­
servers, in  particular, noted the absence of the slavish obedience to superiors that w as charac­
teristic of other arm ies.198
It w as L eer's trip to Berlin in 1867 that eventually led to the introduction of staff rides in  Rus­
sia.199 The Prussian staff rides were also discussed in the M ilitary Scientific C om m ittee in  
1869 and  the Com m ittee concluded that the Prussian staff rides un d er G eneral M oltke w ere 
w orth  full attention and  som ething to imitate. The Com mittee also proposed th a t staff rides 
be held  in  Warsaw, Kiev, and M oscow M ilitary Districts. The staff rides w ould  give the offic­
ers a chance to practise 'w hat w as required of them  in w a r ' and  w ould  provide the officers 
w ith  an opportunity  to reconnoitre areas and im plem ent different m ilitary operations.200 Fur­
therm ore, in 1869, M iliutin had  asked the M ilitary Plenipotentiary, C ount Golenishchev-Ku- 
tuzov, to ask General M oltke w hether it w ould  be possible to send Russian officers as 
observers. In 1870, all of the preparations had  been m ade and  Zeddeler and  Fel'dm an w ere
197' Apart from Leer's articles in 1868, see especially Mosolov, N. 'Obzor akademii general'nogo shtaba 
v zapadnykh evropeiskikh gosudarstvakh', Voennyi sbomik (7,1863): 3-70. Mosolov graduated from t he 
Academy in 1862. A. Gololobov. 'Nasha akademiia general'nogo shtaba', Voennyi sbomik (5,1871): 61- 
139. Gololobov graduated in 1870. See also, for instance, V., P. 'Neskol'ko slov o general'nom shtabe', 
Voennyi sbomik (4,1871): 140-144; and M. G. 'Ustroistvo i sluzhba general'nogo shtaba', Voennyi sbomik 
(7,1873): 85-114.
198‘ Hamley, E.B. The Operations of War. 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1872): ix-x.
199‘ Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 266-67,310-11. Erickson and van Dyke seem to believe that the intro­
duction of practical exercises was a result of Obruchev's report of 1864. Erickson, John. The Russian Im­
perial/Soviet General Staff. The College Station Papers. (College Station, TX: The Center for Strategic 
Technology, 1981): 108; van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine: 60.
200‘ RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 345, ff. 135-136v. 'Journals of the Military Scientific Committee'. No 13,31 
Oct. 1869.
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ready  to go to the Generalstabsreisen that were due to begin in  A ugust.201 The outbreak of the 
w ar cancelled these plans and only in 1872 could L. L. Zeddeler, F. A. FeTdman, and 
F ligel'ad iutant G. G. Berg participate in the Prussian staff rides 202
The chronology is im portant since it shows that the Russian War M inistry w as w ell aw are of 
the possible use of the Prussian staff rides before the P russian victory in  1870-71. Rather, it 
w as the A ustro-Prussian War of 1866 that was the catalyst. It is clear that w hen L. L. Z eddeler 
w rote about P russian Generalstabsreisen in one of his reports from  the theatre of w ar in  1870, 
he only told the War M inistry w hat it already knew.203
The first staff ride w as held  in 1871 under the supervision of the C om m andant of the A cade­
my, L ieutenant-G eneral A. N. Leont'ev.204 Forty-two officers from  the A cadem y's faculty par­
ticipated, am ong them  Leer and Obruchev. From the M ain Staff, fifteen officers had  been 
appointed . The ride in  eastern Livonia lasted nine days. Later that year, staff rides w ere also 
held  in Moscow, Warsaw, and Kiev Military Districts.205 Two years later, in 1873, the M ain 
Staff held  its first staff ride.206
The staff ride in Russia served several goals, m ost im portantly  it served educational pu rp o s­
es. It w as also a step in  bridging the gap between line officers and  General Staff officers. This 
issue w as close to M iliutin 's heart and, in 1872, General Staff officers w ho aim ed to becom e 
regim ental com m anders or chiefs-of-division staff were com m anded to serve in the line for 
one year.207 Clearly, the new ly graduated Staff-Captain Nikolai Ivanovich M au echoed the 
War M inister's views in an article in Voennyi sbomik, w hich em phasized the im portance of 
line officers' participation in the staff rides. In addition, M au underlined  that it w as im portan t 
to m ake the purpose of the staff rides clear not only to the arm y b u t to b roader sectors of the 
society:
201 • RGVIA, 1870, F. 401, op. 2, d. 84, ff. 6-6v. 'About the Mission of General Staff Colonels Baron Zeddel­
er and Fel'dman to the Prussian General Staff Manoeuvres'. 1870. See also Miliutin's memoirs where he 
explicitly stated that the staff ride was learned from the example of General Moltke in Prussia. RGB OR, 
F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 152v.
202‘ RGVIA, 1872, F. 401, op. 2, d. 71. ff. 4-6. It was after this trip abroad that Fel'dman produced the con­
troversial paper on the Prussian General Staff. See Chapter 3.
203- GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 344, ff. 6-6v. 'Tactical and Strategic Preparations and Military Officer Educa­
tion'. 1 Oct. 1870.
204- Aleksandr Nikolaevich Leont'ev (1827-1878) was Commandant of the General Staff Academy be­
tween 1862 and 1878.
205. 'PoJevye poezdki ofitsery general'nogo shtaba v 1871 g.', Voennyi sbomik (4,1872): 133-166. See also 
Glinoetskii, N. P. 'Zametki o polevykh poezkakh ofitserov General’nogo shtaba', Voennyi sbomik (10,
1872): 249-267.
206. David. 'The Tsar's Colonels: Military Professionals and the Remaking of Russian Strategy, For­
eign Policy, and Autocracy, 1840-1895'. Manuscript, 1997: Chapter 4.
207‘ R...n. 'Neskol'ko slov po povodu prikomandirovyvaniia ofitserov general'nogo shtaba k stroiu', 
Voennyi sbomik (12,1874): 381-388.
119
In Prussia ... not only is the military community interested in the staff rides, but also 
peaceful citizens, who respect the staff ride and recognize its usefulness.... In the efforts 
to make our staff rides known, neither the private nor the specialist military press has 
touched on those issues most likely to be of interest for society: what a staff ride is, the 
aim and purpose of it, the work, and the officers' situation, etc.208
In essence, this w as the sam e call expressed by  Valuev in  1870; namely, th a t the arm y and  ci­
vilian society should find com m on ground. This w as perceived as im portan t since universal 
m ilitary service w as about to be introduced.
The staff rides seem  to have helped to create an esprit de corps w ith in  the A cadem y itself.209 
M any years later, A. I. Denikin w ould remem ber that the traditional staff ride w as the only 
occasion w hen the relations betw een teachers and students at the A cadem y w ere relaxed and 
intim ate.210
The Russian General Staff also m ade efforts to develop w ar gam es p layed  on m aps. From  
1872 onw ards, w ar games w ere incorporated into the tactics course at the G eneral Staff A cad­
em y and  the first gam es took place involving both  second- and third-year students.211 War 
games, as such, were no t com pletely new  in the Russian army. D uring the 1830s and  1840s, 
there had  been som e interest in them, above all in the G uards General Staff. In 1848, a hand­
book w as published by Colonel Kuzminskii about how  to conduct w ar gam es.212 However, it 
was only in the early 1860s that w ar games started to develop seriously in  Russia. This devel­
opm ent has tw o distinct parts: the first taking place during  the beginning of the 1860s, the 
second -  clearly influenced by  Prussia's victories of 1866 and  1870-71 -  during  the 1870s. The 
first stage w as m ostly concerned w ith questions regarding the overall usefulness of w ar 
games and w hether they should  be practised at low er levels of the army. The second stage 
was concerned w ith  producing material, instructions, and  books. By this tim e no one serious­
ly questioned the use of the games.213
In the early 1860s, the m ilitary debate was very m uch concerned w ith  questions about educa­
tion of soldiers and officers and the w ar game debate w as a p art of this. E. Feoktistov argued 
in Voennyi sbom ik for the spreading of w ar gam es am ong the troops214and, at the sam e time, 
w ar gam es w ere being introduced in different units of the army.215 The critics of w ar games
208- Mau, N. 'Polevye poezdki i uchastie v nikh stroevykh ofitserov', Voennyi sbomik (6,1873): 293-311
209• Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii ocherk: 311.
210‘ Denikin, A. I. Staraia armiia. 2 vols. (Paris: Rodnik, 1929,1931): Vol. 1: 65.
211- Otchet o zanaiatiiakh... 1871-72 g.: 7-8.
212‘ Kuzminskii. Rukovodstvo k voennoi igre. (St. Petersburg, 1848).
213‘ See, for instance, Kazanskii's articles 'Zametka o voennoi igre', Russkii invalid,, 20,21 Oct. and 31 
Dec. 1872.
214- Feoktistov, E. 'Uproshchennaia voennaia igra', Voennyi sbomik (6,1863): 335-382.
215- For instance 1st Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, the Azov Infantry Regiment, the regiments of 
the 12th Infantry Division, etc. Skugarevskii, 'Voennaia igra, ee literatura': 61.
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focused on tw o issues: the usefulness of the w ar games, and  the Prussian application of them. 
M. I. Dragom irov questioned the benefit of w ar games a t the low er levels of the army. He 
w rote tw o articles on this m atter in Oruzheinyi sbomik 1862.216 A t the tim e he w as adjunct pro­
fessor in tactics at the General Staff Academ y and  teacher of tactics to  the H eir A pparent. 
D ragom irov w as strongly against m aking w ar games an  obligatory p art of the train ing at the 
low er levels of the army. Dragom irov criticized w ar gam es because of their pure ly  theoretical 
nature. H e acknow ledged that the w ar games were useful for officers, bu t th a t there were 
m any m ore im portant things for soldiers to devote their training to.217 It can be argued that 
D ragom irov probably w as right in questioning the usefulness of w ar gam es for soldiers and 
non-com m issioned officers w ho needed more basic education.218
The other critical voices clearly show that although inspired by  Prussia -  after all, it w as P rus­
sia that invented w ar gam es219 -  the Russian officers d id  no t sim ply copy, b u t seriously dis­
cussed the advantages and  disadvantages of w ar games. In 1862, Stankevich h ad  pointed out 
a negative feature - in  his view  - of the Prussian w ar games, that is, the tendency to create 'if 
n o t a science, so at least an a rt' of w ar games. This led to w ar gam es becom ing like a textbook 
filled w ith  rules. Stankevich saw  w ar games as a practical aid to strategic and  tactical think­
ing.220
Skugarevskii clearly learned a lot from Prussia, particularly from the teachings of Verdy d u  
Vemois.221 Skugarevskii played an instrum ental role in introducing w ar gam es in Russia. He 
too, however, was no t uncritical. H e w as concerned w ith adapting  the w ar gam es to suit the 
Russian arm y and also criticized the Prussian arm y for w anting to do too m uch. War games, 
in Skugarevskii's view, were good for solving simple, concrete tasks. War gam es should  aim  
at developing independent m ilitary qualities. The m ain benefits of the gam es w ere th a t they 
gave a concrete picture of the battles and  that they could be som ething to talk  about w ith 
other like-m inded people. In this spirit, he published a book about the battle of N achod in 
1866.222 It w as a detailed study w here all of the troop m ovem ents w ere recorded alm ost 
m inute by m inute. The purpose was to present the events as objectively as possible and, in 
opposition to Leer, Skugarevskii noted that he could not use the 'norm al m ethod of critical
216- In No 1 and 4, later published in Dragomirov, Sbomik original'nykh: 111-131.
217■ Dragomirov, Sbomik original'nykh: 123-125. See also his Odinnadtsat’ let, Vol. 2:413-414.
218‘ Incidentally, the criticism of the 'lack of realism' in the 19th century war games seems valid. See 
'War Games' in Macksey, Kenneth. The Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology: From Prehistory to 
the Present Day. (London: Penguin Books, 1995): 358.
219- Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, 1991:29-31.
220‘ Stankevich, A. 'Voennaia igra', Voennyi sbomik (7,1862): 91-116. Skugarevskii, A. 'Voennaia igra, eia 
pol'za i nedostatki', Voennyi sbomik (4,1875): 223-230.
221‘ Skugarevskii, 'Prakticheskiia zaniatiia': esp. 269-277. See also Verdy du Vemois, Julius. Kriegsges- 
chichtliche Studien nach der applikatorische Methode. (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1876) which contains a de­
tailed description of the battle of Custozza 24 June 1866.
222‘ Skugarevskii, Srazhenie pri Nakhode.
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study ' since this would lead to a subjective description that m ight conceal the true facts. At 
each stage, the reader should be able to stop and ask: 'how could one act in that situation? 
how  w ould he have acted? why in this way and not the other?' In this way, he hoped to ad­
dress the problem that every army faces, namely that:
In peacetime, there tends to be a conviction that in battle one can always act according 
to certain rules, whereas w ar teaches us that sometimes a sudden coincidence can com­
pletely overthrow the rules.223
Clearly, both staff rides and war games had come to stay. W hat role did they play in the Rus­
sian w ar planning process? This is very difficult to answer, but the following points can be
Wmade. Although the Russian staff ride had been directly inspired /» twi the Prussian example, 
it hardly seems to have played any major role in the war planning processin contrast to Prus­
sia.224 The greatest use of the staff ride in Russia lay in its educational benefits. W hen the staff 
rides were introduced it was these aspects that were emphasized.225 Nevertheless, they were 
also of strategic importance. In view of the fact that the staff rides up until the outbreak of the 
Russo-Turkish War 1877-78 took place in Warsaw, Kiev, Moscow, Vil'na, and Odessa Military 
Districts, it would not be unreasonable to think that the first years of staff rides were also 
used to reconnoitre and acquaint the officers with the western borderlands. All of the w ar 
planning in 1876 could not stop Obruchev from making a reconnaissance tour to Poland in 
May.226
The introduction of staff rides and war games in Russia demonstrates that the War M inistry 
followed international development closely and was willing to borrow ideas from Prussia. It 
was by no means an easy process. A serious problem in Russia, especially com pared with 
Prussia, was the lack of competent officers to conduct the staff rides and to act as um pires in 
the w ar games. But at least it was a recognized problem. In 1869, the Military Scientific Com­
mittee pointed out that the success of the staff rides was, to a high degree, dependent on indi­
vidual officers.227 The lack of competent umpires in w ar games was highlighted by 
Skugarevskii.228 Moreover, in the first years relatively few of the whole Russian officer corps 
took part in the staff rides. During the first half of the 1870s only approximately 100-200 offic- 
ers of approximately 30,000 officers participated. It may not look very impressive b u t the
223- Ibid., ii-iv.
224 Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen: 29-31,89-91.
225' Glinoetskii, 'Zametki o polevykh poezkakh'.
226' Rich, 'The Tsar's Colonels': Chapter 4.
227- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 345, ff. 136v-137.
228, Skugarevskii, 'Voennaia igra, ee literatura': 63.
229■ In 1871, a total of 140 officers took part in staff rides. 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik 
(4,1871): 157. Rich, David. 'The Tsar's Colonels': Chapter 4. For the num bers of the officer corps, see Be­
skrovnyi, Russkaia armiia: 40,62; Pintner, Walter M. 'The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725- 
1914', The Russian Review 43 (1984): 253; Stein, Hans-Peter. 'Der Offizer der russischen Heeres im  Zeitab- 
schnitt zwischen Reform und Revolution', Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geshichte 13 (1967): 374.
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early staff rides involved the w ar planning section of the arm y and  com petence w as bu ilt up  
w ith  new  generations of graduates from the General Staff A cadem y In addition, w ar games 
and  other intellectual pursuits slowly began to spread to lower levels.
4.4 Discussing War
It w as no t only the exclusive elite of the General Staff officers w ho w ere affected by the new ­
born  interest in m ilitary affairs that the wars of the 1860s brought w ith  them. It affected the 
entire officer corps in several ways. The m ost distinct features of this developm ent w ere the 
grow ing im portance of the m ilitary press (spearheaded by  the m ilitary journal, Voennyi 
sbomik), the appearance of officer clubs or m ilitary gatherings (voennoe sobranie), and the ac­
tive state support of regim ental libraries. This aspect deserves special attention since it shows 
the first seeds of a growing professional attitude in  the Russian officer corps.230 In addition, it 
dem onstrates an aw areness of the War M inistry that m easures needed  to be taken to im prove 
the intellectual climate in  the arm y and that lessons could be learned from  abroad, above all, 
Prussia.
First, in the 1860s there was a growing interest am ong Russian officers to discuss m ilitary af­
fairs publicly. Voennyi sbomik  had  been founded in 1858 and, later, tw o new  specialized publi­
cations were created; Oruzheinyi sbomik in 1861, and Pedagogicheskii sbom ik  in  1864. In the 
1860s the artillery journal, Artilleriiskii zhum al, and the engineering journal, Inzhenem yi zhur- 
nal, changed from bi-m onthly to m onthly publications. The daily new spaper, Russkii invalid, 
w as im portant as well, b u t Voennyi sbomik clearly played an instrum ental role in educating 
the Russian officer corps.231 It w as often the only m ilitary literature that m any officers ever 
read. This was underlined by an anonym ous w riter in 1860, w ho poin ted  out the im portance 
in publishing not only reviews of major m ilitary w ritings b u t also extracts from  them . That 
was the only chance m any officers had, living 'in  God know s w hat com ers [of the earth]' to 
become acquainted w ith these works.232
It is h u e  that the subscription rate of the Voennyi sbomik fell from 5,063 in  1858 to 2,612 in  1864 
but, at the same time, officers started to write m ore articles in the journal. The reasons for the
230‘ Zaionchkovskii mentioned this development in passing and did not go into it in any detail. Zaion­
chkovskii, Voennye reformy: 213,218.
231- For a general overview, see Maksheev, F. A. K 50-letiiu "Voennogo sbomika". (St. Petersburg, 1910) 
and 'Voennyi sbomik', Voennaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 6: 587-589. See also Beskrovnyi, Ocherki po istochniko- 
vedeniiu: 430-37. Levasheva, Z.P. Bibliografiia russkoi voennoi bibliografii sistematicfieskii perechen osnovnykh 
bibliograficheskikh ukazatelei s nachale XIX veka do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii. (Moscow, 
1950): 31-32.
232- Voennyi sbomik, (4,1860): 413. The letter was published as a footnote to the article 'Vostochnaia voi­
na'by K.Sh.
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drop  in subscription rate has been attributed to the fact that, after eight m onths as editor, N. 
G. C hem yshevskii w as replaced by P. K. Men'kov. It has been alleged that the journal then 
sim ply becam e the official voice of the War Ministry.233 In any case, the num ber of contribu­
tors receiving fees for delivered articles rose from forty-four in 1859, to 120 in 1863,150 in 
1865, and  then stabilized at approxim ately 170 234 The share of original articles w ritten  for the 
journal com pared w ith translations also rose slightly, as d id  the num ber of articles subm itted 
for publication 235 This developm ent m ade the journal note in  1867:
Ten years ago, our sporadic military literature was mostly supplemented with foreign 
military literature; the existing military journals were filled with translations and only 
in exceptional cases were original articles written.... Ten years ago military journalism 
hardly existed.236
Second, the appearance of officer clubs was an  im portant event in  providing an opportunity  
for the self-im provem ent of the officers. These institutions grew  in  num ber and  received state 
support as a direct consequence of the changes in  warfare in the 1860s.237 In particular, it w as 
recognized that m odem  warfare required officers to be able to act independently  and  that 
they had  to teach soldiers to act individually. To achieve this, m easures needed to be taken to 
develop the intellectual level of the officer corps, and to encourage the officers to s tu d y  m ili­
tary science on their own.238 The War M inistry exam ined the situation in  1869 and, a t that 
time, officer clubs existed in three m ilitary districts: Warsaw, ViTna and  in Finland. In add i­
tion, the com m ander of K azan' M ilitary District had  recently started  a club for officers.239 
D uring the period 1869 and  1872, the clubs spread from a higher level dow n to battalion lev­
el.240 Lectures w ere organized w hich covered different aspects of warfare, including such
233. Keep, Power and the People, 1995:267-292; Makeev, N. N. G. Chemyshevskii - redaktor Voennogo 
sbomika. (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1950). For a thoughtful discussion on how it came to be that
Chemyshevskii was appointed editor, see Brooks, E. Willis. 'The Improbable Connection: D.A. 
Miljutin and N.G. Chemyshevskii, 1848-1862', Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 37 (1989): 21-44. Mil- 
iutin's comments on Chemyshevskii in his memoirs are published in Koz'min, B. 'N. G. Chemyshevskii 
v redaktsii "Voennogo sbomika". Iz vospominanii D. A. Miliutina', Literatumoe nasledstva (25-26,1936): 
234-237. Airapetov compared the main themes of the Journal's first eight months with the first eight 
months under the editorship of P. K. Men'kov, but did not discover any significant changes in what kind 
of articles were published. Airapetov, 'Zabytaia kar'era': 33,38.
234. ' R u s s k o e  voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbornik (2,1864): 243.
235• In 1863,174 articles were submitted to the journal; in 1869, the number had risen to 233. See the 
yearly statistical figures in Voennyi sbornik (1,1864): 239-242; (2,1866): 200-205; (4,1867): 149-154; (3, 
1868): 67-70; (2,1869): 212-214; (2,1870): 160-162; (2,1871): 91-92; (2,1872): 143.
236‘ 'Izdanie Voennogo sbornika v 1866 g.', Voennyi sbornik (4,1867): 149-150.
237‘ See Miliutin's recollections of this development. RGB OR, f. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 152v. 'Memoirs'. 
1870-71. See also 'Voennye besedy v 22-i pekhotnoi divizii', Russkii invalid, 13 Feb. 1871; 'Voennye 
besedy v 15-i pekhotnoi divizii', Russkii invalid, 4 Feb. 1872.
238‘ Anon. 'Besedy i chteniia v inostrannykh armiiakh po povodu voennykh voprosov', Voennyi sbomik 
(11,1869): 83-102; Anon. 'Ob ustroistve voennykh sobranii i obshchikh ofitserskikh stolov', Voennyi 
sbomik (9,1871): 57-103; 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (1,1873): 37-48.
239‘ Anon. 'Ob ustroistve': 60,70.
240- See, for instance, 'Besedy o voenno-pokhodnom telegrafe', Voennyi sbomik (12,1872): 343-366; Anon. 
'Zametki o sovremennom takticheskom boe i o podgotovke k nemu pekhotnogo soldata. Voennaia 
beseda, prochitannaia v sobranii ofitserov 1-go i 2-go batalionov 98-go pekhotnogo Derptskogo polka', 
Voennyi sbornik (11,1874): 44-66.
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topics as the history of firearms in  the major pow ers of Europe and  in Russia, the cam paigns 
of 1866 and  1870, m ilitary history, and the critical-historical m ethod. There w ere lectures on 
rifled artillery, railways, m ilitary hygiene, topographical studies, and  even na tu ra l science.241 
The War M inistry em phasized that giving a lecture should no t be reserved for specialists, b u t 
every officer should be encouraged to give talks 242 The events d id  no t restrict them selves 
only to lectures. In som e places, like the 97th Infantry Livonian Regiment, the officers gath­
ered twice a week to discuss different tactical problem s.243
Different activities began to fill up  the year of the Russian officer. D uring the w in ter m onths 
there w ere the discussions and lectures. In the summer, staff rides had  spread from  the Gener­
al Staff to divisions and  regiments. The approach to m ilitary science and  education w as 
changing and  the officers of the G uards First Rifle Battalion s ta r te d  to read m ilitary articles 
and  books w ith particular interest'. A t the sum m er exercises in 1871, the younger officers 
were given -  for the first time -  tactical tasks like reconnaissance. All of these activities were 
no t w ithout their problem s, of course, and the historian of the G uards First Rifle Battalion 
probably spoke for m any w hen he remarked: 'All this, as every new  thing, could not be estab­
lished im m ediately and  firmly, not least because the inspection and  verification at that time 
were very superficial.'244
Indicative of the prevailing views in Russia was the fact that a w riter in Russkii invalid felt a 
need to stress that these officer gatherings were not a luxury 'but an inevitable and urgent neces­
sity ' (italics in original).245 P. Kazanskii even suggested that the talks should  be m ade perm a­
nent and become m andatory for every officer 246 Agreeing w ith  him , an  anonym ous w riter in 
Voennyi sbomik highlighted the difficulties in organising these m ilitary discussion clubs. He 
argued that the groups had  to be started and supported  by  the com m anders of the units.247 
The m ain problem  w as that if a group had  been organized on private initiative it h ad  no 
chance of surviving in the long run. A n officer, acting on his ow n initiative, w as usually  
view ed by his colleagues w ith contem pt, as someone w ho w as trying to rise above the rest, a 
snob trying to teach others, w ho were less informed. A nother article poin ted  to  the exam ple 
of Prussia where participation in the lectures and w ar games of the so-called m ilitary societies 
was m andatory -  not in  the form  of orders, bu t as a m atter of m oral obligation 248In other
241 • 'Voennye besedy v 16-i pekhotnoi divizii', Russkii invalid, 25 Feb. 1872.
242‘ Anon. 'Ob ustroistve': 73.
243- 'Voennye besedy', Russkii invalid, 31 March 1872.
244- Kartsov, P. lstoricheskii ocherk leib-gvardii pervogo strelkovogo Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva batal'ona 
1856-1885. (St. Petersburg: F. S. Sushchinskii, 1885): 101-102.
245‘ 'Voennye besedy', Russkii invalid, 13 Feb. 1871.
246‘ P. Kazanskii. 'O voennykh besedakh', Russkii invalid, 3 Dec. 1872.
247‘ Anon. 'Neskol’ko slov ob ustroistve voennykh besed v ofitserskikh sobraniiakh', Voennyi sbomik (10,
1873): 317-336.
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w ords, it was a m atter of pride for the officers to take p art and at least in  one regim ent each 
officer gave one lecture each year.
In  Russia, the new ly-set up  m ilitary gatherings were distinct from  the self-confident Prussian 
Militarische Gesellschaft,249 O ne serious problem  was the lack of prem ises w hich ham pered  the 
grow th of the clubs.250 Moreover, the Russian War M inistry could no t w ait for the officer 
corps to develop a group identity  as it had  in Prussia and, in  1874, participation in the officer 
gatherings was m ade m andatory.251
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that these clubs w ere set up  w ith  the explicit goal to cre­
ate a group identity (dukh tovarishchestva) am ong officers. A part from spending tim e discuss­
ing m ilitary science and  playing w ar games, the officer clubs w ere encouraged by  the War 
M inistry to arrange various social activities. It was im portant to attract as m any officers as 
possible. Civilians w ere allowed to attend the clubs as guests, b u t could not becom e m em ­
bers.252
In relation to the developm ent of officer clubs, the War M inistry began to  give atten tion  to the 
regim ental libraries. Regim ental libraries had  existed in Russia since 1810 w hen libraries were 
founded in  the Semenovskii and  Preobrazhenskii regiments. These libraries, an d  others that 
were bu ilt up , were created at the officers' ow n expense.253 The need for im proved libraries 
was a them e in  the m ilitary debate in the 1860s. In one library, one w riter po in ted  out, the 
m ain inform ation came from the m ilitary journals, bu t these were often rem oved by a few, 
senior com m anders and  there w as nothing left to read for the rest of the regim ent.254 To u n ­
derscore his point, another w riter listed the holdings of one regim ental library: fourteen titles 
-  m ostly novels and travel books, not one about a m ilitary subject. A nother library h ad  a 
seemingly im pressive sixty titles in the m ilitary science section; however, only six of them  
were new. The section consisted, to a large degree, of old regulations.255 These were only a 
few indications of the state of the libraries, b u t they were surely not exceptions. The exception 
was rather the N aval Library at Kronstadt, held out as an example by one writer, w ith  30,000 
volum es.256
248‘ 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbornik (1,1873): 43.
249. jhg  fjj-gt Military Society in Prussia had been started in Berlin by Schamhorst. Craig,The Politics: 28.
25°- 'Russkoe voennoe obozrenie', Voennyi sbomik (1,1873): 49.
251‘ Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk: Vol. 6:409-410.
252- Anon. 'Ob ustroistve': 77.
253. 'Bibiioteki voennye i voiskovye', Leer, ed . Entsiklopediia: Vol. 1:424.
254‘ Serebrenitskii, A. 'Ob ekzamenakh ofitserov', Voennyi sbomik (11,1863): 104.
255. j 'Neskol'ko slov po povodu stat'i Polkovye ofitserskie biblioteki', Voennyi sbomik (7,1866): 93-98.
256- Anon. 'Neskol'ko slov ob ustroistve': 333-334.
126
In  1873, the War M inistry designated extra m oney for the libraries, and the M ain Staff started  
to  publish  lists w ith titles that every library w as obliged to acquire.257 Access to the library of 
the M ain Staff, hitherto  restricted to  General Staff officers, w as extended in 1874 no t only to 
the entire officer corps, b u t also to civilians "engaged in scientific research".
All this pointed to som ething distinctly new  in Russian m ilitary life. H ow  deeply  d id  all of 
this penetrate the Russian officer corps? The War Minister, D. A. M iliutin, w ould  later rem ark 
that 1872 stood out am ong all others in this outburst of interest am ong officers for m ilitary 
science. These activities, said M iliutin, had  a positive influence on the Russian officer 
corps.258 However, he w ould also (long afterwards) claim that these efforts, including staff 
rides, w ar games, officer clubs, w ould  have been more successful if the com m anding officers 
and, no t least, A lexander II had  been able to get over the old habits. In a rare em otional ou t­
burst, he noted that these habits had  taken root in Russia during  the reign of Paul I an d  h ad  
reached a climax during  the reign of Nicholas I. A lthough A lexander II recognized the posi­
tive developm ent am ong the troops, he could no t overcome the old traditions and  continued 
to dem and the strictest regularity and alignm ent in ceremonial parades, "the w hole form er 
petty  formalism", thus:
One reprimand by the Tsar for a trivial error regarding some paragraph in the regula­
tions or for some false step, an insufficiently neat alignment, paralyzed all of the efforts 
to try to give the education of the army a new character, corresponding more to the true 
value and conditions of war.259
The role of the Tsar in  influencing the army, particularly perhaps its intellectual developm ent, 
w as still great. But that the War M inistry actively tried to support developm ent tow ards a 
m ore educated, intellectually hom ogeneous officer corps is beyond doubt. Furtherm ore, Mil- 
iutin"s pessim ism  cannot be entirely justified. D uring the 1880s and  1890s, the developm ent 
of officer clubs continued to receive support from the War M inistry and, in  1885, the G uards 
Corps in St. Petersburg M ilitary District began to publish their m ilitary discussions.260 The
257- Leer, ed. Entsiklopediia: Vol. 1:424. See also "Spravochnyi katalog izdanii o kotorykh bylo ob'iavleno 
v tsirkuliariakh glavnogo shtaba s 1870 po 1875", Voennyi sbomik (1,1876): 1-14, and 'Spravochnyi kata­
log izdanii o kotorykh bylo ob'iavleno v tsirkuliariakh glavnogo shtaba s 1870 po 1880 g /, Voennyi 
sbomik (5,1881): 1-14.
258- RGB OR. F. 169. k. 16. ed. khr. 4, f. 90. 'Memoirs'. 1872-73. See also Zaionchkovskii, P.A., ed. Dnevnik 
D.A. Miliutina. 4 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina. 
Otdel rukopisei., 1947-50): Vol. 1:154.
259' RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, ff. 152v-153. This topic, the military style of the Romanovs, is dis­
cussed in Keep, John L.H. Power and the People, 1995:189-209. See also Wortman, Richard. Scenarios of 
Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), espe­
cially 343-378 for the military education of Alexander II. Regarding Alexander's military education see 
also 'Gody ucheniia ego imperaterskogo vysochestva naslednika Aleksandra Nikolaevicha 1826-38', in 
Sbomik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, Vol. 30,1881:1-20,287-318; Tatishchev, S. S. Im- 
perator Alexander II, ego zhizn' i ego tsarstvovanie. Reprint of 1911 ed. 2 vols. (Moscow: Charli, 1996): Vol. 1: 
10-12,23-25,29,49,55-57,61-62,76-77,104.
26a The name of the publication was Voennye besedy ispolnennye v shatbe voiskgvardii i Peterburgskogo 
voennogo okruga. For the officer clubs, see Fuller, William. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881- 
1914. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985): 22-23.
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first Russian private m ilitary journal, Razvedchik, w as founded  in  the mid-1880s. In 1896, a 
group of General Staff and Guards officers founded a m ilitary society, Obshchestvo revnitelei 
voennykh znanii, w hich grew so that by 1905 its m em bership was larger than  the Im perial Ge­
ographic Society.261 Towards the end of the 19th century, Russian m ilitary science flourished 
and m uch original research was conducted 262 It has been pointed out that only a very small 
group of General Staff officers -  a few thousand officers -  w ere engaged in  intellectual pu r­
suits, and  this m ay be true 263 The point here is that in  the 1860s and  early 1870s, the Russian 
War M inistry was aw are of the current changes in the m ilitary developm ent an d  took im m e­
diate m easures to come to term s w ith them  and in the sphere of intellectual im provem ent -  
an activity that is no t easily controlled through regulations and  orders -  the M inistry tried to 
act.
We have seen that m any of the burn ing  issues of foreign w ars were reported  by  the m ilitary 
attaches and observers and  discussed in the m ilitary press. The im pact of foreign w ars on the 
General Staff A cadem y and the w ar planning process have also been discussed. W hat influ­
ence d id  foreign w ars have on the secret w ar plans of the W ar M inistry? This is the question 
for the next chapter.
261- Fuller, Civil-Military: 34-35.
262, Menning, Bayonets: 130-136; Steinberg, The Education and Training': 151,172-190.
263' Fuller, Civil-Military: 35. The disunity of the entire Russian officer corps has been the subject of sev­
eral studies. See especially Stein, Der Offizer: 376-389. It will be noted that the my view of the intellectu­
al development of the Russian officer corps differs from that of Bushnell and Kenez. Bushnell, John. 
The Tsarist Officer Corps 1881-1914', American Historical Review 86 (3,1981): 753-80, Kenez, Peter. 'A 
Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps', California Slavic Studies 7 (1973): 150-158. They treat the 
period more immediately preceding the First World War, when the situation was very different from the 
1860s and 1870s. Even so, Professor Bushnell has based his conclusions largely on memoirs and fiction 
which no doubt reveals part of the truth, but in my view tends to be exaggerated in its focus on drunk­
enness and thievery, etc. Recently, Fuller has given a more balanced account. Fuller, Civil-Military: espe­
cially 15-46.
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5 Facing the Enemy - the Strategic 
Conference in 1873
5.1 Strategy and War Plans in Russia
From 1870 onw ards the Russian War M inistry was involved in  hectic activity that touched on 
every aspect of the arm y -  organizational, political and  strategic. It h ad  becom e increasingly 
clear to the Russian War M inistry and its M ain Staff that it was no t enough to  try  to catch up  
w ith the changes in contem porary warfare sim ply by  patching holes as they appeared. The 
War M inistry had  long been painfully aware of a grow ing d isparity  betw een the reform s in 
the Russian arm y and the changes needed to be able to keep u p  w ith  current m ilitary devel­
opm ents. In 1870, the War M inistry estim ated that G erm any and A ustria could each raise an 
arm y of more than one m illion m en.1 M iliutin touched on this problem  in his annual report to 
the Tsar in 1869 and  developed it further in 1870. In his 1 January  1870 report, he asked:
...is our army large enough - even in its full wartime strength - in view of the colossal 
armed forces, that are being created from the masses of armed people in every Europe­
an state and even in Turkey?...This question is so important and touches on so many 
state interests that it requires special consideration.2
In other words, the changes that confronted the Russian arm y in 1870 w ere sim ply too p ro ­
found to be solved by  the War M inistry alone. Priorities needed  to be m ade in  view  of the 
growing size of w artim e armies through universal m ilitary service and  the grow th of railw ay 
lines enabling swift concentration of troops.
1- Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA) F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. lOOv, 
102v, Tacts for the Evaluation of the Armed Forces of Russia'.
2- Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Otdel rukopisi, (hereafter RGB OR) F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, 
f. 75. 'Memoirs'. 1868-69. See also Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 godov v Rossii. (Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952): 257.
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In  1870, the War M inistry had  set to w ork  on the details of the p lanned  changes, and  tw o 
com m issions had  been created, both  un d er the chairm anship of the Chief of the M ain Staff, 
G eneral Fedor Logginovich H eyden.3 One com m ission w orked on the in troduction of un iver­
sal m ilitary service (as w e saw in C hapter 2) and the other w orked  on the fu ture organization 
of the arm ed forces.4 Both commissions had  com pleted their w ork  by early 1873.
This developm ent culm inated in  1873 in  a secret, strategic conference, chaired b y  A lexander 
II, w here the question of Russia's strategic position w as to be treated. It w as an  effort b y  the 
War Minister, D. A. M iliutin, to rally his m inisterial colleagues around the army, an d  to  gain 
broad  political support for the changes of the arm y that M iliutin knew  m ust be m ade. There 
w as fierce opposition at the conference both  to D. A. M iliutin personally  and  to  all the arm y 
reform s since 1862. As it tu rned  out, the attack d id  no t succeed. H ad the opposition  succeed­
ed  in rem oving M iliutin, it w ould  surely have called the p lans of introducing universal m ili­
tary  service into question. This underlines the im portance of the strategic conference for the 
developm ent of the Russian army. The agenda of the conference w as form ulated  around  the 
first Russian w ar p lan  of 1873.5 This p lan  was w ritten  in  the w ake of the Prussian victory over 
France in  1871 and was, in  fact, p roduced  as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War.
The w ork w ith  strategic w ar plans in the 1870s differed fundam entally  from  the previous 
Russian w ar plans. H itherto, this w ork had  been characterized by  reaction to curren t events 
and  m ostly contained lists of deploym ent of units and com m anders in war. In 1866, at the re­
quest of Foreign M inister A leksandr M ikhailovich Gorchakov,6 M iliutin sketched a few  sce­
narios for a possible developm ent along the W estern border. In the following year, M iliutin 
m ade some prelim inary calculations in the case of w ar w hich he presented to A lexander II.7 
In 1867, Russia feared A ustria-H ungary and  w as convinced that the dual-m onarchy w as pre­
paring for w ar against H *  Russia. Extremely w orrying w as a dispatch from  the m ilitary at­
tache in Vienna, F. F. Tomau. In  the report Tom au described a conversation w ith  an  A ustrian
3- Fedor Logginovich Heyden (1821-1900), General, Chief of the Main Staff 1866-1881, succeeded N. V. 
Adlerberg as Governor-General in Finland 1881. Voennaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 7:211.
4- The instructions for the Commissions were printed in Russkii invalid, 25 Dec. 1872, and in Obruchev, 
N. N., ed.Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik. 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1867-71); Vol. 4, Part 
2, Appendix 2: 232-235. There are also copies of the instructions in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 24, ed. khr. 36, ff.
30-32, and in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) F. 677, op. 1, d. 345, ff. 29- 
32. The deliberations of the Organizational Commission are kept in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 26, ed. khr. 13. 
For the journals of the meetings, see RGB OR, F. 169, k. 26, ed. khr. 1-3. The members of the Commission 
are listed in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 24, ed. khr. 38, ff. 1-2, 'The Creation of the Commissions'.
5‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 74-110,119-120,126-145. 'Considerations on the Defence of Rus­
sia'. 19 Jan. 1873. A copy of the plan and its appendices can also be found in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 37, ed. 
khr, 4,5, and 6.
6- Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, (1798-1883), Foreign Minister 1856-1882.
7 RGB OR, F. 169, k. 38, ed. khr. 32, 'Thoughts on a Change of the Demarcation Lines in Europe'. 1866.; 
RGB OR, F. 169, k. 37, ed. khr. 1, 'Preliminary Thoughts in the Case of War'. 9 Nov. 1867. See also Shneer- 
son, Lev Mikhailovich. Avstro-prusskaia voina 1866 g. i diplomatiia velikikh evropeiskikh derzhav. (Minsk: 
Ministerstvo vysshego, srednego spetsial'nogo i professional'nogo obrazovaniia SSSR, 1962): 156,212.
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general w ho was convinced that A ustria and Russia w ould  go to w ar against each other over
Q
the Eastern question. Every m ove by  the A ustrian arm y w as followed closely b y  Tom au in 
Vienna and the War M inistry in St. Petersburg.9 A t the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, 
the War M inister drew  up  some plans in case the w ar spread, and  A lexander II ordered the 
arm y to mobilize.10
Soon this kind of ad-hoc p lanning w ould be a thing of the past. In term s of strategic p lanning 
the Franco-Prussian War w as a w arning, later recognized b y  D. A. M iliutin.
The events in the Franco-Prussian War clearly demonstrated that we were not prepared 
[for war]. It was recognized that we needed a general defence plan for the western the­
atre of war...11
The M ain Staff was unprepared and, before a w ar plan  could be com pleted, a com m ission of 
General Staff, engineering, and artillery officers w as sent in 1871 to examine the W estern parts 
of Russia. The interest was, above all, directed tow ards the strategic defence line Vil'na, Ko- 
vno, Grodno, Belostok, Proskurov, and  the upper p art of the Dnestr.
M ilitary developm ents in Europe necessitated a w ar plan  that contained not only a thorough 
examination of the geographical/topographical conditions of the possible w ar theatres, b u t 
also an evaluation of the geopolitical situation and the strength of the arm ed forces from  a 
strategic perspective. The Prussians had  seemed to show that w ars w ere w on or lost very 
quickly. The railways had  m ade it possible to m ove large forces across long distances in a 
m uch shorter period than previously. In order not to be taken by surprise, it w as necessary to 
think and  plan  for future w ars before they began. Prussia had  realized this earlier than  had  
other European countries, and had  taken a lead in developing concise operational w ar 
plans.12 Strategic thought has been largely neglected by scholars treating the Russian arm y ,13 
yet it touches on m any issues related to the very existence of a state. A n analysis of Russian
8‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 76, ed. khr. 36, ff. 7-10. 'F. F. Tomau to D. A. Miliutin, 19 June/1 July 1867'. See also 
Miliutin's memoirs, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 1, ff. 118v-119.1867.
9' RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 1, f. 119. Tomau's reports from 1867 are located in RGVIA, F. 428, op. 1, 
d. 106. See also Narochnitskaia, L. I. Rossiia i otmena ndtralizatsii Chemogo moria 1856-1871 gg. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1989): 131,170.
10- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 37, ed. khr. 2. 'Preparatory Notes for the Report Submitted to His Majesty 9 Au­
gust 1870 in the Case of War'. The weekly reports on the progress of mobilization are found in RGVIA, 
F. 400, op. 2, d. 1472. 'War Preparations 22 Aug. 1870 -12 Mar. 1871'. See also Narochnitskaia, Rossiia i ot­
mena neitralizatsii: 171; Fuller, William C., Jr. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: Free 
Press, 1992): 277-278.
n - RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 158v. 'Memoirs'. 1870-71.
11 See, for instance, Bucholz, Arden. Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning. (New York: Berg Pub­
lishers, Inc., 1991): 39-41. See also Kennedy, Paul, ed. The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914. Reprint 
ofl979 ed. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985): 1-3 and, for more details on Moltke's plans, Rothenberg, 
Gunther. 'Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment', in Makers of Modern Strategy 
from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by P. Paret. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994): 296-311. In his 
memorandum in 1870, P. A. Valuev praised the Bavarian war plan of which he had managed to get a 
copy. He claimed that it had taken approximately three years to complete the plan. RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, 
op. 2, d. 99, f. 23v-24. 'A Non-Military Man's Thoughts on our Armed Forces'.
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strategic thinking in 1870-73 includes questions about foreign w ars in a  b roader context of 
foreign policy, finance, and  the arm y's links to civilian institutions.14
The Russian w ar planning process in a broad sense w as touched upon  in  C hap ter 4. This 
chapter will attem pt to illustrate the im pact of the w ars of 1859-71 on Russian strategic think­
ing and  to judge to w hat degree the lessons of these w ars w ere absorbed in the w ar p lan  of 
1873. This p lan  form ed the basis for the future Russian w ar plans of the next th irty  years. The 
first part of the chapter will deal mainly w ith developm ents from  1870 until 1873. The second 
p art w ill analyse the w ar plan  of 1873 and the results of the strategic conference.
5.2 Russia and Europe in 1870 - the View of the Army
One of the first -  if not the first -  strategic docum ents in R ussian w ar planning  that ap ­
proached the contem porary requirem ents was produced in the War M inistry in  1870. The 
docum ent, T acts for the Evaluation of the A rm ed Forces of Russia', consists of 204 pages, 
handw ritten  by  a clerk.15 The author is unknow n, bu t a qualified guess is that it w as w ritten  
by the Chief of the Military-Scientific Committee, N. N. Obruchev, during  the first half of 
1870, before or just at the outset of the Franco-Prussian War.16 It is a thorough sum m ary  of the 
m ilitary and political developm ent in Europe since the end of the C rim ean War. N o reference 
was m ade to the Am erican Civil War. The docum ent is d iv ided into five sections: (1) C ondi­
tions for the developm ent of our m ilitary system, (2) Changes in  European political condi­
tions, (3) Transform ation of the military systems in Europe, (4) General conclusions regarding 
the m ilitary system  and size of European forces, and (5) C om parison betw een the European 
and the Russian forces. The docum ent is w orth closer scrutiny since it clearly illustrates how
13‘ Notable exceptions are the recent studies by Fuller, Strategy and Power; Rich, David. 'The Tsar's Colo­
nels: Military Professionals and the Remaking of Russian Strategy, Foreign Policy, and Autocracy, 1840- 
1895'. Manuscript, 1997.
14‘ The strategic level of military activity has been defined as 'the employment of national armed forces 
to secure by force national goals defined by political leadership'. Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray, 
and Kenneth H Watman. 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations', in Military Effectiveness, Volume I: 
The First World War, edited by A. R. Millett and W. Murray. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988): 6-7. For a few 
interesting views on the definition of strategy or grand strategy, see Kennedy, Paul. 'Grand Strategy in 
War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, edited by P. Kennedy. 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991): 1-7; Murray, Williamson, and Mark Grimsley. 
'Introduction: On Strategy', in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, edited by W. Murray, M. 
Knox and A. Bernstein. Reprint of the 1994 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 1-23; 
Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Reprint of the 1986 ed. (Ox­
ford: Clarendon Press, 1994): 3-8.
15, RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. 30-133. The document is kept in one of the four files with material 
regarding the secret conference in February and March 1873 chaired by Alexander II. The other numbers 
of these files are F. 401, op. 2, d. 98,100, and 102.
16- Obruchev made a few corrections on the document and occasionally filled out gaps of information in 
the text. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, the Soviet historian who spent a large part of his life in the archives, 
guessed that Obruchev was the author. Zaionchkovskii only commented very briefly on the contents of 
this document. See Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 258,364.
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the Russian War M inistry perceived potential new  threats at the beginning of 1870 and  how  it 
was prepared to m eet them.
The first section is largely a description of the Russian m ilitary reform s un d er D. A. M iliutin. 
The m ain achievem ent of these reforms, according to the docum ent, w as to m ake faster m obi­
lization possible. The m obilization time h ad  been reduced from six to eight m onths to tw enty- 
eight days. In six to seven weeks after mobilization, it w as estim ated that the arm y w ould  be 
prepared to go into battle.17 These im provem ents w ere adequate for the international situa­
tion at the end of the 1850s bu t developm ents in Europe, both  m ilitarily and  politically, w ere 
rapid.
The m ain change in  European politics during  the last fifteen years w as the appearance of 
w hat the author called the 'national factor'.18 The au thor illustrated his po int b y  m aking a 
brief survey of each of the m ain European pow ers. France was the first European pow er to 
em bark on this road, strengthened by  the success in  the Crim ean War. The au th o r's  suspicion 
and d istrust of France's role in European politics w ere thinly veiled. H e noted  that, in  1859, 
France had  proclaim ed the freedom  and independence of Italy from  the A lps to  the Adriatic 
Sea. Furtherm ore, France had  played a dom inant role in m eddling in  the Polish crisis of 1863. 
A lthough the French involvem ent in  Poland had  resulted in a diplom atic defeat it h ad  boost­
ed the m orale of the Poles. A t the next opportunity, the Poles could confidently count on Eu­
ropean support. France had  also encouraged the non-Slavonic population  of the D anubian 
principalities to unite in a new  state, Romania.19
Britain had  also begun to support the national cause in  international politics. N o t only had  
she pushed  for the international recognition of Italy, she had  also show n su pport for the 
Greeks. With a touch of malicious delight, the author noted that this policy h ad  consequences 
for England in relation to Ireland:
England's relationship with Ireland is very much like our position as regards Poland.
England cannot relinquish Ireland without infringing on the unity of the State.20
Prussia w as perhaps the best example for dem onstrating the grow th of nationalism  in Euro­
pean politics. In the w ars of 1864 and  1866, Prussia had  acted in her ow n interest, although for 
a long time Prussia had  obscured her true goals by hiding behind 'com m on G erm an inter­
ests'. Prussian policy clearly show ed that Prussia completely recognized the principle of act-
01ing in the national interest, according to the docum ent.
17- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. 42-42v.
18- Ibid., f. 44.
19- Ibid., ff. 44v-48.
20- Ibid., ff. 48-50v.
2L Ibid., ff. 50v-53.
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A ustria had  also adopted the new  policy of 'nationalism ', however, no t as a m eans to 
strengthen the state, bu t only to support its shaking foundations. For ten years, she had  tried 
to stifle the natu ral ambitions of its peoples, and the cam paign of 1859 h ad  show n the 'artifi­
cial system ' of the A ustrian state.22 The year 1866 h ad  show n th a t a state w hich w as no t firm­
ly built on a single nationality w as constantly threatened by  destruction. A ustria had  been 
forced to tu rn  to H ungary and to create a new  state based on tw o nationalities, b u t the crucial 
question of the future of the H apsburg Empire rem ained unsolved. The au thor predicted  that 
if the questions of the M ilitary Border, Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalm atia, and  Galicia re­
m ained unsolved, the Austro-H ungarian m onarchy w ould  inevitably fall. The only solution 
w ould be to create a federation, where the rights of Bohemia, Poland w ere recognized.23
After a brief survey of Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and  Scandinavia, the au thor asked: 'C an  all 
of these things happen  w ithout influence on the position of Russia?' N ot surprisingly, he no t­
ed that neutrality  had  been the only possible policy for Russia after the C rim ean defeat, b u t in 
view of European developm ents, Russia needed to change. Russia w as forced to respond, 
since Europe had  begun to view Russia no longer as purely  a un itary  state:
Europe began to see Russia, not only as the powerful Russian people, full of life, receiv­
ing freedom, using a land organization (zemel'noe ustroistvo) unthinkable in the feudal 
West, rich both in economic and moral terms, but more importantly as a state with ra­
cial (plemennye) connections which extended far beyond the political borders, reaching 
to Elbe and the Adriatic, a leader for all Slav peoples, reflecting an influence not only on 
the future fate of Europe, but on the whole world.24
Alarming as this m ay sound, it in no  w ay prom pted the Russian War M inistry to think in  of­
fensive terms. Russia was depicted as a victim and growing nationalism  w as seen w ith  trepi­
dation. The factor of national interest in  European politics had  given Russia a few  new  friends 
but, above all, m ore enemies. N either France nor Prussia could be trusted  any longer. In other 
words, as far as the Russian strategic planners were concerned, an  alliance w ith  France in 
1870 -  a reality tw enty-tw o years later -  w as very remote.25
21 Ibid., ff. 53v-54.
^  Ibid., ff. 54-57. The Military Border system had evolved over centuries and was an area in the south­
ern parts of the Austrian Empire where, above all, Croats and Serbs served initially as a defence force
against Turkish invasion. For a succinct, albeit short introduction to this system, see Rothenberg, 
Gunther E. 'The Habsburg Military Border System: Some Reconsiderations', in War and Society in East 
Central Europe, edited by B. K. Kiraly and G. E. Rothenberg. (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979): 
361-392.
24 RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. 59v-60.
25‘ On the military agreements in the Franco-Russian alliance, see Airapetov, O. R. 'N. N. Obruchev. Za- 
bytaia kar'era "russkogo Mol'tke"'. Manuscript, 1996:142-146; Fuller, Strategy and Power: 350-362; Ken- 
nan, George F. The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984): 15-16 and esp. Chapters 9-11. Both Airapetov and Fuller think# 
more highly of Obruchev's strategic understanding than does Kennan. Kennan attached much signifi­
cance to the fact that Obruchev's wife was French and that Obruchev spent his vacations at the family 
chateau in France.
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Who, then, w as the potential enem y and w as the Russian arm y prepared  to fight? In answ er­
ing these questions, the m em orandum  described m ilitary developm ents in Europe over the 
last ten  years. If the single m ost im portant event in European political relations w as the grow ­
ing strength of nationalism , the equivalent on the m ilitary side w as the introduction  of 
'arm ed m asses'.26 The w ar of 1866 had  created a chain reaction in Europe. P russia h ad  m an­
aged to m obilize huge forces in fifteen to tw enty-tw o days. It h ad  only been possible to train  
and prepare such large forces only in a system based on a m ilitary-national (voenno-narodnyi) 
model. Several of the other European states -  even Turkey -  hurried  to  copy the Prussian ex­
ample. Three years had  no t yet passed and the w hole continent w as already covered w ith 
arm ed masses.
In Prussia, the m ilitary organization was based on universal m ilitary service, w hich w as ad ­
vantageous from  a financial point of view (that is, it w as com paratively cheap). In addition, 
the au thor stressed that the m ilitary system 'inculcated in  all the sections of the population  
the sense of the sacred du ty  to defend the fatherland '.27 The draw backs w ith  the Landwehr 
soldiers had  become obvious in 1848,1850, and 1859 w hen the Landwehr soldiers w ere both  
unwilling to serve and ill-disciplined. These faults were corrected by the reform  in 1860, a re­
form that aim ed to strengthen the arm y and  to reduce the role of the Landwehr. The w ars of 
1864 and 1866 justified the reform  in a convincing way. The au thor stressed th a t m ilitary ac­
tion in 1866 h ad  started so quickly because of the Prussian field army, w hich h ad  been able to 
enter Bohemia and  thus cover the m obilization of the Landwehr. The subsequent success of the 
field arm y had  boosted the m orale of the Landwehr.28 In other w ords, the au thor p ra ised  the 
fact that Prussia had  a trained reserve -  not an arm ed militia. M ilitia forces w ere d readed  not 
only by the Russian army. These forces were view ed as unreliable, useless in  battle, and  po­
tentially dangerous to the domestic order.
The French m ilitary system  -  until recently the guiding-star in  Europe -  w as no  longer held  in 
high regard in  Russia. The French m ilitary reforms in 1868 h ad  proposed to increase the an­
nual intake and  to create a trained reserve force, garde mobile, of 500,000 m en bu t, in  reality (as 
the m em orandum  pointed  out) not very m uch had  happened.29 In fact, the law  of 1868 in 
France w as never im plemented. It was only after the defeat against Germany, in 1872, that 
France in troduced a m ilitary system  based on universal m ilitary service.30 The only im prove-
26- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 60.
17' Ibid., f. 66. The phrase 'the sacred duty to defend the fatherland' was subsequently used by D. A. 
Miliutin later in 1870 when he drew up the plans for the reorganization of the Russian army. See his 
memorandum 'About the Basic Status of Individual Military Service', GARF. F. 677, op. 1, d. 345, f. 27. 
The phrase was also used in the first paragraph of the law 1 January 1874. Polnoe sobranie zakonov (PSZ) 
II: XLIX. 52983.
28- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 69.
29- Ibid., f. 81v.
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m erits of the 1868 law  were the reduction of num bers of long-serving m ercenary soldiers and  
the recruitm ent of larger num bers of young recruits. However, the num ber of tactical units 
an d  their cadres had  not changed. The author calculated that France w ould  be able to p u t
616,000 m en on a w ar footing, w hich w ould not be enough to defend the country. The mili­
tary  strength of the N orth  Germ an Federation and Baden, W iirttem berg and  Bavaria w as, ac­
cording to the calculations, 1,146,325 soldiers.31
In reality, these figures were alm ost correct for Germany, b u t overestim ated the French forces. 
In 1870, Germ any m obilized 1,183,000 m en in eighteen days, and  sent 462,000 to  the French 
frontier to start the campaign. To m eet this force, France (on paper) h ad  a 567,000-man arm y 
to mobilize bu t w as only able to m uster 200,000 men.32
The Russian War M inistry was as dismissive of the A ustrian m ilitary organization as of the 
French, b u t for different reasons. The defeats of 1859 and 1866 had  show n the need  for 
change, bu t the A ustrian attem pts at reform  were only half-hearted. The w riter no ted  that 
since the Landwehr was a national force, the organization of such forces w ere executed w ith 
m uch greater efficiency in  H ungary than in Austria. 'In  A ustria', he rem arked, 'the Landwehr 
remains a dead le tter'.33 The fact that A ustria w ould be able to raise an  arm y of one m illion 
m en in the case of w ar was not impressive since m ost of its troops w ould  'never be able to ac­
quire the unity  and patriotic spirit that is needed '. The A ustrian arm y could only count on pa ­
triotism  am ongst the German, H ungarian, Tyrolian and, to some extent, Polish troops. The 
rest of the army, in particular the troops in the M ilitary Border, contained an elem ent w hich 
could tu rn  easily into a hostile force against the A ustro-H ungarian governm ent. All in  all, the 
author calculated the num ber of pro-governm ental troops to be 300,000 m en in  an  arm y of
1,161,00a34
Leaving the accuracy of these estim ates aside, the assertion that the arm y of the dual-m onar- 
chy found it increasingly difficult to rely on the loyalty of the different ethnic un its seems to 
have been valid. In particular, this was true as regards the Czech or H ungarian  troops, and 
even of the Croats, traditionally used along the M ilitary Border.35
30- Challener, Richard D. The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939. (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1955): 10-45; Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 
1870-1871. Reprint of 1961 ed. (London: Routledge, 1991): 29-34.
31- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 76.
32- The German mobilization was not the very smooth process anticipated in the plans, but it was vastly 
superior to that of the French. Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 57-78. The use of railways in the German 
mobilization in 1870 is examined by van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to 
Patton. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977): 89-96.
33- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 97v.
341 Ibid., f. 102v. Unlike Tomau eleven years earlier, the author used the different names of the national­
ities (Poles, Slavs, Romanians, etc.), rather than the geographical areas, in the list.
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The au thor sum m ed up, saying that these changes h ad  led to  an increase in the w artim e 
strength  of armies in  Europe. It was the reserve forces that h ad  developed the m ost, bo th  w ith  
regard to num bers and service time. The principle th a t it w as the personal d u ty  of each citi­
zen to defend the country was recognized everywhere. H e also pointed out that the system s 
based on universal m ilitary service had  m anaged to com bine the interest of the state w ith  
those of the different classes of society. The fact that people from  all classes w ere recruited 
h ad  im proved the m orale of the armies and the 'conservative factor' had  increased in  im por­
tance in  these new  armies. This was due to the fact that the h igher classes -  and  educated  peo­
ple -  could become officers by serving as volunteers for a very short period. These volunteers 
w ould  then serve as officers in the reserve or Landwehr. This po in t is noteworthy. The War 
M inister, D. A. M iliutin, w as already convinced of the necessity of the reform  an d  hard ly  
needed  to be persuaded  of its virtues. The fact that this po in t is m ade in an  official docum ent 
in the War M inistry speaks volum es about how  controversial the issue of universal conscrip­
tion was.
In the face of this potentially m enacing situation -  the w hole of continental Europe filled w ith  
arm ed m asses -  the author pointed out that it was, above all, the defence capacity of the 
states that had  im proved considerably, w hereas the offensive pow er had  no t been  affected 
significantly. Offensives could only be carried out by  the regular armies (in contrast to the re­
serve and  the militia) and even then the armies could no t com m it all troops to offensive ac­
tion. France had  troops tied up  in  Algeria and Prussia -  in the case of w ar w ith  France -  had  
to secure its rear (Russia) and its flanks (Denmark and  Austria). In the case of w ar against 
Russia, Prussia w ould  have to secure its rear against France and  its flanks against Denm ark. 
A ustria, planning a w ar against Prussia, w ould have to com m it troops against a possible at­
tack from  Russia and Italy.36
W hat, then, were the consequences for Russia? It was no t likely that a single coun try  w ould  
em bark on an  offensive cam paign against Russia. Consequently, Russia had  to prepare  for an 
attack by a coalition of forces. This coalition was likely to consist of three different constella­
tions: (1) A ustria and Prussia (including the N orth  G erm an states), (2) A ustria, Prussia, Tur­
key and  Sweden, or (3) states m ostly interested in the Eastern question; that is, A ustria, 
Turkey, France, Italy, and England.
35 ■ Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1550 to 
2000. (London: Fontana Press, 1988): 279-280. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the First World War, all of 
the the different people of the Austro-Hungarian army were as enthusiastic and filled with patriotic 
feelings as other European armies. It was only as the war continued that desertions among the Slav 
units began. Stone, Norman. The Eastern Front 1914-1917. Reprint of the 1975 ed. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998): 122-127.
36- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, ff. 121-122.
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C om paring the size of the forces of each of these coalitions w ith  the Russian forces, the au thor 
p roduced  the following figures.37
TABLE 5 Strength of the Russian Army and European Armies in 1870
Battalions Squadrons Guns Number of 
men
1. Austria, 
Prussia
585 474 1986 695,000
Eur. Russia 536a 208 1368 585,000
2. Aust. Pr. 
Turk. Swe.
750 620 2546 875,000
Eur. Russia 
and Caucasus
654 224 1460 700,000
3. Aust. Turk, 
Fr. It. Eng.
602 460 1922 655,000
Eur. Russia 
and Caucasus
654 224 1460 700,000
a. Includes both field and garri­
son battalions.
Judging from these figures alone, it m ight seem that the third scenario w ould  be the best for 
Russia. However, the author feared this scenario the most. W ithout spelling it out, he clearly 
had  the lessons of the Crim ean War in m ind, where the Russian arm y had  been forced to tie 
up  forces for the defence of St. Petersburg that were needed in the Crimea. The au thor noted  
that, in the third scenario, the participation of tw o m ajor naval pow ers w ould  force the Rus­
sian arm y to split and m ake concentration difficult. Consequently, Russia w ould  actually be 
weaker at the decisive po int of the battle than the enemy.38
The best w ay ou t of this situation w ould  have been to attack, bu t the Russian arm y w as hard ­
ly in any position to do so. W ith regard to the new  armies in Europe, there w ere no longer just 
regular forces on the other side of the border b u t hundreds of thousand of troops, partly  field 
troops, partly  local, as well as masses of Landwehr or militia. It w ould  no t be difficult to defeat 
these secondary forces, according to the m em orandum , bu t it required a concentration of 
forces a t the very beginning of the offensive to deal a successful first blow  against the enemy. 
This w as estim ated to require 600,000 troops, a num ber Russia w ould  hard ly  be able to m us­
ter in an attack since "we have to leave a part of the troops to secure the borders of the state'. 
Thus, an  offensive cam paign w ould  only succeed under 'very favourable political conditions 
for us'. H aving com pared the num ber of forces in the different scenarios, the m em orandum
37- Ibid., ff. 127-128v, 131v-132.
38- Ibid., ff. 127-128v, 132-132v.
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reached the conclusion that the Russian arm y was hard ly  prepared  to defend the country ef­
fectively and  was even less capable of m ounting an  offensive cam paign.39
Thus, the Russian strategic analysis in 1870, in  practice, excluded any offensive action and  
w as very pessimistic about Russia's chances to resist an  attack by coalition forces. The un d er­
lying assum ption was that an  offensive could only succeed if Russia had  a coalition partner 
or at least a friend w ho w ould  refrain from attack. In 1870, the friend w as undoubted ly  Prus­
sia. A t the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, M iliutin described both  A ustria-H ungary 
and  England as 'unreliable'.40 Conspicuously absent in  the strategic analysis is any evalua­
tion about w hich scenario w as the m ost likely. The Russian arm y w as sim ply preparing  for 
everything. Within only three years this had  changed.
In view  of the lessons from the Crim ean War and  -  added  to this -  recent m ilitary develop­
m ents in  Europe, the conclusions in the analysis are hard ly  surprising. The view  of Russia as 
a victim  of circumstances m ay seem exaggerated b u t it contains a grain of truth. The gap  be­
tw een the Russian arm y and, at least, the Prussian arm y w as w idening, no t only in  num bers 
b u t also in  m odem  w eaponry and  the construction of railw ay networks. However, it w as not 
in  m ilitary technology that the m ost significant change lay. Universal conscription encom ­
passed the idea of the citizen-soldier, the patriotic, educated m an w ith close ties to the arm y 
un it and  to the fatherland. N ationalism  was growing in strength in  Europe as G erm any and 
Italy w ere unified. A t the same time, the distinction betw een the m ilitary and  the civilian life 
of the nations became less apparent.41 War correspondents reported  from  the w ar using  the 
telegraph to send their reports. Soldiers on leave could travel hom e and  back, and  the 
w ounded  could be treated at home. The w ar effort increasingly becam e the concern of the en­
tire nation. These aspects w ere no t lost on the Russian War Ministry.
5.3 Lessons from Prussia and America
5.3.1 Militia Contra Reserve - the American Connection
The m ost acute problem  for the Russian arm y in 1870 w as the lack of a trained reserve force. 
The reserve forces had  greatly increased in Europe, as the au thor of 'Facts' h ad  poin ted  out, 
and  Russia w as lagging behind. Still, during M iliutin 's time as War Minister, the trained  re­
serve had  increased from approxim ately 200,000 in 1862 to 500,000 in 1869.42
39- Ibid., f. 133.
4a RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 31.
41- Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 3; Howard, Michael. War in European History. (Oxford: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1976): 98.
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In 1870, M iliutin subm itted the first provisions in preparing  for the in troduction of universal 
m ilitary service. They consist of tw o documents: 'A bout the D evelopm ent of ou r A rm ed Forc­
es' and  'A bout the M ain Foundations of Individual M ilitary Service./43The form er outlined a 
proposal for a new  organization of the Russian arm y -  above all the creation of a substantial 
reserve force. M iliutin dem anded tw o things: (1) that a reserve force of at least 600,000 m en be 
created, and  (2) that this force be deployed in the European parts  of Russia, w here the threat 
w as perceived to be the greatest.44
The docum ent, 'A bout the D evelopm ent', is notew orthy because it w as one of the few official 
docum ents by D. A. M iliutin in which clear reference to the A m erican Civil W ar w as m ade. It 
w as the use of m ilitia forces in the U nion arm y that had  caught his attention.
In m aking his case for the form ation of the reserve, M iliutin argued against m ilitia forces 
(opolchenie). The m ilitia could in no w ay replace a trained reserve force. The m ain  task of a 
trained reserve w as to support the active field arm y and  to relieve it from  taking p art in sec­
ondary  m ilitary operations, that is, in areas aw ay from the m ain  theatre of war. These opera­
tions could still involve conflicts w ith  enem y forces but, according to M iliutin, the reserves 
d id  no t have to be equal to the active arm y in tactical knowledge. However, in  discipline, en ­
durance, and  fighting morale, the reserve force needed to be as good as the active army, 
w hich required a fair am ount of training. A militia did no t have enough train ing  to  be useful 
in battle. 45 To illustrate his point, he used the Am erican Civil War. In the beginning of that 
war, w hen the U nion arm y largely consisted of a militia force, w ith  only a few m onths of 
training, the arm y had  suffered constant defeats:
Only when the government had replaced the militia with volunteers, recruited for three 
to five years, did the discipline of the army grow stronger, a real military spirit was cre­
ated and, with it - victory.
The A m erican Civil War d id  not persuade M iliutin of the need to create a trained reserve. As 
we have seen, he w as already convinced of this. Rather, he used  the A m erican Civil War to ar­
gue his case in the political debate on universal conscription. The Civil War h ad  dem onstrat­
ed  (1) that it w as possible to  train civilians to become good soldiers in  a fairly short period, 
and  (2) that a reserve force required people w ho had  gone through proper m ilitary  training. 
H e later rem em bered the initial chaos of the Civil War. The battle of Bull Rim clearly show ed 
how  inefficient a m ilitia force could be if it lacked both training and  discipline. H e noted  how
42- Obruchev, Voenno-statisticheskii sbomik: Vol. 4, Part 2:76; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 79; Skalon, 
D.A., ed. Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902.13 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1902-1914): Vol. 1,485-86, Ap­
pendix 11: 80.
43- GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 345. 'Documents by War Minister D. Miliutin'. 9 December 1870.
44 Ibid., ff. 6 ,7v, 17v.
45- Ibid., f. 6v.
46- Ibid., f. 7.
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panic in the Union arm y had  lead to desertions and to the the dissolution of entire units. It 
w as good fortune that the Confederate arm y had  not exploited this.47
M iliutin had  discussed different ways of changing the recruitm ent system  in  R ussia w ith  his 
uncle, R D. Kiselev.48 As early as 1865, Kiselev noted in his d iary  that it w as w ell w orth  stu d ­
y ing the use of volunteers in  the Civil War. Kiselev felt that a standing arm y of 300,000 m en 
w ould  be sufficient w ith a reserve force similar to the one used  in the U nited States. Such a re­
cruitm ent system  w ould  be beneficial to the Russian finances and  'w ithou t any danger for her 
defence'.49 Kiselev was also an adm irer of the Swiss volunteer system, som ething th a t M iliu­
tin  w as no t so enthusiastic about. M iliutin w as careful to m ake a distinction betw een a m ilitia 
and  a reserve force.50 Even if he had  been a supporter of K iselev's ideas, he w as careful n o t to 
say so. The issue of universal conscription w as controversial enough, and  M iliutin  preferred 
to tread lightly and  not argue outright for the creation of a  large militia.51 The A m erican Civil 
War provided  him  w ith argum ents to show that universally conscripted civilians could be 
trained to become good soldiers.
5.3.2 Military Expenses - the German Connection
Finance w as a m ajor obstacle to the efforts to reinforce the Russian army. A ccording to M iliu­
tin, the outcom e of the Franco-Prussian War h ad  m ade people realize that it w as necessary to 
look beyond m oney w hen it came to the reforms of the arm ed forces 52 This seem s exaggerat­
ed, considering the constant battle betw een the War and  Finance M inisters. M ikhail Khristo- 
fovich R eutem  w as a form idable adversary, no t open to any argum ents that w o u ld  involve an 
increased m ilitary budget.53
However, after 1870 Prussia's prestige and power, w on by  three stunning victories, w as indis­
putable and  the Russian War M inistry used the opportunity  to the m axim um . A t the en d  of
47, Miliutin ignored the fact that the Confederate Army at this time was a militia force as well. RGB OR, 
F. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 1, f. 56v. 'Memoirs'. 1861. The Battle of Bull Run was fought on 21 July 1861 (N. S.), 
and General Irvin McDowell's Union army fled in panic when enveloped by the Confederate force. The 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis's decision not to authorize pursuit was much criticized subse­
quently. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A  Military History of the Civil War. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983): 44-49.
48- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, f. 74; Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, A. P. Graf P. D. Kiselev i ego vremia. 4 
vols. (St. Petersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1882): Vol. 3:411-412.
49- Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Graf P. D. Kiselev: Vol. 3: 370-371.
50- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, f. 74v.
51 • In his memoirs, he would later admit that he 'had to act very carefully in order to gradually achieve 
a better balance between the peace time staff of the army and the full wartime army. It was out of the 
question to go directly to a militia system'. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, ff. 76-76v.
5Z RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 49.
53- Mikhail Khristofovich Reutem (1820-90) was Finance Minister between 1862 and 1878. Russkii bi- 
ograficheskii slovar' (hereafter RBS): Vol. 16: 5-22. Several of his reports to Alexander II were published in 
Reutern, Michael von. Die finanzielle Sanierung Rufilands nach der Katastrophe des Krimkrieges 1862 bis 1878 
durch den Finanzminister Michael von Reutem. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1914).
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1871, N. N. Obruchev com pleted a com parison betw een the m ilitary budgets of G erm any and 
Russia.54 The purpose of the docum ent was to explain and defend the level of Russian m ili­
tary  expenditure in com parison to Germany. It w as p rin ted  and  distributed to m inisters and 
m em bers of the State Council.55 The tone was slightly alarm ist w ith  a few exaggerations and 
contradictions. For instance, Obruchev initially gave a very bleak picture of Russia and her 
arm ed forces in order to explain the high Russian m ilitary b udget yet, a little later, he stated 
confidently that "the Russian arm y is in  no respect inferior to  foreign arm ies7.56 Nevertheless, 
the docum ent offers a valuable insight into the War M inistry 's thinking on the arm ed forces 
in  relation to politics, and it clearly shows w hat im pression the Prussian w ars h ad  m ade on 
the arm y leadership or, at least, how  the example of G erm any w as used  in the debate. 
O bruchev used a num ber of Prussian publications regarding the Prussian army. There is even 
a rare acknowledgem ent of the w ork of the m ilitary attache, K. G. Doppelm aier, w ho had  
supplied  the Germ an m ilitary budget and explained certain of its de ta ils .57 The docum ent 
provoked an angry response from the Finance Minister, w ho accused the W ar M inistry of m a­
n ipulating  the figures.58 The details of the financial argum ent do no t prim arily  concern us 
here, b u t rather O bruchev's views on Russia, politics, and  m ilitary affairs.
H ow  could the large Russian m ilitary budget -  approxim ately th irty  p er cent of the state 
b udget -  be explained? In absolute figures, Russia spent m ore on its arm y than  any  other 
country, for instance, fifty-five per cent more than Germany, and  tw enty-nine per cent m ore 
than  France.59 According to Obruchev, such a com parison of figures w as no t accurate since 
there w ere m any differences betw een Russia and other countries. H e tu rned  to G erm any to il­
lustrate his point. Russia w as a m uch larger country than Germany. For instance, the Europe­
an part of Russia alone w as ten  times larger than the entire G erm an territory. The clim ate w as 
harsher in  Russia and the average tem perature of Bremen (+10 degrees centigrade) could 
only be com pared w ith O dessa and  A strakhan'. Russia had  a population  of eighty-tw o m il­
54' RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, ff. 26-110. 'Comparative Table of the Military Expenses of North 
Germany According to the Estimated Budget of 1870 and of Russia According to the Actual Expenses of 
1869' with an Explanatory Statement'. These document can also be found in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 28, ed. 
khr. 8. Airapetov relied on Miliutin's memoirs for an account of the contents of these documents. 'Za- 
bytaia kar’era': 67-68. See also Askew, William C. 'Russian Military Strength on the Eve of the Franco- 
Prussian War', The Slavonic and East European Review 30 (1951): 185-205 which contains an abridged 
translation of the Explanatory Statement. Eugene Schuyler, the United States charge d'affaires in St. Pe­
tersburg, had managed to secure a copy of the document and sent it translated to the Secretary of State, 
Hamilton Fish, on 6 March 1872.
55- It seems clear that at least some of the military attaches read the 'Comparison'. Tomau returned a 
copy to the member of the State Council Sergei Grigorievich Stroganov 22 December 1871. RGVIA, F. 
401, op. 5, d. 615, f. 18.
56- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, f. 29
57- Ibid., ff. 44,45v, 46v.
58‘ There is a summary of the Finance Minister's response in Beyrau, Militar und Gesellschaft: 300-304. 
For more details on 'the war of pamphlets' between the War Ministry and the Finance Ministry, see also 
Fuller,Strategy and Power: 300-303.
59- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, f. 26v.
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lion, Germ any had  forty million.60 Furtherm ore, he stressed the lack of railw ay netw orks in 
Russia as com pared to Germany. The inhabitants of popu lated  areas w ere financially poor 
and  very few tow ns in Russia could be com pared w ith  foreign towns:
...the rest look like villages that periodically bum  down due to frequent fires. In the re­
mote areas of the State, it is still possible to encounter large parts of the population 
without proper lodgings, being content with dens, huts, yurts, cabins, etc.
O bruchev was no t alone in referring to geographical and climatological factors as aggravat­
ing for Russia and its arm y in the efforts to m odernize. M iliutin pointed  to these factors w hen 
he discussed the possibility of introducing a militia or volunteer system  in Russia. The vast­
ness of Russia, the long distances, and the climate, according to M iliutin, m ade it im possible 
for Russia to copy a volunteer system  like that of Sw itzerland.62 In 1870, again, it w as the ge­
ographical situation, the long borders, and the unprotected coastlines that m ade it im perative 
for Russia to increase the size of the w artim e army.63 From  this, it becomes ev iden t that Rus­
sian geographical exceptionalism was used by  the arm y w hen it w as opportune to  do so in 
the dom estic political debate, w hether to defend a large budget or argue for different reforms. 
Im portantly, neither Obruchev nor M iliutin believed that Russia w as so exceptional in geo­
graphical or other term s that universal m ilitary service could no t be introduced. Rather, it 
w as a foreigner w ho seized on Russian Exceptionalism '. W hen the G erm an W ar M inister, Al­
brecht von Roon, m et M iliutin in  1872, he told M iliutin that he d id  no t understand  w hy  Rus­
sia w ould  w ant to introduce universal conscription since it d id  no t correspond to  Russia, 
neither the State order no r the level of civilization.64
O bruchev w as aw are of the need to develop the industrial potential of Russia, particularly  
p roduction  of coal and iron as well as mechanical and  chemical industry. He claim ed th a t the 
industrial level always stood in relation to the people's needs. W ith a tone of bitterness, he 
added  that the Russian people had  begun to acquire the necessities of life only in  the p ast ten 
years, w hereas until the em ancipation of the serfs, the people had  lived in slavery. In educa­
tion, Russia suffered from total 'backw ardness' (otstalost'). The low  level of general education 
m ade it difficult even to recruit sufficient num bers of com petent adm inistrators to  govern­
m ental service. The degree of literacy am ong the population w as stated to be one or tw o per 
cent.65
60- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, ff. 27-27v.
6L Ibid., f. 27v.
62‘ RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, f. 74v. Quote from the yearly report from the War Ministry 1 Jan. 
1868.
63- GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 345, f. 3v.
64 RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 59-59v. 'Memoirs'. 1872-1873.
65- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, ff. 27-27v. This figure probably refers to the entire population. The 
literacy rate among new recruits was considerably higher. See Chapter 2.
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Furtherm ore, Obruchev argued that since the tasks of the State w ere m ore extensive and  diffi­
cult in Russia than in Germany, the tasks of the arm y w ere even m ore com plicated. He noted  
that the maintenance of the arm y was closely linked to the highest interests of the State. The 
m ilitary expenditure of every state depended on the general political situation and  on the 
conditions in w hich the arm y existed:
... The first; that is, the political situation determines the number and the purpose of the 
troops; the second; that is, the conditions of the troops, more or less determine the cost 
of their maintenance. The War Ministry has only a limited influence on the latter point 
and even less on the former, which in turn is immediately subordinate to the territorial 
expansion of the country, the power of its neighbours, and the political role marked out 
for it by history. Therefore, all that can be reasonably asked of the War Ministry is that 
the cost of the army should correspond to the surrounding circumstances.66
It w as in relation to this (that is, the political sphere), that Prussia provided an  exam ple to  fol­
low. In 1867, the N orth  Germ an Confederation had  been created and  the Parliam ent had  im ­
m ediately passed a law  providing funds for m aintaining an arm y equal to one per cent of the 
population. This so-called 'iron law ' autom atically provided an  annual g rant of 225 thalers 
per man. This, according to Obruchev, show ed that Prussia h ad  realized that there w as a rela­
tionship betw een the cost of the maintenance of the troops and  the general strength  of the ar­
my. The m ilitary budget was discussed and  criticized in  the parliam ent, b u t 'a ll occasions for 
unfounded, unreasonable com plaints of the size of the m ilitary b u dget' had  been rem oved. In 
Russia, O bruchev felt, there w as still m uch resistance to m ilitary expenditure.
This view  of the situation in  Prussia is only partly  correct. It is true that the parliam ent of the 
N orth  Germ an Confederation had  passed the 'iron law ' that provided  funds for the army, b u t 
w hether this was actually a result of m ore knowledgeable G erm an politicians can be d ispu t­
ed. For one thing, the decision w as taken in the wake of the P russian  victory over A ustria, 
w hen Prussia had  established itself as the leader of Germ an unification. Furtherm ore, the mil­
itary laws passed by the N orth  Germ an Confederation had  been im plem ented in Prussia as a 
p art of the military reform s betw een 1859 and 1864 b u t the Prussian Cham ber took no  p art in 
these decisions.67 The Prussian governm ent u nder Bismarck had  sim ply circum vented the 
Chamber, w hich had  refused to approve any military funds in the constitutional conflict du r­
ing the first half of the 1860s - facts conveniently not m entioned by Obruchev. The im portant 
point, however, is that a Russian General Staff officer had  seen the connection betw een the 
arm y and the political system  -  and  argued that Russia had  som ething to learn from  Germ a­
ny  in  this respect.
66- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, ff. 28-28.
67‘ Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964): 
164-66,174-179,220.
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O bruchev em phasized the need to keep a small standing arm y in peacetim e in order to in­
crease the reserve and  expand the arm y in times of war. The peacetim e arm y served tw o p u r­
poses, he noted: (1) to m aintain order in the interior, and (2) to serve as cadres for the troops 
to be m obilized in  wartim e. Russia's standing arm y in peacetim e w as twice as large as the 
G erm an army. But Germ any could expand its arm y three times in war, w hile Russia could 
only expand the arm y one and  a half times.
In view of the latest developm ents in  Europe and in the art of war, O bruchev argued  that no 
m ore cuts in the Russian m ilitary budget could be made. After all, the arm y had  cut its nu m ­
bers substantially during  the last tw enty years. In 1850, the arm y consisted of tw o per cent of 
the population and, in 1870, it w as less than one per cent. Thus, there w ere no  'superfluous 
m en ' in the Russian army:
The army is a political instrument, but also a technical one requiring constant improve­
ments. If the existence of a state requires the existence of such an instrument, this in­
strument should be equal to those of other countries, and always ready to enter into 
conflict with them.68
To ignore these principles w ould  lead to fatal consequences. The violation of these principles 
accounted for the defeat of A ustria at Koniggratz and  the defeat of France M etz and  Sedan. 
Prussia w on these w ars because its governm ent saw  the arm y n o t as a b u rd en  w eighing on 
the economic interests of the country, b u t as a force which guaranteed the very existence of 
the State.
So, if P. A. Valuev in his m em orandum  had  argued for the im portance of m oving the people 
closer to the army, O bruchev w anted to m ove the ministers and  politicians closer to the army. 
Both argued for a closer integration of m ilitary and civilian life. The days of a large standing 
arm y were num bered  and  a trained reserve force was needed. Peacetime preparations for re­
cruitm ent and  mobilization slowly became concerns of civilian life not, as before, restricted to 
the arm y exclusively. Large armies required weapons, uniform s, and supplies on a h itherto  
unprecedented scale. Com m unications -  above all enlarged railw ay netw orks -  needed  to be 
im proved. The general level of education needed to be im proved. G erm any w as seen as an  
example to follow in all of these areas.
C onventional history has it that the Im perial Russian arm y officer lacked political un d er­
standing.69 This view  needs modification. O bruchev's m em orandum , w hich w as supported  
by  M iliutin, clearly show s considerable political insight. In a tim e of grow ing nationalism  and  
industrialization, political unity  had  become a prerequisite for survival. In  term s of nationali­
ty, it was clear that the G reat Russians were seen as the dom inating people. M iliutin in  the of­
68- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 98, f. 43
69- Ray, Oliver Allen. 'The Imperial Russian Army Officer', Political Science Quarterly 76 (4,1961): 592.
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ficial m em orandum  'A bout the D evelopm ent' expressed doubts about the reliability of the 
population  in the border areas in the case of an invasion.70 The grow ing strength  of national­
ism  posed a challenge to the existence of the m ulti-national Russian Empire. The Russian War 
M inistry w as no t unaw are of this -  on the contrary M iliutin and Obruchev felt that the arm y 
had  an im portant role to play in  unifying the Empire since the arm y w as som ething that both 
the political centre of the autocracy and larger parts of the, universally conscripted, popu la­
tion could rally round. A t the same time, they saw the arm y as being im portan t in the efforts 
to m odernize the Empire. These views were no t shared by  everyone in  the political life of St. 
Petersburg, bu t it is indicative that am ong these were the m ost influential officers of the Rus­
sian army.
5.4 Stand Firmly in the West - the War Plan of 1873
The w ork on a strategic survey of Russia began in 1872. The m ilitary districts w ere instructed  
to provide the War M inistry w ith  surveys of the possible theatres of w ar in their districts.71 
The m ilitary attaches w ere also involved in providing estim ated size and  m obilization tim e 
for the foreign armies.72 This m aterial was then com piled in tw o strategic surveys, one of the 
European frontier districts and the other of the Caucasus. O bruchev w as responsible for the 
former, G rand Duke M ikhail Nikolaevich for the latter.
O bruchev's plan, 'Considerations on the Defence of Russia', was, no  doubt, the m ore signifi­
cant docum ent.73 In effect, it was the first Russian w ar p lan  that laid the basis for all of the 
w ar plans to 1909.74 True enough, it does no t contain all the details for m obilization an d  de­
ploym ent as d id  the p lan  of 1880 and subsequent plans,75 bu t the strategic concept outlined 
in  1873 rem ained the same. The p lan  was presented and  discussed at the strategic conference 
in 1873, the debates of w hich w e shall return to later.
The p lan  and the strategic conference are of such im portance in the history of the Russian 
arm y that it m ay seem odd  that they have only received attention from  a sm all num ber of
70‘ GARF, F. 677, op. 1, d. 345, f. 3v. In 1859, Major-General P. K. Men'kov had noted that 'our Fatherland 
may be vast - but the ruling element is one'. RGVIA, F. VUA, d. 18068, f. 190. 'Thoughts on the Organi- 
zatization of the Military System in Russia'. 3 May 1859. This document by Men'kov was written as a 
commentary to Miliutin's memorandum of 1856.
7L RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 158v, and F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 85-85v.
72- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 615, ff. 12-17.
73- P. A. Zaionchkovskii summarized Obruchev's plan in his Voennye reformy: 280-288. Although it is an 
extensive summary it contains a few important omissions. My interpretation of the plan differs some­
what from that of Professor Zaionchkovskii.
74- Zaionchkovskii, A. M. Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine v mezhdunarodnom otnoshenii. (Leningrad: Gos- 
voenizdat, 1926): 29-30,340.
75- Fuller, Strategy and Power: 341; Rich, 'The Tsar's Colonels': Chapter 4.
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scholars. The conference w as the first attem pt to get b road political support for a strategic 
program m e of the Russian army. Fundam ental questions about the Russian arm ed forces 
w ere raised. The m aterial from  the conference that has survived in  the archives consists of ap ­
proxim ately 1,200 pages of docum ents for discussion, personal statem ents from  participants, 
the final resolution, and a num ber of additional papers concerning the im plem entation of the 
decisions. If detailed m inutes of the day-to-day deliberations w ere taken they are now here to 
be found. However, the different m em oranda from the participants, and  the diaries of M iliu­
tin an d  G rand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich give a good, although not com plete, p icture of 
w ha t w ent on during  the meetings. The conference convened five times in the W inter Palace 
u n d er the chairm anship of A lexander II betw een 28 February and  31 March. The seniority of 
the participants, including five grand dukes, the tw o field m arshals, and  a num ber of senior 
m inisters, and the fact that the conference was chaired by the Tsar indicate that the issues dis­
cussed were of overriding importance.
The only historian, until recently, w ho m ade the connection betw een the Franco-Prussian War 
and the conference in 1873 was A. M. Zaionchkovskii, in  1926. P. A. Zaionchkovskii analysed 
the conference m ore from  a domestic-political than from  a strategic perspective. Recently 
O bruchev 's plan  has received attention from tw o Am erican historians, b u t for various rea­
sons they were no t able to consult the original docum ent, and relied exclusively on P. A. Za- 
ionchkovskii's sum m ary.76 O ur focus is the influence of the foreign w ars on Russian strategic 
thinking. The p lan  illustrates how  the wars, the European conflicts as well as the A m erican 
Civil War, had  an im pact on the Russian strategic thinking. A nother po in t -  perhaps obvious 
-  is th a t the very fact that the docum ent was w ritten is, in itself, indicative of a p rom pt reac­
tion to foreign m ilitary developm ents. Strategic plans of this significance, w hich clearly iden­
tified a threat and laid dow n a long-term  com m itm ent for the army, had  no t been m ade 
before. The first effort was the 'Facts for the Evaluation of the A rm ed Forces of Russia', b u t it 
w as only in 1873 that the strategic evaluation of Russia had  grow n into a m ore com prehen­
sive plan.
O bruchev's plan w as defensive in thought and action. It was a defence based on three pillars: 
m ass of men, railways, and fortresses -  all in the Western parts of Russia. O bruchev dem and­
ed four things: (1) a program m e for building strategic railw ay lines, (2) an  increased num ber 
of infantry battalions, (3) the relocation of the cavalry to the W estern frontier, and  (4) a p ro ­
gram m e for upgrading  the fortresses.
76- Fuller, Strategy and Power, 295-300; Rich, 'The Tsar's Colonels': Chapter 4. See also, Menning, Bruce W. 
Bayonets before Bullets. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992): 19-20, and Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 
'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk', in Miliutin, D. A. Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 4 vols. (Moscow: Gos- 
udarstvennaia ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina. Otdel rukopisei., 1947-50), Vol. 1:40- 
43.
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The basic thought in  O bruchev's plan was that Russia had  to  prepare for a w ar against a coa­
lition, since the reasons for w ar were not likely to  be personal quarrels am ong the European 
sovereigns, bu t w ould  be based on significant political differences:
In preserving peace, all prepare for war. ...The art of diplomacy can provide us with al­
lies and equalize our chances in a fight with the enemy. Strategic considerations cannot 
venture into the diplomatic domain, but must consider the defence system of the State 
from the situation where we have to - not attack - but defend ourselves, which means 
[preparations! for a war with a first-rate opponent.77
The transition from peace to w ar had  become instantaneous and  four questions needed  ur- 
gent answers: (1) #as the current arm y large enough in relation to the arm ies of neighbouring 
countries; (2) how  quickly could the Russian arm y mobilize; (3) how  quickly could it concen­
trate; and (4) were the frontier areas properly prepared to m eet the enemy?
In the case of a w ar in Europe, the Russian arm y could no t use all of its forces. O bruchev not­
ed  that the arm y in the Caucasus could not be used, nor could the troops in O renburg, Turke­
stan and  Siberia.78 These troops am ounted to a total of 226,400 soldiers. G eneral Sherm an, 
hero of the Am erican Civil War, w ho visited Russia in M ay 1872, rem arked w ith  regard  to the 
troops in  Caucasus '...in the case of a European war, she could no t w ithdraw  these forces, as 
the natives w ould surely rise.'79 Sherman d id  no t know  how  right he was. For a w ar in  Eu­
rope, the Russian arm y could raise (including the Don Cossacks) 1,000,000 soldiers com pared 
to G erm any's 1,270,000, A ustria's 1,020,000, and Turkey's 230,OOO.80 This w ould  p u t Russia in 
an aw kw ard position, not only in the case of a coalition force, b u t also in relation to  G erm any 
alone.
'M obilization - as it is conducted today - is a completely new  thing to u s ', O bruchev contin­
ued, acutely aw are of the fact that the use of railways had  fundam entally  changed m obiliza­
tion. M odem  mobilization w as characterized by large num bers of troops being m sh ed  long 
distances in a short time. In 1870, Germ any had  transported 462,000 m en over nine railw ay 
lines in merely tw o weeks.81 This compares w ith the Russian arm y's attem pt to m obilize in  
1859 against Austria, a process p lanned to take three m onths, b u t w hich had  taken  five 
m onths to com plete or, for that matter, w ith the failed attem pts by Prussia to  come to the res­
cue of A ustria in 1859.82 It will be remem bered that France had  m ade a successful use of rail­
ways in 1859.
77' RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 74. Zaionchkovskii's summary only contained the first sentence 
of the paragraph quoted here. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 280.
78‘ In the First World War, the Siberian Corps and also units from Turkestan and Orenburg were impor­
tant reserves on the Eastern Front. Stone, Eastern Front: 104,112,118,142,257.
79' Saul, Norman E. Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867-1914. (Lawrence, Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 1996): 74.
80- The number of the Turkish army does not include opolchenie. RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 76.
81- Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 60; van Creveld, Supplying War: 90.
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O bruchev observed that it was the w ar of 1859 that had  first highlighted the im portance of 
railw ays.83 The French arm y needed less than three weeks from the A ustrian  ultim atum  to 
deploy behind  the Alps. Furtherm ore, the latest w ars of 1866 and  1870 w ere even m ore con­
vincing since they dem onstrated how  the battle readiness of contem porary arm ies w as no t 
m easured  in m onths or even weeks bu t in days and hours.
For the Russian army, this m eant that it m ust try  to achieve the sam e battle readiness as the 
rest of Europe 'regardless of territorial or economic obstacles' -  as O bruchev p u t it. As the 
m ain  obstacle to achieve this he m entioned Russia's poor economic situation, following the 
cost of rearm am ent and  the m oney spent on im proving the depots of the army. These depots 
had  been exhausted in  the Crim ean War. Nevertheless, substantial progress h ad  been m ade 
and  the tim e needed to bring the troops of the different districts to fighting-strength had  
d ropped  from  betw een 25 and 50 days in 1867 to betw een 8 and  32 days in  1872.84 This 
achievem ent w as ascribed to new  railway lines and the electric telegraph. The Achilles h e t l  of 
an even faster m obilization was the provision of horses. In the St. Petersburg M ilitary District, 
it w ou ld  take 35 days to gather the horses required. In the W arsaw M ilitary District, the m obi­
lization of horses w as estim ated at 60 days and  in the Caucasus 90 days. N evertheless, the 
picture w as no t entirely black and the entire arm y w ould  have reached their m obilization de­
pots on the eighteenth day, and it w ould  have been ready to m ove in  five to six w eeks from  
the call-up.85 This w as now here near the Germ an arm y's m obilization speed w hich w as esti­
m ated  to be nine days. The A ustrian arm y's w as estim ated as being w ith in  tw elve days. The 
m ilitary attache in Vienna, however, w as sceptical about A ustria 's official m obilization esti­
m ates. In January 1872, he noted that the A ustrian army, officially, w ould  be able to raise
420,000 m en against Russia in four weeks. Tomau thought that these figures w ere exaggerat­
ed bu t, as he som ew hat ironically pointed out, 'I will not argue against them , since if I am  
w rong it w ill no t do us any good'.86
O bruchev was clearly frustrated by this developm ent -  even Turkey h ad  speeded u p  the m o­
bilization of its arm y -  and  it was im perative that the Russian arm y follow suit. But to speed 
u p  the arm y 's m obilization and concentration depended no t only on the War M inistry but,
82- RGIVA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 77-77v; Showalter, Dennis. Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technolo­
gy and the Unification of Germany. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975): 40-43; Wawro, Geoffrey. The 
Austro-Prussian War. Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996): 12. The military attache in Vienna was asked about the Russian mobilization and reported 
to the War Minister that he replied to all inquires that he did not know anything about it, since at his lat­
est visit to Warsaw he had not seen any troops on the move. RGVIA, F. 401, op. 1, d. 85, f. 4. 'Tomau to 
the War Minister. 31 Jan./12 Feb. 1859'.
83- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 77.
84‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 78. The Caucasus Military District had - at least on paper - im­
proved the mobilization time from 111 days in 1867 to between 19 and 39 days in 1872.
85- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 80v.
86- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 615, f. 16v. 'F. F. Tomau to F. L Heyden, 16/18 Jan. 1872'.
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above all, on the general disposition of the State (gosudarstvennoe rasporiazhenie) and, m ore 
specifically, on railw ay construction.
Concentration, according to Obruchev, depended on tw o factors: arm y deploym ent (which 
units are stationed where) and  communications. Regarding the latter factor, Russia still had  
too few railw ay lines, in spite of recent developm ents. In European Russia, the railw ay net­
w ork am ounted to 14,000 versts (14,938 km) whereas G erm any h ad  22,000 versts (23,474 km) 
and  A ustria 11,306 versts (12,064 km). But the territory of the tw o neighbours w as m uch 
sm aller than the Russian territory. In term s of actual lines that could be used  to concentrate 
troops against Russia, G erm any had  ten lines to Russia's five. The R ussian lines w ere St. Pe­
tersburg-W arsaw, Moscow-Warsaw, Odessa-Belostok, Kursk-Vil'na, and  Riga-Kovno. A  coali­
tion of G erm any and A ustria had  sixteen lines, com pared to the six Russian lines against this 
coalition.87
In calculating the m obilization and concentration times, O bruchev reached the conclusion 
that it w ould  take the Russian arm y betw een 63 and 70 days to concentrate against A ustria, 
w hereas A ustria could concentrate its troops against Russia w ith in  30-33 days. A gainst Ger­
many, the situation was equally bleak. The concentration of the R ussian arm y w as estim ated 
at 54 to 58 days, com pared to the estim ated 20-23 days it w ould  take the G erm an arm y to con­
centrate against Russia. O bruchev pointed out that these calculations w ere only approxi­
m ates, bu t they clearly illustrated the lack of railways on the R ussian side. This p u t Russia in 
a position betw een tw o extremes. Either Russia could start the w ar w ith  an  insufficient arm y 
and risk being crushed alm ost before the w ar had  begun, or it w ould  have to retreat and  lose 
the border areas.88 In a worst-case scenario, A ustria could have taken a large p a rt of Poland 
and Volhynia w ith in  thirty  days from the m obilization announcem ent. W ithin the sam e time, 
Germ any could have occupied Poland and a large part of L ithuania.89 In addition, the Rus­
sian arm y w ould  no t only have to fight the attacking enem y b u t also the 'entire rebellious 
populations of Poland and  Volhynia'. In an appendix to the strategic report, there is an  analy­
sis of reliable/unreliable elements of the Polish population. O ut of a total population  of
6,200,000 people, four m illion peasants w ere considered to be largely loyal, T>ut in a critical 
m om ent, neither they, no r the Jews are to be trusted. The nobility, the m erchants, the clergy, 
and the petty  bourgeois (meshchane) will tu rn  against us'.90 Similarly, in  the strategic survey
87- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 82-82v.
88- Ibid., f. 84.
89‘ Ibid., ff.84v-86. Most likely, these figures were vastly overestimated, at least as far as Austria was 
concerned. Much later, in 1914, the Russian General Staff (and perhaps the Austrians themselves) be­
lieved that the Austrian army could reach far into Volhynia within twenty days of mobilization. In real­
ity, by 1914, they were still far south of the Russian border. Stone, Eastern Front: 34.
90- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 129.
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of the Caucasus, G rand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich anticipated a M uslim  insurrection against 
Russia in the case of a Turkish invasion of the area.91
The frontier areas w ere not at all prepared for a G erm an/A ustrian  offensive. In O bruchev 's 
m ind, the Western areas were extremely vulnerable. The area in  Poland around the Vistula 
was prepared for a direct attack from the West, bu t it could easily be circum vented from  the 
N orth  a n d /o r  the South. The north-w estern theatre - 'a  vital area of our territory from  a m ili­
tary po in t of view ' - was not secured by anything. The area contained the m ain roads to St. 
Petersburg and Moscow and, perhaps worse, gave the enem y access to the Vil'na and  Riga 
'centres of Polish and  Germ an aspirations'.92 Vil'na, for instance, w ith  four railw ay lines, d id  
not have any substantial fortifications. Furtherm ore, the m ain area (glavnaia baza) for the Rus­
sian army, betw een the rivers Dvina and Dnepr, was no t supported  by  any railways, w hich 
was particularly serious since 'today, all strategic considerations have to be based on rail­
ways'.
Russia was thus burdened  by slower mobilization and concentration times than  its neigh­
bours, due to lack of railways, long distances, and a problem  w ith the supply  of horses. In  ad­
dition, the fortresses in the western provinces did no t m eet the current dem ands of warfare. 
They required both  new  rifled guns and im proved fortifications in  view of the increased fire­
pow er of the rifled artillery. So w hat could be done?
Obruchev tried to be diplomatic. He pointed out that in every detail, the size of the arm y 
could not be p u t on the same level as one or other European power. The arm y had  to reflect 
the geographical and  political situation of the Empire and  its history, no t m erely the curren t 
political situation. Looking w estwards, he saw two pow ers -  bo u n d  by  com m on interests -  
being able to raise 60 divisions, supported  by  reserves, against Russia and  concluded:
Here is our main danger (opasnost'). In order to avert it we must be able to stand up 
against these neighbours with equal power.93
Consequently, the Russian arm y needed 720 battalions to protect the W estern borders, p lus 50 
to 60 battalions for Finland, St. Petersburg, and the Baltic Sea, as w ell as 50 to 60 battalions for 
the Black Sea area. In total, 820-840 infantry battalions needed to be deployed in European 
Russia.94 This figure can be com pared to the 516 infantry battalions that w ere stationed there 
at the time and the estim ated 728 battalions that A ustria-H ungary and  G erm any could m us­
ter against Russia. O bruchev w anted the battalions to be active, no t reserves.
9L RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 102v.
92‘ Ibid., f. 89. All of these references to fears of an internal uprising in the case of war were omitted by P. 
A. Zaionchkovskii.
93- Ibid., f. 91v.
94 Ibid., f. 92.
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The idea behind  O bruchev's calculations was to stand firmly in the West and  no t retreat from  
Poland. There was no  question of retreating into the depths of the Empire. Historically, the 
vastness of the territory and the distance of governm ental centres from  the borders had  u nde­
niably been an asset, b u t to pursue such a strategy in 1873 w ould  be m ortally  dangerous, 
O bruchev m aintained. To w ithdraw  from Poland, even for a short period, could lead to  the 
loss of the Poland. It w ould  look like a defeat and have im plications that w ere dangerous. In 
addition, the position on the Vistula was the only really good position from w hich to m ount 
an offensive. W ithin a m onth  (or 400 versts) lay the A ustrian, H ungarian  and  Prussian capi­
tals. To launch an offensive from the area around the Dvina and  D nepr w as deem ed im possi­
ble.95
It is significant to note that these strategic thoughts are coloured on the one h an d  b y  fears of 
foreign invasion and on the other by fears of internal uprising. The events of 1863 in  Poland 
were still vivid in the m em ory of the Russian strategic planners and  w ould rem ain there for a 
long time. The fear of an uprising in Poland explains both  the conviction th a t it w as im possi­
ble to retreat into the interior, and  the reluctance to undertake offensive action. In  the case of 
an offensive the Russian arm y in 1873 d id  no t have enough reserves to leave beh ind  to secure 
internal order.
A num ber of m easures were needed to secure a position in Poland. First and  forem ost, a large 
part of the Russian cavalry had  to be m oved to the border and  the infantry h ad  to be de­
ployed slightly behind the cavalry units. M ost of the Russian cavalry at that tim e w ere de­
ployed in the interior. O bruchev argued that it was vital for the cavalry to be redeployed on 
the border w hen w ar w as declared. Its task was to slow dow n the concentration of the enem y 
through raids against its railw ay lines and, a t the sam e time, to protect the m obilization of the 
Russian infantry.96 This notion deserves m erit since it clearly shows that the lessons of the 
Am erican Civil War w ere being absorbed into Russian strategic planning.
By 1880, alm ost half of the Russian cavalry (128 squadrons) h ad  been deployed on the Ger­
m an and the A ustrian borders.97 It should to be pointed out that all this w as a form  of com ­
pensation -  in  this case, for the lack of railways. In no w ay does it indicate th a t the Russian 
M ain Staff w as unaw are of the m ilitary usefulness of railways. W hen Bismarck com plained in 
1883 to the Russian governm ent about the massive build-up of cavalry units at the borders, 
Obruchev remarked:
Who can really compare the offensive power of cavalry with the offensive power of rail­
ways? Just as steam power exceeds horse power, in modem strategy, offensive force is
95- Ibid., f. 94.
96- Ibid., ff. 94-94v.
97 Fuller, Strategy and Power: 306.
152
determined not by the relative deployment of cavalry squadrons in peace, but by the 
quantity and speed of those trains which will bear the troops from all quarters to their 
points of concentration on the frontier with the declaration of mobilization.98
The w illingness of the Russian arm y to learn so readily from  the use of cavalry in the A m eri­
can Civil War has several explanations. Geographical sim ilarities betw een the countries u n ­
doubtedly  played  an im portant role. In com parison w ith other European countries, Russia 
had  an enorm ous territory, not unlike the territory w here the Am erican Civil W ar took place. 
A lthough the U nited States d id  not have the same difficulties w ith  m ilitarily pow erful neigh­
bours as d id  Russia, they had  similar terrain and long distances in common. A nother factor, 
already indicated, w as the lack of railways in Russia. In order to gain tim e for its ow n mobili­
zation, raids into enem y territory were seen as a necessity. A th ird  factor w as surely financial. 
Since cavalry w as expensive to m aintain and the traditional role of cavalry on the battlefield 
was threatened in view of increased firepower, the soil w as fertile to search for new  cavalry 
tasks. Raids and  reconnaissance provided a solution to the problem , and  the America»Civil 
War provided  am ple examples of a new  role for the cavalry.
One of the consequences of the decision to deploy more cavalry in the W estern borderlands, 
surely not accidental, w as that the num ber of Russian troops perm anently  stationed in these 
predom inantly  non-Russian areas increased. On the other hand , the redeploym ent of cavalry 
regim ents from their traditional areas in the interior of Russia, at least initially, proved de­
m oralizing for the cavalrymen. V. A. Sukhomlinov recognized that the m ove m ade sense 
from a strategic point of view, bu t still called it a 'dangerous experim ent'. He claim ed that it 
took years of training to repair the damages inflicted on the cavalry by the redeploym ent 
from the 'native Russian garrisons' to the West. M any officers sim ply re tire d ."
Nevertheless, Russia urgently needed more railways. O bruchev asked for the extension of 
new  railways by  proposing that eleven lines at a total length of 6,780 versts (7,234 km) be 
built over the next five years. Of these, 1,800 versts (1,921km) w ere strategic railways; that is, 
they connected garrisons and were built exclusively for m ilitary purposes. These w ere lines 
w ithin Poland in an area stretching from  the Vistula to the D vina-D nepr region. The rest were 
equally im portant for m ilitary purposes but could also be defended for economic reasons. 
Obruchev h ad  the following dem ands:
(1) From Lukov to Ivangorod: 60 versts (64 km); (2) N ovogeorgievsk to Ivangorod, eastw ard 
to Zamosts, including a branch from Piaska to  connect to the Kiev-Brest line: 395 versts (421 
km); (3) Ivangorod to Cracow w ith a branch to transport coal - 255 versts (272 km), and  (4)
98‘ Quoted in Fuller, Strategy and Power: 343.
"• Sukhomlinov, V. A. Vospominaniia. (Berlin: Russkoe universal’noe izdatel'stvo, 1924): 62-63. See also 
Kersnovskii, A. A. Istoriia russkoi armii. Reprint of 1933-38 ed. 4 vols. (Moscow: Golos, 1992-94): Vol. 3:
20.
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Lublin to the station Koliushka at the Lodz line: 235 versts (250 km). This w ould  im prove the 
com m unications in Poland, b u t im portant as they were, they d id  no t secure links w ith  the in­
terior of the Empire. In 1873, there were three such links leading from  W arsaw to Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and  Kiev. Just as the Germ an and  A ustrian lines w ere vulnerable to  attacks from  
the Russian side, Obruchev was aware that the Russian railw ay lines w ere equally vulnerable 
to enem y raids. H e w anted additional lines that w ould  secure the m ain area {glavnaia baza) for 
Russian concentration, between the Dvina and Dnepr. This included a line from  Briansk to 
Brest (over Gomel, M ozyr and Pinsk) w ith  tw o branches ending in G rodno and  Rovno, re­
spectively. Moreover, in order to secure the area behind the D vina and  Dnepr, a line betw een 
Vitebsk and Gomel w as necessary.100 In addition, the Baltic region w ould  need  a line from  
Pskov to Riga, and  a further connection w ith  the Rybinsk-Bologoe line. The Black Sea region 
needed a connection from Sevastopol to Kerch and  a line connecting Kherson, N ikolaev and 
Odessa. Likewise, the Eastern parts of the Empire needed som e 1,000 versts (1,067 km) from 
Kursk to Voronezh, from K har'kov to Borisoglebsk, and  from the station of N ikitovka to Tsar­
itsyn. All these lines, according to Obruchev, were of economic as well as strategic interests. 
The strategically vital lines betw een the Vistula and  the Dvina-Dnepr region m ight have little 
economic use, b u t almost 5,000 versts (5,335 km) coincided w ith  economic interests.101
These were no t unrealistic dem ands. Russia had  bu ilt 9,654 kilom etres of railw ay betw een 
1860 and 1870, and in the eight-year period 1870-78, the Russian railw ay netw ork  w as extend­
ed by another 10,597 kilometres.102 The crucial distinction here is 'strategic ' railw ay lines, 
w hich m eant that they were alm ost exclusively useful for m ilitary purposes. This m eant extra 
expenses for the m ilitary - that is, from  the State budget. The Russian railw ays du ring  the 
1850s and  1860s were largely built w ith  private, foreign capital. This policy w as highly  con­
tested by  D. A. M iliutin, w ho thought that railways were m uch too im portan t to be left to p ri­
vate capital. H e m aintained that the railw ay policy w as based on a faulty axiom; namely, that 
railways were always a burden  to the State budget. In M iliutin 's view, the exam ples of Prus­
sia and A ustria h ad  dem onstrated that railw ay construction w as a question of national securi­
ty that sim ply could not be m easured in  roubles and  copecks. H e strongly advocated 
governm ent funded  railway construction, against the policy that relied on foreign capital for 
the railways.103 Ever since 1866, the War M inistry had  been trying to gain su pport for a rail­
w ay program m e financed by  the State to im prove the connections to Poland. O bruchev had  
written a report in  1868,104 w hich w as subsequently discussed in the Com m ittee of M inisters 
on 11 February 1869. The Finance Minister, Reutem , trying to stabilize the rouble, w as a
10°- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 95v-96v.
101- Ibid., f. 97v.
102- Maksheev, F. Zheleznye dorogi v voennom otnoshenii. (St. Petersburg, 1890): 7. See also Geyer, Dietrich.
Der russische Imperialismus. Studien tiber den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswdrtiger Politik 1860 bis
1914. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977): 34-35.
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sworn enem y of anything that looked like increased expenses of the State budget, and  he ar­
gued successfully against the report.105 M uch to M iliutin 's annoyance, Chancellor A. M. Gor­
chakov sided w ith the Finance Minister.106 However, tw o lines to the War M inister's liking 
were approved -  from Brest-Litovsk to Smolensk and to Kiev. In spite of this, the m ilitary fac­
tor in the developm ent of the railway networks d id  not p lay  the im portan t role the W ar M in­
istry w ould have liked.
This w as very different from Prussia, where the cost of railw ay netw orks w as low er due, for 
instance, to m uch shorter distances. In Prussia, a state-ow ned railw ay system  w as being de­
veloped alongside a privately-owned one. Initially, the P russian  state-ow ned railw ay policy 
was run  at the insistence of the M inister of Commerce. In 1860, about half of Prussia 's rail­
ways were state ow ned.107 Throughout the 1860s, the General Staff un d er General M oltke 
w ould develop both  the strategic thinking about railways and  its im plem entation. As a m em ­
ber of the State Committee for Railways, he had  a direct influence over railw ay construc­
tion.108
In Russia, the policy of state-built railways w as not introduced until the 1880s, w hich led  to  a 
more rap id  developm ent of the railways in Poland that O bruchev had  called for.109 The rail­
way netw ork in the Vistula region w est of Belostok, Brest and  Rovno w as extended by  3,000 
kilometres during  a tw enty year period (1882-1902), 1,800 kilom etres of w hich w ere 'strategic ' 
railways. Furtherm ore, in European Russia, the railway netw ork  grew  from  16,293 kilom etres 
in 1873 to 48,724 km  in 1903.110 D uring the thirty years betw een 1870 an d  1900, the total Rus­
sian railway netw ork grew from 11,243 km  to 56,976 km. This can be com pared w ith  Ger­
many, w here the netw ork grew from 19,575 to 51,391 km  during  the sam e period  and the 
growth of A ustria 's netw ork from 9,589 km  to 36,883 km.
103. Throughout the 1870s, the State sold much of the state-owned railways to private interests. At the 
same time, the government often held a majority of the private railways' debentures. See Solov'eva, A. 
M. Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975): 95-118; Gatrell, Pe­
ter. The Tsarist Economy 1850-1917. (London: B.T.Batsford, 1986): 150-154,214-216; Westwood, J. N. A His­
tory of Russian Railways. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964): 48-50,74-78. See also Brooks, E. Willis. 'The 
Military and Industrialization in Reform Russia: the Railroad Connection'. Manuscript 1987:3-4.
104- RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 416. 'Material About the Construction of Railways'. 1868.
105, In spite of finding railway construction one of the 'most important future tasks' for the Russian gov­
ernment in 1866, Reutem noted that the financial situation had made it all but impossible for the State to 
build railway networks. Reutem, Die Finanzielle Sanierung: 55-56.
106- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16. ed. khr. 2, ff. 106-106v.
107' Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: 38.
108- Creveld, Martin van. Technology and War from 2000 B.C. to the Present. (London: Brassey’s, 1991): 158- 
159.
109' Solov'eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport: 153-63; Westwood, A History of Russian Railways: 75-76; Za- 
ionchkovskii, A. M. Podgotovka: 57-58.
110' Zaionchkovskii, A. M. Podgotovka: 58-59.
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Finally, the fortresses needed attention. N ew  and stronger fortifications w ere needed  in  view 
of the pow er of rifled artillery fire and since they served as supply  depots - increasingly im­
portan t in the West if Obruchev's plan of deploying large num bers of troops w ere to be real­
ized. O bruchev dem anded a program m e for the im provem ent of fortresses at a total cost of 
forty million roubles.111 According to one historian, this project w as one of the last efforts to 
fully solve the issue of engineering preparations in Russia. A lthough no t fully com pleted, the 
program m e rem ained unaltered until 1908, w hen the cost to im prove totalled eight billion 
roubles.112 O ther countries also p u t m oney into fortresses. For instance, after 1871, Germ any 
decided to im prove its fortresses at the cost of 96 million thalers.113
The first priority  of the fortress program m e w as to secure the defence of the N em an. There­
fore, it concentrated on the fortresses at Grodno, D ubno and  Kovno -  no t in  Poland itself. Ko- 
vno was seen as a key point in the defence of Russia.114 M iliutin w ould  later state that it was 
the Franco-Prussian War that had  turned the War M inistry 's attention to the need for a for­
tress program m e. The outcome of the w ar had  dem onstrated  the vulnerability of R ussia's po ­
sition on the Vistula, w hich easily could be circum vented from  the no rth  o r the south. The 
realization of this danger was a direct consequence of the Franco-Prussian War.115
In Poland, three fortresses were of special importance: N ovogeorgievsk (where the Vistula 
and Bug-Nareev meet, just north  of Warsaw), W arsaw and  Ivangorod (where the Vistula and 
the Veprzha meet, south of Warsaw). There were tw o options to  consider: either to fortify the 
city of W arsaw or to build  a bridgehead in central Poland betw een the rivers Bug-Nareev and 
Vistula. Obruchev dism issed the first option, on the grounds that the population  w ould  be 
very hostile to  any large-scale fortification construction w ith in  the city. This hostility  could 
also affect the m orale of the soldiers in a negative way. In addition, it w ould  be very  expen­
sive to fortify Warsaw. Instead, Obruchev opted to m ake some im provem ents to the citadel in 
Warsaw but, above all, to make im provem ents at Ivangorod and N ovogeorgievsk a t a cost of 
twelve m illion roubles.This w ould not, of course, protect W arsaw or preven t the enem y from 
entering, b u t Obruchev thought that the very threat of bom bardm ent w ould  force the popu la­
tion to rem ain submissive. Clearly, there was no  doubt at the Russian War M inistry that the 
Poles w ould rebel at the first possible chance. A  case in point: before 1876, artillery am m uni­
tion was never distributed to the units bu t w as kept in the fortress of N ovogeorgievsk so that 
it w ould not fall into Polish hands in case of an uprising.116
111 • This compares to the three million roubles that the War Ministry currently was spending on fortress­
es per year. RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr 3, f. 158. See also Shil'der, N. Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben: ego 
zhizn' i deiateVnost'. (St. Petersburg: V. A. Tikhanov, 1885-86): Vol. 2: 702.
112' Zaionchkovskii, A.M. Podgotovka, 51.
113, Shil'der, Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben: Vol. 2: 585.
m - RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 98-98v.
115- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 158.
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Such was the p lan  of 1873. It stressed the need to be on the defensive -  at least initially. A  stra­
tegic retreat, like that m ade in  1812, w as categorically excluded. The only serious considera­
tion of offensive action was m ade w ith  regard to the Caucasus in  the case of a Turkish 
intervention.117 The idea that a fu ture w ar in Europe w ould take place on Polish territo ry  re­
m ained in the subsequent, m ore elaborated w ar plans of 1880,1883,1887, and  1890. All of 
these plans also provided for initial cavalry raids to thw art G erm an and  A ustrian  concentra­
tion at the borders of Russia. However, from 1887 onw ards, Russian plans started  to provide 
options for offensive action against Austria even at the beginning of the war.118 One of the 
reasons for this was that the Russian w ar planners became convinced that the very lack of 
roads and railways, the size of the country, its poverty - that is, all of the things th a t w ere seen 
in 1873 to w ork against Russia - could w ork to its advantage. In 1880, O bruchev th ough t that 
all of these things were a factor ''about w hich an invading arm y m ust think tw ice an d  w hich 
could possibly free m ore of our troops for an offensive7.119 The w ar p lan  of 1880 contained 
features for both  a defensive and defensive/offensive campaign. W hich w ould  be chosen de­
pended  on w hat action the Germ ans took. Am azing as it m ay seem, the M ain Staff p lanned  
that the Russian m obilization w ould  switch from defensive to  offensive action if it tu rn ed  out 
that the Germ ans d id  not m ount as large attack as had  been assum ed.120In 1873, the Russian 
War M inistry d id  no t seriously consider the possibilities of launching an offensive from  the 
west.
The threat to Russia in 1873 w as perceived as coming from the west, above all, from  G erm any 
and Austria-Hungary. Britain w as m entioned only in passing as a threat to Russian interests 
in the south. W hy Obruchev saw  Germ any and Austria as the m ain threat ra ther th an  Britain 
can to some degree be explained by  the recent unification of G erm any by Prussia. The P rus­
sian arm y seem ed invincible on the battlefield, and a great m ilitary pow er h ad  sudden ly  ap ­
peared at the Russian borders. But this was only part of the explanation. O bruchev 's view  in 
the w ar plan w as that Russia w as m ore or less isolated at the European arena and, therefore, 
had  to  cope alone. He felt that neither Germ any nor A ustria were to be trusted  in the d ip lo­
matic sphere. The offensive-defensive alliance betw een A ustria and Prussia, signed on  20 
April 1854 (N. S.), was cited by  O bruchev as a dem onstration of the unreliability of these 
pow ers.121 As far as the Crim ean War was concerned, it had  been lost due to geographical 
and political factors. He w as visibly w orried over the fact that Prussia and  Russia h ad  re­
m ained friends w hen Prussia, at the sam e time, in every political question, evidently  'pu r-
116- Fuller, Strategy and Power: 279-280.
117- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 92.
118- Zaionchkovskii, A.M. Podgotovka: 45; Fuller, Strategy and Power: 348-350.
119- Fuller, Strategy and Power: 347.
12°- Ibid., 348-49.
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sued  only G erm an in terests'.122 If O bruchev felt that Russia and  G erm any w ere destined to 
be  enem ies out of a deeper concern for the growing pow er of nationalism  a n d /o r  because of 
cultura l factors, he w as n o t explicit about it.123 His concern for w hat he perceived as Russian 
in ternational isolation and  the w eight he gave to political factors, nevertheless, suggests a 
deeper anxiety. The problem  for O bruchev was this: should the friendly relationship w ith  
G erm any break dow n, Russia w ould have had  no obvious coalition partners. O n the other 
h and , as an  officer in  the w ar planning section of an arm y in the m idst of fundam ental re­
form , he w as m ore likely to present a worst-case scenario in order to get at least som e of the 
m oney needed  for the reforms, w hether or no t he actually anticipated that a w ar against Ger­
m any  w as inevitable. Furtherm ore, since Alexander II w as very  pro-Prussian, it is unlikely 
that O bruchev w ould  or could have expressed deeper concerns tow ards Prussia in an  official 
docum ent such as the w ar plan .124 However, in Russian society as a whole, according to  Mil- 
iutin , feeling w as on the French side.125
Was the w ar going to be long or short? The w ar plan implicitly assum ed that G erm any w ould  
aim  for a short cam paign, that is, a decisive battle. A lthough G erm any h ad  no  plans for a  w ar 
against Russia at the time, the assum ption that Germ any w as planning for a short cam paign 
w as sound. This w ould  later be established in the Schlieffen Plan, the basic p lan  for G erm any 
in the First World War.126 To p lan  for a protracted w ar including a retreat far in to  the Russian 
territory  w as hardly  realistic in  view  of Prussia's rapid victories in  1866 (seven weeks) and  
1870 (Sedan after only a m onth  w here N apoleon m  and an arm y of m ore than  80,000 m en  had  
surrendered).127 From the Russian perspective, this scenario w ould  have led to a certain de-
121, RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 91-91 v. The agreement had a secret article authorizing Austria 
to use force against Russia if Russia did not vacate the Danubian Principalities. See Goldfrank, David. 
The Origins of the Crimean War. (London and New York: Longman, 1994): 265; and Taylor, A. J. P. The 
Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954): 62-665,69. Taylor 
wrote that the treaty seemed 'a complete Austrian victory'.
122‘ RGIVA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 93. The quotes referring to Obruchev's political concerns were 
not mentioned by Zaionchkovskii.
123‘ He was consistently unclear when he spoke of 'common German interests'. Sometimes he referred 
to Prussia, sometimes to Germany and/or the Hapsburg monarchy. RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 99, f. 
51; F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 91 v.
124‘ Obruchev's counterpart in Prussia, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, was more explicit. In 1871, 
he claimed that the friendly relationship between the two powers could not be expected to last forever: 
'Between the peoples themselves there is an unmistakable and mutual antipathy of faith and customs, 
and their material interests are in opposition.' Whether or not Obruchev confided such thoughts in let­
ter or other personal documents is unfortunately likely to remain a secret. Although it is clear that some 
of the documents from Obruchev's archive are kept in RGVIA in Moscow, they have not been assem­
bled into a single fond. To what extent his personal papers have survived is unclear. Moltke was quoted 
in Craig, The Politics: 275-276. For the search of Obruchev's archive, see Airapetov, O.R. 'K sud’be arkhi- 
va N.N. Obrucheva', Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta ser. 8 (2,1993): 80.
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126‘ Beyrau, Militar und Gesellschaft: 278; Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen: 127. Interesting essays on the war 
plans before the 1914 can be found in Kennedy, Paul, ed. The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914. Re­
print ofl979 ed. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). For Russia, see Fuller, Strategy and Power: 433-451; Ker- 
snovskii, Istoriia: Vol. 3:155-169; Lieven, Dominic. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. (London: 
Macmillan, 1983): 101-118.
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feat. The Soviet historian, P. A. Zaionchkovskii, has criticized O bruchev for failing to take into 
account the possibility of an enem y attack deep into the Empire.128 The po in t is that such a 
p lan  w ould  have been essentially unrealistic. The Prussians w ould  certainly have found an 
offensive cam paign deep into the Russian Empire impossible. W hether they could have been 
forced by  Russia to m ake such a m ove remains, perhaps, even m ore questionable. O bruchev 
calculated, correctly as it tu rned  out, w ith this. He thought that the European pow ers in  the 
West h ad  learned from history and w ould  not try to fight a protracted cam paign far into the 
R ussian Empire. To p lan  for a retreat, therefore, w ould  not have m ade any sense.129
It has been  alleged that the General Staffs exclusively planned for short w ars ever since the 
P russian  victories in 1866 and  1870-71 and  d id  not count on the possibility of a long war. This 
m ay be true at a later stage but, in 1873, the Russian arm y clearly d id  no t exclude the possibil­
ity  of a long campaign, if only they could m eet the initial G erm an assault. Fuller has argued 
eloquently  for the rationale of planning for a short war.130 He believes that the Russians d id  
n o t p lan  to fight a protracted w ar from  Poland because it was 'no  solution'. The po in t I 
should  like to stress is that it was no  solution, because it was no option. F ighting from  Poland, 
the Russians had  to p lan  for a short war. In view of the perceived threat from  the Polish p o p ­
ulation, the Russian w ar planners found it impossible to tu rn  Poland into an  arm ed  bastion. 
However, the issue of the length of a future w ar w as sim ply passed over in silence. The belief 
in and  the planning for short wars d id  not seem to have penetrated  the Russian strategic 
planning. A t the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, m any expected a protracted  war. L. L. 
Zeddeler, one of the Russian observers, quoted A lexander II to that effect. Chancellor Gorcha­
kov w as also quoted as saying:
It will require terrifying sacrifices and a lot of time for one of the sides to lose. If a thirty-
year war is not plausible, a seven-year war is possible.131
A nother poin t needs to be made. The plan  of 1873 touches only im plicitly on the fact that in­
dustrial capacity had  become a determ ining factor of a country 's m ilitary strength. The 
A m erican Civil War had  h inted  at this, bu t it w as scarcely noticed at the time - an d  then  only 
in  passing.132 However, as indicated above, the Russian War M inistry w as no t com pletely u n ­
aw are of the im portance of a strong industrial capacity. Indicative of this are the facts that 
O bruchev thought that the developm ent of the arm y reflected society's developm ent as a 
whole, and  that he saw industrial advancem ent as a reflection of the needs of society. In add i­
127' Howard, Franco-Prussian War: 222.
128‘ Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 288.
129‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 93v.
i30. puiier  ^strategy and Power: 299-300.
131‘ Zeddeler, L.L. 'Dvadtsat' piat' let nazad. Otryvok iz dnevnika', Istoricheskii vestnik (4,1896): 115.
132- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, ed. khr. 2, f. 116. 'Memoirs'. 1865.
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tion, D. A. M iliutin clearly appreciated the im portance of having a dom estic arm am ents in ­
du stry  and  state-funded railways for the army.133 There were several problem s connected to 
these issues in Russia -  primarily, economic ones. There w as no t m uch room  for m aneouvre. 
The strategic railways, expensive to build  and to m aintain, w ould largely be useless in  peace­
time. The situation w as similar in the arm am ents industry. Since Russia could no t count on 
exporting  arm s or m unitions, there w as no real incentive for the State to invest in  factories 
th a t w ould  only produce during wartim e. This is also why, in the bu ild-up  to  the First W orld 
War, the War M inistry used to buy  shells from existing m anufacturers, ra ther than  to build  
factories.134
Thus, the Russian War M inistry d id  not fail to observe -  and  to som e degree to act on  -  the 
consequences of recent m ilitary developm ents. The willingness to respond to change, how ev­
er, w as only shared by a small num ber of officers in the M ain Staff and  w as no t 'com m on 
know ledge ' am ong the other m inisters or even am ong m any other high-ranking officers. 
M oreover, the inability of the War M inister to persuade his m inisterial colleagues to  support 
the necessary changes was a ham pering factor in the War M inistry 's efforts to ad ap t to 
change.
5.5 Between Victory and Defeat - the Strategic Conference
The agenda of the conference w as formed around the strategic plan. The agenda contained 
fourteen questions, no t all of which were discussed during  the five meetings. The m ost im ­
p ortan t issues concerned the military budget, the railway program m e and  the program m e for 
fortresses, outlined in  Obruchev's strategic plan, and m easures to  speed u p  m obilization and  
concentration. In addition, the creation of a reserve force and the future organization of infan­
try, cavalry, field artillery, and engineering troops were issues on the agenda.135
The idea of organizing a special conference to consider m ilitary affairs had  first been  raised 
on the train  from  Tsarskoe Selo to the Crim ea in  the sum m er of 1872.136 D. A. M iliutin sug­
gested to Alexander II that there should be a conference w ith  selected m ilitary an d  State offi­
cials to discuss the fundam ental questions facing the Russian arm y in view  of a un ited  
Germany. M iliutin w anted to secure political support for a w ar p lan  and  the reorganization of
1 3 3 . Bradley, Joseph. Guns for the Tsar: Technology Transfer and Small Arms Industry. (DeKalb, Illinois: 
Northern Illinios University Press, 1990): 119,165,178. Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 'D. A. Miliutin. Bi- 
ograficheskii ocherk': 31; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 140-80.
134‘ Stone, Eastern Front: 145-46.
135‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 3-5. 'Questions to be Discussed'. A copy of the agenda is located 
in RGB OR, F. 169, k. 37, ed. khr. 7, ff. 29-31.
136- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 86-86v.
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the arm ed  forces. He also hoped  that the conference w ould  solve the financial question since 
O bruchev 's plan  required a lot of additional funds. Priorities needed  to be m ade and  the basic 
question  at the conference w as fundamental. W hat was the m ost im portant fu ture task of the 
R ussian army? The initial date for the conference was set for Decem ber 1872 b u t the W ar M in­
istry 's  preparatory  w ork  was not finished until the beginning of 1873.
A total of thirty-three participants gathered, including A lexander II and  D. A. M iliutin, five 
g rand  dukes, Field M arshals Bariatinskii and Berg, Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov, Finance 
M inister M. Kh. R eutem , State Controller A. A. Abaza, the m em bers of the State Council (S. G. 
Stroganov, K. V. Chevkin, P. N. Ignat'ev), M inister of the Im perial C ourt (A. V. A dlerberg), the 
N aval M inister (N. K. Krabbe), Director of the Third D epartm ent (P. A. Shuvalov), the M inis­
ter of Com m unications (A. P. Bobrinskii), and the Interior M inister (A. E. Timashev). In add i­
tion, five M ilitary District com m anders and eight War M inistry representatives participated. 
M ajor-General N. N. O bruchev and Colonel F. K. Velichko (later Acting Secretary in  the M obi­
lization Com mittee) w ere the conference secretaries.
The only objections to Obruchev's plan were raised by G rand D uke Nikolai N ikolaevich the 
Elder.137 In a prin ted  statem ent that was circulated am ong the participants, he  strongly o p ­
posed  the defensive nature of the plan. To prepare for defence w ould  be to give u p  all that 
R ussia's 'traditional policy ' had  accomplished. Poland should be the m ain area from w hich 
an  offensive should be launched, and this required m ore troops in  the w estern  regions. It 
w ould  be necessary to  keep these troops on a constant w ar footing.138 Cost w as n o t an  issue 
for h im  -  to launch an  offensive and fight the future w ar on enem y territory w ould  clearly im ­
press W estern Europe and that was the policy Russia had  to pursue.139 Besides, the arm y w as 
going to cost m oney anyw ay; therefore, it was better to spend  it on preparations for an  offen­
sive. Ironically, like Obruchev, he came to the conclusion that it w as m ost urgen t to strengthen 
the flanks and, therefore, to im prove the fortresses at Kovno, Grodno, Dubno, and  Bender. All 
sim ilarities ended there. Obruchev w anted to strengthen the flanks for tw o reasons: he feared 
that the enem y w ould  circum vent the defence line either from  the no rth  or the south, an d  he 
thought it im possible for political reasons to make Poland into an  arm ed bastion. The G rand 
Duke, however, saw  the flanks an the area from which troops could be concentrated to launch 
offensives into enem y territory. He only advocated new  railw ay lines to connect Kovno and  
G rodno and  a branch connecting Briansk-Gomel w ith Brest-Litovsk. H e d id  n o t su p p o rt the
137- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, ff. 96-115. 'Memorandum by Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder'.
138- The Russian army had four different levels in which to keep an infantry unit: cadre, normal or 
peacetime, reinforced, and war. It referred to the degree to which the unit had fulfilled its numbers with 
regard to the estimated fighting-strength in the case of war. To illustrate: if the full fighting-strength was 
100 per cent, the reinforced unit was 75 per cent, the normal was 55 per cent and the cadre unit was 35 
per cent.
139- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, ff. 97v-98,114-115.
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W ar M inistry 's proposal to build  railways in  the Polish salien t,140 w hich m ay appear curious, 
b u t he w as clearly convinced that it w as a waste of m oney to invest anything in Poland. Even 
the im provem ent of fortresses in Poland was a defensive m easure. H e proposed that 75 per 
cent of all Russian infantry divisions be deployed in the w estern regions -  the area betw een 
the rivers Volkhov and D nepr -  in preparation for a m assive offensive.141
In com parison w ith Obruchev's strategic plan, the response from  the G rand D uke seems su­
perficial and  full of rhetorical statements. There are no  thoughts about how  the troops w ere to 
be supp lied  in  its offensive or, for that m atter, anything that indicates a deeper strategic un ­
derstanding. The offensive was necessary for the Russian Em pire to defend its place in  histo­
ry  and  im press Western Europe. It m ight be unfair to com pare the tw o docum ents since the 
strategic p lan  had  taken years to develop w hereas Nikolai N ikolaevich presum ably d id  no t 
have m ore than a few weeks to form ulate his response. Nevertheless, the lack of d ep th  in  his 
statem ent is telling. After all, he was Inspector-General of the Cavalry and  Engineering forces 
as w ell as com m ander of the St. Petersburg M ilitary District. The G rand D uke d id  no t w in 
over the conference for his ideas and  O bruchev's w ar p lan  was accepted w ithou t further ado. 
In its final statem ent, the conference underlined the im portance for Russia, in view  of Europe­
an developm ents, 'to  continue to pursue a pacific policy'.142 W ith regard to the troops in Po­
land, the conference strongly objected to keeping these units on a constant w ar footing: 'It 
w ould  be very inconvenient not only for economic reasons but,prim arily, for political rea­
sons.'143
The adoption of the p lan  could certainly be described as a success for the War Ministry. H ow ­
ever, it w as a short-lived accomplishment. A lthough the conference had  accepted the basic 
reasoning of the plan, it was not prepared to supply any large financial m eans to im plem ent 
it. Already, on the first day of the conference, the Finance M inister R eutem 's proposal was 
adopted. This stipulated a military budget for 1874 of 174,290,000 roubles, then to be fixed at
179,290,000 roubles a year for the next three-year period.144 In addition, it w as decided that 
the Finance Ministry, together w ith the State Controller and  the War Ministry, should  w ork 
out a p lan  how  to m ake the m ilitary budget 'norm al'; that is, to  stop add ing  to the b udget 
each year. The basic principle laid dow n by the conference w as that no m easures could be u n ­
dertaken by  the War M inistry or the M ain Staff, unless prior approval - either by the Tsar or
140- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, f. 98v.
14L Ibid., f. lOOv.
142- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 6. 'Resolution of the Secret Conference Under the Personal 
Chairmanship of the Emperor 28 February, 3,8,10,31 March 1873'. The entire resolution: ff. 1-2,6-26. 
The pages in the file have not been sorted in the correct order. A copy of the resolution is located in RGB 
OR, F. 169, k. 37, ed. khr. 7, ff. 1-26.
143- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 11.
144- Ibid., f. 6v.
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the W ar M inister respectively - had  been obtained.145O bruchev w ould  later po in t out w ith 
obvious disappointm ent:
...in 1873, the danger of a restored Germany was recognized and a few measures were 
taken, but modestly. Three, five millions a year were assigned, when others spent tens 
of thousands of millions.146
The result m ay seem  curious, to say the least. Indicative is the decision to accept the railw ay 
program m e discussed at the second meeting. N o objections w ere raised and  the War M inis­
try 's  proposal w as approved. K onstantin Nikolaevich w rote soberly in his diary:
The railways were discussed but it did not result in anything because everything de­
pends on finances.147
W ithout objections or reservations, the conference accepted the fortress program m e. It even 
m ade a po in t of stressing that it w as im portant to strengthen Poland and  the flanks, D ubno 
and  Dnepr-Bug areas. N o works were to be m ade on the fortresses in the city of Warsaw, ex­
cept for the citadel.148 Since insufficient funds were allocated for these projects, the construc­
tion of new  railway lines had  to be postponed for the time being and  the program m e for 
fortresses w as delayed by fifteen years.149
Im portantly, the conference acknowledged the significance of build ing barracks for the troops 
in the w estern  areas to speed up  mobilization. But no t only that; the conference noted  that 
barracks w ere needed to im prove the education of the troops.150 The lack of room s had  ham ­
pered  the efforts to teach the soldiers to read and w rite, and  h ad  dim inished the opportunities 
for officers to study independently.151 In 1870,56 to 58 per cent of the troops lived in  barracks 
and  the rest lived w ith the local population.152 The lack of barracks w ould  delay the deploy­
m ent of cavalry units in Poland and it w as only after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 that 
the m oney for the construction of barracks was provided.
In a sense, the results of the conference seem like a paradox. Decisions were taken that appear 
to nullify each other. In fact, neither the economic no r the strategic issues w ere m uch debated
145‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, f. 121. 'Report from D. A. Miliutin to Alexander II'. 1 May 1873; 
Ibid., f. 212v-213. 'Instructions to the Main Staff by D. A. Miliutin'. 28 May 1873.
146- Obruchev, N. N. 'Pervaia nasha zabota - stoiat’ tverdo v Evrope', Istochnik (6,1994): 4-21. The pub­
lished report was originally written in 1885 with the title 'Fundamental Historical Questions for Russia, 
Our Preparedness and Ability to Solve Them'.
147- GARF, F. 722, op. 1, d. 104, f. 22.3 March 1873. 'Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Diary'.
148- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401. op. 2, d. 100, ff. 7v-9.
149- Beyrau, Militar und Gesellschaft: 304.
150- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 2v, 10-11.
151, See, for instance, Bobrovskii, P. 'Vzgliad na gramotnost' i uchbnye komandy (ili polkovye shkoly) v 
nashei armii', Voennyi sbomik (3,1871): 41-87.
152‘ Beyrau, Militar und Gesellschaft: 333. Numbers quoted from the yearly report from the War Ministry 
1 Jan 1870. See also Voenno-istoricheskaia kommissia glavnogo shtaba. Opisanie russko-turetskoi voiny 
1877-78 gg. na Balkanskompoluostrove. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1901-06): Vol. I.: 156.
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at all. It w as another issue that brought the conference to the boiling point - the organization 
of the army. This conflict nearly cost Miliutin his post and  it jeopardized all of the arm y re­
form s since 1862. It is clear that the controversy w as no t prim arily  about arm y organization or 
increasing the com bat preparedness of the Russian arm y - no t even about lessons learned 
from  Prussia, although both  sides in the conflict vigorously claim ed to be learning from  Prus­
sia. By suggesting that a conference should be held, D. A. M iliutin had  hoped  to w in  w ide po ­
litical support for the developm ent of the arm ed forces. H e w anted  his m inisterial colleagues 
to su pport the army, just as they had, so it was perceived, in  Prussia. Instead, the very oppo­
site happened.
As soon as the first m eeting began on 28 February, Field M arshal Bariatinskii launched a  se­
vere attack on the War M inister and his reforms. H is com plaints echoed a longing for tim es 
past and  reflected a frontline soldier's contem pt of bureaucracy. A dm inistrators had  taken 
over the War Ministry, the operational element in  the arm y had  been set aside and, if the War 
M inistry needed  anything, it w as not more m oney b u t to cut all excessive expenses.153 G rand 
D uke K onstantin Nikolaevich noted afterwards in  his diary:
It began with an improper attack, full of bad faith, by Bariatinskii on the War Minister 
and all of his work. Even the Tsar did not like this very much, and he told him a few un­
pleasant truths.154
A lexander II noted tersely in his diary: 'Bariatinskii against the War M inister/155 This w as 
only a sm all forew arning of the conflict that w ould  develop later. It w as skilfully d isen tan­
gled by  A lexander II w ho appointed a commission -  headed  by  Bariatinskii -  to look in to 
possible cuts in the m ilitary budget. 'Let those w ho talk about possible cuts show  w hat cuts 
they have in  m ind ', he told the War Minister. M iliutin w as irritated but, in  the end, the com ­
m ission's investigations came to nothing.156
The serious conflict opened u p  on 10 March, the fourth  day  of the conference. General-A dju­
tan t A leksandr Petrovich Khrushchev157 proposed the creation of four arm ies in  the Europe­
an parts of Russia. Altogether, the Russian army should consist of five armies; four in  the 
European part, and one in the Caucasus. A lexander II, G rand Dukes M ikhail N ikolaevich and 
N ikolai Nikolaevich, and  Field M arshal F. F. Berg clearly supported  the proposal.158 In add i­
tion, Berg w ent so far as to plainly suggest that m ost of the m ilitary districts be abolished, and 
that only four large districts be kept. This w ould no t only increase the fighting preparedness,
153- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 115-115v.
154- GARF, F. 722, op. 1, d. 108, f. 20.28 Feb. 1873. 'Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Diary'.
155- Quoted in Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy, 295.
156- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, f. 119v. For a detailed description of the Commission's futile efforts, 
see Beyrau, Militar und Gesellschaft: 295-299.
157- Aleksandr Petrovich Khrushchev (1806-1875), Governor-General in Western Siberia and Command­
er of the West-Siberian Military District between the years 1866-1874.
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b u t also save m oney in peacetime.159A t the same time, G rand D uke M ikhail N ikolaevich p ro­
posed  to  create six regim ents in an infantry division;160 that is, to ad d  an extra brigade to each 
division. This w as also supported  by  the Tsar and the G rand Dukes. According to  M iliutin, he 
first heard  about G rand Duke M ikhail Nikolaevich's p lan  tw o days before the conference 
started161 although it seems that these ideas had  been boiling since the end of 1870.162
The proposal to create five armies w as a frontal attack on M iliutin and  his reform s. It th reat­
ened to overhaul the m ilitary district system  or, at best, reduce the m ilitary districts to purely  
adm inistrative entities. The m ilitary districts had  been created in 1864 and  enjoyed considera­
ble autonom y, no t only in such m atters as supply  and m ilitary logistics b u t also in threat anal­
ysis and  even defence planning.163 The arm y com m anders, directly subordinated to the Tsar 
and  thereby circum venting the War Ministry, w ould have become responsible for all opera­
tional planning. The proposal w as also a call for the resurrection of the pre-C rim ean m ilitary 
organization in Russia. A separate General Staff had  existed in Russia in 1815-36 and  m ost of 
the troops were not subordinated to the War Ministry. The four corps (the G uards Corps, the 
G renadier Corps, the Caucasus and  Orenburg Corps, and  the Active A rm y in  the west) w ere 
directly subordinate to the Tsar. In addition, the Artillery and  Engineering A dm inistrations 
w ere independent from  M inisterial control. The Corps com m anders and  the Directors of the 
separate Adm inistrations, often G rand Dukes, were all-powerful and  ran  things the w ay they 
though t best. It w as a highly centralized and rigid m ilitary system  that had  proven  itself to be 
a failure in the C rim ean War.
O n the other hand, the creation of five armies in peacetime, in fact, w ould  have greatly im ­
proved  the m ilitary preparedness in the case of war. Provided that the arm ies w ere properly  
trained and led by  com petent officers, the operational flexibility of sending arm ies w here 
needed  w ould  have im proved. Furtherm ore, the plan w ould  have given the fu tu re field com­
m anders m ore time to  think about strategy and  operative planning, instead of having  to 
w orry  about adm inistrative issues. However, the plan w as no t realistic. First, it w ould  have 
been very expensive to realize. Second, it w ould  have been difficult to im plem ent the plan,
158‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102. General Khrushchev's proposal, ff. 216-219. F. F. Berg's comments 
on Obruchev's strategic plan and the proposal to create four large armies, ff. 182-198. See also Nikolai 
Nikolaevich's support for Khrushchev's proposal, ff. 112-113 and Alexander II's notes, ff. 54-55. These 
were also written down by A. V. Adlerberg, ff. 56-63. Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich's comments on 
the criticism of the proposal, ff. 202-209. Miliutin's account of the event can be found in RGB OR, F. 169, 
k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 122-122v; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 299.
159- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, f. 197.
160‘ An infantry division consisted of four regiments.
16L RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, f. 114.
162- At the end of 1870, the heir apparent, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (together with General 1.1. Vo- 
rontsov-Dashkov and Field Marshal Bariatinskii) seems to have had far-reaching plans to oppose the 
War Ministry's plans of reorganizing the army. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 293.
163- Miller, Forrestt A. Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia. (Charlotte, North Carolina: Vander­
bilt University Press, 1968): 52-55,69; Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 84-85,95.
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since the arm y already suffered from a  severe lack of educated officers. A part from  the gener­
als needed  in the proposed arm y organization, the proposal w ould  have required  approxi­
m ately thirty-three per cent m ore regim ental com m anders.
M iliutin called it 'a  m onstrous project7 and w as so upset that he threatened to resign. H e re­
pea ted  this threat in  a conversation w ith  A lexander II on 11 March. A lexander II tried  to calm 
h im  b y  explaining that it w as not a question of changing the m ilitary adm inistration (voennoe 
upm vlenie) b u t the organization of the troops. M iliutin was baffled:
But is not the organization of the troops an essential part of the military organization 
(voennoe ustroistvo) of the State. The organization of the troops is linked to all the in­
structions of the War Ministry in every detail. Especially now, when we are about to in­
troduce a new law on military service...164
In a m em orandum  w ritten  23 M arch 1873 w ith  the help of Obruchev, M iliutin ou tlined his 
m ain  objections. First, the proposal to create four armies in  European Russia w o u ld  create a 
rigid system  that d id  no t allow for any flexibility. Since it was impossible to p red ic t w hich co­
alition the Russian arm y w ould  meet, such an organization m ight lead to a situation  w here 
there w ere no troops w here needed, and there m ight be a surplus of inactive troops in sec­
ondary  areas.165 Second, M iliutin feared four arm y com m anders, pointing  ou t th a t they were 
only needed  in war. H e argued that, on the one hand, they m ight use their pow ers and  conse­
quently  underm ine or go against the governm ental pow er by creating their ow n pow er cen­
tres; on the other hand , they m ight be com m anders-in-chief by nam e only, in  w hich case they 
w ere no t needed anyway. H e used the example of Prussia to poin t out that the arm y in  P rus­
sia w as one and und iv ided  and, that it d id  not have separate armies and  arm y com m anders 
in  peacetim e. To create large armies w ould  p u t an end to the m ilitary district system  which, in 
tu rn , w ould  prolong mobilization:
In Prussia, from the moment that mobilization has been announced, it is forbidden to 
make any extra demands and all correspondence from lower instances to higher is pro­
hibited. All must know what they have to do and prepare for this in peacetime. Such an 
administration can only be achieved through many years of work. To think one can 
achieve this without a proper division of districts is as unthinkable as creating an army 
without companies, battalions, regiments, or divisions.166
It is interesting to note that it w as M iliutin, and  not prim arily his adversaries, w ho m ost ea­
gerly used  the Prussian example to argue his case. M iliutin had  tried  to create a system  that 
w ould  adap t m ore readily to the requirem ents of contem porary warfare. W ith the grow ing 
size of wartim e armies, m ilitary adm inistration and  organization had  grow n m ore complex. 
This required centralization. The troops needed weapons and supplies on an  unprecedented  
scale. The railways had  drastically shortened m obilization times which, as w e have seen, re-
164- RGB OR, E 169, k. 16. ed. khr. 4, f. 124v.
165- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, f. 131. 'Memorandum, 23 March 1873'.
166- Ibid., f. 139.
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quired that plans w ere m ade in  peacetime for the m obilization and  the concentration of the 
troops. A t the same time, flexibility w as needed to allow each district to be responsible for the 
battle preparedness of the units w ithin its jurisdiction. This required  decentralization. The 
balance w as delicate, b u t M iliutin believed he had  achieved it through a unified War M inistry 
and  the m ilitary districts. W hat M iliutin feared m ost w as a re tu rn  to the old, pre-C rim ean, 
arm y organization.167 U nity w ould  be lost. Looking at Prussian efficiency in  m ilitary  organi­
zation and  the requirem ents of contem porary warfare, M iliutin concluded th a t a step back­
w ards w ould  be detrim ental to Russia's ability to defend herself.
In the end, A lexander II stood by  his War Minister. A  com prom ise w as reached at a  m eeting 
w ith  the Tsar, the heir apparent, G rand Dukes M ikhail and Nikolai N ikolaevich and  M iliutin. 
The m eeting took place separate from the conference on 24 M arch and it w as decided no t to 
m ake any substantial changes to the arm y organization.168 C orps w ere to be created, b u t in 
the w est only, and the corps com m anders were to be subordinate to the com m ander of the 
m ilitary district. In peacetim e, the corps should consist of two or three infantry divisions w ith  
cavalry and  artillery. In w artim e, an  engineering brigade should  be added. It w as also decid­
ed  to create brigade staffs in each division, w hich m eant that each division w as d iv ided  into 
tw o brigades. M iliutin d id  no t hurry  to create corps, and  w hen the w ar against Turkey broke 
ou t in 1877, the corps staffs had  not yet been created, w hereas the brigade staffs w ere in 
place.169
The last m eeting of the conference w as uneventful. A  num ber of decisions w ere taken  w ith  re­
gard to arm y organization. Briefly, they can be sum m arized as follows. The basic though t be­
h ind  these changes w as to have a peacetime organization that w ould  resem ble (as far as 
possible) the w artim e organization. All units required in  w ar should already have been creat­
ed  in peacetime, and in  the case of mobilization, it w ould  only be necessary to b ring  u p  these 
units to w artim e strength.
A n infantry regim ent w ould consist of four battalions instead of three, and  each battalion 
w hould  consist of four com panies instead of five. One sharp-shooting battalion w as assigned 
to each infantry division deployed in a border area, whereas the other divisions w ere rein­
forced w ith  infantry units. It w as decided to keep all the divisions in European R ussia at 
peacetim e strength; that is, about half of its projected fighting-strength in  wartim e. However, 
the conference d id  no t completely rule out the possibility of bringing some of the divisions in 
the w est to an reinforced fighting-strength -  75 per cent of projected strength in w ar -  b u t this 
w ould  have to be decided w ith  regard to the financial situation.170 It is significant to  note that
167- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 102, f. 137v.
168- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 4, ff. 130v-131.
169' Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 335.
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the increase in the num ber of battalions in the peacetime organization no t only led to a h igher 
degree of m ilitary preparedness bu t also an increased preparedness in the case of in ternal d is­
turbances. Furtherm ore, a new  dislocation plan  in 1874 provided  for the redeploym ent of 
m ost of the infantry and  the artillery to the western m ilitary districts behind  the Narev, Bug 
and  Vistula rivers.171
A n interesting consequence of the changes in cavalry divisions w as that the integration of the 
Cossack units into the ordinary cavalry organization. It w as decided to break u p  the existing 
cavalry divisions (which consisted of six regiments) by  splitting them  in  tw o and  add ing  a 
regim ent of Don Cossacks to each division. In European Russia, sixteen cavalry divisions 
w ith  four regim ents in  each w ould  be created: one dragoon regim ent, one uhlan , one hussar, 
and  one Don Cossack regiment. The Don Cossack regim ents that w ere no t included  in the 
cavalry division w ere to be given to the infantry divisions. The cavalry division should  -  like 
the infantry division -  consist of two brigades.172 The Cossacks had  previously been organ­
ized in ten  separate hosts (voiska) and several lesser formations. A lthough som e of the sepa­
rate hosts had  a p roud  historical legacy, the Cossacks during  the nineteenth  century  w ere 
often called upon  to strengthen the regular cavalry.173 There had  been rum ours in the m id- 
1860s th a t M iliutin had  w anted  to abolish the special privileges of the cossacks, w hich is no t 
unlikely considering M iliutin 's attitudes to hereditary privileges in general, b u t no th ing  had  
been done.174 In any case, the solution of 1873 m eant that the Cossacks were tied  m ore closely 
to the regular cavalry organization.
The Franco-Prussian War had  dem onstrated the need to strengthen the field artillery so th a t it 
w as proportionate to the infantry.175 It was decided to strengthen the foot artillery by  an  in­
crease of approxim ately one third; that is, from six batteries in a brigade to eight. This deci­
sion w as never im plem ented.176 Furtherm ore, two m ounted  batteries w ere ad d ed  to each 
cavalry division. This included the m ounted Don Cossacks.177 Finally, it was decided to reor­
170‘ RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 14-15. The size of the infantry division was kept at the same lev­
el; that is, in peacetime 6,000 men, in wartime 10,800 men.
171‘ Fuller, Strategy and Power: 305. In 1877, a new law regulating the use of the army by the civilian au­
thorities was approved. Fuller, William C., Jr. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914. (Prince­
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985): 77-81.
17Z RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 17v, 22,18v, 23.
173- Menning, Bayonets: 28. For a brief summary on the impact of the introduction of conscription on the 
cossacks, see McNeal, Robert.H. 'The Reform of Cossack Military Service in the Reign of Alexander IT, 
in War and Society in East Central Europe, edited by B. K. Kiraly and G. E. Rothenberg. (New York: Brook­
lyn College Press, 1979): 409-421. For a general introduction to the Cossack forces in the Russian army, 
see also McNeal, Robert H. Tsar and Cossack 1855-1914. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).
174- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 15, ed. khr. 3, ff. 138v-139. 'Memoirs'. 1866.
175- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, f. 157.
176‘ Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 1881-1903. (Moscow: 
Mysl’, 1973): 137.
177• RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 19v, 24,20v, 25,21 v, 22v.
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ganize the five engineering brigades. A railway battalion and a military telegraph park were 
added to each brigade 178Again, according to Miliutin, it was the Franco-Prussian War that 
had dem onstrated to the Russian War Ministry the need to improve military telegraph parks 
and the organization of perm anent railway battalions.179 These had not had a perm anent or­
ganization before 1873.
In the end, several im portant decisions had been made and the War M inistry could continue 
with the reform of the Russian army. Basically, the war plan had been approved. Yet, the orig­
inal purpose of the conference, to gain broad political support for the w ar plan and the army 
reforms, had not been achieved. Miliutin, who had proposed the conference in the first place, 
was so disappointed and angry that he started to keep a diary at the age of 57. Earlier, he had 
not found the time to do so.180
The most serious setback was not the conflict about the arm y organization -  spectacular as it 
was -  bu t the reluctance of the conference to procure money for the strategic plan. It may 
seem curious that the War Ministry was unable to put more weight behind its dem ands, con­
sidering the fact that all but three participants in the conference were officers themselves. Mil­
iutin was clearly not only incapable 4* influencfliis ministerial colleagues, bu t his own 
officers as well.181
Moreover, considering the strategic purpose of the conference, the silence from the Foreign 
Ministry is conspicuous. The Foreign Minister took part in the conference bu t left no impact 
on the outcome. N o m em oranda and no reactions can be found in spite of the fact that Miliu­
tin had kept Gorchakov informed by sending a steady stream of papers to the Foreign Minis­
ter in the weeks leading up to the conference.182 This silence m ay have had a simple 
explanation. Pro-Prussian sentiments still prevailed in the Russian court and even the rela­
tionship with Austria-Hungary was improving. In view of this, the worst-case-scenario of the 
war plan m ust have seemed exaggerated. The German-Austrian alliance was still in the fu­
ture and the worst-case scenario did not become reality until forty years later. In the Spring of 
1873, the preparations for the League of the Three Emperors were being finalized. It is
178- RGVIA, 1873, F. 401, op. 2, d. 100, ff. 22v, 17,23v.
179- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 3, ff. 159v-160.
180- Miliutin, Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina: Vol. 1: 77.
181 • For a similar observation w ith regard to the debate about railway construction, see Brooks, 'The 
Military and Industrialization': 12.
182- Fuller, Strategy and Power: 302; Rich, 'The Tsar's Colonels': Ch. 4.
183- Taylor, The Struggle: 219-221; Rich, 'The Tsar's Colonels': Ch 4; Kiniapina, N. S. Vneshniaia politika 
Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka. (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1974): 133. On 6 Mayl873, Field M arshal Berg 
and the Chief of the Great General Staff, Helm uth von Moltke signed a m utual defence agreem ent in 
Berlin between Russia and Germany. Bismarck refused to endorse it and the agreement remained a foot­
note in the relationship between the two countries. It was never invoked later.
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clear, however, that M iliutin d id  no t achieve his aim  of w holehearted political su p p o rt beh ind  
the army.184
The conflict that h ad  culm inated at the conference d id  not originate prim arily  in  m ilitary is­
sues. It w as a m ixture of personal and  political rivalries. D. A. M iliutin w as seen by  his politi­
cal enemies as a liberal, 'a  red '. M iliutin continued to argue for reform s even w hen m ost of 
the other m inisters had  stopped doing so at the end of the 1860s. The H ead of the Third De­
partm ent, G eneral-Adjutant Petr A ndreevich Shuvalov, was a driv ing  force in  the opposition 
against the War M inister.185 D uring the second half of the 1860s, the conflict w ith  Bariatinskii 
h ad  developed into a real press war. In the pages of Russkii m ir and  even the financial new s­
paper, Birzhevye vedomosti, the sharp pen  of M ajor-General Rostislav A ndreevich Fadeev, 
w orking as an aide to Bariatinskii, relentlessly criticized the War M inister an d  the reform s.186 
The opposition invoked the Prussian m ilitary organization as an  exam ple to follow, pressed 
for the creation of an  independent General Staff, and accused M iliutin of having  created a 
French m ilitary system. In reality, the conflict w as not about a French or a Prussian  m ilitary 
system. A part from  the personal differences betw een Bariatinskii an d  M iliutin, and  the larger 
political issues of the policy of reform, the conflict also had  som e ideological overtures. It w as 
about privileges and  a resurrection of the pre-1856 Russian arm y organization. Bariatinskii, 
the G rand Dukes, and  Shuvalov represented privilege and birth, w hereas M iliutin represent­
ed  m erit and competence, the 'self-m ade' man.
M iliutin w as pessim istic about the outcome of the conference. H e wrote:
The dark clouds had passed by; apparently things had become quiet. The latest reports 
[by me] to the Tsar have reassured me. But I have no illusions. I know that the intrigue 
against me does not go away easily; after a defeat [the enemies] do not lay down their 
weapons, but will await new opportunities to renew the attacks, openly and behind the 
scenes.187
His negative assessm ent of the conference cannot be entirely justified. In fact, w hen M iliutin 
had  retired in 1881, the new  Tsar, A lexander HI, appointed a com m ission to exam ine the or-
184‘ Miliutin's influence in foreign policy, however, increased after the diplomatic failure a the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878. Zaionchkovskii, 'D. A. Miliutin. Biograficheskii ocherk': 50-54; Hammer, Michel. D.A. 
'Miljutin et la Politique Exterieure de la Russie', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 23 (3-4,1982): 333- 
349.
185‘ See the revealing memoirs by the German Ambassador to St. Petersburgl876-1892. He knew Russia 
well. Between 1865 and 1869, he was the Prussian military plenipotentiary at the Russian court. Sch- 
weinitz, Hans Lothar von. Denkwurdigkeiten des Botschafters H.L. von Schweinitz. 2 vols. (Berlin: Verlag 
vom Reimar Hobbing, 1927): vol. 2: 385. See also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy: 289-293. P. A. Shuval­
ov (1827-1889) was Head of the Third Department in 1866-1873. He was ambassador in London 1874- 
1878. RBS: Vol. 23:487-489.
186- See also his book Vooruzhennye sily Rossii. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia (Katkov i Ko), 
1868). Several of Fadeev's writings can also be found in Alexander Ill's fond in GARF. F. 677, op. 1, d. 
335,349,355 are particularly revealing for Fadeev's criticism. For biographical details on Fadeev, see 
RBS: Vol. 21: 6-10.
187‘ Miliutin, Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina: Vol. I: 78.
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ganization of the army.188 U nder the chairm anship of A djutant-G eneral Pavel Evstaf'evich 
Kotsebue, M em ber of the State Council and, in 1874-1880, Governor-G eneral in  Warsaw, the 
com m ission set to w ork on a complete revision of M iliutin 's system. One of the questions ex­
plicitly dealt w ith the introduction of an independent General Staff. This w as the m om ent 
M iliutin 's enemies had  been waiting for, yet nothing came of it. The m ilitary district system  
rem ained unaltered, the War M inistry's hegem ony survived. It w as only w ith  the reform s in 
1903 and  1905 that the M ain Staff received a m ore independent status from  the W ar M inis­
try.189 The m ilitary system  of M iliutin rem ained in  power. W hy w as this? One h istorian  ex­
plained it by  acknow ledging that A lexander III was no t stup id  and  w hat h ad  seem ed righ t in 
1873 appeared unw ise eight years later.190 M ore to the point, it supports the argum ent that 
the conflict in 1873, to a substantial degree, w as a personal conflict. In 1881, Bariatinskii w as 
dead  and  Shuvalov had  lost his influence. In addition, change required m oney and  the finan­
cial situation in Russia after the w ar against Turkey in 1877-78 d id  not provide room  for any 
expensive reform s.191
One of the constant com plaints of the opposition against the War M inistry w as that the 'm ar­
tial sp irit' w as m issing in the arm y of M iliutin, w ho was seen sim ply as an  adm inistrator -  
regardless of the fact that he had actually been w ounded in battle during  his early  career in 
the Caucasus.192 To some degree, the opposition w as right. The reform s to create a unified 
W ar M inistry and the m ilitary district system  w ere adm inistrative reform s, w ith  the aim  to 
im prove the over-centralized m ilitary adm inistration of the C rim ean War. In  addition, the 
fears that future field com m anders w ould be ham pered by  adm inistrative w ork  were no t en ­
tirely unfounded.193
Nevertheless, at a time w hen peacetim e planning and strategic thinking had  becom e increas­
ingly im portant, the Russian arm y d id  not rem ain idle. A strategic p lanning  section h ad  been 
created in the M ain Staff and  strategic plans w ere beginning to be d raw n up. The General
188‘ Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie: 92-102.
189 ■ This reform did not last very long. In 1909, the Main Directorate of the General Staff, created in 1905, 
was brought back under the control of the War Ministry. Kavtaradze, A. 'Iz istorii russkogo general’no- 
go shtaba', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (12,1971): 75-80; Kavtaradze, A. 'Iz istorii russkogo general’nogo 
shtaba', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (7,1972): 87-92; Menning, Bayonets: 97-98,218.
190- Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie: 102.
191, The war preparations and the actual war between 1876 and 1877 had cost 888 million roubles. For 
more on the problems with military expenditure at the end of the century, see Fuller, Civil-Military: 47- 
74.
192- RGB OR, F. 169, k. 27, ed. khr. 9. 'Memorandum by Field Marshal Bariatinskii to Alexander II re­
garding the new Regulation on the Field Administration of Troops'. Bariatinskii's memorandum is also 
located in RGVIA, F. 1, op. 1, d. 28904, ff. 122-134. See also Kersnovskii, Istoriia, Vol. 2:183,194-195, and 
Zaionckovskii, Voennye reformy: 131-133.
193- For instance, before the outbreak of the war in 1914, the field-staffs were occupied with administra­
tive tasks rather than operational planning. Rostunov, 1.1. Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1976): 114-115.
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Staff officer behind  his desk had  m ade his entry into the Russian arm y -  a lthough clearly no t 
as com pletely as h ad  his Prussian counterpart. General M oltke h ad  realized the im portance of 
w ar p lanning and  it was in this field that the Prussian G eneral Staff had  laid the foundations 
for the Prussian victories in  1866 and  1870-71. Thus, General M oltke could spend  the m obili­
zation in 1866 lying on a sofa reading a book -  all preparations h ad  already been  m ade.194 
Preparations for w ar were no longer m ade m ainly on the parade ground, b u t behind  a staff 
office desk.
194- van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1985): 115.
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Conclusions
This thesis set out to examine the Russian arm y's im pressions of foreign w ars and  the arm y's 
attitude tow ards change betw een 1859 and  1871. Several areas of the arm y have been studied 
as w ell as several aspects of change: m ilitary technology, m ilitary science (including educa­
tion, tactics and strategy), the creation of mass armies, and  the grow ing strength  of national­
ism. The picture that has em erged is one of an arm y that w as open and  w illing to learn from 
foreign wars. It is no t an unam biguous picture, bu t the Russian arm y in the 1860s and  1870s 
w as largely involved in trying to keep up  w ith the changing times. By exam ining foreign 
w ars, this thesis has explored new  ground which has uncovered a new  vantage po in t for 
analysis of the Russian army.
The interpretation of the Russian arm y in this thesis differs from  som e of the traditional inter­
pretations. An attem pt has been m ade to analyse not only w hat the Russian officers said, bu t 
w hy they drew  the conclusions they did. 'W hen all is said and done', the h istorian  Marc 
Bloch once wrote, 'a  single word, "understanding," is the beacon light of our stud ies'.1
Returning to the beginning of this thesis, w ould it be correct to say that 'Sedan w as alm ost a 
second Sevastopol' for the Russian army? If we m ean that Sedan w as perceived as a w arning, 
that it highlighted the need for change, the answ er m ust be no. The Russian War Ministry, led 
by  D. A. M iliutin, had  been aware of the need for change long before the fatal defeat of the 
French arm y on 1 September 1870. Sedan, however, m ade it possible for the War M inister to 
push  the reform of universal m ilitary service m ore forcefully.
1- Bloch, Marc. The Historian's Craft. Translated by Putnam, Peter. Reprint of 1954 ed. (Manchester: Man­
chester University Press, 1992): 118.
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The m ilitary attaches played an im portant role in providing the War M inistry w ith  inform a­
tion about the latest m ilitary developm ents. They were also perm itted  to report about politi­
cal issues. Does this m ean they influenced m ilitary or foreign policy? A lthough the tim e 
fram e in this thesis is limited, little has been found to support such  a claim. N one of the m ili­
tary  attaches reached influential positions from w here they could have influenced policy. The 
role of the m ilitary plenipotentiary at the Prussian court was special, b u t no th ing  suggests 
that he w as involved in policy m aking, at least not during this period. Rather, it w ould  seem  
his role w as to execute policy, that is, m ake sure that the good relations betw een the sover­
eigns w ere upheld.
One of the underly ing them es in this thesis has been the question of how  a large and h ierar­
chical organization like an  arm y learns lessons. There is no doubt that m any of the R ussian 
generals w anted  to learn, w hich was one of the lessons the Russians learned from  foreign 
w ars.2 Adm ittedly, the circle was not large, bu t am ong them  w ere som e of the m ost influen­
tial officers. N evertheless, it is im portant to stress that the Team ing process' varied  considera­
b ly  in im m ediacy and  depth. For instance, in the field of strategy and  the developm ent of a 
w ar p lan , the im pact of foreign wars w as alm ost immediate. The Russian arm y d id  no t react 
to this developm ent m ore slowly than any other European army, w ith the exception of Ger­
many. In 1870, the Russian w ar planners d id  not point to any specific direction as the area 
w here the threat of attack could be perceived as greatest. Three years later, the p lanning  con­
centrated on a possible attack from the West. Lessons were also learned in  technology, rail­
ways, and  rifled w eapons, and the arm y responded as quickly as the economic realities 
w ould  allow.
However, tactical lessons never seem to be learned easily. In other w ords, there is a lim it to 
w hat can be learned from  study alone. It took alm ost ten years for the tactical lessons regard­
ing cavalry to penetrate m ilitary planning. A nother case in  po int is that the Russian arm y w as 
n o t equipped w ith entrenchm ent tools until after the experience of the 1877-78 w ar against 
Turkey. Yet, long before that war, m ilitary writers had  pointed ou t the grow ing im portance of 
such tools in  warfare. In tactics, at least in certain aspects, one's ow n arm y 's m istakes seem ed 
to be the m ost pow erful teacher. In large, rigid, organizations it could, perhaps, no t be o ther­
wise. Introducing innovations, w hether technical or tactical, always entails a risk and the con­
sequences of innovations are not always easy to predict. With hindsight, it is clear that the 
A ustrian arm y drew  the w rong conclusions from their defeat against France in 1859. In  1870, 
the French arm y leadership had  high hopes for the mitrailleuse w hich came to alm ost no th ing  
since practically nobody had  been trained to use it. Furtherm ore, to change the regulations,
2‘ One military writer criticized the French army for having been too self-centred and proud to find it 
worthwhile to study the armies of foreign countries. 'Zametki s teatra voiny', Russkii invalid, 13 Sept. 
1870.
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w hich m ay seem  innocent enough, is a large undertaking which is no t easy to correct. There­
fore, one can expect large organizations, such as armies, to show a certain reluctance to jum p 
too quickly in adjusting to change. On the other hand, a general 'w ait and  see ' attitude is p o ­
tentially dangerous and can lead to devastating results. M uch of the problem  consists of find­
ing a balance in peacetim e betw een adjusting to change and determ ining the actual value of 
innovations for war. There is a balance to be found here betw een novelty  and  tradition, be­
tw een jum ping  to conclusions and resisting change. The fact that its position is directly linked 
to the security of the state does not m ake the arm y's situation an easy one. It is hard ly  surpris­
ing, therefore, that armies are often described as being m arked by  a curious contradiction. O n 
the one hand, they are oriented tow ard the present and future in  their efforts to m ake the 
m ost rational use of their m eans and to be as efficient as possible. O n the o ther hand , they are 
often perceived by  both  insiders and outsiders as the carriers of traditional values, represent­
ed  by ceremonies that should be preserved at all cost.3
This balancing act betw een future and past became m ore evident in  times of rap id  change. In 
tactics, a balance needed to be found betw een technology and  morale. The pre-1914 European 
arm ies w ere later accused of disregarding technology and of pu tting  too m uch em phasis on 
morale. The experience of the First World War certainly seems to vindicate this criticism. N ev­
ertheless, m any w ars of the tw entieth century have dem onstrated tim e an d  tim e again that an  
arm y w ith  poor m orale, regardless of its technological superiority, does n o t w in  w ars. In the 
w ar plan, balance needed to be found betw een a perceived threat and  the resources available 
to m eet that threat. The first step, to identify an enemy, was obviously essential, b u t by  no 
m eans obvious. In 1859, the French arm y seemed invincible. Eleven years later, it w as the 
Prussian army. Predicting the future is a hazardous task; thus the w ar p lanner m ust in terpret 
the im m ediate situation and draw  up  the plans accordingly. This is w hat O bruchev d id  in 
1873. In reality, the threat from Germ any a n d /o r  A ustria-H ungary w as practically non-exist­
ent at the time, b u t Obruchev saw a united Germ any and, a t the sam e time, a very  w eak de­
fence line in  Poland. Therefore, the arm y had  to stand firm  in the West. Surely m oney -  or 
ra ther the lack of it -  p layed a role w hen Obruchev w rote the plan. The program m es in  the 
p lan  w ould  have cost a lot of money. By dram atizing the possible threat, O bruchev could 
quite possibly count on receiving at least some of the m oney needed.
The Russian arm y's attitude tow ards change and learning from foreign w ars cannot be sepa­
rated  entirely from  the domestic political debate, including the larger issue of the reform s of 
the Russian empire. This is, perhaps, no t surprising in  the case of in troducing conscription -  
considering the social im plications of this reform -  b u t other areas of the m ilitary debate
3- Keep, John L.H. Power and the People: Essays on Russian History. (Boulder: East European Monographs, 
1995): 189.
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w ere also affected by  politics, for example, m ilitary technology and  the debate on the change 
of the infantry regulations. In the m idst of the War M inistry 's rearm ing the infantry  w ith  a 
new  rifle, the Berdan, the heir apparent launched his ow n version of a rifle, the Baranov. H is 
actions were directed against D. A. M iliutin, and  Alexander II finally intervened in  1869 and 
told A leksandr Aleksandrovich to stop interfering and that he ham pered  the rearm am ent 
from  running its course.4 Moreover, it w as surely no coincidence that bo th  L. L. Z eddeler and  
L. M. Baikov (who were involved in the debate w ith M. I. D ragom irov in the beginning of the 
1870s) had  close ties w ith G rand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Even the slightest attack on 
D ragom irov could not, at that time, be interpreted as anything b u t an  attack - directly or ind i­
rectly - on M iliutin. As we have seen, D ragom irov's and  M iliutin 's views on Suvorov entailed 
m ore than  the issue of infantry tactics. They touched on the role of the arm y w ith  im plications 
for the contem porary m ilitary reforms. W ithout exaggerating these aspects, they seem  to ind i­
cate that to learn lessons from  foreign w ars was no t a value-free, im partial process. Does this 
suggest that the Russian arm y w as different in its attitudes tow ard  change com pared to other 
armies? Judging from the A ustrian arm y's 1866-68 debates about in troducing new  rifles, is­
sues surrounding technology were generally not value-free since they challenged the estab­
lished m ilitary order.5 In France, the adoption of the chassepot w as delayed for three years 
because of the War M inister's objections.6 In Prussia, the King refused to change the infantry 
regulations in favour of breaking u p  the closed colum n and  continued to stress the im por­
tance of m orale and  discipline.7 The question is w hether or not attitudes tow ards change can 
be com pletely detached from political and  other issues. Evidence suggests not, b u t the Rus­
sian arm y does no t seem to have been very different from  other arm ies in this respect.
One of the m ost controversial issues w as that of copying the Prussian General Staff system , 
w here the General Staff was independent of the War Ministry. One m ay ask w hy  M iliutin was 
so reluctant to copy this system  since it evidently w orked so well in  Prussia. The standard  an­
sw er has been that M iliutin feared losing power, and that he defended the alm ighty W ar M in­
istry in  order to defend his ow n position. Such an explanation -  though  perhaps n o t entirely 
w rong -  seems too simplistic. It can be argued that M iliutin m ay have been correct in  d read ­
ing a separate power-base of the arm y given its already strong tendencies to factionalism. 
M iliutin once suggested that a General Staff system  of the Prussian m odel w ould  n o t have
4‘ Rosskiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Otdel rukopisi, (RGB OR) F. 169, k. 16, ed. khr. 2, ff. 95-96. 
'Memoirs'. 1868-1869; Zaionchkovskii, P. A. Voennye reformy 1860-70 godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izda- 
tel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952): 174-176.
5' Wheatcroft, Andrew. 'Technology and the Military Mind: Austria 1866-1914', in War, Economy and the 
Military Mind, edited by G. Best and A. Wheatcroft. (London: Croom Helm, 1976): 45-57.
6’ Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 1870-1871. Reprint of 1961 
ed. (London: Routledge, 1991): 35.
7- Showalter, Dennis. Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany. (Hamden, 
Conn.: Archon Books, 1975): 216.
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w orked in Russia, since there w as no  General M oltke in the Russian army.8 This m ay be true 
b u t it is beside the point, since the structure, the m ilitary educational system, an d  the prevail­
ing intellectual climate w ould have m ade it very difficult for any individual to acquire the 
equivalent position of M oltke in the Russian arm y and, for that matter, in  o ther arm ies as 
well.9
This question is linked to a larger issue at hand; the question of taking system s from  other 
countries as m odels in efforts to modernize, be it adm inistrative practices, legal systems, fi­
nancial institutions, or in  the m ilitary field. D uring the Great Reforms, the Russian govern­
m ent w as involved in a process of borrowing ideas from foreign sources. Officials w ere sent 
abroad to stu d y  a vast num ber of aspects of Western society, including the peasant question, 
as w ell as the judicial, banking and  military systems. Implicit in this process w as the w illing­
ness to learn and  borrow  ideas, b u t at the same time make adjustm ents to Russian conditions 
so that the reform s d id  no t sim ply m irror the Western models. N ot even the introduction of 
universal conscription w as copied from Prussia w ithout modifications to Russian conditions.
W hy are some cultures ready to im port entire systems straight from abroad, w hereas others 
are not? W ithout attem pting to address this complex question in  its entirety, the following 
points can be m ade. N o doubt, it has m uch to do w ith self-perception. Both D ragom irov and  
Leer w rote on this issue and m ake it clear that copying from abroad, w ithout m aking adap ta­
tions to Russia, w as seen as som ething negative and degrading.10 It w ould  have been per­
ceived as adm itting  that Russia d id  not have its destiny in its ow n hands. History, or rather 
the interpretation of history, m ight have played a role here. The m ilitary reform s by Paul I, 
w hich included copying from Prussia, w ere w idely seen am ong Russian officers as a failure 
and  an em barrassm ent. It is also true that there was a tradition of resentm ent in  Russian soci­
ety against Germ ans, due largely to their success and affluence in Russia.11 In addition, the is­
sue of im porting W estern m odels was linked to nationalism  and  a growing conviction that 
foreign practices could no t be copied. They w ould not w ork since a certain system  had  been 
developed for a specific nationality. H ow  did  the Russian officers perceive them selves in 
com parison to their Western colleagues? M iliutin captured m uch of the conflicting feelings 
w hen he re turned  from  his European journey in 1840-1841:
...my journey has opened my eyes to the real conditions in Russia compared to Western
Europe from a cultural perspective. Sincerely loving my country, I deeply lament how
8- Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA) 1872, E 401, op, 2, d. 71, f. 67v.
For the debate within the French army, see Mitchell, Allan. Victors and Vanquished: the German Influence 
on Army and Church in France after 1870. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984): 82-96.
10‘ Dragomirov, M. I. Ocherki Avstro-Prusskoi voiny v 1866 godu. (St. Petersburg: Departament Udelov, 
1867): 217-218; Leer, G. A. Publichnye lektsii o voine 1870 mezhdu Frantsiei i Germaniei do Sedana vkliuchi- 
tel'no. (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1871): 7-8.
11- Lieven, Dominic. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. (London: Macmillan, 1983): 25.
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much we have departed from the way, showed by Peter the Great.... I write these lines 
with sincere grief: from the depths of my soul I hope to live to see the day when all I 
have said would be an anachronism.12
The view  of the West as a source of inspiration ra ther than of im itation, and  balanced by  a 
firm  belief in  the Russian autocracy, w ould underp in  the m ilitary reform s and  the entire re­
form  period. In connection w ith this, it is im portant to stress that the view  of Russia as 'back­
w ard ' or 'exceptional' was only invoked by M iliutin and O bruchev w hen they though t it 
w ould  strengthen their case in the political debate. In general, it has been popu lar am ong 
W estern scholars to apply  the term  'backw ardness' to Russia. This - in m y view  - should  be 
avoided since it tends to m islead and  obscure m ore than it explains. Implicit in this view  is 
that Russia w as exceptional or at least fundam entally different in com parison w ith  other 
states. A lthough all nations differs from  each other in  some respects, this thesis has attem pted 
to dem onstrate that the Russian arm y's im pressions of foreign w ars w ere neither 'backw ard ' 
no r particularly  exceptional.
The Russian generals were affected by the growing strength of nationalism  in Europe. M iliu­
tin  held  up  Germ any as an example as a 'hom ogeneous' state. O bruchev poin ted  at the grow ­
ing strength of 'nationalism ' and  the need for Russia to respond to this developm ent. Both 
expressed fears about the 'unreliability ' of the population in the border areas. A t the sam e 
time, the arm y was seen as a unifying instrum ent in Russia, as som ething that society as a 
w hole should gather around. The Great Russians were seen as the leading nationality  of the 
Empire. In 1870, the au thor of the report 'Facts for the Evaluation of the A rm ed Forces of Rus­
sia', observed that Europe's view of Russia had  changed to  a more 'nationalistic' attitude. In 
fact, the view  of Russia from w ithin was also changing in  the sam e direction. Im plicitly here 
lie the seeds of the policy of Russification. It w ould be an  exaggeration to claim  that M iliutin 
and  O bruchev explicitly advocated a suppression of all nationalities of the Russian em pire, 
except for the Great Russians. Their version of Russification w as m ore inclusive than  exclu­
sive, a hope, or desire, that the arm y - universally conscripted - w ould  create a sense of equal 
citizens defending the Tsar and the Fatherland together. The law  of 1874 stipulated:
...the strength of the State does not depend exclusively on the number of its troops, but 
is based chiefly on the moral and intellectual qualities of the army, which can be fully 
developed only on condition that the defence of the country has become the common 
task of the people, and when all, without distinction of rank or class, unite in that sa­
cred cause.
12- Miliutin, D. A. Vospominaniia 1816-1843. Edited by L. G. Zakharova. New edition. Originally pub­
lished in Tomsk, 1919 and reprinted in Newtonville, 1979 ed. (Moscow: Rossiiskii arkhiv, 1997): 420.
13- Polnoe sobranie zakonov II: XLIX, 52982. (1 Jan. 1874).
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This m ay be perceived as naive perhaps, bu t it does not im ply political ignorance.The Rus­
sian generals w ere, in reality, signing up  to the policy of Russification largely as a result of 
their analyses of foreign wars.
One of the m ost im portant lessons that the Russian arm y learned from  Prussia - and  one that 
M iliutin w anted to copy - w as the lesson connected to the intellectual life of the arm y  The re­
forms in m ilitary education, the im provem ents of Russian m ilitary journalism , an d  the efforts 
m ade by  the War M inistry to help officers im prove them selves indicate a fundam ental b reak 
w ith  the traditional warrior-nobleman. It points towards an  em erging professional attitude 
am ong officers. The Russian arm y had  created a system  th a t placed the em phasis on talent 
w hen educating its officers. M iliutin had  no t only understood  the Prussian system , b u t 
shared the basic underly ing views held by such reformers such as Scham horst an d  
G neisenau.14 It is no t clear how  deeply this developm ent penetrated  the Russian officer 
corps; further research is needed in this area. Nevertheless, Fuller saw  the sam e tendencies of 
an em erging professional officer corps in  his study  on civil-m ilitary conflict at the tu rn  of the 
century. There is no  doubt that the developm ent started as early as the 1860s and  1870s, a re­
sult of the im pressions from  foreign wars.
Finally, w e m ust ask w hy this lesson, so central for the Russian arm y in  the 1860s an d  1870s, 
seems to  have been com pletely forgotten forty years later. M iliutin w anted  a m ore self-confi­
den t arm y w ith officers and soldiers united  in professionalism  and  patriotism . Yet, the gener­
al picture of the Russian arm y before 1914 is that of a deeply divided entity; the h igh  
com m and was p lagued  by personal rivalries, the officer corps w as characterized b y  narrow  
group interests, the cavalry despised the infantry, the artillery thought itself superior to bo th  
the infantry and the cavalry, the the G uards saw  them selves as the only true m ilitary elite.15 
In 1912, a senior general rem arked that 'there will never be unselfish cooperation am ongst the 
higher leaders as in  the G erm an arm y'.16 One m ay only speculate on the reasons for this or, 
indeed, w hether or not the sitation was very m uch different from  other armies. O ne po in t can 
be m ade: intellectual developm ent cannot be ordered by  decree. M ilitary establishm ents, like 
other state institutions, are characterized by a corporate identity  that develops over time, in­
fluenced by a num ber of factors. M iliutin pointed to the param ount role of the Tsar in  this re­
spect and even criticized A lexander II for not entirely appreciating the im portance of 
intellectual developm ent w ithin the army. U nder the reign of A lexander III, the counter-re- 
forms no  doubt h ad  a dam pening effect. More remarkable, perhaps, is no t that every lesson
14- See also W ildman, Allan K. The End of the Russian Imperial Army: the Old Army and the Soldier's Revolt 
(March-April 1917). (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980): 38-40.
15‘ Fuller, William C., Jr. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
U niversity Press, 1985): 22.
16- Lieven, Russia and the Origins: 112.
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was no t im plem ented, bu t that so m any lessons were learned and  observed and  that efforts 
were m ade to act on them. This, in fact, was one of the m ost im portan t consequences of the 
lessons learned from  foreign wars.
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Appendix 1
Russian military attaches 1859-1872
Adlerberg, N ikolai Vladimirovich (1819-1892) Count, General, M ilitary Plenipotentiary, Ber­
lin 1856-1866
Daller, A leksandr Aleksandrovich, Major-General, Berlin 1872-
Frankini, Viktor A ntonovich (1820-1892) Lieutenant-General, C onstantinople 1856-1871
Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Vasilii Pavlovich (1803-1873) Count, Lieutenant-General, M ilitary 
Plenipotentiary, Berlin 1866-1873
Gorlov, A leksandr Pavlovich (1830-1905) Lieutenant-General, W ashington 1868-1872 
Hasford, Vsevolod Gustavovich, Major-General, Turin and Florence 1862-1868 
Kutaisov, Pavel Ippolitovich, (1837-1911) Count, General, London 1872- 
Novitskii, N ikolai Aleksandrovich, Lieutenant-General, London 1861-71, Rome 1872- 
Richter, O tto Borisovich (1830-1908) General, Florence 1868-1871 
Shuvalov, Pavel Andreevich (1830-1908), Count, General, Paris 1859-1861 
Tomau, Fedor Fedorovich (1810-1890), Baron, Lieutenant-General, Vienna 1856-1873 
W ittgenstein, Petr L'vovich, Prince, Lieutenant-General, Paris 1861-1875 
Zelenyi, A leksandr Semenovich (1839-1913) General, Constantinople 1872-1879
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Other Officers Stationed Abroad1
Astaf'ev, Staff-Captain of Cavalry, Florence 1869-
Doppelm eier, Konstantin Gavrilovich (d. 1871) Captain, Berlin 1866-1871
Giuliani, V ladim ir Iulievich, Captain, Paris 1861-1870
Kleinmichel, M ikhail Petrovich (1848-1872) Count, Captain, Paris 1869-72*
Lanskoi, Pavel Petrovich, Lieutenant, Karlsruhe 1869- 
Leont'ev, D m itrii Nikolaevich, Captain, Paris 1870-72
M eshcherskii, Em m anuil Nikolaevich (1832-1877), Prince, C aptain  of Cavalry, Brussels 1859- 
Molostvov, V ladim ir Vladimirovich (1835-76) Colonel, Frankfurt 1866 and Vienna from  1869 
Nechaev, A ndrei Glebovich, Colonel Florence 1861- 
Trubetskoi, Prince, Lieutenant, The H ague 1869-
W eymam, Fedor Petrovich (1831-1913) General, Prussia 1863-1866, and  Poland (1864)*
L Based on RGVIA, 1869, F. 401, op. 2, d. 118, f. 8. 'List of Officers A ttached to  o u r Foreign Embassies In­
dependently  of the M ilitary Agents'. 9 Dec. 1869. Those m arked w ith  an  asterisk d id  no t appear on  the 
list.
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